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This thesis questions how Mindfulness and Mindlessness might be understood, 
measured and invoked in relation to Human-Computer Interactions. Current designs 
of user interfaces often follow a design trend, drawing upon familiar layout and icons 
across a broad range of applications. Designers often try to make the interface 
easier to understand, familiar, and more intuitive. While the use of technologies that 
are familiar holds qualities such as low cognitive demand and ease of use; they hold 
within them an intrinsic problem. The familiarity and repetition in design qualities 
produces habitual response and reduces the facilities of reflection and 
contemplation upon the interaction. Subsequently this inhibits the discovery of 
novel solutions to challenges and / or formation of novel goals for the user of a 
technology.  
The primary goal of this thesis is to provide (and justify) a definition of 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness that is suitable to be applied in the field of human-
computer interaction; and clearly describe these experiential and behavioural 
phenomena of the user of interactive technology. These definitions draw upon 
related fields to better inform understanding through the application of their 
methods of evaluation and advancements in understanding. Resultantly an 
additional goal of this thesis is to pave way for future work in this area in providing 
insight to, and example of, methods for the measuring of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness that are suited to the field of human-computer interaction and 
supported in the informing related work. Lastly, this thesis holds the goal of situating 
the work in related literature of how the states of Mindfulness and Mindlessness 
might be invoked and their effect upon human-computer interaction. More broadly, 
this thesis seeks to provide the framing of human-computer interaction and interface 
design through a lens of Mindfulness and Mindlessness as a means of better 
understanding and designing for the distinct qualities each holds. 
These goals are achieved through three stages; first this body of work provides a 
pragmatic definition of Mindfulness and Mindlessness that can be applied to 
interactions with technologies. In doing so it overcomes the problematic qualities of 
directly applying previous definitions and facilitates further study of the 
phenomenon through empirical modalities founded in cognitive science. Second, 
this research provides the reporting of an exploratory study conducted, and findings 
for future works to build upon, in the analysis of Mindful and Mindless experiences 
during interactions with digital technologies. This is achieved through a neuro-
phenomenological methodology, combining first person reporting alongside 
physiological measurement highlighting Mindful and Mindless interactions. Finally, 
this thesis provides insight to how the design of technologies can invoke Mindful 
and Mindless interactions and the consequences of these, followed by design 
considerations in the final conclusion.  
Through this the thesis addresses the Understanding, Measuring, and, Invoking 
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Introduction And Outline Of Thesis and Contributions 
The overarching research question of this thesis asks, how Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness can be understood, measured and invoked in relation to Human-
Computer Interactions?  
Mindfulness, in the context of this thesis, can be summarised as a broad reflective 
awareness that is receptive to new perspectives, new approaches, and context. 
Mindful interactions facilitate novelty in the goals and execution and so offer a 
broader range of outcomes and meaning generation, however they are slow in their 
steps, and are typically cognitively demanding. Mindlessness can be summarised as 
the reliance upon well-learned routines and behaviours and is low in cognitive 
demand and rapid in execution. However, Mindless interactions fail to develop novel 
meanings and solutions as they are performed as a well-learned script, intuitively or 
habitually (Langer, 1989). 
The use of human-computer interaction in this thesis refers to a specific (human) 
use of digital technology(ies); following MacKenzie and Wajcman’s (1985) definition 
of technology as ensembles of technical artefacts, activities or processes, and 
practical knowledge. Interaction is here considered an action through use/behaviour 
of (or toward) a technology concerning a particular task, benefit, or goal, or (often 
bilateral) conveyance of meaning and information/knowledge. This occurs at an 
interface - the “bridge” between technology and its “user”, such as a mouse, touch-
screen, or display.  
The research question is developed in response to the on-going pursuit within 
human-computer interaction design of designing toward efficiency (Dillon, 2002). 
Goals for new designs and improvement on old seek to be more “intuitive”, familiar, 
less cognitively loading, fewer action steps or “clicks”, and thus faster. Such qualities 
are employed as a utility and exploit this feature as a Mindless attribute of a system. 
In the context of interaction used in this thesis, utility is understood to be a function, 
a use toward a particular benefit – specifically a conveyance of meaning and 
information. Though this is clearly a required attribute of any interface, this thesis 
proposes that utility might be augmented to provide benefits (in the right 
circumstance) that oppose traditional tropes of efficiency and facilitate 
understanding new meaning and information. However, there has been substantially 
less attention toward the development of interactions that challenge traditional 
notions of utility, those that instead encourage reflection, inquiry, novelty (in being 
unfamiliar); and the benefits that such Mindful systems might promote. 
Consequently, such Mindful interactive systems might open up utility through 
embracing interpretative qualities; encouraging reflection upon the wider affordance 
space and meanings offered through the interaction; and consequently, the 
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development of appropriate schemas of meaning contextualized to the present 
interaction.  
While considerably less common, there is growing support in movements that 
aim to encourage users of technologies to reconsider how they engage with 
technology that is often demanding, “invisible”, time centric and increasingly 
integrated into commonplace experiences. Interactive technologies designed to 
make people more “efficient” now encompass a broad spectrum of activities (such 
as assistive, social and entertainment roles) and are “…more or less continuously 
present as part of a designed environment” (p162, Hallnäs and Redström, 2001). In 
response Slow Technology advocates a readdressing of traditional interaction 
paradigms to encourage technology designed “…in a way that encourages people 
to reflect and think about it.” (p169, Hallnäs and Redström, 2001). As noted by 
Grosse-Hering et al. (2013) this does not specifically mean slowing interactions (with 
regards to time taken) but opening up interactions to promote ‘slowness’ on aspects 
of interaction that may be more meaningful for users and in doing so “…can be 
used to create more ‘Mindful’ interactions that stimulate positive user involvement” 
(p3431). Thus, the goals of slow technology encourage “reflection and moments of 
mental rest rather than efficiency in performance” (p161, Hallnäs and Redström, 
2001); and as shall be highlighted through this thesis are highly sympathetic to 
Mindfulness. In a similar vein to the Slow Technology movement are positions that 
consider the felt experience of the user as central motivations of action and design. 
Such concepts hold that interactive experiences focusing on functionality 
(understood in traditional quantifiable metrics of efficiency) only activate limited 
capacities of the experience of the user. Such example is found within experience-
centred design (Wright, Wallace and McCarthy, 2008; Wright and McCarthy, 2010; 
Hassenzahl 2011); that proposes while the functional attributes of interactive systems 
are of great importance, they should be supported through an understanding of the 
emotional values that people construct through interactions with other people and 
technology.  
These opposing positions, making interactions between people and technology 
experientially efficient and cultivating ongoing reflection and experience; are framed 
here as Mindless and Mindful interactions (respectively) in their core attributes, aims, 
approach and use. The use of these terms however, and the qualities that they 
manifest are not intended to be positioned as inherently positive or negative. For 
example, Mindlessness is often viewed and described as a negative experience 
without benefit and so regarded as something that should be avoided at all cost 
(Nucci, 2014); yet has qualities such as being cognitively light, rapid in execution, 
predictable, and, multitasking support. Consequently, in this thesis it is argued that 
such dichotomy has created a lack of understanding in how and when Mindfulness 
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and Mindlessness might best be applied. This thesis argues for balanced 
consideration of both Mindful and Mindless interactions when designing interactive 
systems to understand and apply which may be most appropriate for a particular 
context.  
 
The commonplace misgivings of understanding Mindlessness might stem from 
the widespread use of Mindfulness. Initially, and surprisingly considering the 
increase in popularity of ‘Mindfulness’ as a ‘solution’ and approach marketed to 
many varied audience, it became apparent that definitions of Mindfulness (and 
Mindlessness) are often lacking in their grounding and clarity of meaning. Many 
works keenly state they applied/explored a Mindful approach, quality, or values, yet 
are often are reliant upon definitions from fields such as a spiritual or clinical practice 
that further mystify this complex state and pay little justification to its use or 
meaning. This is not to say that states of Mindfulness or Mindlessness are 
unfathomable and beyond description, many have experienced and described 
moments of ‘running on autopilot’, actions as ‘habit’, or more simply put as acting 
Mindlessly. Likewise, many are also aware to (Mindful) moments of experience where 
things ‘click’, ‘connections are made’ and the ‘broader picture’ revealed.  
Consequently, there are larger ‘problem spaces’ to be explored prior to formulation 
of specific context questions upon the topic of Mindfulness during human-computer 
interaction e.g. “How can Mindfulness alter interactions with social media and ‘Fake 
news’?”. As a result, care was given to avoid ignoring the wider complexities and 
problem space and sought to address the core challenge – principally; what are 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness and how might they be understood in broader 
human behaviours and actions through and with technologies; and furthermore, how 
might we measure and evaluate such qualities, and how might we implement 
features to invoke these qualities when interacting with digital technologies.  
While Mindfulness and Mindlessness both hold beneficial and costly qualities less 
consideration is given to such user experiences in commonplace interaction design 
(Dillon, 2002). In providing a means in which designers and evaluations of interactive 
technologies can accommodate understandings of such qualities, opportunity to re-
address the balance or appropriately design for such states is better facilitated.  
This thesis seeks to address such positions through the definition, development 
of method of analysis, and example in design; of the states of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness. Consequently, the thesis is by design in three sections in response to 
three lines of investigation answering the overarching research question, and 
described through the contributions outlined in the following. 
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How Can We Understand Mindfulness and Mindlessness During Human-
Computer Interaction? 
As will be highlighted in Section 1, existing definitions of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness are unsuitable in application to human-computer interaction research 
through holding ambiguity in definition, lack of suitability (i.e. referring to general 
dispositions), and failure to accommodate complementary and well-established 
research findings.  
Addressing this the core of this thesis seeks to provide a pragmatic definition of 
these states grounded in broader disciplines incorporating philosophical, 
psychological and cognitive science perspectives; that can be applied toward the 
framing and understanding of interactions with digital technology. Resultantly a 
definition is provided that holds as a central tenet: a reduction of the ambiguity of 
the phenomena (and its facets) being discussed; ability to describe specific instances 
and qualities of interactions with technologies; incorporation and openness to 
understanding and knowledge from well-established related research domains; 
capacity to support research methods developed in well-established related 
research domains i.e. facilitates further enquiry into the phenomena described. In 
contribution from this the thesis provides:  
• Justification upon why existing definitions of Mindfulness (and 
Mindlessness) are problematic in their direct application to HCI research and 
design. (Chapter 1.1 – 1.3) 
• Justification and support in the understanding and defining of Mindfulness 
and Mindlessness grounded in philosophical and cognitive science 
perspectives providing basis for further future enquiry employing methods 
from well-established disciplines. (Chapter 1.4 – 1.12) 
• A lexicon for describing differing conscious states in the context of Mindful 
and Mindless to clarify ambiguities of such phenomena (Chapter 1.5) 
• Differentiations of technologies affordance availability in the context of 
Mindful and Mindless approaches through the definitions of Tool and 
Equipment; to clarify framings of interactions with technologies (Chapter 1.9) 
• Definitions of technologies affordance availability inclusive of the broader 
experiential state of the agent operating the technology in the context of 
Mindful and Mindless approaches; to clarify framings of subjective 
experiences during interaction with technologies (Chapter 1.10) 
And most significantly 
• The encompassing understanding and definition of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness during interactions with technologies that facilitates further 
understanding through measurement of physiological processes supported 
through well-established related domains research methods. (Chapter 1.3) 
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How Can We Measure Mindfulness and Mindlessness During Human-Computer 
Interaction? 
Building upon the above, Section 2 seeks to inform future work through the 
development of a method in which Mindfulness and Mindlessness might be 
empirically measured (through physiological measurement) and so bi-directional 
effects during interactions with technology are better understood.  
This is achieved through the reporting of an exploratory study that provides novel 
direction for future work in the development of systems that might unobtrusively 
measure moments of Mindfulness and Mindlessness. Employing methods facilitated 
through the (previously described) definitions, a neurophenomenological approach 
is taken that draws upon first person accounts alongside physiological measures. 
This seeks to provide capacity to measure the defined states of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness during interactions with technologies. Consequently this broader 
question directing the exploratory study, i.e. how can we measure Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness during human-computer interaction?, aims to provide; justification of 
the definitions and supporting literature (found in Section 1), descriptions of the 
successes and failures in methods of the measurement of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness, and provide methods for further exploration in future work in this 
area. 	
In contribution from this line of questioning the thesis provides:  
• Justification and support in the use of neurophenomenological methods 
(Chapter 2.0) and of the guiding statements informing study design derived 
from Section 1 (Chapter 2.9) 
• The reporting of findings and methods from an exploratory study into the 
measurement of Mindful and Mindless states. (Chapter 2.5 – 2.8) 
• Insights to the user perspective upon Mindful and Mindless states during 
interaction, how they alter interaction, and how such states are experienced. 
(Chapter 2.8) 
• Four modalities for further exploration in view of the physiological 
measurement of Mindful and Mindless states during interactions with 
technologies. (Chapter 2.9) 
 
How Can We Invoke Mindfulness and Mindlessness During Human-Computer 
Interaction? 
Given the field of application (human-computer interaction design) Section 3 
provides insight in distinguishing interactions as those invoking moments ‘thinking’ 
  12 
and reflectivity and those for ‘knowing’ providing transparent windows to 
information. This is achieved through highlighting some of the ways in which design 
choices can lead to Mindful and Mindless interactions and the consequences of such 
choices through understandings and example in HCI design.	
In contribution from this line of questioning the thesis provides:  
• Insight to how HCI design might invoke Mindful and Mindless engagements 
with digital technologies. (Chapter 3.1 – 3.5) 
• Insight toward how such states might be countered (Chapter 3.1 – 3.5) 
• Design considerations for facilitating Mindful and Mindless interactions with 
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Methodology 
Through a pragmatist approach a research methodology is chosen that is best 
suited to purpose and aims of the research question. Tashakkori and Teddlie (p713, 
2003) describe pragmatism as: 
“… a deconstructive paradigm that debunks concepts such as ‘truth’ and 
‘reality’ and focuses instead on ‘what works’ as the truth regarding the 
research questions under investigation. Pragmatism rejects the either/or 
choices associated with the paradigm wars, advocates for the use of mixed 
methods in research, and acknowledges that the values of the researcher 
play a large role in interpretations of results.”  
A central tenet of a pragmatic approach is a commitment to the end-cause and 
practical outcomes as providing validity and value; i.e. an ideology or theory is 
considered to be true if it works to a satisfactory degree, the value of a theory is 
within the practical consequences of accepting it, and ideas which are unpractical 
are rejected. In the process of method selection, pragmatism advocates a mixed 
methods approach. Methods used in validation of a particular position are chosen 
not due to their epistemological implications or as an externally dictated 
methodology; but for the appropriateness of how well they fit and answer the 
research question. Consequently here, findings are given value with relationship to 
practical consequences e.g. contribution of knowledge that provides additional 
utility over previous understandings and can be verified through practical / well-
established methods.  
This thesis argues for a pragmatic definition of Mindfulness and Mindlessness 
largely influenced by a neurophenomenological approach (described in Chapter 
1.11.1 and Chapter 2.0.1) in the question: “How Can We Understand Mindfulness 
and Mindlessness During Human-Computer Interaction?”. It is apparent that there 
exist moments of sub-conscious interactions with technologies which “disappear” 
into phenomenological invisibility, (Weiser, 1991); conversely there are interactions 
with technologies which develop that draw the user to a reflective state of broader 
awareness. Consequently, a definition to describe these phenomena and 
incorporate understanding their facets from well-established domains is required. 
While existing framings and methods in assessment of Mindfulness (and so 
Mindlessness) hold utility in their respective domain (such as part of spiritual practice 
or cognitive based therapy); such utility does not translate to human-computer 
interaction. To ensure utility to human-computer interaction an operational definition 
is required; i.e. a definition that facilitates “some form” of inquiry to determine if an 
interaction falls within and can be accurately categorised and described by said 
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definition. Understandings from well-established domains are drawn upon to firstly 
inform these definitions, and secondly to facilitate practical application of methods 
of analysis from these fields. This understanding is achieved through drawing upon 
existing framings and methods in assessment of Mindfulness (detailed in their 
corresponding publications) to inform key themes for further exploration. The 
resulting background research of these key themes, through seminal texts and 
understandings that describe the facets of Mindfulness and Mindlessness, then 
informed the hypothesis of how such phenomena should be understood and 
defined.  
The informing works of Section 1 additionally guided the exploratory study 
design and modalities of measurement (described in Chapters 2.0 to 2.5) in 
questioning “How Can We Measure Mindfulness and Mindlessness During Human-
Computer Interaction?”. Through providing designers of interactive technologies 
understandings and methods in measuring Mindfulness and Mindlessness they will 
be better equipped to design support for each more suitably i.e. knowing when and 
where such states would be most effective. Consequently, the broader aim of the 
exploratory study is toward providing tools for the assessment of Mindful and 
Mindless states during human-computer interaction. While this broader goal remains 
for future work the exploratory study is intended to provide two utilities. Firstly, 
toward verifying the definitions developed in Section 1 and the facets described 
within and informing those; and secondly, expose methods that might be further 
refined (or those to be rejected) to achieve measurement of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness during interactions with technologies. This is line of investigation was 
achieved through drawing upon a number of theoretical positioning’s informed by 
the previous findings (of Section 1) as points of contrast and comparison, and 
analysis (described in depth in Chapter 2.2.2). Secondly the exploratory study holds 
a neurophenomenological approach (described in Chapter 1.11.1 and Chapter 
2.0.1) in its method. This neurophenomenological approach triangulated 
philosophical perspectives (highlighted in Section 1), knowledges gained through 
cognitive sciences (highlighted in Section 1), qualitative report (derived from first-
person report) and quantitative measures (physiological measurement) (gained 
through the exploratory study – Section 2); in combination to inform richer 
understandings of the phenomena of Mindfulness and Mindlessness. Methods used 
in this exploratory study are described in greater detail in Chapter’s 2.0 to 2.5.  
Finally, in Section 3, understandings from HCI design and theory are drawn upon 
in the development of design considerations in answer to the question “How Can 
We Invoke Mindfulness and Mindlessness During Human-Computer Interaction?”. 
Drawing upon existing framings, theories, and example, within human-computer 
interaction design and design in general; evidence for the support of specific system 
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attributes invoking Mindful and Mindless interactions is developed through 
background research.  
 
The findings presented here are subject to refinement, alteration, and, expansion 
of both hypothesis (and consequently definitions) and modalities of measurement. 
This is expected to occur given the continual improvements in understandings of the 
role our bodies play in forming and shaping our experiences, and the knowledge 
and methods in measuring such experiences.   
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SECTION ONE 
Understanding And Defining Mindfulness And Mindlessness During Interaction 
In the following section it will be highlighted that existing definitions of 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness are unsuitable in application to human-computer 
interaction research.  
Consequently, this section sets out to provide a pragmatic definition of 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness that can be applied in the framing and understanding 
of interactions with digital technology. Resultantly here a definition is required that 
has the following qualities or utility:  
• Reduce the ambiguity of the phenomena being discussed 
• Can be applied to describe specific instances and qualities of interactions 
with technologies  
• Incorporates, and supports further incorporation of, understanding and 
knowledges from well-established related research domains 
• Draws upon well-established related domains for which research methods 
have been developed and are transferable in application i.e. facilitates 
further enquiry into the phenomena described through established 
verifiable methods. 
The definitions will be evaluated by their capacity to move beyond previous 
definitions of Mindfulness and Mindlessness. The criteria of evaluation to determine 
success is: a reduction in ambiguity around the phenomena, capacity to describe 
specific instances and qualities of interactions, facilitating incorporation of 
knowledge from well-established fields (and so hold capacity to incorporate future 
knowledges as those fields advance), supporting well-established methods of 
analysis from related fields, and incorporating and equally valuing philosophical 
learnings where cognitive science currently lacks and vice versa. 
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1.0.0: Introduction To Mindfulness 
Throughout recent years there has been growing interest and research into the 
concept of Mindfulness and its application in a variety of fields (Sauer et al, 2013; 
Brown, Ryan and Creswell, 2007a) (see figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1; Publications in journals on the topic of Mindfulness.1 
Originating from ancient Buddhist, Hindu and Chinese philosophies; Mindfulness 
can now be broadly described as falling into two categories; Eastern, centred upon 
traditional Buddhist practice and as a general mental disposition (e.g. that of Kabat-
Zinn (e.g. 2003)); and Western (e.g. Langer (1992)), concerning creativity and 
understanding as a task situated mental state (transient as opposed to general 
disposition) (Ie, Ngnoumen and Langer, 2014; Siegling and Petrides, 2014), and may 
ultimately be seen as an “information processing” (Sauer et al, 2013; Schramm and 
Hu, 2014).  
Mindfulness is considered to be a complex process of human consciousness that 
may be described as the process of the mind to reflecting upon itself (a reflection 
upon subjective experience). Mindfulness has been described as a quality of mind 
(p20, Kuan, 2008), a particular form of attention and awareness (Kabat-Zinn, 2003) 
that can be cultivated during meditation (Kuan, 2008; Thera, 1962). Although being 
practiced as a central tenet of spiritual practice since the earliest Buddhist teachings 
(Gunaratana, 2002; Nhat Hanh, 2008; Nanamoli and Bodhi, 1995); Mindfulness is 
                                               
1	Retrieved	from	https://goamra.org/resources/	-	05/011/16	
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increasingly practiced in western culture (Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Brown, Ryan and 
Creswell, 2007a) and has more recently been applied in fields such as psychology, 
neuroscience, healthcare and business leadership. Although there is ongoing debate 
that western approaches (neuroscience, psychology etc.) may be inappropriate and 
undermine further development in the field (Williams and Kabat-Zinn, 2011; Kabat-
Zinn 2003).  
However, defining Mindfulness has lacked clarity and consistency (Bishop et. al., 
2004; Grossman, 2008; Brown, Ryan and Creswell, 2007a; Chiesa, 2013); with 
understandings ranging from a simplification as “mere observing” (Sauer et al, 
2013); to framing this state of experience as an undistracted awareness of the 
present developed from a knowing of the underlying process of our subjective 
experience as opposed to being in “automatic-pilot mode” (i.e. automaticity) 
(Hollis-Walker and Colosimo, 2011).  Through the inconsistencies and mystification 
of definition (from Eastern approaches), existing seminal theories of mind, 
psychology and behaviour that may further explain particular qualities of 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness (and their origins) may be overlooked as considered 
insignificant for a particular study or application (Brown, Ryan and Creswell, 2007a). 
This attribute becomes problematic in defining this quality with agreement as a 
cross-disciplinary application and field of research; as noted by Bishop et. al.: 
“There have been no systematic efforts to establish the defining criteria of 
its various components or to specify the implicated psychological 
processes, and general descriptions of Mindfulness have not been entirely 
consistent across investigators”  
(Bishop et. al., 2004, P231). 
As described, understandings of Mindfulness and Mindlessness have been 
developed through two ‘schools of thought’, Eastern and Western (Brown, Ryan and 
Creswell, 2007a; Hart, Ivtzan and Hart 2013; Ie, Ngnoumen and Langer, 2014). While 
these two schools share many similarities they differ through several core aspects. 
These differences primarily lie at their; construct, philosophy, target audience, 
interventions, measurement, and scope of application (Brown, Ryan and Creswell, 
2007a; Hart, Ivtzan and Hart 2013). The lack of consistency in definition is further 
problematic as without consensus of unified attributes and selective utilisation of 
constituting elements, the importance of such elements and how they may be 
influenced is often manipulated/applied in favour of the intended application; as 
noted by Brown, Ryan and Creswell (2007a): 
“To a degree, the meaning that has been given to mindfulness by clinicians 
and researchers has been colored by these particular clinical approaches.” 
(p215) 
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As the contribution of this thesis is of a cross-disciplinary grounding (with 
intended application to the field of human-computer interaction), the defining of 
Mindfulness (and Mindlessness) will primarily adopt a Western approach and 
understanding.  
Western study and framing of Mindfulness approaches the topic from 
psychological and cognitive perspectives as states of experience and action. In 
doing so this approach seeks to describe Mindfulness as a naturally occurring 
phenomena that can be placed in opposition to Mindlessness and grounded within 
established theory and observable phenomena, such as automaticity and habit 
which may be understood as:  
“…some cognitive process whose operation is not subject to conscious 
control”  
(p165, Anderson, 1992)  
In the context of this thesis (and in application to Human-Computer Interaction) a 
Western approach is most suitable as it facilitates defining Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness as grounded within well-established concepts that provide a broader 
understanding, systematic measurement and application. However, due to the 
number of validated empirical measures that originate in Eastern understandings 
(i.e. within clinical application), these will also be of consideration in understanding 
the core attributes and scope.  
 
1.1.0: Eastern Practices And Definitions Of Mindfulness  
While it will be demonstrated that Western perspectives of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness are most appropriate in the context of HCI design it is additionally 
important to gain understanding of Eastern practices and definitions of such 
phenomena. This is due to the majority of previous applications and explorations of 
Mindfulness referring to the concepts origins in Buddhist practice. Similarly, equal 
can be said of Mindfulness and Mindless in clinical application, often drawing upon 
Eastern positions to guide and inform measures adapted to the context of inquiry 
and aims of application. 
Eastern perspectives of Mindfulness typically categorise the concept of 
Mindfulness, as a practice for improving wellbeing, emotion regulation, and 
understanding of experience; cultivated through meditation as part of Buddhist 
spiritual practice (Hanh, 1976; Thera, 1962; Silananda, 1990). However, differing 
schools of thought place greater emphasis over the various constituting elements of 
Mindfulness (Brown, Ryan and Creswell, 2007a) further mystifying this complex state 
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of experience.  
Mindfulness can be (and has been) described in many differing ways such as 
Watts (1957, p53) “… a total clarity and presence of mind, actively passive, wherein 
events come and go like reflections in a mirror; nothing is reflected except what is”; 
Thera (1962, p32) who defines Mindfulness as “…the clear and single-minded 
awareness of what actually happens to us and in us at the successive moments of 
perception”; and Hanh (1976) as “keeping one’s consciousness alive to the present 
reality” (p11) and “…the miracle by which we master and restore ourselves” (p16).  
Bodhi (1994) describes Mindfulness as a presence of mind and form of attention 
or awareness. Bodhi notes while all conscious experience involves a form of 
awareness, Mindfulness is framed as awareness that is “…applied at a special pitch”, 
a “bare attention” to the present moment and differs profoundly from our usual 
“mode” of consciousness (Bodhi, p70-, 1994). Bodhi further describes a Mindful 
state as open, quiet and alert; contemplating the present and refraining from drifting 
with distracting thoughts. Though it is broadly understood that we can summarise 
Eastern framings of Mindfulness as “The elements of mindfulness, namely awareness 
and nonjudgmental acceptance of one's moment-to-moment experience” (Keng et 
al., 2011). This Eastern framing of mindfulness is often associated and centralised 
toward the goal of a cessation of suffering (a central tenet of Buddhist practice and 
teachings). Grossman and Van Dam (2011) further summarise that Mindfulness 
encompasses several features including “open-hearted awareness of moment-to-
moment perceptible experience”, “kindness, tolerance, patience and courage”, “An 
awareness markedly different from everyday modes of attention” (p221, Grossman 
and Van Dam, 2011). 
These understandings have been further expanded upon to incorporate a more 
contemporary and commonly accepted notion of Mindfulness as a “paying attention 
on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally to the unfolding of 
experience moment by moment” (p145, Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Such terms, however, do 
not give full justification or reasonable depth of explanation to this complex quality 
of mind. Furthermore such definition suggest that Mindfulness is only present in 
entirety and of utmost importance to achieve over Mindlessness. This has resulted in 
confusion towards the weighting and value of the constituting elements (if stated) 
without agreement upon definition (Bishop et. al., 2004; Grossman, 2008; Brown, 
Ryan and Creswell, 2007a; Chiesa, 2013).  
 
While Eastern understandings of Mindfulness have previously served purpose in 
the understanding of this phenomena, such definitions pose several problems in the 
context of  human-computer interaction:  
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• Primarily; they lack a consistency in what Mindfulness specifically is and so 
often add confusion (through mystification) to this complex state.  
• The definitions are often presented as part of a framework in spiritual 
practice and so directly applying such understandings towards HCI 
presents a potential for misinterpretation (i.e. religious/spiritual 
association) and misappropriation in how such interventions should be 
received (e.g. Potentially as a spiritual intervention). 
• Such definitions give little insight into how and why such states occur (in 
terms of the underlying processes), and more broadly how they may be 
applied toward human-computer interaction. 
• Finally; such understandings of Mindfulness and Mindlessness pose that 
Mindfulness should be of utmost importance with Mindlessness avoided. 
This position provides little insight or attention to why Mindlessness states 
may occur and how these may be beneficial. 
Consequently, these definitions fail to satisfy the previously outlined qualities and 
utility necessary for a definition of Mindfulness and Mindlessness for human-
computer interaction.   
The framings and understandings of experience e.g. those described by Thera 
(1962, p32) as “the clear and single-minded awareness of what actually happens to 
us and in us at the successive moments of perception”; do, however, offer basis 
form which a novel perspective to understanding our interactions with technologies 
may be developed and drawn upon in framing and understanding such interactions.  
Within mental health practice insights of Mindfulness (Eastern philosophy) have 
led to the exploration of how such qualities may be applied in Cognitive Behaviour 
Therapy (CBT) (Brown, Ryan and Creswell, 2007a), and additionally, how such 
qualities may be categorised and measured as part of ‘Mindfulness-Based 
Intervention’ (MBI) and ‘Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction’ (MBSR) (Cullen, 2011). 
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1.2.0: Clinical Applications And Empirical Measures 
Of Mindfulness 
Many clinical applications of Mindfulness exist and attempt to build upon and 
apply the previously described Eastern understandings of Mindfulness towards the 
treatment of psychological disorders. As noted by Keng et al. (2011), the qualities of 
Mindfulness “…are regarded as potentially effective antidotes against common 
forms of psychological distress…”. Examples that apply a Mindfulness-based 
intervention include: Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 2003), 
Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), Self-Mutilation / Suicidal Behavior 
Prevention (Linehan et al; 1991); and Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; 
Segal, Williams, and Teasdale, 2002); and have been applied by national health 
organisations (e.g. NHS2). Such applications in therapeutic practice have proven to 
withstand empirical testing of the beneficial results of Mindfulness training and show 
a novel method in treatment for enhancing psychological wellbeing e.g. Warren, 
Brown and Ryan (2003). Resulting from such studies (and their application in 
treatment) are a number of methods for the assessment of an individual’s 
Mindfulness (Sauer et al, 2013; Brown, Ryan and Creswell, 2007a); and supported as 
valid measures in cognitive behaviour therapy and psychological assessments (Haigh 
et al., 2010). Although these measurements/scales are proven to share 
commonalities, as during the validation of a methodology the tests are crosschecked 
to ensure consistency of results between tests (Baer et al, 2006; Siegling and 
Petrides, 2014); the assessments vary depending on the emphasis of the intended 
application (Haigh et al., 2010; Sauer et al, 2013; Brown, Ryan and Creswell, 2007a). 
Examples of such assessments include: Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (Walach et 
al., 2006); Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale–Revised, (Feldman et al., 
2007); Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2008); Philadelphia 
Mindfulness Scale (Cardaciotto et al., 2008); Southampton Mindfulness 
Questionnaire (Chadwick et al., 2008); Mindfulness Process Questionnaire (Erisman 
& Roemer, 2012). Such assessment measures are typically generalised in that they 
are not seeking reflection upon a specific task but rather a broader disposition on 
life, emotional aspects and sensory experience, and a broader life outlook than 
towards a specific task or time (though some consideration to present focus is 
questioned). 
                                               
2	http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/cancer-help/about-cancer/treatment/complementary-alternative/therapies/meditation?script=true#Mindfulness	
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Although these previously described measurements contain sub-groupings into 
differing themes it is noted that sub-groupings alone (as individual tests) do not 
provide an accurate measurement of a person’s Mindfulness disposition and it is 
required that the whole test is accounted for in achieving consistency and validity of 
results (i.e. outcomes of the individual subgroups cross-test are not consistent, unlike 
outcomes of complete tests). Thus, the application of such measurements of 
Mindfulness necessitate the test be completed in full. While some elements of these 
measurements hold application towards the assessment of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness during a human-computer interaction e.g. “I rush through activities 
without being really attentive to them” (FFMQ, Baer et al., 2006), large proportions 
of the measurements often refer to a broader disposition and emotional wellbeing 
e.g. “Even when I’m feeling terribly upset, I can find a way to put it into words” 
(FFMQ, Baer et al., 2006). As such measures are required to be presented in full for 
accuracy, their application towards HCI analysis would add confusion to participants 
in evaluating their interactions and would yield results of their general disposition of 
Mindfulness as opposed to the intended context (i.e. a specific interaction 
experience to be analysed). While such measurements provide argument that the 
concept of Mindfulness holds application beyond spiritual practice and can be 
empirically measured (Sauer et al, 2013), the application of these measurements is 
not suitable in the assessment of human-computer interactions as (similarly to 
previously discussed Eastern / spiritual framings):  
• Such definitions lack a consistency in what Mindfulness specifically is 
(and its components) and so add confusion to this complex term and 
how it may be applied to human-computer interaction.  
• The intended context of the measurements presents a potential for 
misinterpretation of intent when applied to evaluation and 
understanding of human-computer interaction. 
• Such measurements assess a broader life disposition as opposed to a 
context specific experience/interaction. 
• The framings and measurements give little insight into how and why 
such states occur, and how they may be applied toward human-
computer interaction; and further pose that Mindfulness should be of 
utmost importance with Mindlessness avoided (due to its association 
with negative mental traits such as rumination, anxiety, worry, fear, 
anger etc.) and so provide little insight to why Mindless states occur 
and how these may be beneficial.  
Consequently these definitions and framings fail to satisfy the previously outlined 
qualities and utility necessary for a definition of Mindfulness and Mindlessness for 
human-computer interaction as they introduce ambiguity of the phenomena being 
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discussed, elate to broader dispositions, do not incorporate understanding and 
knowledges from well-established related research domains that might further 
understanding and investigation to the phenomena. 
 
1.2.1: Measuring Mindfulness As A Transient State 
(Contextualised As Opposed To Trait)   
Some particular approaches toward understanding and framing Mindfulness hold 
within them a differentiating of awareness from attention (a position advocated in 
this thesis); and so, position Mindfulness as a behaviour and allow for broader 
perspectives from cognitive science inform the understanding. As will be highlighted 
in the following chapters such approach provides scope to not only understand 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness in ways applicable to human-computer interaction 
but validate such understandings through well-established methods developed in 
specific research domains found within cognitive science. 
Brown and Ryan differentiate “awareness” as “the background “radar” of 
consciousness, continually monitoring the inner and outer environment.”, and 
“attention” as “process of focusing conscious awareness, providing heightened 
sensitivity to a limited range of experience ” (p822, Brown and Ryan, 2003), yet note 
that these processes are deeply intertwined. The distinction of Mindfulness from 
these two interrelated states presented by Brown and Ryan as: 
 “…attention and awareness are relatively constant features of normal 
functioning, mindfulness can be considered an enhanced attention to and 
awareness of current experience or present reality”  
(p822, Brown and Ryan, 2003)  
Opposed to positions that frame Mindfulness as a personal trait Brown and Ryan 
(2003) position Mindfulness as an active “doing”. In doing so Brown and Ryan 
position Mindfulness as a state like experience, opposed to general disposition, that 
one might hold. Furthermore, Brown and Ryan explicitly differentiate “awareness” 
and “attention”. The significance of this will be increasingly apparent throughout 
this thesis as it is proposed that Mindless acts still involve awareness (in that one 
holds sensory awareness) yet Mindfulness holds a concerted attentive aspect which 
is consciously present and experienced. This can be exemplified though “highway 
hypnosis (Charlton and Starkey, 2011); when a person driving a vehicle performs 
complex acts; avoiding other road users, navigating to a destination, responding to 
traffic signals etc.. Upon arrival (if highway hypnosis occurred) the driver holds no (or 
little) recollection of entire series of complex events (i.e. they were not conscious of 
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them). All of the events of driving require awareness (else there would be no 
responses) yet these events (during highway hypnosis) do not hold attention toward 
them. Some events, e.g. The car ahead suddenly braking; do call for attention and 
the driver holds a differing form of awareness; e.g. they can recall the event and 
describe it.  
A truly Mindful state might be considered an enhanced form of this attention, 
rather than being responsive, as one that is concerted and consciously controlled 
and directed.  
 
One clinical application of Mindfulness that positions the quality as a state like 
experience is the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS) (Brown and Ryan, 
2003) (See: Appendix 1.1). The Mindful Attention Awareness Scale proposes 
Mindfulness as an attribute of consciousness (discussed at length in chapter 1.5.0) 
that exists through an enhanced (attention to) awareness of what is happening in the 
present. Though this measure focuses on daily activities (as opposed to a specific 
task or instance) it does hold a closer focus upon actions and so is useful in 
understanding context specific moments of Mindfulness. Similarly, the Toronto 
Mindfulness scale (TMS) (Lau et al., 2006) (See: Appendix 1.2), later developed to 
the Toronto Mindfulness Scale - Trait Version (TMST) (Davis, Lau, & Cairns, 2009), 
was specifically directed towards assessment of Mindfulness as a state like 
experience in medicinal (psychological wellbeing) practice. The framing/defining of 
Mindfulness by Lau et al. (2006) is of two components, developed upon Bishop et al. 
(2004) and Hayes et al. (1999), as a “mode” or state like quality “that is maintained 
only when attention to experience is intentionally cultivated with an open, 
nonjudgmental orientation to experience” (p1447, Lau et al., 2006). The TMS holds 
the two qualities of Mindfulness as; an intentional self-regulation of attention, and as 
specific quality of awareness connecting all “objects” of sensation, thoughts and 
emotion. Closer still to the position adopted in this thesis, the State Mindfulness 
Scale measure (Tanay and Bernstein, 2013) (See: Appendix 1.3) is a development 
that seeks to address Mindfulness as “as a mental behavior, which is statelike, 
context dependent, and variable” (p1286) as opposed to a “trait” like. This is 
understood as a mental state of self-regulation of attention to immediate experience 
and orientating ones experiences towards curiosity, openness and acceptance; in 
addition to “incorporating objects of which one is Mindful and the quality of how 
one is Mindful of these objects.” (p1287, Tanay and Bernstein, 2013). 
 
While the previously described measures and framings of Mindfulness as a state 
like quality or behaviour hold closely to the position of the position of this thesis, 
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Bodner and Langer’s Mindfulness/Mindlessness scale (2001) (Appendix 1.4) provides 
a much stronger resonance in terms of the position taken and the validation of such 
position.  
The Langer Mindfulness/Mindlessness scale (MMS) (Bodner and Langer, 2001) is a 
21-point measurement of Mindfulness and Mindlessness. Eschewing from the 
Eastern understandings of Mindfulness, Langer’s (1989) application of Mindfulness is 
considered a Western approach; centring upon novelty seeking and producing, 
engagement, and, flexibility (Haigh et al., 2010), in understanding and task 
performance while being grounded in psychology. Bodner and Langer (2001) note 
that while assigning meaning to events and objects is a great achievement in 
cognitive development, repeated strengthening (repeated assignment of meaning) 
leads to an automatic process of association (a position discussed at length in 
Chapter 1.11, and Chapter 1.12). That is to say, if object X holds meaning Y, with 
repeated exposure to object ‘X correlating to meaning Y’ the process of meaning 
deduction becomes automatic and the correlation becomes dominant. While 
meaning remains “malleable” it is noted in the context of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness that: 
“Although one meaning of an object or event may be dominant for a 
particular situation, individuals do have the ability to consider alternative 
meanings for the same object or event. The cognitive state in which 
individuals unwittingly accept a rigid understanding of information has been 
called mindlessness. In contrast, when mindful, the individual actively draws 
novel distinctions and this increases awareness of alternative meanings.”  
(p1, Bodner and Langer, 2001). 
Bodner and Langer (2001) liken a person acting in a Mindless state to a “robot” 
acting with “programmed routines” that determine thoughts, emotions and 
behaviours based on previously learned distinctions and associations. Bodner and 
Langer (p1, Bodner and Langer, 2001) further state that such routines are triggered 
by environmental cues and “run” to completion without conscious control or 
awareness i.e. without “mind” and so are called Mindlessness. Bodner and Langer 
(2001) construct validation of the Mindfulness/Mindlessness Scale though several 
theoretically associated constructs (Described in greater detail in Appendix 1.4):  
• Openness to experience (Digman,1990): A willingness to be open to experience 
and likely engage with the surrounding environment in new ways. That is, a 
Mindful individual will be open to and seek unfamiliar and novel experiences.  
• Capacity to entertain multiple perspectives (Langer, 1997): A capacity to 
view/understand the “world” form another’s/multiple perspectives. 
• Need for cognition (Cohen, Stotland and Wolfe, 1955): The degree to which an 
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individual enjoys and engages in “thinking” - “… a need to structure relevant 
situations in meaningful, integrated ways.” (p291, Cohen, Stotland and Wolfe, 
1955) 
• Thinking styles and general cognitive ability:  Bodner and Langer (2001) state 
that a Mindful person should exhibit a “legislative-liberal” thinking style. 
Similarly, the should hold a “general cognitive ability” as “…a constellation of 
thinking abilities designed to cope with environmental complexity.” (p3, Bodner 
and Langer, 2001).  
 
Langer’s understanding of Mindfulness and Mindlessness will be discussed at 
greater length in the following chapters as its positioning is of a central tenet and 
contribution to the definition of Mindfulness and Mindlessness during interactions 
with digital technologies. 
 
1.2.2: Suitability Of Mindfulness State Measurements 
Towards Understanding, Defining And Measuring 
Mindfulness And Mindlessness During Human-Computer 
Interaction  
The intended application of this thesis is toward the understanding of 
Mindfulness/Mindlessness during interaction with technologies as opposed to a 
persons general disposition, and so positions approaching Mindfulness with specific 
focus upon this state as a transient experience of attentive awareness are better 
suited toward such understanding. 
While the MAAS measurement (Brown and Ryan, 2003) focuses upon attention 
and awareness it does contain questions that would not be suitably adapted toward 
human computer interaction. The framing of Mindfulness taken by Brown and Ryan 
(2003) is of particular importance to the research and of framing interactions with 
digital technologies i.e. awareness as “the background “radar”, and attention as 
“process of focusing conscious awareness, providing heightened sensitivity to a 
limited range of experience” with Mindfulness being “considered an enhanced 
attention to and awareness of current experience”. Such positioning is of particular 
interest to the broader understanding of the thesis, allowing us to frame some 
actions within the “background” of awareness and others in the centre stage of 
attention (akin to the position of Baars’ global workspace theory (1993, 1996, 1997) 
described in chapter 1.12.5), Mindful interactions facilitating both attributes (broader 
awareness and centred attention). However, the application of the MAAS 
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measurement to understanding human-computer interaction would still introduce a 
degree of confusion to the participant and reveal a broader life disposition e.g. “I 
forget a person’s name almost as soon as I’ve been told it for the first time”.  
Likewise, TMS (Lau et al., 2006) and State Mindfulness Scale measure (Tanay and 
Bernstein, 2013), contain elements that may confuse participants when applied in 
the context of human-computer interaction e.g. “I was more concerned with being 
open to my experiences than controlling or changing them” (TMS, Lau et al., 2006). 
However, the State Mindfulness Scale measure (Tanay and Bernstein, 2013) adds 
further understanding of how Mindfulness can be framed “as a mental behavior, 
which is state like, context dependent, and variable” (p1286). This positioning is of 
particular use to this thesis as it specifies an orientation toward context and a 
specific task, as opposed to previously discussed measurements and framings that 
understand Mindfulness as a broader and general disposition.  
The Mindfulness/Mindlessness scale (Bodner and Langer, 2001) provides the 
richest understanding of how Mindfulness might be understood and measured in 
relation to human-computer interaction. The measurement is framed and validated 
through several measures and theoretical positioning’s that are situated outside of 
research of Mindfulness (as a specific focus). This provides not only additional 
validation to the field of study but furthermore facilitates a broader understanding, 
justification and explanation of this complex state. Furthermore, the position of 
Bodner and Langer (p1, 2001) states that “…one meaning of an object or event may 
be dominant for a particular situation”, and that “Environmental cues trigger these 
behavioral routines”. In the context of HCI this may be understood as cues (from an 
interface) invoking dominant reactions where a user interacts in ridged and pre-
learned understandings developed through repetition (and where meaning 
deduction has become automatic).  
While the measurements for Mindful and Mindless states (above) is not directly 
applicable toward HCI analysis they do provide understandings that frame 
Mindfulness as a state like experience that is capable of change and reactionary to 
environmental stimulus and situations. This provides opportunity for adaptation 
toward a more suitable line of questioning that may be used in the assessment of 
peoples Mindful and Mindless states when interacting with technology. 
 
1.2.3: Appropriateness Of Mindfulness Measures In The 
Study Of Human-Computer Interaction. 
Though the study of Mindfulness can easily be said to hold roots within Eastern 
Buddhist philosophy the direct application of this philosophy toward HCI research is 
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inappropriate. As highlighted, such philosophies hold a degree of mysticism and 
thus interpretation toward them; with potential to leave the nature of study at risk of 
misinterpretation (between understanding user experience and understanding 
spirituality). Similarly, such framings of this complex state, though attempting to 
understand it, give little insight as to how or why such states occur. Furthermore, in 
the context of Buddhist spiritual practice, Mindfulness is promoted as the ideal state 
and disposition to maintain (over Mindlessness) with little insight to the beneficial 
qualities that a state of Mindlessness might hold. Perhaps most importantly to the 
aims of this thesis, such framings lack a consistency of what Mindfulness is with 
definitions varying between schools of thought and context of delivery.  
Similarly, clinical applications and measurements of Mindfulness that are informed 
by such Eastern Buddhist philosophy again hold several key issues that invalidate 
them as a modality for HCI analysis. Inconsistencies in definition of Mindfulness 
between study (Brown, Ryan and Creswell, 2007a), presents a mixed notion of what 
aspects of Mindfulness are truly of question when viewing the broader spectrum of 
studies (i.e. the concept being tailored toward intended outcome). As with Eastern 
practice there is also little insight toward how and why such states might occur and 
possibility of how the opposite state (Mindlessness) may be of benefit.  
As highlighted, some methods of Mindfulness assessment attempt to take 
findings from the field of cognitive science as a means of which to better understand 
and explain why such attributes of experience occur and how they may be 
influenced. Most appropriate to the context of this thesis are measurements that not 
only consider better understanding though support from related fields, but 
additionally consider the phenomena of Mindfulness and Mindlessness as state like 
experiences influenced by events, actions and environments. Such perspectives of 
Mindfulness as a state like quality influenced by our interactions and experience of 
our environment, may be summarised by Tanay and Bernstein (p1286, 2013) as “a 
mental behavior, which is state like, context dependent, and variable”, and 
highlighted by Bodner and Langer: 
“Environmental cues trigger these behavioral routines and their programs 
run their course. Crucial to mindlessness is that these routine behaviors 
operate without conscious control or awareness (hence the name).”  
(p1, Bodner and Langer, 2001) 
Such perspectives are closely inline with the overarching aim of this thesis, 
understanding Mindfulness and Mindlessness during human-computer interaction. 
However, the proposed measurements of Mindfulness as a result of the work from 
the above authors would again require amendment to ensure they are appropriate 
for the study of human computer interaction.  
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One of the most prominent features of all the previously described studies (and 
definitions) is the variability of definition and framing of Mindfulness used between 
them. Of these, Western perspectives hold the greatest coherence as they are often 
supported through widely accepted literature and theory within well-established 
research domains (e.g. psychology and cognitive science) with the intended 
application that differs. Similarly, with grounding the definition of what exactly it is 
that is of question allows for a better understanding and evaluation of its validity. 
Therefore, the remainder of this section of the thesis will develop and justify a 
pragmatic definition of Mindfulness and Mindlessness, supported within broader 
related fields, that such phenomena might be better framed within human computer 
interaction. In doing so this provides further utility of validation through well-
established methods drawn from related fields which inform the defining of the 
phenomena. As will be highlighted and noted by Brown and Cordon (p59, 2009) 
such a first step is necessary in that it “…concerns the basic scientific principle that a 
phenomenon can be studied only if it can be properly defined and measured.” 
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1.3.0: Developing A Definition Of Mindfulness And 
Mindlessness During Interaction. 
It is recognised that “Mindfulness is not an easy concept to define” (Langer and 
Moldoveanu, 2000). While the concept in terms of Eastern and clinical 
understandings and constructs provides insight it has been noted that: 
“…that literature’s characterization of mindfulness has not been clearly 
translated into contemporary research psychology. The psychological 
literature reveals considerable variance in descriptions of the nature of 
mindfulness on both theoretical and operational levels.”  
(p214, Brown, Ryan and Creswell, 2007a). 
Brown, Ryan and Creswell (2007a) further expand on this explaining the two 
primary reasons such variance has occurred, most significantly here being the result 
of “different clinical approaches” resulting in different definitions and 
operationalization’s that follow particular treatment perspectives and more 
significantly “the outcomes they seek to foster” (p215, Brown, Ryan and Creswell, 
2007a). Brown, Ryan and Creswell (2007a) indicate that clinical applications and 
constructs of Mindfulness (and their measures) seek to facilitate the by-products of 
Mindfulness (e.g. self-control, emotion regulation, compassion) that, though may 
hold application within the field of human-computer interaction, are here beyond 
the scope of this thesis. While the utilisation of Mindfulness and its resulting 
properties has been tailored toward specific aims in clinical application (e.g. emotion 
regulation) it is noted there is a need for agreement so that this complex state may 
be further studied, as stated by Brown, Ryan and Creswell: 
“There is a clear need for conceptual agreement on the meaning of 
mindfulness, not only to facilitate communication about the construct but, 
most pragmatically, to create a stable platform of basic and applied 
research in this still young area of investigation.”  
(p214-215, Brown, Ryan and Creswell, 2007a) 
Mikulas (2011) further simplifies this point by stating “…it is very important to be 
clearer on what we are talking about. And this clarity will significantly improve the 
effectiveness of our programs and the usefulness of our research.” (p1), “People can 
define mindfulness as they wish, but they should be very clear about what they are 
saying.” (p5); further highlighting the need for a conceptual agreement and clarity of 
the construct of Mindfulness.  
This thesis proposes to overcome such concerns and confusion through the 
development of a pragmatic definition of Mindfulness and Mindlessness that can 
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specifically facilitate further inquiry and future incorporation of relational theories; as 
exemplified through validation of the construct of Mindfulness within the Langer 
Mindfulness/ Mindlessness Scale (Bodner and Langer, 2001). In doing so this seeks to 
not only clarify the concept definition within its application toward interaction; but 
expose how it may be further understood, analysed and applied in HCI design. 
The shared themes, descriptions, and definitions of Mindfulness (and 
Mindlessness) from existing measurements and framings (Chapters 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2) 
was treated as a corpus of data. Descriptions and definitions that were deemed 
unsuitable and too ambiguous for applicability to human-computer interaction, e.g. 
“…the miracle by which we master and restore ourselves” (p16, Hanh 1976), were 
rejected. Upon the remaining data, thematic analysis was conducted following Braun 
and Clarke (2006) at a sentence to paragraph level to summarize contents semantic 
and latent meaning. Lens was restricted toward the ways in which the authors 
specifically described/defined Mindfulness (and/or Mindlessness). For example, 
“Mindfulness can be viewed as a mode or state-like quality that is maintained only 
when attention to experience is intentionally cultivated with an open, nonjudgmental 
orientation to experience” (p1447, Lau et al., 2006); was coded as an openness to 
experience, and further categorised under the encompassing theme of Presence of 
“mind” (i.e. Conscious awareness of experience), as awareness of experience is a 
central tenet in discussing the mind and consciousness. Similarly openness to 
experience is also placed in the encompassing theme of Openness to novelty as 
such an orientation is assumed to hold a degree of rejection of predetermined mind-
sets (and acceptance of novel mind-sets). From this the following encompassing 
categories informed the further areas of investigation: 
• Presence of “mind” (i.e. Conscious awareness of experience) (Chapter 1.5 
and 1.12) 
• Directed / controlled attention and / or awareness (Chapter 1.6 and 1.12) 
• Contextualisation to present moment (Chapter 1.7) 
• Openness to novelty (Chapter 1.12) 
• Habit / repetition / automatic behaviour (Chapter 1.12 & 1.8) 
• Cognitive state (Chapter 1.11) 
(Sub categorisations can be found in Appendix 1.5) 
It should be noted however that while the broader themes are here as distinct they 
inherently overlap and are deeply interconnected.  
The initial premise to guide the research was drawn that Mindfulness involves a 
directed / controlled awareness that exists as a presence of mind (an active 
awareness toward experience) facilitating contextualisation and an openness toward 
novel distinction and creativity. Mindlessness can be framed as a lack of such 
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qualities existing as a habitual, repetitive or automatic behaviour. Both of which are 
understood as a state like experience. 
 
1.3.1: Defining Mindfulness And Mindlessness For 
Human-Computer Interaction 
As previously discussed the direct application of existing measures and 
definitions of Mindfulness towards understanding human-computer interaction is not 
suitable; i.e. holds mystification and ambiguity, focused upon resulting properties 
intended for a clinical application addressing a broader “life” disposition. 
The defining of Mindfulness (and Mindlessness) and its application holds 
importance for several reasons as noted by Brown and Cordon (though framed in 
relation to Mindfulness based interventions and behavioural science): 
“The first concerns the basic scientific principle that a phenomenon can be 
studied only if it can be properly defined and measured.  
Second, investigation of mindfulness creates opportunities to investigate 
the specific role of this quality in subjective experience and behavior 
through methodologies derived from basic science that can complement 
applied, intervention research.  
Third and relatedly, it is assumed that the efficacy of mindfulness 
interventions is due, in large part, to the enhancement of mindful capacities 
through training; but only with clear definitions and operationalization’s of 
mindfulness can this claim be tested.  
Fourth, and more fundamentally, the study of mindfulness can help to 
widen the window into the study of human consciousness and its modes of 
processing experience. In this way, the study of mindfulness can help to 
inform about the nature of consciousness, its fundamental role in human 
functioning, and how its processes can be refined to enhance that 
functioning.”  
(p59, Brown and Cordon, 2009) 
To apply the study of Mindfulness and Mindlessness in the context of HCI such 
phenomena requires a definition that facilitates opportunity to classify and measure 
such states. Such positioning (as Brown and Cordon (2009)) is here understood as 
the requirement of a definition that overcomes the ambiguity of Eastern (i.e. 
Buddhist) framings that mystify such qualities of experience and behaviour, and 
holds a broader understanding of the state than a focus upon specific desirable 
outcomes (as with many clinical interventions). As such this thesis grounds the 
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definitions of Mindfulness and Mindlessness with support from the fields and 
understandings of philosophy of the mind (Chapters 1.5-1.8) and cognitive-sciences 
(Chapters 1.11-1.12), that such qualities may be better framed through supporting 
and established understandings. While Brown and Cordon (2009, above) frame the 
necessities for such understanding in Mindfulness based interventions and 
behavioural science, the same conditionals are required in the field of human-
computer interaction. Thus, the development of the definitions of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness (presented in this research) in HCI are not only intended to clarify 
ambiguity but additionally seek to incorporate (and encourage) further investigation 
and measurement of such states. In doing so it is hoped that opportunities for 
investigation of this state (as subjective experience and behaviour) may better 
facilitate understandings of human-computer interaction that might otherwise be 
overlooked in favour of a particular quality (e.g. Intuitiveness of a system). 
Furthermore it is understood that through grounded definition and methods in 
analysis of Mindful and Mindless states the efficacy of such states may be fully 
realised and appropriately applied.  
As previously described, existing measures and definitions provided initial areas 
of investigation to understand the concept of Mindfulness and Mindlessness and 
facilitate the development of definitions (stated below).  
The contribution of these definitions are to provide an initial understanding of 
Mindfulness framed toward interaction that may facilitate further study and 
measurement of such phenomena. It should be noted that through future work such 
definitions are open (and expected) to develop to reflect advancements derived 
from contributing fields of research. The constituting elements that have informed 
the understandings and provide rational to the definitions are discussed at length in 
the following sections.  
 
1.3.2: Mindfulness 
The following is the contribution of this thesis of how Mindfulness can be defined 
in relation to human-computer interaction and is justified in the proceeding 
chapters.  
Mindfulness, is defined as a state of broad reflective-conscious awareness upon 
the present context and content of information and stimulus. Information and 
technologies are explored and combined through concerted deliberation in 
novel categorisations of distinctions and action potentials as an abstract-tool.  
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During interaction Mindfulness is slow yet analytical whilst being receptive to 
change, whereby constituting elements are consciously present through use and 
application of a fluidic-tool. 
This mental state is understood as an opposite and in flux with Mindlessness. 
A pictorial example (designed to be interpreted by the reader) of how we might 
understand Mindfulness is provided in the following Figure 1.2.   
 
Figure 1.2; Graphical depiction of Mindfulness. Differing colours represent 
different understanding and knowledge gained or developed e.g. the point 
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at which conscious reflection occurs develops new understanding that 




The following is the contribution of this thesis of how Mindlessness can be 
defined in relation to human-computer interaction and is justified in the proceeding 
chapters.  
Mindlessness is defined as an intuitive understanding that exists in non-conscious 
processes, with failure to account for contextual dependencies through 
premature cognitive commitments; where information and technologies hold a 
functional fixedness viewed as absolute through equipmental-fixedness. 
During interaction, Mindlessness is without conscious deliberation through sub-
conscious automaticity, developed from a cognitive fixation upon previous well-
learned solutions. Such actions are performed before, faster than or without 
concerted conscious awareness in phenomenological invisibility; resulting in the 
inability to develop novel solutions and the application of technology through 
equipmental-transparency. 
This mental state is understood as an opposite and in flux with Mindfulness. 
A pictorial example (designed to be interpreted by the reader) of how we might 
understand Mindlessness is provided in the following Figure 1.3. 
  37 
  
 
Figure 1.3; Graphical depiction of Mindlessness. Differing colours represent 
differing knowledges.  Solid black lines represent automatic processes of 
knowledge deduction whereas breaks in these lines represents potential 
incorporations (i.e. additional knowledges), yet lacking in adoption of 
thought and knowledge production.  
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1.4.0: Grounding Of Mindfulness And Mindlessness 
Definitions 
While the previous chapters have outlined limitations in clinical framings of 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness (toward human-computer interaction) there are others 
who frame these states in ways applicable to the context of interest to this thesis. 
Langer (1992) proposes that Mindfulness and Mindlessness are central to 
cognitive functioning, though this position is furthered by Mayer (2000) who 
suggests that a knowledge of Mindfulness may facilitate a deeper comprehension of 
consciousness, how it may be structured, and its role in human understanding and 
functioning. Mikulas (p1, 2011) expands upon this suggesting that Mindfulness may 
be understood in terms of “behaviours of the mind” (as opposed to the “contents of 
the mind” such as perceptions, memories, thoughts, and feelings), i.e. Mindfulness 
as a behaviour rather than a felt experience.  
Langer (p289, 1992) defines Mindfulness as “a state of conscious awareness in 
which the individual is implicitly aware of the context and content of information”; 
contrasted by Mindlessness as “compared to more familiar concepts such as habit, 
functional fixedness, overlearning, and automatic (v’s controlled) processing”. This 
position is supported by Hollis-Walker and Colosimo (2011) who describe 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness as a: 
“...Buddhism-derived concept and practice that involves an undistracted 
awareness of the here-and-now. A lack of Mindfulness means unknowing of 
underlying processes in our subjective and objective worlds. An example of 
this is seen by automaticity (Anderson, 1992), where a person goes into 
automatic pilot-mode during a complex, well-learned activity. Likewise is 
the ‘unknowing’ of absorption in a daydream or rumination while driving 
and the state of flow, characterized by complete engagement, balance 
between challenge and expertise, and time seemingly to stand still 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1997).”  
(p222, Hollis-Walker and Colosimo, 2011) 
Although Hollis-Walker and Colosimo suggest that Mindlessness arises when 
engaging well-learned activities, Langer (1992) proposes “… that mindlessness may 
result from a single exposure to information.”. Langer suggests that this 
Mindlessness state may occur when information (objects etc.) is/are presented or 
perceived in such a way they appear as absolute and require little or no reason to 
critically examine further. When such assumption is made the person viewing the 
information fails to see “contextual dependencies” that may alter the meaning of 
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the information, and in its place permanently fix the meaning of what was originally 
assumed. This is understood as developing and enacting a “Premature Cognitive 
Commitment” (Chanowitz and Langer, 1981). That is, Mindlessness is enacted as a 
lack of conscious awareness upon information/events regarding their “Semantic 
Variability” (Langer, 1989), having no reflection upon content and context. Langer 
and Imber’s (1979) earlier studies suggest that even though tasks may initially be 
performed with concerted effort, potentially as Mindfully, with increased familiarity 
the ability to keep a Mindful awareness of the task becomes increasingly 
inaccessible.  
A pictorial example (intended to be interpreted by the reader) of how we might 
compare Mindlessness and Mindfulness is provided in the following Figure 1.4. 
 
 
Figure 1.4; Comparison of Mindfulness and Mindlessness in relation to the 
adoption and incorportation of cotent and context informing discision 
making and action. 
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Langer and Imbers positioning is significant here as not only does it suggest that 
our approach towards activities (and so technologies) may become habitual but 
furthermore, our approach toward interactive objects may also carry a 
decontextualised fixed meaning. That is to say, we may develop a fixed meaning 
and use of technologies (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985), regardless of their 
additional potential functionalities and contextual dependencies, derived from their 
presentation or previous usage. Within HCI there has been much ongoing work in 
understanding how objects communicate their potential utilities (known as 
affordance – discussed at length in Chapter 1.8). 
Through Langer and Imbers understanding it is suggested that such 
communication of how an object may be used (its affordances or rather our 
subjective-understanding them) can be altered through a Mindful (i.e. seeing 
multiple use) and Mindless (i.e. fixed use) approach. Therefore it is important that we 
understand our experience of such communication and/or relationship toward 
technologies (i.e. their affordances) in the broader understanding of Mindful and 
Mindless interactions as a core attribute of these states. In this thesis this is achieved 
through a philosophical understanding supported through findings in the field of 
cognitive science.  
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1.5.0: Mindfulness And Consciousness 
“Time and effort are required to integrate our positivist psychological 
tradition with a Buddhist phenomenological orientation based upon 
thousands of years of systematic investigation of subjective experience.” 
(p1039, Grossman, 2011) 
“It is also challenging to discuss the concept of mindfulness; research on 
the topic is comparatively new to the field of behavioural science but more 
deeply, mindfulness concerns consciousness…”  
(p272, Brown, Ryan, Creswell, 2007: b).  
The concept of Mindfulness can be understood through a framing of 
consciousness; “Mindfulness is a state of conscious awareness…” (p289, Langer, 
1992).  
Consciousness is a term that is often used to describe several states, such as a 
“wakefulness” (i.e. the opposite of asleep or a coma), to be ‘aware of’ something 
(e.g. Visual or auditory perception), and as a mental state (e.g. emotion and thought) 
(Rosenthal, 2009). In the context of this thesis the ‘wakefulness’ of a person is not of 
focus as it is assumed that a person interacting with digital technologies is capable 
of interaction (i.e. Has the capability to be responsive to stimulus or environment). 
For this thesis the context in which consciousness is used is in relation to a “first-
person view” of the world, a subjective experience one holds as a sentient being 
and observable through introspection (the ‘observation’ or ‘paying attention toward’ 
ones thoughts, feelings and perceptions).  
While emotional and mental states exhibit a physiological change in the body, 
the uncovering of consciousness as biological function (often assumed as a product 
of brain function) has proven difficult (Blackmore, 2007). This has led to a number of 
understandings of consciousness, often through a mental and physical relationship 
(often referred to as mind-body problem) in attempt to resolve the “problem of 
consciousness” i.e. the difficulty in explaining ‘experiential consciousness’ (Kügler, 
2013). This mind-body problem (of experiential consciousness) can be understood 
(as simplified example) that we may observe how the brain functions when holding a 
cup, e.g. different areas of the brain show activity such as the motor-cortex 
controlling voluntary arm movement etc. (as measurable physiological changes); but 
the experience of the cup (the 'qualia' of experience), its felt texture, perception of 
how ‘deep’ a shade of orange it is, the pleasure it produces; is subjective and does 
not exhibit distinct ‘physiological presence’ that is (currently) measurable or 
quantifiable (as conscious ‘felt’ experience).  
Attempts to answer this ‘problem of consciousness’ and how such experiences 
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arise have yet to be satisfactorily addressed and has often lead to a dualistic 
understanding reliant upon ‘unknowns’; furthering disagreement between disciplines 
and schools of thought (see: Vimal, 2010 for overview). Indeed the complications 
and difficulty of understanding such phenomena has previously been noted; e.g. 
Chalmers: 
“Consciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the 
mind. There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious 
experience, but there is nothing that is harder to explain. All sorts of mental 
phenomena have yielded to scientific investigation in recent years, but 
consciousness has stubbornly resisted.” 
(p200, Chalmers, 1995) 
And so conscious experience still remains ‘inexplicable’ through an empirical 
answer of complete understanding (i.e. Consciousness is produced by “x”), 
prompting much on-going discussion. However, as noted by Brown and Cordon, this 
does not need to dismiss the study of consciousness as a facet of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness, rather the inclusion of such debate can further our understanding: 
 “[…] the annals of philosophical and psychological discourse are replete 
with discussions of consciousness that can help to inform the construction 
of a well-specified theory about the meaning and functional consequences 
of mindfulness.” 
(p60, Brown and Cordon, 2009) 
Thus, the understanding of Mindfulness and Mindlessness, as states of 
experience, necessitates the inclusion of the discourse of consciousness.  
 
It is important to note that this thesis draws upon the study of consciousness as a 
central and integral part in the understanding of Mindfulness however, it does not 
claim to demonstrate or explain consciousness as a function or product of an organ 
(e.g. brain). While the “how it is produced” of consciousness remains elusive it will 
be demonstrated that the “when it is produced” can be observed through 
introspection and measurement of physiological process.  
 
1.5.1: Consciousness And Scientific Inquiry 
Chalmers states ““Consciousness” is an ambiguous term, referring to many 
different phenomena.”(p200, 1995); which he divides into two sets of “problems”;  
easy, which can be understood through conventional cognitive science relating to 
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the “computational” or neural mechanisms of the body (such as reaction to stimulus, 
difference between wakefulness and sleep) and hard, processes of conscious 
organisms that pose much greater challenge to detect, measure and isolate. As 
noted by Chalmers: 
 “The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. 
When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but 
there is also a subjective aspect.”  
[…] 
“…there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective 
aspect is experience.” 
(p201, Chalmers, 1995) 
We can understand Mindfulness as a property of consciousness as many of the 
‘easy problems’ (i.e. those that can be understood as cognitive aspects of an 
organism (Chapter 1.11)) are directly related to the areas of inquiry and framings 
previously discussed in the methods of measuring Mindfulness. Yet Mindfulness may 
also be categorised as a form of ‘hard problem’ involving introspection and 
subjective experience of such ‘easy problem’ qualities. Consequently this requires a 
deeper understanding and defining (performed in the following Chapter 1.5.2) 
This thesis draws upon and integrates cognitive science and philosophy to 
provide a thorough understanding of how the constituting elements of Mindfulness 
and Mindlessness may be classified, measured and utilised in the use of digital 
technologies. However, while drawing upon fields such as neuroscience this does 
not intend to state that consciousness is purely a product of the brain; as noted by 
Vimal (2010) and Pepperell (2000) such a claim would be, and often is, unfounded 
and heavily contested. It is, however, recognised that many aspects of subjective 
experience (i.e. consciousness) are closely correlated with observable physiology of 
the body; e.g. brain activity (see Kügler (2013), Baars (2002) and Valera (1996) for 
examples). And so, the broader positioning of this thesis adopts that as stated by 
Pepperell (2000) that ”Consciousness is the function of an organism, not an organ". 
In doing so, this thesis supports the position that one cannot frame consciousness as 
reducible to physiological processes and distinct from the context (environment) of 
the agent in question; a position sympathetic to that of embodiment (Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch; 1991).  
In its approach this thesis’ position does not seek to reduce consciousness as a 
phenomenon of physiology, but seeks to apply findings in related fields (e.g. 
neuroscience) to further understandings of Mindfulness and Mindlessness while 
remaining aware of the limitations of such applications. Thus the integration of 
philosophy and science in this thesis aims to facilitate better understandings and 
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perspectives that are unachievable by conventional scientific methods, that attempt 
to reduce such phenomena to physiological processes, alone.  
Therefore the contribution of this thesis draw upon philosophy of the mind but 
should not be considered as promotion or denial that consciousness exists as a 
measurable physiological manifestation; yet observable correlations of such a 
phenomena (to physiological manifestations) can improve our understanding. 
 
1.5.2: Mindfulness, Mindless And Between: Four Forms 
Of Consciousness 
To clarify understanding of consciousness, four terms are introduced to frame 
different conscious experiences within the context of this thesis and its contribution 
of how Mindfulness and Mindlessness can be understood in human-computer 
interaction. In doing so it provides the utility of explicitly stating what ‘form’ of 
consciousness is discussed and avoids common language / clinical understandings 
e.g. conscious being responsive, or as an opposite to unconscious (or comatose). In 
doing so this facilitates broader distinctions when referring to specific 
phenomenological states of interaction, yet still adheres to the concepts presented. 
This follows in line of Chalmers point that ““Consciousness” is an ambiguous term, 
referring to many different phenomena.”(p200, 1995). As previously described 
(chapter 1.2.1) Brown and Ryan differentiate “awareness” as “the background 
“radar” of consciousness, continually monitoring the inner and outer environment.”, 
and “attention” as “process of focusing conscious awareness, providing heightened 
sensitivity to a limited range of experience ” (p822, Brown and Ryan, 2003). Both of 
these properties are understood as properties of consciousness in that they are an 
experience of sensing the environment; though both hold a differing degree or 
range of experience. Brown and Ryan state that Mindfulness might be considered an 
even further range of experience to normal functioning: 
 “…attention and awareness are relatively constant features of normal 
functioning, mindfulness can be considered an enhanced attention to and 
awareness of current experience or present reality”  
(p822, Brown and Ryan, 2003)  
From reflection upon our own experience we can see that our experiential 
consciousness is not continually present as a singular state. While reading you may 
turn a page without concerted attention toward doing so yet hold awareness of the 
action; when driving people often arrive to a destination with no recollection of the 
act of driving. But these are not permanent qualities, breathing is an automatic 
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behaviour, yet can be ‘consciously’ controlled, sensed and interrupted.  
Here, the distinction of the differing states of consciousness aims to clarify 
ambiguity and confusion when discussing these subtle different states. 
 
1.5.3: Reflective-Conscious (Mindful):  
Awareness of external stimulus and internal thought processes present at the 
forefront of subjective-experience. Introspection and abstraction upon the meanings 
and values of such stimulus and subjective-experience is facilitated in this state. This 
may be understood as paying attention towards potential and actual objects, actions 
or experiences as goals and meanings at a meta level.  
For example, When observing a coffee table and appreciating its aesthetic 
qualities while recognising its constituting elements, meaning and affect, and 
affordances. This state of consciousness may be understood as a high-level 
abstraction. Such states of consciousness is that which is required to resolve the Two 
Rings Problem (McCaffrey, 2012) (described in chapter 1.7.1), whereby an abstract 
reflection upon objects as "raw" elements towards a broader goal is required.  
This state is represented in pictorial example (designed to be interpreted by the 
reader) in the following Figure 1.5. 
 
 
Figure 1.5; Pictorial 
example (designed 
to be interpreted 
by the reader) of 








reflection) all shape 
knowledge 
production. 
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1.5.4: Conscious (Mindful):  
Awareness of external stimulus present at the forefront of subjective-experience. 
This may be understood as paying attention towards a particular action or 
experience e.g. Deliberately running one's hand over a table to feel its texture and 
listen to the sound it makes, or being aware of the surrounding environment and its 
context. 
This state is represented in pictorial example (designed to be interpreted by the 




(designed to be 
interpreted by 
the reader) of 
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1.5.5: Sub-conscious (Mindless):  
Termed as ‘un-conscious’ within some literature; experience, emotions and 
actions not in, yet accessible to conscious awareness through deliberation. This state 
is typically exemplified through “driving without awareness” (also referred to as 
highway hypnosis):  
“…a sudden realisation that you have no recollection of the past several 
minutes of driving, and that you have arrived at this point in the journey 
with little or no conscious attention to the surrounding traffic.”  
(p456, Charlton and Starkey, 2011).  
 
This state is represented in pictorial example (designed to be interpreted by the 




(designed to be 
interpreted by the 










though can be 
drawn into 
knowledges and 
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1.5.5: Non-conscious (Mindless):  
Awareness and actions that exist beyond conscious control (as involuntary). Many 
non-conscious actions may hold a degree of ability to be considered sub-conscious 
e.g. Breathing is largely non-conscious though may be influenced, but is  often 
understood as ‘instinctual’. An example of non-conscious action may be a sneeze in 
reaction to sniffing spilt pepper or a visceral response to a film (e.g. Laughter, fear, 
excitement).  
This state is represented in pictorial example (designed to be interpreted by the 




(designed to be 
interpreted by the 









external stimulus is 
ignored, conscious 
control does not 






Such distinctions of consciousness will later be further justified, though are 
presented here as a lexicon to aide in understanding the presented concepts. 
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1.6.0: Phenomenology And Its Relevance To 
Understanding Mindfulness And Mindlessness 
During Interaction With Technology 
Phenomenology is a branch of philosophy that studies the structures of 
consciousness as experienced from a first-person (subjective) point of view; i.e. the 
subjective aspect: conscious experience.  
When understanding Mindfulness as originating through a Buddhist 
phenomenological orientation (Grossman, 2011) that deeply concerns consciousness 
(Brown, Ryan, Creswell, 2007b), and through phenomenological perspectives, the 
positioning of the research in understanding this phenomena as a state of 
experience of (and through) interactive digital technologies (as opposed to a 
general disposition) is justified. Furthermore, the application of phenomenological 
philosophy of technology use and experience may also be applied to broaden 
understandings of Mindfulness and Mindlessness during human-computer 
interaction. 
As noted by Smith (2013) the literal understanding of phenomenology is the 
study of “phenomena”: “… appearances of things, or things as they appear in our 
experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our 
experience”. Phenomenology can be understood as the consideration of not only 
the perception of objects, tools or information but centric upon how such qualities 
manifest as the knowledge experience of these; “phenomenology is given a much 
wider range, addressing the meaning things have in our experience, notably, the 
significance of objects, events, tools, the flow of time, the self, and others, as these 
things arise and are experienced in our “life-world” ” (Smith, 2013).  
The ‘school’ of phenomenology (as a 20th century ‘Western’ philosophical 
movement) is often attributed to stemming from the thoughts and works of Edmund 
Husserl (and developed from that of Franz Brentano). Husserl placed “intentionality” 
as the central concept in his philosophy of mind, as a fundamental property of 
consciousness (McIntyre and Smith, 1989). Intentionality is the concept of 
consciousness as a "directedness" “of” or “about” something. The facility to read 
Mindfulness through a “Husserlian” lens has previously been noted by Brown and 
Cordon: 
“While the concept of mindfulness appears to have been first described in 
Asia, its phenomenological nature is strikingly familiar to Western 
philosophical and psychological schools of thought. Phenomenology, 
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particularly in the Husserlian school (e.g., Husserl, 1999), has a considerable 
literature of relevance to the experiential nature of mindfulness.”   
(p61, Brown and Cordon, 2009) 
 
1.6.1: Heidegger And The Phenomenology Of Tools And 
Equipment 
Martin Heidegger is regarded as a highly influential philosopher whose work can 
be seen as a continuation of the questions raised through phenomenology posed by 
Husserl. Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology can be understood as in 
opposition to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology (p2, Dreyfus, 1991). As 
noted by Winograd and Flores (1986) Heidegger's writing, and the broader 
understanding and questioning of 'Being' ('Dasein'), are both important yet difficult 
in the understanding interactions with technology. Dasein is translatable from its 
German origins as 'being-there' or 'being-here' (more commonly known as being-in-
the-world), but more broadly meaning an existence or 'presence' of an entity or 
agent capable of conscious experience and phenomenological contemplation 
(reflective-consciousness).  
Here focus is directed toward the understanding and interpretation of two 
interrelated concepts within Heidegger’s philosophy, Ready-to-hand and Present-at-
hand; including the expansion upon these two terms found upon Koschmann, 
Kuutti, and Hickman's (1998) “un-ready-to-hand” and “purely-present-at-hand” (an 
adaption of p210, Dreyfus, 1991). The application of such understandings directly 
addresses the notions of Mindfulness and Mindlessness as they may be understood 
in contemplative (conscious and reflective-conscious) and automatic / non-reflective 
actions (sub/non-conscious) toward and through technologies. 
 
1.6.2: Heidegger On Functioning And Breakdown 
As noted by Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman (1998) Heidegger posed that the 
"resources" though which we live our daily life (normal day-to-day activities) do not 
require our conscious awareness (though here understood as not requiring a "full 
concerted" or effortful reflective-/conscious awareness), there is a "transparency of 
equipment" (Dreyfus, 1991) whereby equipment in use "disappears" and so "we are 
not aware of it as having any characteristics at all" (p94, Dreyfus, 1991). For 
example: a postal worker may enter their vehicle and begin a journey to the place of 
delivery, while they are aware of the experience (to a degree) they are not fully 
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conscious toward the vehicle they are operating. They operate the controls of 
vehicle, though none needs to be effortful and thought through or deliberated upon 
(i.e. Does not require reflective-/conscious awareness). It is as though the vehicle is 
an extension of their body, the actions of how to interact with the vehicle are 
transparent to the experience of the user. This is often, in common use language, 
understood as being 'at one' with an object, an intuitive (discussed at length in 
chapter 1.12) or 'natural' knowing, as an effortless interaction.  
That is, once effortful interactions or tasks, with repetition and practice become 
less effortful to the point of becoming sub-conscious (i.e. without concerted 
conscious consideration) or instinctive. As described by Heidegger in relation to a 
hammer: 
"…the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold 
of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and 
the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is—as equipment. […] 
The kind of Being which equipment possesses—in which it manifests itself 
in its own right—we call ‘readiness-to-hand’."  
(p98, Heidegger, 1962) 
That is to say, when we stop viewing the hammer as an object and assessing its 
qualities (i.e. its 'outward appearance' ["Aussehen"] (p98, Heidegger, 1962)) and put 
it to use in the act of hammering; we develop a relational understanding toward the 
hammer as an action.  
The use of the hammer further exposes how 'it is' in use. Thus, when the hammer 
is in this state of "Being" it holds a property to which equipment possess that is 
beyond the hammer as a viewed and contemplated object; and becomes a state of 
being in its own right and in relationship to the environment. As noted by Winograd 
and Flores: 
"To the person doing the hammering, the hammer as such does not exist. 
Its is part of the background […] taken for granted without explicit 
recognition or identification as an object. It is part of the hammerer's world, 
but it is not present any more than are the tendons of the hammerer's arm."  
(p36, Winograd and Flores, 1986) 
Heidegger defines such a state as "Ready-to-hand" where objects (e.g. A 
hammer) in use (e.g. Hammering in a nail) are not in the reflective-/conscious 
experience of the user, they are "transparent” to introspection. 
"If we look at Things just 'theoretically', we can get along without 
understanding readiness-to-hand. But when we deal with them by using 
them and manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; it has its own 
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kind of sight, by which our manipulation is guided and from which it 
acquires its specific Thingly character… "  
(p98, Heidegger, 1962) 
This form of “experience” that one holds of an equipment that is ready-to-hand, 
is without explicit concentration or contemplation upon it; and as such, where the 
equipment recedes from reflective-/conscious awareness, it is no longer available to 
be 'theorised' upon. Yet in this state it is experienced through; as though 'it' (the 
equipment) is an extension of the 'self' (the subjective experience, the Dasein of a 
"hammerer" and experience of hammering). 
While ready-to-hand is in relation to understanding the equipment as purely 
functional and in use, there is logically the opposite of such a state, Present-at-hand, 
whereby a 'breakdown' occurs and the equipment becomes theorised upon.  
A breakdown within the context of this thesis is understood as that defined by 
Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman: 
"…a disruption in the normal functioning of things forcing the individual to 
adopt a more reflective or deliberative stance toward ongoing activity." 
(p26, Koschmann, Kuuti and Hickman, 1998) 
Thus a “breakdown” here provides a point of comparison; in opposition to the 
sub-/non-conscious states of interaction, as a contemplative reflective-/conscious 
state whereby “things” are brought to our awareness and available for theorising 
upon. As described, an equipment may be ready-to-hand and this may be 
understood as normal “day-to-day” existence or functioning. However, there are 
times when a breakdown occurs, when equipment once ready-to-hand becomes 
unusable (as normal functioning) and "not properly adapted for the use we have 
decided upon" (p102, Heidegger, 1962). When such events occur our perception of 
the equipment is altered: 
"We discover its unusability, however, not by looking at it and establishing 
its properties, but rather by the circumspection of the dealings in which we 
use it. When its unusability is thus discovered, equipment becomes 
conspicuous."   
(p102, Heidegger, 1962) 
Thus the equipment becomes a state of “un-readiness-to-hand”. It reveals itself 
as an "equipmental Thing which looks so and so" (p103, Heidegger, 1962), as such 
it shows itself as present-at-hand. As noted by Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 
such a breakdown can fundamentally alter our experience, understanding, and use 
of technologies:  
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"Resources for Heidegger can present themselves in different modes of 
being - that is to say, they can assume different states with respect to our 
ongoing activity. The status of an entity can, in turn, affect the nature of our 
activity and our understanding of the object in use." 
(p26, Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998) 
Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman expand upon understandings of ready-to-hand 
and present-at-hand (in an adaption of p210, Dreyfus, 1991):  
 
 
(Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998, p27) 
 
Thus, as stated by Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman (1998) when an entity 
(equipment) is ready-to-hand the nature of the activity (experienced by the agent 
interacting) is through a primary understanding, where such a state is experienced 
non-reflectively and sub-/non-consciously. However, there exists a transitory state 
where an equipment is no longer ready-to-hand but un-ready-to-hand. This state 
facilitates deliberation whereby the activity does not encounter a full "breakdown", 
as the context of the activity remains the same; however, it does not maintain full 
absorption to the task. That is to say, there is a change in the phenomenological 
relationship and the once sub-/non-conscious activity is made aware of and enters 
conscious awareness. Such a state may be exemplified as a delivery worker reaching 
to change a gear of the van he/she is driving and "finding" the wrong gear; the 
ready-to-handness of the driving is momentarily interrupted, the correct gear needs 
to be selected, where its (the relationship between driver and van) ready-to-
handness is restored and the driving act continues. Figure 1.9 provides an 
interpretive understanding of how we might conceptualise such transitioning of 
conscious states. 
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Figure 1.9; Pictorial example (designed to be interpreted by the reader) of 
how we might understand transitional moments between sub-conscious 
and conscious events. Thought processes (vertical) run from top of figure. 
When encountering breakdown thought processes become more complex, 
until repair of activity and normal functioning. 
However, there exists a present-at-hand state that is considered a resultant of a 
breakdown of an equipment. For example, should the delivery drivers van 
breakdown unexpectedly, the once ready-to-hand (and so extension of the self as 
transparent equipment), calls itself into question and reflection, it is theorised upon. 
When in this state the "Thing" is viewed as a separate object and available to 
consciousness. This presence-at-hand occurs from the event of a breakdown, the 
"interrupted moment of our habitual, standard, comfortable 'being-in-the-world'". 
(p77, Winograd and Flores, 1986). The equipment at hand becomes exposed from 
its phenomenological transparency and resolve is required, as noted by Koschmann, 
Kuutti, and Hickman: 
"In this way, aspects of the situation that were previously tacit, such as the 
causal connections among actions and goals, now become explicit." 
(p28, Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998) 
Further to this state of present-at-hand exists a state of reflective-consciousness, 
pure-present-at-hand: 
"In this mode, it is possible to contemplate concepts in an entirely abstract 
way, independent of any context."  
  55 
(p28, Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998) 
Where the delivery van was once ready-to-hand and an extension of the driver's 
"self" is broken, in a state of pure-present-at-hand it becomes an object without 
action and it can only be theorised upon. As defined by Heidegger (when referring 
to equipment once ready-to-hand yet now observed in terms of its properties): 
"Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment, but only to 
withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of something with which one concerns 
oneself - that is to say, of the sort of this we find when we put it back into 
repair"   
(p103, Heidegger, 1962)  
The following figure (figure 1.10) provides a pictorial representation of how these 
varying states of phenomena might be understood comparatively. 
 
 
Figure 1.10; Pictorial example (designed to be interpreted by the reader) of 
how we might understand technology use (when functional as black) from 
prior to object use (top), as unready to hand (right) whereby actions and 
knowledges increase in complexity, ready-to-hand (black verticle) simplistic 
knowledges and actions without contemplation, and when encouring a 
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breakdown event (bottom) when a number of actions and knowledges are 
provoked. During breakdown the previous action (black) is no longer 
fostered as knowledges become too complex. 
And so, in Hiedeggerian understandings, technologies, objects, tools, or 
equipment may be understood as holding properties that may only exist and be 
understood through; their use, as a posteriori, dependent upon experience, 
"habitual, standard, comfortable" (p77, Winograd and Flores, 1986); and toward the 
opposing end of the spectrum, specifically through their contemplation, as a priori, 
and purely abstract until their functionality is restored. Koschmann, Kuutti, and 
Hickman (1998) draw upon these philosophies of Heidegger and place them in 
comparison to Leont'ev and Dewey to provide a broader understanding of "…the 
role of breakdown or failure as a means of revealing the nature of the world around 
us." (p25). This position is particularly useful as the paradigms they offer are 
developed in differing fields, phenomenology, behavioural psychology, and, 
psychology of education. This, here, provides broader grounding and supports the 
approach of this thesis as fundamentally interdisciplinary. While Koschmann, Kuutti, 
and Hickman acknowledge they are not the first to compare the three bodies of 
work, in being focused toward the understanding of breakdown between the work 
they provide a novel contribution.  
1.6.3: Leont'ev On Functioning And Breakdown 
Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman (1998) compare the work of Leont'ev to that of 
Heidegger with regard to breakdown. Leont'ev poses three hierarchical levels in that 
of Activity Theory; Activities, Actions, and, Operations. Activities (an object or 
motive of the activity) consist of a number of Actions (a sub-set of goals) that in turn 
consist of a number of Operations (conditions) (Koschmann, Kuutti, and 
Hickman,1998). An interpretive comparison between the positions of Leont’ev and 
various conscious states (previously defined Chapter 1.5) can be found in figure 
1.11. 
 
Figure 1.11; Comparison of 
position of Leont’ev toward 





For example, a postal worker may enter their vehicle and begin a journey to the 
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place of delivery (the delivery of the parcel being the motive or activity). As with the 
previous example they turn the steering wheel to navigate obstacles, alter their 
speed to the flow of traffic etc. (i.e. a number of actions are required in the activity). 
To turn the steering wheel the postal worker must coordinate their hand and arm 
movements etc., indeed the broader actions (such as navigating around obstacles) 
involve a further subset of actions, yet these are routinised and so understood as 
operations. Thus, as Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman (1998) state, as we go further 
"down" through the levels of actions and the goals of such actions become 
increasingly smaller, we reach levels where actions are no longer performed 
consciously:  
"…that level, and levels below that, are called Operations. Operations, 
therefore, lack conscious goals but are instead triggered by conditions 
faced during an Action. They are employed in adapting an Action to actual 
conditions."  
(p29, Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998)  
While Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman (1998) initially state that operations are 
unconscious they do note that there are two forms of operations; Adaptive through 
sub-/non-conscious adaptations to conditions of the larger objective conditions and 
performed as "involuntary, initially unconscious, and rigid (e.g. bodily movements 
needed for balancing on a bicycle)" (p29), and, conscious operations formed 
through the course of learning and are typically a planned model of action, 
understood as possessing an orienting basis.  
However, it is noted that: 
"When a model for a conscious Action is good enough, the Action has 
been practiced long enough, and the situation is sufficiently stable, the 
Action loses its "orienting basis" and becomes "routinized" into an 
Operation. […] The process of "routinization" of independent Operations 
and the subsequent broadening scope of associated Actions are 
fundamental features of human development. […] At the beginning, every 
step in the process […] is a conscious Action that requires planning, 
sequencing, and decisions. As these conscious Actions become routinized, 
however, the planning and decision making eventually fade away, resulting 
in a smoothly integrated Action. Ultimately, this […] Action becomes an 
embedded Operation in more complex […] Actions." 
(p29-30, Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998) 
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Figure 1.12, interpretation of 
Leont’ev’s position of how breakdown 










Thus, when engaging in skilled and complex actions there are routinised sub-
/non-conscious operations that facilitate a broader emergent and complex action.  
However, it is noted that should there be a breakdown (an interruption in normal 
functioning), previously developed (sub-conscious) operations will revert to requiring 
a conscious or reflective-conscious action to resolve (see figure 1.12). For example, 
when learning to drive a van a reflectively-conscious planning of how to achieve the 
meta motive is thought out, the necessary equipment is collected and planned out, 
the agent learning to drive will learn all of the smaller steps (operations) such as how 
to control the breaking, balance starting, change gear, follow what the eye sees and 
translate it to a movement of the vehicle through the steering wheel through 
dexterity of hand and arm movements; all of which require reflective-conscious  to 
consciously focused attention. Once the agent has acquired sufficient skill, the once 
conscious operations become sub-conscious and amalgamate toward a singular 
action and activity. Yet should the activity encounter a breakdown, e.g. the vehicle 
stalls and looses power, the activity shifts back towards the action and calls the 
operation into consciousness, potentially shifting to a new activity (that of repair of 
the fault or breakdown). It is understood that Leont'ev places conscious operations 
as a primacy of knowing as all operations were once reflective-/conscious actions, 
running in opposition to Heidegger who places the transparency of equipment as 
the primacy of knowing (Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998); yet both explain 
the breakdown of tools in analogous understandings i.e. Resorting to a reflective-
/conscious awareness upon the point or place of breakdown. 
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1.6.4: Dewey On Functioning And Breakdown 
The third comparison raised by Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman (1998) is upon 
the works of Dewey. Dewey distinguishes stimulus from sensory excitation 
exemplified as an animals sensing toward a scent where the response is localised to 
the sensory organs (nostrils dilate, inhalation draws scent to olfactory receptors etc.). 
This is understood as localised "Because there is no disequilibration, there is no 
need for readjustment of the organic and environmental factors of the total 
experienced situation." (p31, Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998). However, 
should the animal experience a global disequilibration a more demanding "stimulus-
and-response" event occurs and provokes a motive or action to return to 
equilibration. Thus disequilibration exists as a tension of motives or stimulus to be 
resolved, with the degree to which the disequilibration exists as leading toward 
action or inhibition of action.  
It is understood that while the above may present the role of disequilibration as a 
totality, a task or goal may hold several minor disequilibrations during the course 
toward achieving equilibrium (the broader primary goal). Yet as noted by 
Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman (1998): 
"…Dewey thought that organic reequilibration is sequential and not merely 
serial. It therefore plays an essential role in the formation of new habits. 
Even though an organism may experience repeated occurrences of 
excitation-response behavior, such behavior does not contribute to 
readjustment within a total experienced situation. For there to be 
readjustment, there must first have been a breakdown of organic energy 
relations. The consequent struggle for reequilibration is then the basis for 
reformation of habits. In such cases, closure or consummation involves a 
consolidation of past experiences with a view to their potential use in future 
breakdowns of relevant types. In the case of nonhuman animals, habit 
formation is "pushed from behind", unreflectively. Among humans, 
however, habit formation is "pulled from beyond" by reflectively 
constructed ends-in-view. For Dewey, life, especially life that involves 
complex organizational factors, is a continuing process of breakdown and 
reconstruction of habits.  
Dewey observed that humans often attempt to recover equilibrium in ways 
that do not promote growth. Faced with a breakdown, they often retreat to 
more primitive levels of behavioral response rather than moving forward 
onto behavioral plateaus that are more richly meaningful."  
(p32, Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998) 
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Thus, for Dewey a human is capable of a reflective-conscious understanding that 
often addresses a longer (temporality) or wider encompassing goal as opposed to 
resolving sensory excitation (primitive levels of behavioural response). Such 
perspectives of actions developing from sensory excitation are parallel to cognitivist 
views as will be discussed later in chapter 1.11 (see: Århem and Liljenström (1997)). 
Many actions are reliant upon previously developed habitual responses in 
resolving equilibrium, with challenges presented being the breakdown and 
reconstruction of habits. However, humans often attempt to recover equilibrium 
through means that do not promote growth and fall reliant upon previously 
developed habits; they respond sequentially through previously learned methods, 
and so do not develop practices that are more richly meaningful. To achieve growth 
a level of "inquiry" is required that is a reflective level of action (and thus reflective-
conscious) and facilitates development and improves the response towards a 
required action. Therefore, a breakdown for Dewey is not only an obstacle in an 
objective but is additionally "…the occasion for the formation of new habits, 
including enriched technologies of all sorts, ..." (p32, Koschmann, Kuutti, and 
Hickman, 1998). 
A visual interpretive example of how Dewey’s position compares to the previously 
defined differing states of conscious awareness is provided in the following figure 
1.13.  
Figure 1.13; Interpretation of how 
the position of Dewey might be 
understood in terms of the 
previously defined (Chapter 1.5) 
differing states of consciousness. 
To be noted is that enriched new 
equilibrium state is of a different 
colour to the previous habit as it is 





Thus, through Dewey's understanding, while challenges and breakdowns may pose 
difficulties towards agents should they move beyond habitual and pre-learned 
responses the breakdown or challenge offers opportunity to develop a broader 
understanding and growth.  
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Using the example of a delivery driver responding to the vehicles engine 
struggling to maintain speed or achieve acceleration requiring a gear change; a 
level of inquiry and growth is required to ease such situation i.e. Learning to change 
gear prior to such events e.g. seeing an approaching roundabout and adjusting the 
vehicles gears and speed to ease efficiency and manoeuvrability.  
Through Dewey’s understanding instances of breakdown are seen as observable 
facts of life (and learning) in the formation and improvement of habits toward 
cessation of disequilibration and opportunities facilitating enriching experiences. 
 
1.6.2: Heidegger, Leont'ev And Dewey Agreements And 
Disagreements 
While the three understandings (Heidegger, Leont'ev and Dewey) differ in their 
framing of breakdowns there are commonalities that are applicable to the research 
presented here. Specifically this can be understood as a breakdown causing a 
deliberate contemplation upon a tool or task as a disruption to non-reflective and 
habitual (sub-conscious) processing. Additionally each of the models of breakdown 
hold intentionality toward a goal as a congruent theme, thus a breakdown can only 
occur in the context of a directed activity. Should a breakdown occur outside of the 
aims of a goal (in that it does not impact the immediacy of the activity) then it will 
not alter the actions of the agent or their experience in the activity. Therefore, here 
normal functioning and breakdown are understood as necessitating a context in the 
directedness toward “something” (i.e. a goal or technology) rather than abstract 
experience. As Mindfulness and Mindlessness are here understood as states of 
consciousness it further supports the positioning that an agent can be Mindful or 
Mindless toward a goal or technology (as a state as opposed to a trait).  
These philosophical understandings are useful toward a pragmatic definition of 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness as they facilitate understanding the phenomena 
within well-established domains, through modalities accessible beyond constrains of 
empirical investigation (given the challenges of understanding consciousness 
through conventional scientific inquiry), and in ways applicable to the use of 
technologies and so the field of HCI. Through situating Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness alongside these philosophies we are equally able to reduce the 
ambiguity (through richer descriptions) of what phenomena is being described and 
where. 
While the positions of Heidegger, Dewey and Leont'ev are not directly framed 
within Mindfulness and Mindlessness they are able to be compared through 
examples of Mindfulness and Mindlessness in the following chapter.  
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1.7.0: Mindfulness And Functioning And 
Breakdown 
As noted by Langer (1989) those who are able to undertake a once concerted 
and effortful task (e.g. Knitting) are often able to multitask (e.g. Knit while watching 
T.V.) and so "…knows how learned tasks drop out of mind." (p20). That is to say, 
through repetitive practice of a task or skill (use of a technology) and with 
improvement "…the individual parts of the task move out of our consciousness. 
Eventually, we come to assume that we can [original in italics] do the task although 
we no longer know how [original in italics] we do it." (p20, Langer, 1989). This 
framing of knowledge acquirement and use, as presented by Langer, would agree 
with Leont'ev and Dewey in that initially there is a degree of learning, a conscious 
directed awareness toward the task or object to which later becomes inaccessible 
without concerted introspection (see figure 1.14); as noted by Langer: 
"If something or someone makes us question our competence on a task 
that we know moderately well but is not overlearned in this way, we can 
search our minds for the steps of the task and find them"  
(p20, Langer, 1989) 
 
 
Figure 1.14; example of formation from effortful novice activity performance 
might transition toward ‘Mindless expert’ performance. This figure is 
interpretive of such action and draws upon the previous images of 
conscious states (Chapter 1.5) 
Langer proposes such a state as that which may be understood as a "Mindless 
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"Expert"". That is, when a task is performed with so much repetition and proficient 
ability it can be understood as being performed expertly (Mindlessly) whereby such 
steps or process may no longer be consciously required. Such a positioning is 
parallel towards that of Leont'ev and Dewey. 
Langer recalls an experience where she observed a highly competent typist who 
had built up such advanced skills over time. Langer enquired if he (the typist) could 
teach her (Langer); in doing so the typist: 
"… Began to take apart each skill, his quick fingers slowed way down and 
so did his memory for how and what he typed. Becoming conscious or 
mindful incapacitated him"  
(p20, Langer, 1989) 
Thus, when engaged in a well learned activity that does not require concerted 
conscious awareness to the elements of the activity it could be understood to be 
performing as ready-to-hand, a routinised operation, and habitual; and in the 
research presented here (and that of Langer, 1989) sub-consciously and Mindless. 
Yet should a person engaged with an activity (as ready-to-hand) be required to 
perform a concerted awareness toward the activity a breakdown occurs; 
contemplation is required (or invoked) and the tool or activity becomes present-at-
hand, is drawn into reflective-/conscious awareness and, as framed in the research 
here (and by Langer, 1989), Mindful. This is exemplified in figure 1.15.  
 
Figure 1.15; Example of the effect of concerted effort toward a task 
invoking reflective-/conscious awareness.  
It should be noted that the previously described understandings of Heidegger, 
Leont'ev and Dewey, are framed as a non-intentional malfunction of a technology; 
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and defined by Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman as "…a disruption in the normal 
functioning of things forcing the individual to adopt a more reflective or deliberative 
stance toward ongoing activity." (p26, 1998). Langer’s example, however, 
demonstrates that a "breakdown" (or rather the effects and experience of a 
breakdown) can additionally be caused through self-directed contemplation 
whereby the technology retains its functional qualities but the primacy of knowing 
(as ready-to-hand) of a routinised and sub-conscious act becomes inaccessible.  
And so here, the understanding of breakdown includes this recognition; that is, a 
breakdown can occur through a failure or inability of a device or apparatus in 
addition to a forced contemplation upon the abilities and process of an activity (as 
present-at-hand). Therefore, when a task or activity once ready-to-hand is required 
to be performed as present-at-hand the contemplation upon functionality forces the 
primacy of "knowing" to become inaccessible and as such a user/self-induced 
breakdown occurs; agreeable to the understandings of Heidegger.  
Langer provides an additional example of Mindlessness developed through 
repetition that moves beyond that of Leont'ev and Dewey (previously described). 
The example suggests that a novice may perform a task better (or rather adapt 
quicker) than an expert should there be a modification to an original task of which 
the expert holds much experience and performs as a repetitive behaviour (where a 
task can be performed Mindlessly). Langer states that should a novice typist be 
asked to type yet remove the spaces between words (e.g. totypelikethis) they will be 
able to modify their behaviour and adapt their practice more easily than that of the 
proficient typist (who may Mindlessly insert spaces and so struggle to perform). As 
noted by Langer:  
"When any much-repeated task is slightly modified in an unusual way, the 
novice may do better. 
A familiar structure or rhythm helps lead to mental laziness, acting as a 
signal that there is no need to pay attention. The rhythm of the familiar lulls 
us into mindlessness"  
(p21, Langer, 1989).  
Thus, Langer’s understanding of the Mindless expert is further sympathetic to that 
of Dewey and breakdown. 
 
1.7.1: Premature Cognitive Commitments And Functional 
Fixedness In Learning And Breakdown 
While the previously highlighted positioning of Langer (1989) suggests that 
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Mindlessness exists in a well learned activity or behaviour (as opposed to directed 
towards an object) Langer additionally provides a framing that may be applied to 
unfamiliarised encounters of objects and tasks. Langer proposes that there are 
instances whereby an individual may encounter “something” and form a “particular 
mindset”, enacting a Mindless disposition whereby the meaning or use becomes 
fixed upon the initial understanding. When reencountering the “something” the 
initial mindset or understanding is reapplied prior to reflection upon potential 
contextual meanings or uses, the user / agent enacts a Premature Cognitive 
Commitment. This is explained by Langer as: 
“When we accept an impression or a piece of information at face value, 
with no reason to think critically about it, perhaps because it seems 
irrelevant, that impression settles unobtrusively into our minds until a similar 
signal from the outside world - such as a sight or smell or sound - calls it up 
again. At that next time it may no longer be irrelevant, but most of us don’t 
reconsider what we mindlessly accepted earlier. Such mindsets, especially 
those formed in childhood, are premature because we cannot know in 
advance the possible future uses a piece of information may serve. The 
mindless individual is committed to one predetermined use of the 
information, and other possible uses or applications are not explored.”  
(p22, Langer, 1989) 
Such a positioning parallels that of Dewey in that a stimulus may invoke a 
sequential behaviour that is routed in a habitual reaction / action. A person 
performing Mindlessly will perform this reaction / action without reflection and will 
therefore fail to see or explore the potentials for creative growth; akin to the 
previously highlighted position of Dewey: 
"…humans often attempt to recover equilibrium in ways that do not 
promote growth. Faced with a breakdown, they often retreat to more 
primitive levels of behavioral response rather than moving forward onto 
behavioral plateaus that are more richly meaningful."  
(p32, Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998) 
Furthermore and noted by Langer and Chanowitz (p1051,1981) "…the context in 
which one is introduced to environmental cues for behaviour affects the ability of the 
individual to use those cues on a subsequent occasion."; and so a premature 
cognitive commitment exists as an assumption toward a context or situation based 
upon initial understandings. And so, when in a Mindless state an agent may resort to 
a premature cognitive commitment (a primitive unreflective habitual response) that is 
exhibited without contemplation or reflection, i.e. as ready-to-hand. The pervasive 
extent of this state is further explained by Langer and Chanowitz: 
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"[…] much [of] complex social interaction is accomplished mindlessly, 
without an awareness of the relevant details that would seem necessary in 
order to accomplish that interaction successfully. […] This perspective 
stands in marked contrast to other views of humans as interacting almost 
exclusively on the basis of active, ongoing processing of incoming 
information made available by the environment. […] as the individual's 
experience with certain situations accumulates, a structure of the situation 
and a sequence of behavior are formed […]. On subsequent occasions, the 
individual will regularly encounter elements in the environment that 
resemble the structure typical of the earlier situations. The individual then 
responds to these elements as cues for maintaining the typical sequence of 
behavior. The theory of mindlessness further maintains that when in this 
"mindless" state, the individual is no longer engaged in actively 
constructing his or her environment; instead, the individual responds to an 
already constructed environment." 
(p1051 - 1052, Langer and Chanowitz, 1981) 
Thus, a premature cognitive commitment exists in opposition to how we may 
view much of our "lived" life i.e. as experienced and intentional in reaction to 
ongoing environmental or situational information. Instead premature cognitive 
commitments indicate that a large proportion of our activities (and interactions) are 
routed in our previous exposure to similar experiences and environments without 
contextualisation and exploration to new modalities of understanding. This 
additionally supports the positioning of Dewey that a breakdown, one that forces a 
contemplation, facilitates creative adaptations (as opportunity to “grow”) to 
otherwise habitual actions.  
While Langer frames premature cognitive commitments as behaviour toward 
environmental cues, the position may be additionally framed through Functional 
Fixedness. Functional fixedness (Anderson, 1962) is understood as an inhibition to 
problem solving through the use of "solution objects", whereby the previous use or 
framing / presentation of the solution object limits the "visibility" of a novel use 
required for the solution toward a problem (This is discussed at greater length in 
chapter 1.12 on Automaticity). One such example of functional fixedness can be 
found in Anderson’s findings of Dunker's "Box" problem (Anderson, 1952). The box 
problem (Dunker, 1945; Anderson, 1952) consists of a study whereby the test subject 
(participant) is instructed to mount three candles vertically to a screen so that they 
do not drip wax below. Objects are provided to achieve this within three 
"pasteboard" (cardboard) boxes of differing sizes containing the candles, some 
tacks / drawing pins, and a matchbox. The solution to the problem requires 
emptying the contents of the boxes, melting some wax to the inside of a box and 
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bonding the candle to this; then fixing the box (and candle) to the vertical surface 
via the tacks. Functional fixedness here prohibits the immediate visibility of the 
solution as the boxes are not viewed as a component of use but as a storage of the 
objects. An additional example of functional fixedness may also be found through 
the Two Rings Problem (McCaffrey, 2012). The Two Rings problem requires a 
participant to fasten together two weighty steel rings in a figure-eight. The 
participant is provided with a long candle, a match, and a two-inch steel cube. The 
immediate functional fixedness driven answer would be to melt the wax over the 
two steel rings to form a bond, however this is not strong enough to hold the rings 
together. The solution requires a deconstruction of the objects provided to the 
constitutional parts. The candle is the source of the solution, however, it requires the 
use of the steel cube to remove the wax and reveal the wick, a piece of string. When 
this becomes apparent the solution is clear, the string wick may be used to tie the 
rings together.  
Here the example of functional fixedness further promotes the understandings of 
breakdown as proposed by Dewey, Heidegger and Langer through a broader 
framing. Rather than applying, the habitual knowing (as described by Dewey), a 
primacy of action (as Heidegger's ready-to-hand), or a Mindless / premature 
cognitive commitment (as described by Langer (1989), and Langer and Chanowitz 
(2000)); a novel abstract contextualisation is required. The habitual and routinised 
behaviour (as described by Leont'ev and Dewey (Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman 
(1998)) must be overcome, the ready-to-hand primacy of knowing must be 
prevented and drawn toward contemplative present-at-hand (as described by 
Heidegger Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman (1998)), and the premature cognitive 
commitment must be blocked and an orientation towards openness of novelty of 
information and objects fostered (as described by Langer, 1989). Thus, in 
overcoming functional fixedness and premature cognitive commitment a breakdown 
must be facilitated to encourage the person to engage with actively constructing his 
or her environment, i.e. a Mindful action.  
 
1.7.2: Toward Understanding Design And Interaction 
Within Mindfulness And Mindlessness 
As previously described, Langer proposes instances whereby an individual may 
encounter “something” and form a “particular mindset”. That is to say, there may 
be times when an agent holds a specific understanding of an object. This could be, 
for example, seeing a pen and knowing it to facilitate writing. These instances are 
similar to that of the Two Rings Problem (McCaffrey, 2012); a candle is for burning, 
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that is its “property”. We (conscious agents) have an approach toward specific 
objects whereby the opportunities of action are “revealed“ to us by their properties, 
stairs for climbing, pens for writing etc.. It can be said that these objects hold 
“affordances”; a communication of the actions of an object toward an agent 
perceiving it. Though an object reveals to us its potential uses though its properties, 
these do not normally “come at us” in a barrage of ideation, a specific use or action 
is often contextual or relational to a goal. A knife may be a replacement to a 
screwdriver, a lever for opening a tin of paint, or a doorstop when needed but is not 
understood in these actions during normal functioning (e.g. At a dinner table). As 
previously described and through the understandings of Heidegger, Dewey and 
Leont'ev; our actions and relations toward technologies are always in 
correspondence or oriented toward a goal. Though the properties (of an object) 
remain the same our understanding and experience of the object changes in 
response to our motives and action. The agent becomes active in constructing his or 
her environment as opposed to responding in an already constructed environment. 
Thus, the properties of objects can reveal their functioning toward us and we can 
“see” or be “blind” toward this in relation to our goals and desires. As this thesis 
concerns the design of interactive technologies, the understanding of such qualities 
holds importance toward the framing of our experience of the object.  
That is to say, the understanding of design revealing / communicating multiple or 
singular use’s of interactive technologies is equal to that of understanding designing 
for Mindful or Mindless interactions with technology.   
Through drawing upon such knowledges we are again better able to describe the 
phenomena of Mindfulness and Mindlessness and validate such position through 
verifiable “real world” example (such as Two Rings Problem (McCaffrey, 2012)). 
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1.8.0: Knowing What To Do - Affordance 
In this chapter and the following (1.9.0) I present the distinction between that of a 
'tool' and 'equipment'. Such differentiation is intended to provide a distinct 
understanding of an interaction in terms akin to that of ready-to-hand and present-
at-hand, and presented here for relating such concepts through a broader construct 
of Mindfulness and Mindlessness. While these contrasting states are heavily 
informed through on-going wider discussion of affordance they are equally informed 
through perspectives such as Langer's "premature cognitive commitments" (Langer, 
1989) and examples such as the transition toward 'Mindless expert' (p20, Langer, 
1989); considering the understanding of technology as a transitory spectrum 
(dependant upon Mindfulness and Mindlessness) as opposed to a linear fixed 
'learnability'.   
The framing of tool and equipment presented here should be understood as not 
solely bound to physical objects (e.g. Such as a hammer or a nail) but encompassing 
the broader understanding of a “technology” such as through Heidegger’s 
“equipment” (see: p95-97, Heidegger, 1962), a “something-in-order-to” (p97, 
Heidegger, 1962).  This positioning follows that of MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985) 
who understand technology as ensembles of technical artefacts, activities or 
processes, and practical knowledge. That is to say, here tools and equipment are 
understood as encompassing specific knowledge’s, methods or devices to achieve 
specific goals or resolve problems. As noted by Dreyfus (p63, 1991) Heidegger’s 
equipment (p97, Heidegger, 1962) is always in relation to a broader nexus of other 
equipment in which it functions and defined in terms of what it is used for and so 
understood as “…an assignment or reference of something to something” (p97, 
Heidegger, 1962).  
Indeed such framings of technologies (and the understanding of experience 
through these technologies) may be applied to non-physical technologies e.g. 
language:  
“Language is a totality of words-a totality in which discourse has a ‘worldly’ 
Being of its own; and as an entity within-the-world, this totality thus 
becomes something which we may come across as ready-to-hand. 
Language can be broken up into word-Things which are present-at-hand.”  
(p204, Heidegger, 1962)  
Though Heidegger’s understanding of ready-to-hand as a primacy of knowing 
(occurring before reflective contemplation i.e. Present-at-hand) would appear to 
contradict this in that language must first be contemplated and reflected upon in its 
learning (we are not born with innate knowledge of our language); the positioning of 
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Leont’ev and Dewey is more inclusive of language as an equipment or tool as noted 
by Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman: 
“Language use for Leont'ev was just another form of Action, and as a result, 
his model by which linguistic skills are acquired resembles that by which 
one acquires a physical skill or learns to use a tool. […] the production of a 
single utterance, even a single word, initially requires conscious attention 
and only becomes routine with extensive practice.” 
“Dewey viewed the acquisition of skills broadly and, as a consequence, 
developed a model of breakdown that is comparably broad. Because he, 
like Leont'ev, considered tools and media to be extensions of the organism 
(Hickman, 1990), his analysis applies not only to organismic forms of 
breakdown, but also to the equipmental forms discussed by the other two 
authors. “ 
(p35, 1998) 
The reasoning that such understandings of technologies as encompassing more 
than a physical object is significant, is we are able to apply insight from cognitive-
science that do not necessarily discuss human-object relations but rather concepts, 
capabilities and facilities relationships. Such example can be found in memory recall, 
which here can be understood as a technology of relating current experiences and 
challenges within a context of previously learned actions or experiences.  
More significantly, such distinctions aid in the understanding that tools and 
equipments are not objective properties of objects, such as a scrollbar or button; 
but a subjective experience of a technology drawing upon qualities such as cultural 
practice, memory, perceivable attributes. The transition of tool to and from 
equipment is therefore not of a physicality but of an experience to be invoked, 
occurring “within us” and concerning the phenomenal.  
 
1.8.1: Affordances And The Openness Of A Technology 
As previously described a technology in the context presented here does not 
refer to a specific 'physical object' but a technology (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985) 
such as technical artefacts, activities or processes, and practical knowledges (i.e. 
conceptual or physical attributes); all of which facilitate 'Affordances’.  
Gibson's Affordances 
Originally coined by Gibson (1977) the concept of affordance was used to denote 
what an environment offers an animal, for either positive or negative effect. It 
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(Gibsons affordance) is an action possibility offered to an animal from the 
environment (in which the animal resides) and is existent should the animal perceive 
it or not (McGrenere and Ho, 2000) (i.e. Gibson’s affordances exist beyond 
perception). The affordance does not change dependant on the animals goals or 
needs, yet, it is dependant on the animals capabilities. For example, the top of a cliff 
face affords fatal injury to an animal who falls from it; thus additionally affording 
primitive hunters a means to drive animals over the edge and toward death, the 
same affordance is true of the animals who fall though they are not aware of such a 
quality of environment; this affordance does not exist toward a bird who has 
capabilities of flight. Thus the affordances as described by Gibson are both objective 
(in that they exist without meaning or interpretation requirements) and subjective in 
that they are dependant upon the frame of reference to (capabilities of) an actor.  
Norman's Affordances 
Norman's (1988) use of the term has led to a degree of ambiguity in its 
understanding and use in the field of HCI research, though Norman has made 
efforts to correct such misuse (McGrenere and Ho, 2000).  
Norman previously stated: 
"...the term affordance refers to the perceived and actual properties of the 
thing, primarily those fundamental properties that determine just how the 
thing could possibly be used."  
(p9, Norman, 1988)  
Norman has sought clarification upon these statements above (as a correction to 
that described within Psychology Of Everyday Things [POET], Norman, 1988) and to 
address the misuse in HCI and design research: 
"POET was about “perceived affordance.” When I get around to revising 
POET, I will make a global change, replacing all instances of the word 
“affordance” with the phrase “perceived affordance.”" 
(p39, Norman, 1999) 
As noted by Norman (2013) we inhabit a world full of objects that are both 
natural and artificially created. In Norman's framing, affordance is the relationship 
between such objects and an interacting / observing agent (a person, creature, and / 
or machine etc.). Norman states that a perceived affordance is dependant upon the 
capabilities of the agent perceiving the object and their perception of how it may be 
used (p11, Norman, 2013). Thus a perceived affordance is not a property held by an 
object but the relationship between an object and agent; it is the ‘visual’ cues for 
how an object may be used or its behaviour.  An example of an affordance in 
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Normans understanding is often provided through consideration of a chair. A chair 
affords ("is for") support and so affords sitting. If the chair is lightweight and free to 
move then most people are able to lift the chair and so it additionally affords being 
lifted (and moved). Should the person try and be unable to lift the chair (e.g. they 
are too old or young and so too weak), the chair does not (and cannot be perceived 
to) afford them this facility of movement. Such properties may be understood 
(through Norman) as a "real affordance" (Hartson, 2003) and akin to Gibson's 
understanding of affordance being physical attributes of an object, and so 
affordance is dependant toward the agent's capabilities. Yet Norman's 
understanding seeks to move beyond that of Gibson's and is inclusive of the notion 
that an object may hold many affordances and will 'communicate' this to the agent 
through its perceivable properties and an agents familiarity to such properties. For 
example, doorknobs communicate the perceived affordance of turning to open a 
door yet vary in design attributes, buttons communicate the affordance of 'pressing' 
and are for pressing but vary in design and end result. Thus a perceived affordance 
is a visual property of an object (characteristics of its outward appearance) that 
reveals or indicates an action possibility (how it should be used).  Norman (1988) 
furthers the position that it is the perceived affordances of an object that hold the 
greatest importance over the ‘real affordances’ (the actual actionable properties of 
an object); as these tell the user what can be performed and how to do this. 
 
1.8.2: Expanding Upon Forms Of Affordance: Cognitive, 
Physical, Sensory, And Functional 
In recognition of the complex nature surrounding the concept of affordance 
Hartson (2003) proposes affordance be understood as divided into four differing yet 
relational framings (Cognitive, Physical, Sensory, and Functional affordances). This 
draws upon Norman's and Gibson's basic precepts, and inclusive of Gaver (1991) 
and McGrenere and Ho's (2000) additions to the concepts, and seeks to extend 
them in more useful ways through a richer and more consistent vocabulary (Hartson, 
2003). Hartson (2003) notes that during interaction a user will perform cognitive, 
physical and sensory actions and so requires affordances to aide with each. Further 
to this Hartson places the affordances in relation toward task oriented contexts, as 
opposed to Gibson who places the concept of affordance as being relational to 
objects in the environment both with and without need for interacting.  
Cognitive Affordance 
Cognitive affordance can be understood as the design for the cognitive element 
of usability in a system’s learnability. Defined by Hartson (2003, p319) as "a design 
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feature that helps, aids, supports, facilitates, or enables thinking and/or knowing 
about something"; and provides the example of a button graphic having a clearly 
worded label indicating its meaning, function and consequences of clicking it. 
Hartson notes that cognitive affordances are likened to perceptual information 
about an affordance / perceived affordances (as described by Gibson (1977), 
Norman (2013), Gaver (1991), and, McGrenere and Ho (2000)); yet are to be 
considered distinct from a sensory affordance. A plate on a door that states "push" 
provides the cognitive affordance of indicating the direction of movement required 
to open a door. 
Physical Affordance 
A physical affordance is a design element that helps, aids, supports, facilitates, or 
enables physically doing something (Hartson, 2003); and is relational to Gibson 
(1977) and McGrenere and Ho (2000) as affordance, Norman (2013) as a real 
affordance, and, Gaver (1991) as the perceptibility of an affordance. An example of a 
physical affordance can be seen in a graphic interface button (to be clicked), the 
physical affordance is relational to the size and position to which it can be clicked. A 
doorknob holds the physical affordance to be grasped and turned.  
Functional Affordance 
A functional affordance is an affordance that helps or aids the user in doing 
something and can be considered as being for a purposeful action (Hartson, 2003). 
More simply put, the functional affordance "ties usage to usefulness" (p316, 
Hartson, 2003), such as a button to arrange files in alphabetical order or in date of 
creation. When a door is operated it provides the functional affordance of entry in-to 
and out-from a room. 
Sensory Affordance 
A sensory affordance is an element of design that "helps, aids, supports, 
facilitates, or enables the user in sensing (e.g., seeing, hearing, feeling)" (p322, 
Hartson, 2003).  A sensory affordance includes the features of a design that consist 
of a visual, auditory, haptic/tactile etc., presence; and works alongside cognative 
and physical affordances in that a user must be able to sense such affordances. This 
affordance is not the perceptual affordances as described by Gibson (1977), Norman 
(2013), Gaver (1991), and, McGrenere and Ho (2000); as there is no cognition of 
action in that the sensory affordance does not help with thinking. A door of a 
differing colour to the surrounding wall features as a sensory affordance, enabling a 
user to sense a different area.  
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While these four distinct forms of affordance draw upon differing human 
capabilities (such as cognitive skills, physical abilities and sensory capabilities) they 
additionally work in harmony to support each other in much the same way a 
sentence is formed form individual words to provide meaning. 
Though the work of Hartson (2003) combines the work of many authors in the 
field of affordance theory and might be considered a more comprehensive 
understanding of the multifaceted nature of affordances; it is often the work of 
Gibson (1977) and Norman (1988, 1999) that is drawn upon when discussing 
affordance in HCI design and evaluation.  
 
1.8.3: Affordance As Application Of Prior Knowledge: 
Familiarity Of Equipment 
It is the combination of Hartson’s four-forms of affordance that will facilitate a 
learning of action potentials and ease in applying them, as noted by Hartson:  
 "The user’s path from sensing to cognition to action shows how each 
affordance role is involved in both learning about (ease of learning) and 
using (ease of use) artefacts."  
(p322, Hartson, 2003) 
However, while affordances facilitate learning of an action potential they 
additionally require a prerequisite knowledge as noted by Norman: 
"I believe that affordances result from the mental interpretation of things, 
based on our past knowledge and experience applied to our perception of 
the things about us." 
(p219, Norman, 1988)  
This can be exemplified in the understanding of the affordances offered by a 
door handle. Though the design may differ previous exposure and knowledge of the 
function of a door handle (and the general design / features) assists in a knowledge 
and utilisation of the door handle. If, for example, an alien species that perfectly 
matched a human in terms of size and strength, graspable limbs, and sensory 
apparatus (i.e. Hands and eyes capturing the visible light spectrum) arrived to earth 
the same affordances offered to a human would not be available. A sign that offers 
cognitive affordances would not apply; use of language would be meaningless; and 
sensory affordances that hold significance to us may appear as decoration rather 
than indicators of action.  
As explained by Norman: 
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 “…designers greatly rely on conventional interpretations of the symbols 
and placement. Much of the discussion about the use of affordances is 
really addressing conventions, or what I call cultural constraints.”  
(p40, Norman, 1999) 
While physical constraints limit potential actions of an object through the physical 
properties (e.g. Being too heavy to lift); there additionally exists logical constraints 
whereby rules of logic (e.g. Being instructed to scroll down indicates additional 
content and scrollable page) allow users to (logically) deduce action (Norman, 1999).  
Further to these affordance constraints exist cultural constraints that are dependant 
on social / cultural norms. A scroll bar or a “drag and drop” are learned conventions 
that exist as cultural constraints. Such affordances require specific knowledge of a 
form action, one that is culturally learned and not available to those without such 
knowledge, and may be understood as involving cognitive and functional 
affordances (as previously described; see: Hartson, 2003). Thus some affordances are 
dependant toward cultural constraints (Norman, 1999) and so previous knowledge.  
Turner (2005) proposes the understanding in the operation of affordances 
through a binary state of “simple” and “complex” affordances.  
A “simple” affordance (as understood by Turner, 2005) may be described as a 
real and objective property of an object, such as its physical attributes. This is 
relatable to a Gibsonian understanding of affordance as they are communicated to 
an animal (or agent in an environment) as “stimulus information”. Thus a simple 
affordance is objective in that the affordance is a referral to the physical properties 
of the object and the animal interacting. However, Turner (2005) notes that while 
objects may implicitly hold affordances “Even if an animal possesses the appropriate 
attributes and senses, it may need to learn to detect this information” (p790, Turner, 
2005). And so, though an object may hold latent properties (of affordance) it is only 
once these are detected and acknowledged as significant (by an agent) that it holds 
(actionable) meaning to an animal and value as a technology in order to do “x”. 
While simple affordances may be understood as directly perceivable there 
additionally exists a “complex” affordance. As noted by Cole (1996) some artefacts 
inherently embody a meaning through a reflection of their use; such artefacts may 
be understood as manufactured or produced as part of and relational to an 
intentional action or use (Turner, 2005). These artefacts, objects, or more broadly, 
technologies, draw upon cultural constraints (Norman, 1999) to facilitate their 
intended affordances.  
Turner (2005) places familiarity and equipment, as described by Heidegger, into 
the understanding of affordance. As previously described, in Heidegger’s use of 
“equipment” (p95-97, 1962) it is understood as a “something-in-order-to” (p97, 
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1962) and is always in relation to a broader nexus of other equipment in which it 
functions (p63, Dreyfus, 1991); and defined in terms of what it is used for, and so 
understood as “…an assignment or reference of something to something” (p97, 
Heidegger, 1962). This broader nexus of equipmental “things” is presented to us (or 
rather experienced by us) as a referential whole (p797, Turner, 2005); e.g. When 
entering a room we initially see the room as a whole and this is developed from our 
familiarity with the equipmental “things” that make up the room (Heidegger, 1992). 
Thus as noted by Turner (p797, 2005) a world according to Heidegger is comprised 
of three characteristics: 
1. The totality of inter-related pieces of equipment; with each piece of 
equipment being used toward a specific task. 
2. A second component of a world exists through a set of purposes to which 
these tasks are performed to achieve. (A higher level goal) 
3. The characteristic that in performing these tasks we acquire or assume an 
“identity” (or identities) (such as doctors, mechanics, students etc.). “Thus 
by worlds we mean cultural worlds”  
(p797, Turner, 2005).  
Thus, the ability to draw upon familiarity allows us to view the world in an 
unconscious and unintentional (p189, Heidegger, 1992) combining of a broader 
nexus of equipment that we may use (presented through affordances) that is 
relational to an existent understanding and framing. And so our experience of the 
world is through equipmental things (and as a nexus of such equipmental things) 
specific to a contextual purpose and through a nexus of cultural and pre-existing 
knowledge. Such perspective “also forces us to conclude that an affordance cannot 
exist in isolation” (p798, Turner, 2005).  
Therefore, as noted by Turner (p798, 2005), “…from a holistic or 
phenomenological perspective, affordance, use and context are one”; dependent 
on the visibility to our subjective (phenomenal) experience and capabilities to reflect 
upon and find meaning (i.e. as present-at- hand) or directly apply in use (i.e. ready-
to-hand). 
  77 
1.9.0: Understanding Of Affordances Through 
Mindfulness And Mindlessness - Defining Tool And 
Equipment 
As previously described there are several understandings of affordances 
developed from the original usage by Gibson (1977). While Norman’s (1988,1999) 
understanding of affordance (as both real and perceived) is perhaps the most 
commonly understood and applied in research, there have additionally been 
attempts upon clarification and expansion of the term to include a broader 
dimension of human cognitive processing and deeper understanding of our 
interaction (and application) with technologies.  
As noted by Turner: 
“An affordance thus exists, whether it is perceived or used or not, 
furthermore it may be detected and used without explicit awareness of 
doing so.  
(p790, Turner, 2005) 
The significance of Turner’s statement in that affordances (though commonly 
described as apparent perceptible qualities of an object) hold a dynamic property 
within them is of particular interest to the concept of Mindfulness and Mindlessness 
during interaction. Objects may be used (their affordances applied in action) without 
explicit awareness of their presence. For example; the pushing of a door, a drink 
from a cup, typing of a password on a keyboard; all of these activities exploit the 
affordances offered of the object to the user, yet some of those affordances do not 
“appear” to the user. Thus, the relationship of affordance is between the agent and 
its environment (akin to that described by Gibson), however this may be considered 
the agents subjective environment, their phenomenological world, an Umwelt that is 
coupled to their experience.  
While there exists an objective reality/environment for an agent it is experienced 
as their “Umwelt” (p174, Varela, Thompson and Rosch; 1991). The Umwelt of an 
agent is the way in which the world exists toward them, how the environment is 
constructed in subjective experience and dependant upon the capacities in which 
they perceive the world. It is presumable that an agent would believe their 
experience (of their Umwelt) must be the objective reality shared by all as it requires 
questioning of the normal experience (how we “know” the world) to challenge such 
assumption. For example, a person who is colour blind yet does not know of such a 
condition will assume that it is how the world appears to all, that it is “how the world 
is” – we cannot know the experience of what it is we do not know the experience of.  
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As noted by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (on critique of Merleau-Ponty3), this 
Umwelt dictates how we act within the world: 
“…perception is not simply embedded within and constrained by the 
surrounding world; it also contributes to the enactment of this surrounding 
world. Thus as Merleau-Ponty notes, the organism both initiates and is 
shaped by the environment. ”  
(p174, Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1991) 
The connection between how we experience the world and how we act upon 
(and within) the world are interrelated – consciousness is, according to Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch (1991), ‘embodied’ in the world, our actions are ‘embodied 
actions’ in which we perform ‘enaction’. Varela, Thompson and Rosch (p172-173, 
1991) highlight that to be ‘embodied’ refers to two qualities. Firstly; that to be 
embodied requires having physicality and presence in an environment and with this 
the ability to sense and navigate or respond to said environment (e.g. sensations of 
sight or touch, movement or reactions); and secondly, that these qualities 
themselves are embedded in broader encompassing biological, psychological and 
cultural contexts e.g. adrenaline to increase heart rate (and so release/allow greater 
muscle energy for faster movement), fear to increase adrenaline, and dangerous 
situations to cause fear. Varela, Thompson and Rosch (p172-173, 1991) further 
highlight that these events of ‘action’ are intrinsically linked; to see perceive and 
sense and to act are in themselves “…fundamentally inseparable in lived cognition”. 
Varela, Thompson and Rosch (p172-173, 1991) note that ‘enaction’ is consequently 
referring to two qualities of an agent in an environment; perception guided by and 
guiding action, and ‘cognitive structures’ (knowledge/memory) develop from 
recurring patterns of action (described above) and allow for such actions to be 
guided by perception.  Thus it can be said perception exists in and as action and 
with repetition of such actions knowledge is gained that allows action guided by 
perception. 
Thus for Varela, Thompson and Rosch; our Umwelt is not only a biologically 
dependent one (of our perception) but additionally shaped by a psychological and 
cultural context (and the meaning we perceive and knowledge we gain). 
Furthermore, they suggest that Umwelt is dependent upon and guided by action 
(and potential for action) and our perception of our actions; i.e. perception is 
primarily for the guidance of action and the recurrent patterns in our perceptions 
                                               
3	Quote	of	Merlau-Ponty:	“…The	environment	(Umwelt)	emerges	from	the	world	through	the	actualization	or	the	being	of	the	organism...”	(In	p174,	Varela,	Thompson	and	Rosch) 
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develop cognitive structures (e.g. a knowing, memory or learning) so that our 
actions may be guided by our perceptions. Such position is highly sympathetic to 
those discussed at greater length in chapters 1.11.0 and 1.12.0. 
Embodiment suggests that we can hold a form of consciousness distinct to 
environments and, more significantly here, the affordances we perceive (as opposed 
to the ones they may offer) as a reciprocal state of being, yet developed over 
repeated exposure. In recognizing using such affordances it is the act of “enaction”, 
as noted by Stoffregen, Bardy and Mantel (2006): 
 “[…] people often exhibit accurate knowledge of their action capabilities 
and that in many cases this knowledge appears to be perceptual, that is, 
based on immediate perceptual information, rather than being based on 
secondary, cognitive operations.” (p5);  
“In ordinary life, affordances are perceived, and this perception is enactive.”  
(p6) 
For Stoffregen, Bardy and Mantel’s (2006) we primarily, or most commonly, see 
(experience) action (affordance) in our environment enactively prior to a thoughtful 
deconstruction (“cognitive operation”). These understandings of Stoffregen, Bardy 
and Mantel (2006), and Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991); are considered to be of 
normal functioning (“in ordinary life”), non-contemplative (“based on immediate 
perceptual information”), and well learned. As such, enaction here is understood as 
guided by the immediacy of perceiving the environment as opposed to a 
consciously guided action of deconstruction.  
It is important to note, as the previous chapters described (1.6 and 1.7), such 
unreflective operation of technologies is not of a permanent state. Technologies 
may encounter a breakdown, e.g. through malfunction or intended contemplation, 
that invokes a reflective state whereby the technology becomes apparent and the 
attributes available to be studied. As the perception of the object (technology) 
changes so does the perception of its affordances, as previously noted by Norman: 
"I believe that affordances result from the mental interpretation of things, 
based on our past knowledge and experience applied to our perception of 
the things about us." 
(p219, Norman, 1988)  
Such differentiations regarding affordances are here highlighted and drawn upon 
through the defining of tool and equipment. Where as one state an agent is active in 
perceiving and creating the ensembles of their latent environment (the tool), the 
other is lead through enaction (the equipment); thus the tool is to be considered 
Mindful use of technology and the equipment Mindless. 
  80 
1.9.1: Mindfulness: Of Tool 
While Norman (2013) states that affordances exist between 'physical' objects, 
here the concept is applied to the broader understanding of a tool i.e. inclusive of 
knowledges, technique, or conceptual or physical attributes. This can be exemplified 
as: a voice having the affordance's of complex communication of ideas (spoken 
language), defence from predators (through volume to intimidate) etc.; the concept 
of numbers holding the affordance of communication of volume / size and 
distinction (labelling), and affordance of mathematics. In much the same way as 
Norman’s affordances, tool affordances (as proposed here) would additionally 
require a level of perceptibility and ability (enaction); vocal ability no-longer affords 
communication to the deaf or an agent who is unfamiliar/not fluent in a specific 
language, the concept of numbers does not hold the facility of mathematics should 
the agent not understand the required equation or lack the cognitive capacity to 
perform such a task.   
Accordingly a tool here is understood as knowledges, techniques, concepts or 
physical objects whose attributes hold affordances to an agent with the capability to 
perceive and apply them. Consequently a tool may exist beyond an agent as a 
'separate entity', e.g. A hammer as a paperweight continues to perform the same 
way with an agents control or not, it continues to perform independent of direct 
manipulation. Though a technology in a tool state may appear self-governing from 
an agent, they are not latent in the objective environment but form part of an active 
construction of an agents subjective world as situated within (yet not consuming 
totality of) actions, goals, attention and awareness. Tools form constituent parts in an 
ensemble of artefacts in an agents phenomenologically present environment in 
relation to a goal.  
Furthermore a tool may be understood as holding a semantic variability towards 
its being. That is to say, a tool possesses qualities in action of Mindfulness, a broader 
contextual meaning beyond the immediate perception. The tool does not hold a 
premature cognitive commitment or functional fixedness and so is "experienced" as 
a range of possibilities, its constituent parts, and how they may be adapted or 
applied.  
The greatest quality of a tool state is holding multiple affordances and is 
contrasted by equipment discussed in the following chapter (see figure 1.16 below). 
 
1.9.2: Mindlessness: Of Equipment 
'Equipment' is explained by Heidegger as a 'something-in-order-to' (Heidegger, 
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1962); though equipment here can be understood as a development of this 
concept. Heidegger framed equipment as relational:  
"In the 'in-order-to' as a structure there lies an assignment or reference of 
something to something."  
(p97, Heidegger, 1962). 
Heidegger stated equipment "always is in terms of (aus) [original in italics] its 
belonging to other equipment" (p97, Heidegger, 1962). Here this is broadened to 
an equipment only being 'present' in relation as an assignment to a goal, task or 
intent (i.e. in use by an agent). As previously described a tool holds the potential of 
multiple affordances (visible to the user as potential uses and applications); an 
equipment, here, can be understood to be affordance (singular) in application by an 
agent. As noted by Dreyfus (p93, 1991) "A piece of equipment is defined [original in 
italics] in terms of what it is used for". Thus the equipment is the application of a 
specific affordance of a tool oriented toward a goal, it is the enacting of an 
affordance and not the tool itself. Whereas a tool holds multiple affordances (and so 
it's relation to the agent is in the revealing as a tool-of-facility-to…'x'), an equipment 
is directly dependant upon enaction and so does not support affordances exterior to 
the goal or task (as such support would alter the equipment to a new 'something-in-
order-to'). Consequently, whereas a tool can exist beyond an agents control, 
equipment cannot as it is dependant upon enaction, therefore when equipment 
breaks down it resorts to a tool like state revealing (and requiring contemplation of) 
its potential affordances.  
And so, a tool can be conceptualised and reflected upon as a separate entity but 
an equipment can only be experienced as the something-it-is-to. Consequently an 
equipment can be considered as holding a premature cognitive commitment or 
functional fixedness, guided by perception without concerted awareness. It holds a 
single apparent use and the constitutional parts hold transparency within the whole 
object use. Therefore, an equipment may be considered as the application of a 
technology in a Mindless manner. 
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Figure 1.16; Comparison between Tool and Equipment in terms of 
Affordances and conscious availability and complexity (to be interpreted 
alongside previous pictorial representations of conscious states – Chapter 
1.5) 
The introduction of Tool and Equipment here provides utility describing 
technologies in more specific terms (reducing ambiguity) and within well-established 
understandings. This provides capability to refer to specific interactions with 
technologies in terms of a reciprocal relationship to the experiential qualities of the 
user, thus Mindful and Mindless technologies can now be understood as state like 
attributes as opposed to objective properties of a technology. In doing so this 
overcomes problematic qualities of previous definitions of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness holding a high degree of ambiguity; and positioned in broader trait-
like dispositions. Consequently definitions that frame specific interactions with 
technology, as opposed to the technologies themselves, are facilitated.  
  83 
1.10.0: Tools And Equipment As Experience In Use 
While the previous definitions of tool and equipment provide a means of 
categorisation of how technologies may be perceived by an agent, they are here 
incorporated within a broader phenomenological state classification of how an 
agent may experience an interaction. This is achieved through building upon 
notions of ready-to-hand and present-at-hand discussed previously in chapter 1.6. 
The aims of the following definitions are to provide such categorization of 
interaction with technologies, as a phenomenological agent-technology relation, 
within the framing of Mindfulness and Mindlessness. While understanding the state 
of a technology to an agent (i.e. tool or equipment) provides indication to how it 
may be approached the following seeks to clarify how it may be “experienced”. This 
builds upon the previously described understandings (chapters 1.5 - 1.9) and in 
particular expands upon the notions of Ready-to-hand and Present-at-hand.   
 
1.10.1: The Incorporation Of Tool And Equipment As 
States Of Mindfulness And Mindlessness 
Equipmental-transparency  
Equipmental-transparency is an expansion upon Ready-to-hand as described by 
Dreyfus (p210, 1991). When an equipment in use is 'invisible' to the user, not in 
terms of its visual presence but in subjective awareness (it is phenomenologically 
invisible); and consequently, when in this state, is not in the subjective experience of 
the user as a separate entity or object. As such, the user of the equipment is able to 
focus toward the 'goals' facilitated through the use of said equipment.  
Through this use of equipment the broader goal may additionally be understood 
as sub-conscious, the goal itself is maintained but the awareness of how this is 
achieved is without introspection of reflective-/conscious awareness. These actions 
are typically performed as a rountinised act. Such an experience of the equipment 
may be considered sub-conscious though this may develop toward non-conscious 
through instinctual or habitual use.  
An example of this may be understood as Langer's expert typist. They perform 
their typing task without conscious awareness towards the activity. Should they be 
required to alter their behaviour then a breakdown occurs and they are forced into 
consciously performing the act.  
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Equipmental-fixedness 
 Equipmental-fixedness is an expansion upon Un-ready-to-hand, as described by 
Dreyfus (p210, 1991). When an equipment performs as a functional fixedness. 
Deliberation upon the equipment does not occur even though the equipment is not 
in use. Its affordances are masked behind a premature cognitive commitment and its 
utility as equipment is non-consciously perceived. Such equipment can be 
understood as experientially present (i.e. available for conscious reflection and the 
equipment understood as distinct from the self) yet does not hold the properties of 
a tool (holding multiple affordances). This state, though involving awareness, can be 
viewed as Mindlessness as noted by Gantman, Gollwitzer, and Oettingen: 
"In defining mindfulness, it is important to note that it is not just self-
awareness (e.g., Duval & Wicklund, 1972); when objects in the environment 
such as a mirror, tape-recorder, or the sound of one’s own voice, are present 
in the environment, they are reminders of the self-as-object and so draw the 
focus of attention of the individual as “Me.” The highly objectively self-
aware individual regards the self as an entity in the environment that can be 
evaluated as any other. Mindfulness is a state of conscious awareness in 
which the individual as “I” actively constructs categories and distinctions. In 
contrast, mindlessness is a state of mind characterized by an over-reliance 
on categories and distinctions drawn in the past—it is not simply taking the 
“I” out of experience. The individual is context-dependent and as such 
oblivious to novel (or simply alternative) aspects of the situation." 
(p237, 2014) 
Thus, though the "I" or "me" is distinct from the equipment the reliance upon 
the previously drawn categorisations exposes the interaction or understanding as 
Mindlessness.  
Fluidic-tool 
 Fluidic-tool is an expansion upon Present-at-hand, as described by Dreyfus 
(p210, 1991). When an equipment has encountered a 'breakdown'. Such breakdown 
may be drawn from a failure of the equipment or through self-deliberated 
observation. As such the tool 'reveals itself' to the entity using it, it becomes 
'consciously present' (we consciously are aware of the tool as a separate entity). Thus 
a tool in this state is phenomenologically visible, we can 'see' the tool as distinct 
from ourselves and so can reflect or theorise upon its meaning and range of 
equipments facilitated through its affordances. As such, the user of the tool focuses 
toward the tool itself and not a specific goal facilitated through the equipment. Such 
an experience is conscious and is considered Mindful as there is active formation of 
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novel categorisations toward a present given context.  
Abstract-tool  
Abstract-tool is an expansion upon Purely present-at-hand, as described by Dreyfus 
(p210, 1991). When a tool is understood through purely abstract categorisations 
whereby constitutional elements are exposed. In this state the tools affordances are 
not only bound by its immediacy but additional modification, deconstruction and 
combination with other affordances and/or technologies toward a broader goal or 
activity. As such, this state of experience is purely contemplative and beyond the 
immediacy of the context the tool is presented in. 
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1.11.0: Understanding The Body In Mindfulness 
And Mindlessness 
While the previous chapters of this thesis have explored Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness through a philosophical lens, here associated concepts from the field 
of cognitive science are explored to provide further insight toward how and why 
such experiences may occur. 
In doing so the thesis takes scope form the field of neurophenomoenology as a 
methodology in understanding these complex states of experience with aim to 
situate such topics within a contemporary scientific discourse. This seeks to improve 
understanding and inform the development of systems for the direct measurement 
of such experiences and provide support in the development of a grounded 
definition of Mindfulness and Mindlessness in fields beyond a spiritual association.  
 
1.11.1: Neurophenomenology 
Building upon phenomenology Varela (1996) proposed that the ‘hard problems’ 
(as described by Chalmers (1995)) may be answered through 
“Neurophenomenology” in that “…the field of conscious phenomena requires a 
rigorous method and an explicit pragmatics for its exploration and analysis.” (p330) 
in a direct addresses to Chalmers 'easy' and 'hard' problems of consciousness 
(1995). Thus, Varela sought to combine cognitive science and a "disciplined 
approach" (incorporating phenomenological understanding and enquiry) to 
understand human experience. Varela places neurophenomenology through 
phenomenology yet does not ascribe it to a particular school or sub-lineage and so 
provides his own understanding: 
“My position cannot be ascribed to any particular school or sub-lineage but 
represents my own synthesis of phenomenology in the light of modern 
cognitive science and other traditions focusing on human experience. 
Phenomenology can also be described as a special type of reflection or 
attitude about our capacity for being conscious. All reflection reveals a 
variety of mental contents (mental acts) and their correlated orientation or 
intended contents. Natural or naive attitude assumes a number of received 
claims about both the nature of the experiencer and its intended objects. 
The Archimedean point of phenomenology is to suspend such habitual 
claims and to catalyse a fresh examination”  
(p335-336, Varela, 1996) 
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Varela (1996) provides a "Working Hypothesis of Neurophenomenology", with 
aim to provide help toward guiding and shaping scientific investigation of 
consciousness experiences (and vice-versa), which he described as:  
"Phenomenological accounts of the structure of experience and their 
counterparts in cognitive science relate to each other through reciprocal 
constraints."  
(p343, Varela, 1996). 
That is to say, first person accounts of subjective experience should be integral to 
cognitive science studies and proposals of physiological function, "…only a 
balanced and disciplined account of both the external and experiential side of an 
issue can make us move one step closer to bridging the biological mind - 
experiential mind gap."(p343, Varela, 1996).  
By the means of Neurophenomenology Varela suggests that all accounts of 
subjective experience may eventually be explainable by a thorough understanding 
of physiology developed through the merging of disciplined first-person accounts 
and rigorous neurobiology studies, as described below:  
"Φ looks like Ψ ⇒ Φ explains Ψ  
where Φ are neural-psychological terms and Ψ are phenomenal terms, and 
the implication operator has a conditional sense: if the empirical events 
'look like' the phenomenal events, then these are explained. " 
(p344, Varela, 1996) 
In the context of this research such positioning is recognised as contested, as 
previously stated there remains on-going debate with regards to the physiology of 
consciousness. The approach of neurophenomenology, however, still facilitates a 
better understanding that though the "experiential mind" may be beyond 
measurement, the physiological process that support or correlate such phenomena 
may be utilised in enhancing understanding of and classification such states. And so 
the research of this thesis builds upon the notion that if empirical evidence within 
cognitive science (Φ) looks like the philosophical understanding (Ψ) then cognitive 
science can help understand, support and explain the particular philosophical 
understanding. Here it is understood that: through rigorous inquiry and disciplined 
first person accounts of Mindfulness and / or Mindless, supported by the 
observation and understanding of physiological process accompanying such states; 
a better-grounded understanding of Mindfulness and Mindlessness may be achieved 
that furthers application in the field of HCI (through providing potential modalities of 
measurement). 
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 "This can hardly be otherwise, since any science of cognition and mind 
must, sooner or later, come to grips with the basic condition that we have 
no idea what the mental or the cognitive could possibly be apart from our 
own experience of it.” 
(p331, Varela, 1996) 
Accordingly, here the 'science' of Mindfulness and Mindlessness during human-
computer interaction is framed through not only a philosophical understanding but 
additionally supported by observable measurements (from findings of related fields) 
and justifiable first-person accounts.  
 
1.11.2: Understanding Of Cognition And Mindlessness:  
“At every moment, the natural environment presents animals with many 
opportunities and demands for action. […] Information is used along with 
representations of current needs and memories of past experiences to 
make judgements and decide upon a course of action. “ 
(p1585, Cisek, 2007) 
“Continuous interaction with the world often does not allow one to stop 
and think or to collect information and build a complete knowledge of ones 
surroundings. To survive in a hostile environment, one must be ready to act 
at short notice, releasing into execution actions that are at least partially 
prepared.  
(p1586, Cisek, 2007) 
While the previous chapters have addressed Mindfulness and Mindlessness 
through phenomenological and philosophical understandings (i.e. subjective, 'felt', 
first-person experience) they have not addressed cognition as a distinct quality. In 
the previous chapters it was established that we (humans) hold capacity for moments 
of reflective-conscious and conscious awareness toward and through technologies, 
yet also states where these forms of awareness are not present, i.e. Sub- and non-
conscious actions and behaviours. Therefore, logically there must a process that 'fills 
in the blanks' when we are not 'looking in' (through conscious awareness as 
introspection) and 'takes over' as sub- and non- conscious actions and behaviours. 
This can is described through the previous example (of Langer (1989)) of those who 
are able to undertake a once concerted and effortful task (e.g., Knitting) yet are then 
able to multitask (e.g. Knit while watching T.V.) as the "…learned tasks drop out of 
mind" (p20). The once effortful task performed with concerted conscious awareness 
becomes sub-conscious as “[…] the individual parts of the task move out of our 
consciousness" (p20, Langer, 1989); there is a part of the action where the conscious 
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“me” stops thinking upon the how and sub-consciously knows to do. Shanahan 
(2010) comments on this difference: 
“[…] an important distinction needs to be drawn between thought and 
cognition. Our immediate concern is thought in humans, and human 
thought, as the term is used here, is necessarily conscious. We can report 
what we are thinking and recall what we have thought in the past, 
[…]  
Cognition might (conventionally) be described as, say, a combined process 
of gathering information from the senses, storing it, processing it, and using 
whats been gathered, stored, and processed to guide behaviour. 
According to such characterisation, a cognitive process may be conscious, 
or it may not. Likewise it is commonplace in philosophy of mind to gloss 
over the conscious/unconscious distinction altogether — to speak, for 
example, of a mental state without declaring weather the mental state in 
question is conscious or not."  
(p42, Shanahan, 2010) 
For Shanahan (p42, 2010) cognition is to "know" as he points out: 
"Contemporary scientific usage has strayed away from the Latin root of the word 
'cognition' which is cognosecre, to know (rather than cogitare, to think)". That is to 
say, cognition is an act of knowledge processing and application whereas 
consciousness is an active 'thinking' act, such as a formation of new knowledge; a 
distinction analogous with the previously discussed Western understandings of 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness. As Langer has previously described (Langer, 1989) 
the more we know how to perform an act the less we need to think of it, until the 
process has completely removed from our conscious awareness. Further to this, 
when thinking (concerted conscious awareness) is placed upon a well-known act 
(that is routinised and performed sub-consciously) it adds an additional burden, and 
the task cannot be as easily performed. For example, when Langer requested a 
skilled typist to deconstruct his typing where he  "… Began to take apart each skill, 
his quick fingers slowed way down and so did his memory for how and what he 
typed. Becoming conscious or Mindful incapacitated him" (p20, Langer, 1989).  
 
1.11.3: Biological Basis Of Cognition And Evolutionary 
Perspective Upon Conscious-Cognition 
Århem and Liljenström (1997) provide further insight to cognition and 
consciousness framed within an evolutionary based positioning. Their work parallels 
and builds upon that of Humphrey (1992) and Lindahl (1997), and provides insight 
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toward the classification of animals degree of capacity to hold conscious 
experiences (e.g. Chandroo, Duncan and Moccia (2004) and, Butler and Cotterill 
(2006)) and in the classification of artificial life (Moreno and Etxeberria, 2005). They 
(Århem and Liljenström) define cognition as a knowledge processing mediated by a 
centralised nervous system and based upon the same principles as non-neuronal 
adaptive processes. Through this positioning they argue that conscious-cognition 
may be a major transitioning point in the evolution of life, appearing in differing 
degrees at different stages of evolution.  
Århem and Liljenström (1997) describe that to survive every organism needs to 
react and adapt to its changing environment. In order to successfully adapt the 
organism must have capability of learning and problem solving and so, all 
(successful) organisms must possess a knowledge about their immediate 
surrounding environment. While all successful organisms do not require a nervous 
system (e.g. Trees); Århem and Liljenström (1997) explain that having a nervous 
system increases the speed and capacity in which an animal can perform adaptation 
to, and interaction with, the environment; and so increase its survival probability. 
Thus, knowledge gained of the environment facilitated by and mediated through a 
nervous system (sensory perception/stimulation) is therefore regarded as cognition.  
The context of cognition for this thesis refers to cognition of organisms with a central 
nervous system with capabilities to sense and store information.  
Conscious cognition differs from cognition as it is not only cognition but 
cognition associated with subjective experience. While Århem and Liljenström (1997) 
do not provide a definition of consciousness (other than being a subjective 
experience) they state that thinking and describing of consciousness in purely 
"computational terms" would not be fertile, and stress "…the subjective aspect of 
our mind cannot be fully understood in terms of computations" (p602, Århem and 
Liljenström, 1997) i.e. Through nervous system activity as input/output alone. 
Through this a distinction is made that conscious-cognition is not consciousness 
itself but subjective experience (consciousness) upon knowledge (cognition). While 
Århem and Liljenström (1997) do not hold the position that consciousness is the 
produce of the brain or central nervous system, they do note that a role of the brain 
is to prioritise this sensory information (from nervous system) and so filter the 
"nonsense" (the mediation between sensation and perception) of continual sensory 
input and leave significant stimulus. Furthermore, they hold the position that the 
capacity for conscious cognition (e.g. reflection upon sensation and perception) is 
presumably advantageous to an animal over solely possessing non-conscious 
cognition; and would require a highly complex nervous system capable of change; 
as noted: 
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"A high flow rate of information may not be sufficient for mind, it is very 
likely a prerequisite for it. Also the dynamical state of the brain is of great 
importance for how the information is being processed, and what the result 
of this processing will be."  
(p603, Århem and Liljenström,1997) 
It is important to remember that here, and as with this thesis, Århem and 
Liljenström’s positioning is not concerning how consciousness is 'produced' (as this 
remains beyond current knowledge) but that it exists when understanding 
conscious-cognition and cognition.  
 
1.11.4: Complex Nervous Systems Allow Complex 
Cognition 
There is some form of knowledge processing before events in the environment 
(as stimulus) cause a responsive behaviour/action (sensation to action). Through 
evolution different strategies have emerged to optimise this process in terms of 
speed, energy used, and balance between a flexibility or stability of the responses. 
Though each requirement has its benefits they are not necessarily compatible and 
often require a sacrificing of the balance of one trait over another. Humans, for 
example, have developed and drawn upon flexible response patterns necessitating 
a highly complex centralised nervous system (Liljenström, 1994) at a cost of greater 
energy use. The range of complex flexible responses requires interneurons, 
neurones that mediate the impulses between sensory and motor neurones; with the 
larger the number of interneurons the larger potential number of responses to 
stimulus (with humans holding the largest number of interneurons) (Århem and 
Liljenström,1997). In addition to this, complex network nervous systems evolved to 
process and store information in efficient ways; facilitating maximal processing rate; 
or maximal information storage capacity (Århem and Liljenström, 1997). It is 
assumed that the central nervous system (of all animals) evolved primarily as a 
means of facilitating rapid information transfer from sensation to action; with the 
ability for high degree of information storage being a later development facilitating 
more complex interaction behaviours with the environment (Århem and Liljenström, 
1997). Århem and Liljenström (1997) describe how the complexity of a nervous 
system alters the speed in which interaction with the environment occurs. They note 
that the shortest time of information transfer (sensation to action) is found in the 
more simple nervous systems (such as primitive invertebrates), providing example of 
(certain) flies that can react to a single cell’s stimulus and respond within a few 
milliseconds. Larger networks, such those found in mammals, normally have a 
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millions of cells involved in any activity with several synaptic steps between the 
sensory and motor control; and so the time between sensation to motor control is in 
the order of hundreds of milliseconds (Århem and Liljenström, 1997). While it may 
initially appear that a simpler system (with fewer synaptic steps) holds advantage 
(being far faster and more energy efficient) a complex nervous system (with more 
synaptic steps) though slower holds additional capabilities to store more information 
and allow for longer periods of learning, facilitating adaption over the mammals 
lifetime. A greater number of synaptic steps additionally allows for a far more robust 
and richer interaction with the environment (stimulus to multiple potential responses) 
(Århem and Liljenström, 1997).  Such biological basis of complex and routinized 
responses provides an evolutionary requirement and development of a duality 
between Mindful (conscious cognition) and Mindless (cognition) states of action and 
response (figure 1.17 below).  
 
 
Figure 1.17; Comparison between conscious-cognition and cognition, this is 
intended to be interpretive and should be understood alongside previous 
images of this section (Chapter 1.5 to present) 
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1.11.5: Conscious-Cognition v’s Cognition 
The previously described understanding of cognition does not require or include 
conscious-cognition as it only addresses the more simple of interactions. Human 
cognition is evidently multi-level with some knowledge processing occurring outside 
of the conscious level and others inclusive of the subjective experience (Århem and 
Liljenström, 1997; Ashby, Turner, and Horvitz, 2010; Anderson 1983, 1992, 1996) 
(though it is suggested that most of knowledge processing occurs outside of 
conscious awareness) (Shanahan, 2010; Baars, 1993). Further to this, Århem and 
Liljenström (1997) state that even conscious processes differ in their levels of 
complexity (as previously described in chapter 1.5): 
“A capacity for selective attention and simultaneous processing 
characterises consciousness, while higher-order consciousness is 
accompanied by a sense of a person, of a self.”  
(p608, Århem and Liljenström, 1997) 
Århem and Liljenström propose that consciousness is required for the higher 
levels of cognitive functions; marking a major transition in our (human) evolution. 
This reasoning is that through an awareness of self, one can understand themselves 
as an actor in an environment (distinct from it), other agents (others with abilities of 
action), and situate this knowledge in a period of time (past, present, and/or future 
as opposed to solely reacting to the immediate). In doing so, an agent with 
capabilities of knowledge of the environment, recall of previous interactions 
(memory), and, understanding of their capabilities of interactions; is able to develop 
and apply increasingly complex behaviours such as plans (predictions) and complex 
interactions (multiple level goals that extend to future events and/or inclusive of 
others actions). 
To explain this more simply; a fly does not possess the capabilities of (highly) 
complex behaviours and planning, it reacts to the environmental stimulus on a 
purely cognitive level and can thus make minor behaviour changes far faster than 
more complex mammals (such as humans) e.g. Evading a moving object. These are 
cognitively ‘hard-coded’ through the flys (relatively) simple nervous system e.g. If 
event X occurs react with action Y; the fly knows (cognitively) what to do and does 
not need think (consciously) upon it. Humans however have a much more complex 
nervous system, environmental stimulus invokes a high number of synaptic 
(cognitive) steps, some of which may enter or provoke a conscious-cognitive state 
whereby a reflection upon the event can occur. While this process is far slower than 
the fly, the human is able to react with a much broader range of actions that are 
contextualised from multiple stimulus information (as opposed to more generic and 
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singular stimulus as with the fly); and draw upon and apply previous knowledge to 
think e.g. does the event X require Y or Z, and which will be an optimal solution 
(what will be the consequence). As noted by Århem and Liljenström (1997):  
“Predictions and expectations that bring cognitive processes into a (distant) 
future, also open for a more advanced planning and setting up of goals”  
(p607, Århem and Liljenström, 1997) 
But as Århem and Liljenström state not all cognition of those with conscious-
cognition capabilities and complex nervous systems is slow and reflective, there still 
remains rapid cognition as “…Some specific pathways, like those involved in simple 
instinctive sensation-reaction schemes, may be very fast” (p605, 1997).  
Consequently actions that necessitate rapid or routinized reactions are often 
performed without a slow Mindful contemplation and are reliant upon previously 
gained and stored knowledge (enacted and Mindless).  However, complex decision 
making (and reactions) requiring a sense of planning and broader contextualisation 
and of self are often slow and can be considered novel and so Mindful.  
 
These understandings allow for supporting the philosophical grounding of the 
definitions alongside verifiable and well-established knowledges that can provide a 
richer understanding of Mindfulness and Mindlessness; and consequently, facilitate 
the introduction of established methods of validation from cognitive science (as will 
be demonstrated in Section 2). The clear division between cognition and 
consciousness additionally allows for a clearer division of the properties of 
Mindfulness (a conscious experience) and Mindlessness (sub-/non-conscious) in ways 
that enrich understandings from and for other domains (e.g. cognitive science), and 
provides insight into how and why such states may occur (as described in the 
following).  
 
1.11.6: Streamlining Of Brain Activity - Development Of 
Specific Pathways 
Described here in simplicity (for fuller account see: Hallihan and Shu, 2011), a 
mammalian brain is composed of billions of interconnected neurones that 
communicate via changes in electrical potential at synaptic connections (the points 
at which connected neurones meet). A neurone will not send a charge, known as 
action potential, until it has received enough stimulus (electric charge potential) to 
surpass a threshold (where the “information”/charge is then passed along through 
the network). Long-Term Potentiation (LTP) is “…an increase in the efficiency of 
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synaptic connections between neurones, due to their repeated and synchronous 
firing” (p491, Hallihan and Shu, 2011), increasing the sensitivity and so achieving the 
threshold faster. It is this development of LTP that facilitates the development of 
“specific pathways” and allows for greater sensation-reaction times (as described by 
Århem and Liljenström, 1997) and faster enacting of learned skills (and considered 
the major mechanism in learning and memory). Although there is relocation in the 
areas of dominant activity within the brain for early skill learning v’s well-learned 
action (Ashby, Turner, and Horvitz, 2010); the LTP development from repetition will 
facilitate and strengthen the recall and speed of stimulus-to-response for a given 
stimulus (i.e. learning). The process of neuronal plasticity (Hallihan and Shu, 2011), 
produced by mechanisms such as LTP allows the rapid reaction to stimulus from the 
environment (improving the chances of survival for an organism). However, fixation 
develops as an inability to activate new neuronal networks that do not have 
dominance over pathways formed through LTP (Hallihan, and Shu, 2011). That is to 
say, the LTP strengthening imposes the inability to see beyond well-learned 
solutions and generate novel or unconventional solutions. Conversely inhibition 
mechanisms (an opposing to LPT) can impede neuronal connections. As novel and 
appropriate solutions and actions (i.e. creativity) are dependent upon the extent of 
the spread of activation in the neuronal network (Gabora, 2010; Hallihan and Shu, 
2011); cognition that avoids the mechanisms of “specific pathways” and calls upon a 
larger neuronal network may prove more advantageous. Through drawing upon 
such larger neuronal network an organism can evaluate present stimulus and better 
contextualise the information to the present environment (as opposed to a reflexive 
response) facilitating more robust reactions (Anderson, 1992; Århem and Liljenström, 
1997; Baars, 1993; Shanahan, 2010).  
It should be noted here either of the traits (conscious-cognition and cognition) 
would furnish an animal with a differing competitive edge and prove necessary in 
evolutionary development, and so neither are here considered as an absolute 
optimal condition or superior. Humans have thus developed, through evolution, 
different strategies for cognition. A ‘lower level’ of cognition optimal in terms of 
speed and energy use, where learning develops specific and dedicated neuronal 
pathways for actions to be performed quickly and with less energy expenditure. This 
process occurs without a conscious reflection (and so should be considered as sub-
/non-conscious). As this process is the re-application of previous/existing knowledge 
it comes with the trade off of being rigid and non-adaptive, it is routed in previous 
knowledge and so is decontextualized and reactionary. Additionally humans posses 
the ability of a ‘higher level’ of cognition (conscious-cognition) in which highly 
complex and flexible responses and actions can be performed. This process is slow 
and draws upon many resources (i.e. widespread brain activity through multiple 
neuronal pathways (Baars, 1993)). This higher level process involves a conscious 
  96 
aspect (and so should be considered conscious / reflective-consciousness); and 
draws upon previous and present knowledge and applies these with consideration 
to future events (broader goal and aims). Thus, conscious-cognition can be 
understood as a process in which novel and creative solutions (thinking) to problems 
reside. 
We can therefore understand and frame cognition as a Mindless process and 
conscious-cognition as Mindful.   
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1.12.0: Cognition And Affordance 
“…Cognition helps an animal decide what to do when the possibilities 
afforded to it by the environment are combinatorially structured. It helps by 
exploring the space of affordances. This can be done either ‘on-line’ - 
through play, with the aid of training, and so on - or ‘off-line’ - that is to say 
by means of purely internal operations.”  
(p44, Shanahan, 2010) 
Shanahan (2010) clearly links cognition to affordance, though does not 
differentiate distinct forms of cognition. Shanahan (2010) states that though an 
environment is full of objects the affordance they offer are reliant upon the agents 
psychological propensities (as previously described in chapter 1.8-on affordance). 
Thus the affordance is often potential as it requires the agents application of 
cognition to expose (to think how) the potentials that are masked (as equipment) 
may operate as a combinatorial structure (as a tool). Combinatorial structure here 
refers to the means in which technologies ‘fit’ together to produce a technology 
greater than the sum of its parts; e.g. Photography captures a specific scene in time, 
a system of trip wires could be applied to trigger a camera shutter relating to a 
specific moment in time, compiling these moments provides a capture of a series of 
time (e.g. stop motion or motion film, exemplified in figure 1.18 below). 
 
Figure 1.18; Example of a combinatorial technology to form a new 
technology – multiple cameras harnessed together to capture multiple 
images of a horse in motion in time as opposed to ‘still’.4  
The complete apparatus is viewed and understood in a summation of parts as a 
singular (novel) technology. Therefore we can understand that cognition in 
                                               
4	Image	retrieved	03/02/2017	-	https://tinyurl.com/hmemx57		
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developing combinatorial structures requires a move beyond the immediacy of the 
equipment (as previously defined chapter 1.9.2) and expose the technologies 
potential combinatorial qualities (as a tool; previously defined chapter 1.9.1) toward 
becoming new technology. Here we can assume that this will be in relation toward a 
goal or motive (‘off-line’ in the future as planned as opposed to reactionary in the 
present). And so, this cognition being reflective (thinking) toward future goals as 
opposed to reactive toward the present (i.e. beyond reflexive) and 
distinguishing/deconstructing objects and their qualities (and our action toward 
them); is a conscious-cognition and Mindful.  
 
1.12.1: Minimising Competition For Cognitive Resources - 
Mental Schemas 
As previously described, Bodner and Langer (2001) state: 
 “In a complex environment, individuals use a variety of cognitive tools to 
minimize the competition for precious cognitive resources. One such tool is 
a reliance on cognitive structures (e.g., prototypes, schemas, scripts) to 
organize experience.”  
(p3, Bodner and Langer, 2001) 
The process of experiencing the environment through combinatorial structures can 
be understood through the application of prior knowledge as mental “schemas”. As 
previously described cognition, both cognition and conscious-cognition, plays a 
critical part in an organisms ability to survive and adapt in a given environment; and 
this is reliant upon the organisms previous knowledge. The application of 
knowledge however is often required to be performed in circumstances that are less 
than identical to the previous knowledge, there is often something that is different, 
added or missing; and a process is required to ‘fill in the blanks’. For example, not 
all drinking glasses are identical (e.g. Figure 1.19 below) but I know that they are all 
drinking glasses without much thinking upon why; the properties of a technology as 
affordances (a range of ‘stimulus’) together with the context in which they are 
presented inform me that the most probable type of object it could be is a drinking 
glass (without needing to explore all of the affordances). There are a set of rules or 
requirements that also inform me that the object is not a bucket (e.g. Size, 
placement in environment etc.).  
  99 
  
Figure 1.19; Example of various drinking glasses5 
Psychologist theorise that this may be due to knowledge being organised as 
cognitive structures within long term memory, known as schemas (Arbib, 1992). 
These schemas are formed as central concepts during interaction with the 
environment and organise experience as mental representations and understandings 
of others, events, and technologies (Piaget, 1962). Chalmers (2003) states Piaget’s 
notion of knowledge and interaction with the environment as founded upon 
schemas with the adaption of existing schemas to incorporate new information 
playing a central role: 
“Piaget proposed that learning is the result of forming new schemas and 
building upon previous schemas. He proposed that two processes guide 
learning: (1) the organization of schemas, and (2) adaptation of schemas. He 
further proposed that adaptation of schemas involves: (a) the assimilation of 
new information into existing schemas, or (b) the accommodation of 
schemas to new information, which may not fit into existing schemas.” 
(p596, Chalmers, 2003) 
As described above, when experiencing external stimulus a process of 
accommodation or assimilation occurs. Accommodation is the process whereby new 
cognitive structures are formed, e.g. The first time you experience an ice-cream.  
Assimilation is the process where the current experience is compared to existing 
schemas to understand the experience of the world around e.g. The second time 
you encounter the same stimulus (an ice-cream) you recognise it against the 
previous experience (mapped schema) of ice-cream. Should there be a mismatch, 
e.g. it is of ice but does not taste of ice-cream (e.g. snow); the process of 
accommodation again occurs and either creates a new schema e.g. of snow, adapts 
                                               
5 Image retrieved 03/02/2017 - https://tinyurl.com/y9td2mx4  
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the existing schema e.g. Not all ice-cream is good; or places restrictions upon it e.g. 
ice-cream does not come from the floor. As noted by Wachtel (1980) a human is not 
just “stimulus-bound”, responding to the environment in a solely reflexive capacity, 
but selectively organises and makes sense of the input in relation to past 
experiences and structures (schemas). Humans, stated by schema theory, do not 
primarily learn new information or approach all stimulus as novel; but apply existing 
knowledge (cognitive structures) toward novel information, stimulus, environment, 
and contexts; and adapt to ill-fitting models. Therefore, when encountering new 
information and stimulus that maps close enough to an existing schema (to be 
functional) the pre-existing schema is applied without need to consciously reflect 
(think) upon the situation; as noted by Fischer, Itoh, and Inagaki (2009) in describing 
interaction with a familiar interface: 
“Schema theory postulates that perception, interpretation, specification and 
execution can be shortcut when prior schemas are triggered. Action is 
direct, automatic - we might here say intuitive - if each stage benefits from 
prior schemas. Conversely, when no schema is triggered, the user has to 
analyze the interface content. This effortful mechanism is necessary until 
new ad hoc schemas are constructed.” 
(p36, Fischer, Itoh, and Inagaki, 2009) 
Fischer, Itoh, and Inagaki’s (2009) understanding of the execution of schemas, 
above, is comparable to cognition as stated by Århem and Liljenström (1997). 
Therefore we can think of assimilation schemas in the same understanding as 
cognition; and so here are understood as a Mindless state when performed based 
on environmental stimulus as automatic and intuitive, bypassing an analytical stage. 
When a schemas do not fit, a new mode of action or behaviour is required 
(accommodation), a slow process whereby the ‘user’ analyses the information, which 
here is assumed to be a conscious-cognition and so Mindful.  
 
1.12.2: Automaticity And Intuition 
Fischer, Itoh, and Inagaki’s (2009) introduce specific terms for the application of 
schemas (or cognition) without requiring conscious reflection or awareness; 
“automatic” and “intuitive” (as previously quoted).  
Intuition 
Intuitive is often understood as analogous to “familiar” (Blackler, Popovic, and 
Mahar, 2010; Raskin, 1994), in that a person “knows” how to achieve a goal, or 
initiate / react to specific stimulus, without conscious effort through drawing upon 
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previously gained knowledge and experience (enacted as “implicit memory” 
(Blackler, Popovic, and Mahar, 2010)). This “intuitive interaction” (Blackler, Popovic, 
and Mahar, 2010) is sub-conscious processing of information and facilitates rapid 
learning/utilisation of how systems of interaction operate (Löffler et. al., 2013; 
Naumann et al, 2013) and can be understood as “knowing without reasoning or 
conscious processes” (p379, Sinclair, 2010). It has been noted that this is not just 
“wild guessing” of potential actions, but is the application of a previous experience 
and knowledge towards a current perceived similar situation (Blackler, Popovic, and 
Mahar, 2010).  
The most apparent effect of intuition is the speed at which meaning or 
significance occurs (being sub-/ non-conscious) as opposed to slower more 
analytical (predominantly conscious and reflective-conscious) processes (Baars, 1993; 
Blackler, Popovic, and Mahar, 2010). Intuition here is understood as the process of 
assimilation of mental schemas toward novel experiences operating without 
inhibition or failure i.e. Do not require amendment. A conscious or reflective 
conscious thought is not required or applied and previously existing knowledge is 
applied sub-consciously. As such, intuition can be regarded as a Mindless act. 
Automatic behaviours (Automaticity) 
Automatic behaviours are (broadly) described as occurring quickly without the 
need for conscious monitoring/attending (Wheatley and Wegner, 2001); seen as 
performing “efficiently” (Bargh,1994) they are fast in action whilst requiring little (if 
any) effortful conscious thought or control (Moors and Houwer, 2006; Wheatley and 
Wegner, 2001). As noted by Anderson (1992), automaticity has previously been 
understood to be the “effortless extraction of features in perception” (p165), though 
this expression is not accurate. Rather, the automaticity that is discussed here is in 
reference to “…some cognitive process whose operation is not subject to conscious 
control” (p165, Anderson, 1992). Differing from intuition, automatic processes are 
learned actions that following significant repetition (consistent practice) become 
enacted sub- to non-consciously (Moors and Houwer, 2006, Wheatley and Wegner, 
2001), and are performed during the majority of daily tasks (Hikosaka and Isoda, 
2010) e.g. familiar password entry, responding to greetings, and typical daily 
operations such as tying shoelaces. The process of a task becoming automatic is 
easier if there is consistent stimulus-to-response mapping (Anderson, 1992), 
whereby new schemes are not required, and existing schemas do not require 
conscious adaption. And so, automatic processes are considered to be triggered 
sub- / non-consciously by stimulus from the environment (operating beyond 
conscious control, such a visceral reaction), or may be consciously motivated 
(Wheatley and Wegner, 2001) as part of a larger goal (as a nested action). This can 
be seen, for example, where a familiar password entry is required and a “conscious 
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automaticity” (Wheatley and Wegner, 2001) is enacted. Much like Langer’s (1989) 
skilled typist before being asked to reflect on the process, the key presses that 
compose the password are pressed in rapid succession with no conscious control (as 
the action occurs faster than conscious recall of the individual key combinations and 
conscious hand movements); this is, to an extent, “conscious” in the fact the 
knowledge of a goal exists (password entry) yet “automatic” in the processes of 
achieving that goal (for a fuller account see (Moors and Houwer, 2006)). This 
automatic process (password entry) may be nested in the further goal of e.g. 
sending an email. While automaticity is beneficial in that it reduces the cognitive 
effort and time to perform a repeated action it holds central a consequence. The 
repeated action/thought, previously consciously initiated, becomes so embedded 
that it becomes the default action for the given stimulus (and any stimulus that maps 
the schema close enough to function), and initiated non-consciously (Wheatley and 
Wegner, 2001) and reflexively (Hikosaka and Isoda, 2010). This is further problematic 
in that the ‘priming effects’ (the stimulus that initiates an automatic behaviour and 
schema) require effortful processes to inhibit (i.e. A Concerted conscious awareness). 
Priming effects have been previously described (two-rings problem and Dunker's 
"Box" problem chapter 1.7). If the automatic action is initiated and performed faster 
than a conscious inhibition (or any conscious awareness) the automatic action will 
continue till its completion. 
 
Though intuition and automaticity are differing in their application context, as 
described above, we can understand them as similar in their process (the application 
of previously learned schemas).  
Automaticity is here proposed as a basis and enactment of Mindlessness.  
 
1.12.3: Adaptive Control Of Thought Theory - 
Automaticity As Skill Development And Enaction 
Anderson (1983, 1992, 1996) proposes an understanding of automaticity 
(automatic behaviours) during skilled activity through the ACT theory (Adaptive 
Control of Thought (Anderson, 1983); and subsequent additions * (Anderson, 1992) 
and -R (Anderson, 1996)). ACT theory suggests a model of understanding complex 
cognition arising from an interaction of procedural (represented by units of 
production rules) and declarative (represented by units called chunks) knowledge 
(Anderson, 1996). Individual units are formed by simple encodings of objects as 
chunks or adaptations of the environment (the context) as production rules 
(Anderson, 1996). Here Anderson's ACT theory is understood as a simile to 
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schemas.  
Within ACT Anderson (1992) proposes 7 qualities of automaticity development 
during skill learning and performance. These qualities will be discussed at greater 
length in the following sections (2.0 describing an exploratory study and 3.0 on 
design in human-computer interaction): 
1. The acquisition of skilled performance speeds up with a reduction in error 
rate with practice.  
2. Well learned skills decay over time; however this is minimal in relation to the 
rate of improvement with practice (i.e. It is easier and faster to relearn that to 
initially acquire).  
3. Spaced practice is more beneficial to the learning process than mass 
practice. 
4. As a skill becomes more practiced, there is less interference with concurrent 
tasks; and furthermore it is less interfered with by a concurrent task. 
5. “It is relatively difficult to inhibit an automatic process, and thus an automatic 
process can be more interfering to another on-going task.” (p166). That is to 
say, should an action require a new schema but holds the qualities that map 
to an existing schema, the existing schema will attempt to apply itself over 
the intent to develop new schemas. This is exemplified through the “Stroop 
test”, where by a participant is required to announce the colour of a word (its 
font colour) as opposed to the word itself that is of a colour (e.g. RED would 
correctly be answered with “Green”). The automaticity of reading words 
presented to us over-rides the instruction to announce the colour.  
6. Automatic processes are less slowed down by the number of alternatives. For 
example: p1 and p2 have identical skill levels; if p1 is presented with options 
a + b and has automaticity to choose a, and p2 is presented with options a + 
b + c + d and has automaticity to choose a; then p1 and p2 will perform this 
with the (near) same speed. Adding more options does not prevent 
automaticity.   
7. “It is easier for a task to become "automatic" if there is a consistent stimulus-
to-response mapping. In the context of this statement, the term automatic 
connotes fast processes, little interference by concurrent processes, and little 
effect of number of alternatives.” (p167). This can be understood as an 
action holding less adaptations to a schema being more easily made 
automatic.  
Anderson notes (p170, 1992) that every time a production rule (understood here 
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as an enacted schema) is practiced it receives an increment in strength (its power to 
become enacted in future). Furthermore, a consistency of mapping conditions; when 
a stimulus is associated with the same response or interpretation, further increases 
the strength of the behaviour (enacted schema) in becoming automatic (enacted 
sub-/non consciously). This can be understood as the process of tool’s (chapter 
1.9.1) becoming equipment (chapter 1.9.2), The significance of this will be more 
apparent later when discussing replication and imitation of designs.  
The introduction of automaticity here allows for a much richer understanding of 
Mindlessness from well-established domains with a number of methods for 
assessing, and means of describing its properties.  
 
1.12.4: Automatic Behaviours As Nested Actions 
Anderson (1983) proposes central themes of framing memory (and its recall in 
enaction). Firstly he proposes that memory is formed of cognitive units, understood 
as units of memory. These cognitive units are formed in associative links, existing as 
a unit node plus a set of elements (as arguments/augmentations of the node). As 
stated by Anderson (1983), when part of a cognitive unit is formed in long-term 
memory, all of it is (i.e. The node and its elements); and so when it is recalled it is 
recalled in full. For example, a node of the word train, may have element of -station, 
and so the memory recall or trigger will draw this association. However, the 
introduction of the new element (augmenter) e.g. Train-ticket, will create a new 
cognitive unit in memory. Reuse of the cognitive unit will increase its “strength” (its 
availability of recall). Anderson further states that there is a retention whereby the 
cognitive unit once formed is not lost, though it looses its strength as a decay over 
time. Thus a cognitive unit once formed may have a strength of e.g. 1, though with 
additional (successful/meaningful) recalls calls this increases e.g. “train-station” here 
now has 2, and “train-station” now has 3.  
Here I present a thought experiment that can be used to exemplify the operation 
of such cognitive units, their recall and decay:  
Think of your last journey by train and suggest an augmenter to the word 
“train-”. 
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“train-station” would be most obvious, as would “train-ticket”, a previously 
established cognitive unit e.g. See footnote 6, is probably not the one that 
was most obvious choice.  
As noted by Anderson (1983), working memory contains information currently 
available for “processing”. This combines current environment, inferences, current 
goal information, and traces of long term memory (p263). A “spreading activation 
process determines the level of activity in long term memory”(p263). Working 
memory elements are sources of activation, e.g. As perceptual events or internal 
concept processing's. These activation events spread form the corresponding 
cognitive unit node to associated elements as a network of elements and cognitive 
units i.e. Current stimulus triggers a network of associated long-term memories.  An 
automatic process is the making of information (long-term memory) available on the 
basis of an associative relatedness (to present working memory) (p264, Anderson, 
1983). This can be understood through the process of priming, i.e. a suggestive 
primer (in the previous thought experiment “journey” in combination with “train”) 
activates a network of associative memory (“Train-station”, “train-ticket”, “taxi”, 
“travel”). The primer activates the network of associations without need for 
conscious control or concerted thought. As previously described, the cognitive units 
of most frequent use present as the stronger association, though strength decays 
over time. Anderson (p263, 1983) additionally states that the activity (strength) of 
associative nodes (working memory elements) will determine the speed in which 
they are processed i.e. The less strength a node has the longer it will take to be 
processed, or more simply put; the least commonly used association will take the 
longest amount of time to become apparent. As noted: 
“… ACT clearly makes the prediction that overlearning will increase the 
probability of retention and speed of retrieval - predictions which are 
equally clearly confirmed” 
(p623, Anderson, 1983) 
In summary of ACT (Anderson, 1983); an “…experience establishes a network of 
nodes connected by links of varying strength. This network consists of cognitive 
units encoding various facts.” (p627). The activation of a network of nodes reflects 
the relationship to the source node (of activation). “The speed with which 
information in any part of the network can be processed is a function of its 
                                               
6	Train-of-thought:	by	drawing	upon	‘locomotive	train’	associations	in	the	preceding	paragraph	there	is	a	priming	for	that	area	of	thinking,	consequently	the	‘train-of-thought’	is	less	prominent	as	an	option.	
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activation” (p627).  
From this we can understand that over repeated application a network of 
activation gains strength and so also gains speed in its processing (or execution). 
This network is dependant upon a combination of triggers composed of incoming 
activations (stimulus) as current environment, inferences, current goal information, 
and traces of long-term memory. The more that an action/behaviour/information 
recall is performed from a specific stimulus the faster it is to perform in future and 
the more dominant (and automatic) it becomes. As previously described, the 
strength of an activation / cognitive unit fades over time without re-activations. 
When the source nodes changes (i.e. A new greater strength stimulus or activation 
of cognitive unit) a spreading activation adjusts the levels of activation to achieve a 
new asymptomatic network pattern of activation. Thus, we do not become inert to 
all stimulus that falls below any previously established maximum strength, and so we 
can adapt to new stimulus or context that do not fit the current network of activation 
(i.e. Forget and move on to new challenges and goals).  
This understanding through ACT is consistent with Århem and Liljenström’s (1997) 
understandings of cognition and conscious-cognition and the role of the brain (and 
central nervous system) as prioritising differing sensory information (from nervous 
system) and filtering the "nonsense" toward a selection of the most appropriate and 
significant stimulation (the mediation between sensation and perception).  
ACT theory holds to the positioning of this thesis in that it establishes a 
foundation that cognition (schemas as concepts and understandings) may form 
automatic learned behaviours that become deep-routed in our capabilities of 
reaction and action. The more that we repeatedly use a technology in a specific 
manner toward a specific goal the less available the options toward conceiving novel 
alternatives are. Thus, where once a new technology revealed a vast range of 
actions, with repeated use it moves beyond the tool toward equipment. While 
“conscious conditions” facilitate a flexibility of behaviours, automatic processes are 
“rigid and stereotypic” and so less able to manage such novelty (p85, Shanahan, 
2010); i.e. Flexibility to novelty will not be incorporated into an automatic act but will 
require a conscious element to facilitate / initiate flexibility. Thus, Mindless actions 
do not hold an active conscious element (sub-/non- conscious) and so are fixed and 
rigid; but a Mindful positioning toward such actions (conscious/reflective-conscious) 
introduces a contextualisation (through incorporating more sensory and mental 
elements) and facilitates flexibility and novelty.  
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1.12.5: Global Workspace Theory  
The global workspace theory of Baars (1993, 1996, 1997) proposes a specific 
information processing architecture comprised of multiple sets of parallel specialist 
processes within a global workspace (through a similar framing to that of ACT). The 
specialist processes (which are sub-/non-conscious) work together and compete to 
enter dominance/control of the global workspace (as a conscious event). This global 
workspace then broadcasts (Shanahan, 2010) back outward through the network 
(directing toward action) (See figure 1.20 below and figure 1.21 following). 
Therefore, consciousness (in global workspace theory) directs action, attention and 
awareness toward specific events or goals. As noted by Shanahan (p96, 2010) the 
global workspace theory holds two central tenets; 1) the human brain (and that of 
some other animals) “conform to this architectural blueprint”; and 2) “[…] the 
conscious/unconscious distinction mirrors the division between processing that is 
mediated in the global workspace and processing that is localised within the 
specialist”. That is to say, processes when localised and specialist will not enter 
conscious/reflective-conscious awareness until they hold dominance over the global 
workspace. Furthermore, multiple specialist processes unconsciously and continually 
happen at the same time. 
 
Figure 1.20; interpretation of strongest process (red) amoung many 
dominating control of the global workspace and broadcastings it back out 
to the wider network, this is an interpretive image and should be 
understood alongside the previous image examples (Chapter 1.5 -) 
As noted by Shanahan: 
“A major attraction of the theory is that it supports the intuition that the 
conscious condition promotes flexibility in the face of novelty, because the 
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blend of broadcast and competition at its core fosters integration among 
otherwise segregated brain processes.” 
 (p96, 2010)  
The specialist processes are not and do not need to always be consciously 
processed, if all input, actions and potential actions are held within this network it 
would be impossible for them all to be conscious; i.e. with every possible action and 
stimulus at the forefront of awareness we would not be able to decipher quickly 
enough the possible actions. This can be exemplified through recall of a simple task 
such as riding a bike, not only would conscious awareness be required of gripping 
handle-bars, moving legs (and each of the individual muscles), breathing (and 
awareness of CO2 in the blood stream and so appropriate rate of breathing); but 
further conscious awareness of bodily temperature (and sweat production, dilation 
or contraction of blood-vessels to maintain), intestine control (as the digestive 
system is functional) etc.. What we actually experience (when conscious of events) is 
an orientation toward limited (or singular) events or sensations e.g. an obstacle in 
our path, the sound of our name being called. The processes held in conscious 
awareness forms part of the continual competition to control and direct the global 
workspace and further guide the supporting specialist processes toward the optimal 
action. Should a process in conscious experience be of lesser importance (activation) 
than a stronger competing event it will be replaced. Thus, the specialist processes 
competition informs the requirement of conscious attention moving the most 
critical/dominant process from sub-conscious (automatic) to consciously deliberative 
and potentially further toward reflective-conscious; or as put by Baars (p292, 1997) 
“[…] focal consciousness acts as a ‘bright spot’ on the stage, directed there by the 
selective ‘spotlight’ of attention”. Thus, while events may be in our awareness they 
do not necessarily feature in the spotlight of attention; the environment is the 
theatre, awareness the stage, but attention is the spotlight to what we see 
potentially focused toward one actor or case wide upon the stage.  
Figure 1.21: “The global workspace architecture with separate sensory and 
motor processes, and accommodated within a sensorimotor loop. Direct 
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connections between the conscious condition is mediated by the global 
workspace” (p102, Shanahan, 2010) 
As noted by Shanahan (previous above) this system allows rigid or fixed 
automatic behaviours but additionally facilitates novelty as the specialist processes 
may be focused upon to inform new behaviours (opposed enacting automatic) that 
integrate all available competing information (elements of the wider stage) which is 
then broadcast back into the network through conscious deliberation as guided 
thought and voluntary action. As highlighted by Baars (1997): 
“One dramatic contrast is between the vast number of unconscious neural 
processes happening in any given moment, compared to the very narrow 
bottleneck of conscious capacity. The narrow limits of consciousness have a 
compensating advantage: consciousness seems to act as a gateway, 
creating access to essentially any part of the nervous system. […] Conscious 
experience creates access to the mental lexicon, to autobiographical 
memory, and to voluntary control over automatic action routines. […] All 
these facts may be summed up by saying that consciousness creates global 
access.”  
(p292, Baars, 1997) 
This notion of global workspace theory is highly supportive to the positioning of 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness and informs how such systems are conceptualised to 
operate in duality, drawn upon to unify the qualities found in the position of Århem 
and Liljenström (1997, Chapter 1.11) and Anderson (1983) (Chapter 1.12.4). 
 
1.12.6: Empirical Evidence Toward Global Workspace As 
A Capacity Of The Central Nervous System And Brain 
As noted by Baars we are facilitated empirical study of consciousness not through 
its direct measurement (as it has been previously established there is little evidence 
of “how” consciousness “happens”) but through understanding and comparing its 
presence and absence through “contrastive analysis” (Baars, 2002): 
“In science, after all, we can only study something if we can treat it as a 
variable, comparing its presence to its absence. A number of historic 
breakthroughs in science emerged from the realization that some previously 
assumed constant, like atmospheric pressure or gravity, was actually a 
variable. We can make use of this classic scientific strategy to explore 
consciousness.” 
(p293, Baars, 1997) 
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“Research traditions on subliminal priming, automaticity, and implicit 
cognition have made it clear unconscious comparison conditions for 
conscious processes are often available.”  
(p47, Baars, 2002) 
The evidence of such global workspace existing can be seen in human brain 
structure and activity where specific areas are more active and prominent toward a 
specific activities or processes, e.g. Speech or vision; yet these do not operate in 
solitude. The brain itself has cross communication between such specialised areas 
and exists as a highly networked organ. Sensory information (e.g. Vision) is 
distributed across multiple areas that give rise to different behaviours. This can be 
exemplified in Blindsight  (Danckert & Rossetti, 2005) where a patient has loss of 
visual experience (e.g. through damage to the occipital lobe or neuronal pathway to 
the lobe, which “processes” vision) yet is able to “guess” visual cues presented to 
them better than by chance alone (Danckert & Rossetti, 2005). In the example of 
blindsight, visual sensory information is held in an entirely sub-/non-conscious level 
yet informs conscious/reflective-conscious decisions.  
Thus, the global workspace architecture facilitates rapid actions/behaviours that 
are processed as sub-/non-conscious (automatic) and compete to inform 
conscious/reflective conscious awareness, e.g. the visual awareness of a change in 
light can inform pupil dilation prior to the conscious reflection upon experience of 
brightness (or darkness). Furthermore, for example, an awareness of fast moving 
objects can invoke bodily movement to avoid injury prior to conscious experience 
and reflective decision making (e.g. is running away appropriate), yet if the dominant 
process is a conscious inhibition then this can control the sub-conscious processes 
(e.g. not running and remaining calm); as noted by Baars, Ramsøy & Laureys (p671, 
2003) the “[…] conscious visual brain activities can influence unconscious ones, and 
vice versa”. Such positioning is analogous with the findings of Århem and 
Liljenström (1997) in “dedicated pathways” (which facilitate rapid action) in addition 
to wider networks facilitating more information, memory, novel decisions, planned 
actions, and ultimately conscious-cognition. Baars (2002) understands dominant 
information as widely distributed activity within the brain with the nervous system 
functioning as a massively distributed set of specialised networks.  
Baars, Ramsøy & Laureys (2003) further provide insight to indicators of when 
information of the central nervous system might be raised to conscious awareness: 
“[…] Although unconscious visual words activate known word-processing 
regions of the visual cortex, the same stimuli, when conscious, trigger 
widespread additional activity in frontoparietal regions. This general result 
has now been replicated many times, using vision, touch, pain perception, 
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and conscious versus automatic skills. Together, these findings suggest that 
conscious access to a stimulus involves a frontward spread of activation 
beyond the sensory regions of the posterior cerebrum.”  
(p672, Baars, Ramsøy & Laureys, 2003) 
While initially empirical work, such as Baars’, was controversial in acceptance, 
more recent neuroimaging techniques and research have added validity to global 
workspace theory supporting the positioning that consciousness might “mobilise” 
and integrate otherwise independent and separate neuronal brain processes (Baars, 
2002); for an overview see: Baars, 2002. Further work has been conducted using 
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to gain insight of brain activity 
during: stimulus-independent thoughts (McKiernan et al., 2006), introspection 
(Goldberg et al., 2006), monitoring of the “mental self” (Lou et al., 2004), integration 
of cognitive processes (Greicius et al., 2003), resting state networks and conscious 
states (Heine et al.2012), and mind-wandering (Mason et al., 2007). All of which 
point to increased and widespread brain activity as empirical measure in 
understanding aspects of deliberative action and reflective consciousness.  
Baars (p47, 2005) posits 6 theoretical claims of capacities enabled by 
consciousness: 
• Conscious perception enables access to widespread brain sources; 
unconscious sensory processing is much more limited   
• Conscious perception, inner speech, and visual imagery enable 
working memory functions; there is no evidence for unconscious 
access to working memory  
• Conscious events enable almost all kinds of learning: episodic and 
explicit learning, but also implicit and skill learning  
• Conscious perceptual feedback enables voluntary control over motor 
functions, and perhaps over any neuronal population and even single 
neurons  
• Conscious contents can evoke selective mechanisms (attention) and 
be evoked by it 
• Consciousness enables access to the ‘‘observing self’’ — executive 
interpreters, involving parietal and prefrontal cortex  
It is noteworthy that while Baars closely relates consciousness with brain functions 
he does not propose that the brain (or specific part of the brain) is the producer of 
consciousness, rather consciousness is the observer and controller of brain function 
and sense making.  
Thus, in the perspective of Baars, the primary functional role of consciousness is 
to allow and operate the workspace architecture in the brain, directing and calling 
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the actors (specialised regions of the brain) and pointing the spotlights (guiding 
attention and awareness) of the ‘theatre’ of experience. In doing so, consciousness 
can direct the brain to integrate, access, and coordinate the functioning of multiple 
specialised networks in harmony toward a task, that would otherwise operate 
autonomously and independently. While this may initially appear to be an 
unnecessary intervention, i.e. preventing otherwise autonomous actions; such 
intervention facilitates novel and richer forms of interaction with and from the 
environment. From a neurological perspective, such reflective consciousness may be 
therefore be evident in the activation of large, widespread, and or synchronised 
activity in the brain activating or inhibiting regions of brain function that would 
otherwise work in autonomy.   
This knowledge allows for the positioning of Mindfulness and Mindlessness in 
broader terms than solely philosophical perspectives and marries the concepts (as 
presented in this thesis) to the cognitive sciences. This additionally provides support 
for the measurement of these qualities through verifiable methods taken from 
related disciplines (as described in Section 2), and encourages the revision of the 
definitions with the future advancement of knowledge and understandings in the 
relationship between physiology and the phenomenon of consciousness.   
 
1.12.7: Reporting On Automatic Actions - Implications For 
The Study Of Mindful Interactions  
Shanahan (p71, 2010) reflects on the availability of automatic actions to 
consciousness. When processes are automatic, they are beyond introspection i.e. 
they exist and are performed outside of and without need of conscious awareness. 
Many of the elements of a process may be available to recall, however, many are 
not. As Shanahan points out, when recalling automatic processes and “facts” about 
them (the specifics involved) “Some are accurate, but some are just guesses, and 
some are plain wrong” (p71, 2010). Baars (2002) further supports this position in the 
distinction of non-conscious v’s conscious activities by their report (non-/sub-
conscious being non-reportable), and using self-report (of the participant) in 
understanding if a task is sub-/non-conscious or conscious/reflective-conscious. The 
availability of automatic processes to be reported upon (or rather their non-
availability) highlights the need to consider these distinct states of behaviour as 
contrast to consciously mediated actions.  
Particularly of importance here is the effect this holds toward understanding 
automatic interactions during human-computer interaction. If we are to understand 
that some of our interactions with technology are automatic, then we must also 
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understand that our ability to recall such interactions are fallible as we try to fill in the 
blanks with best guesses. This poses a challenge to investigation of interaction; 
specifically, if an interaction was performed Mindlessly (as an automatic action) recall 
upon it will be inaccurate and founded upon the previous assumed knowledge (a 
guess based on memory) i.e. a description of the premature-cognitive commitment 
and not the unconscious action performed. This understanding is particularly 
important as will be described in (and motivating) Section 2 (exploring the 
physiological correlations of Mindful and Mindless states during interaction). 
While the above holds focus toward automatic action and behaviours as a refined 
singular “stored” process it additionally suggests the alternative; a wide spread 
activation and incorporation of processes. 
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1.13.0: Section 1 Discussion and Conclusion  
The previous section (chapters 1.1.0 – 1.3.0) highlighted that existing definitions of 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness are unsuitable in application to human-computer 
interaction research and often included ambiguity in their meaning (or would 
introduce ambiguity in application to HCI research). This ambiguity, a symptom of its 
broader use in therapeutic application and spiritual practice, has been furthered 
through a lack of systematic effort given toward establishing the defining criteria of 
Mindfulness, its various components and specifying its implicated psychological 
processes, as highlighted by Bishop et al. (2004). Often definitions of Mindfulness 
and/or Mindlessness lack clarity and/or consistency (Bishop et. al., 2004; Brown, 
Ryan and Creswell, 2007a; Grossman, 2008; Chiesa, 2013) which may be in part to 
specific facets being overlooked as considered insignificant toward (or alternatively 
promoted in favour of) a particular study or application (Brown, Ryan and Creswell, 
2007a). Consequently, previous definitions of Mindfulness, and the methods of 
measurement associated with those definition’s, often carry with them a centring 
upon a specific (often undesirable) trait, typically of therapeutic focus. It was 
highlighted that methods applied in clinical ‘Mindfulness based intervention’ 
similarly failed to address Mindlessness and understanding its potential sources and 
benefits. Such oversight disregards great potential in utilising naturally occurring 
‘optimisation’ in terms of speed and cognitive efficiency in performing tasks.  
As such the remainder of the Section 1 sought to provide a pragmatic definition 
of Mindfulness and Mindlessness for the field of HCI that overcomes the pitfalls of 
reliance upon and application of existing measures, definitions and framings of 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness (as highlighted above). It is hoped that in such 
approach, and providing a novel grounding accounting to the specific needs of the 
field (as opposed to application in favour of a position), a more unified field of 
investigation can be established than that currently existing in clinical based 
applications of Mindfulness and Mindlessness. This aim is largely influenced by 
critique of Brown, Ryan and Creswell (2007a); Mikulas (2011); and, Brown and 
Cordon (2009); all of whom highlight the importance of developing a clear and 
consistent definition of Mindfulness to better aide in research, measurement, and 
application of the concept.  
Consequently Section 1 (Chapters 1.3 through 1.12) provided the grounding and 
facets of a pragmatic definition of Mindfulness and Mindlessness that is applicable 
to Human-computer Interaction. These definitions provided the following qualities 
and utility:  
• Reduced the ambiguity of the phenomena being discussed 
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• Can be applied to describe specific instances and qualities of interactions 
with technologies  
• Incorporate, and allows for further future-, understanding and knowledges 
from well-established related research domains 
• Draws upon well-established related domains for which research methods 
have been developed and are transferable in application i.e. facilitates 
further enquiry into the phenomena described. 
Defining Of Cognitive and Conscious States within Mindfulness 
and Mindlessness 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness is here understood as various states of 
consciousness and cognition. This distinction of consciousness and cognition, 
though perhaps counterintuitive to how we think of ourselves, is not of oversight but 
intention (as outlined in the later chapters of this first section). In making explicit the 
division of these states and their position in Mindfulness and Mindlessness richer 
understandings and methods for evaluation (e.g. from cognitive science) are 
facilitated, a utility lacking in previous definitions. Here the distinctions additionally 
allow for richer descriptions of interactions with technologies (with relationship to 
the subjective state of the user) that move beyond binary polarisations of these 
subtle qualities.  
Consequently, as highlighted, the study of Mindfulness and Mindlessness here 
holds conscious and cognitive variability as a central tenet in its inquiry and defining. 
Of a more critical understanding (for the following Section 2) is that many aspects of 
such variations (though often less subtle) can be correlated with observable 
physiological changes in the body; e.g. brain activity (Kügler (2013) and Valera 
(1996)). Thus in part contribution to the definition of Mindfulness and Mindlessness 
four distinctions of consciousness states were provided (Chapter 1.5.2). These seek 
to provide a clear lexicon for use in discussing Mindful and Mindless states and how 
an agent experiences them. These distinctions (of consciousness in philosophical 
perspectives and cognition in scientific perspectives) facilitate the positioning of 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness within related well established-domain 
understandings and encourage the application of those domain’s methods of 
analysis, specifically supported here as a neurophenomenological framework, as will 
be demonstrated in Section 2.  
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Defining of Tools and Equipments  and their state in Mindful 
and Mindless interactions  
As the primary focus of this thesis is of understanding Mindfulness and Mindlessness 
during interaction, considerations of how agents “see” or experience tools and 
equipment’s during use were drawn upon from phenomenological perspectives and 
the concept of affordances. Through this it is understood that often use of 
technologies in normal functioning hides their distinction from ourselves in a 
phenomenological invisibility, we experience them as an extension of ourselves and 
do not hold contemplation to their alternate use or meaning (their multiple 
affordances outside of the immediate application). Consequently, these occurrences 
exist in our sub-/non-conscious and so Mindless experience. Counter to this are 
events of breakdown, not necessarily of a literal failure of the technology but of a 
disruption to the “normal functioning” of the technology. During such events the 
technology “reveals itself” within our experience and we become aware (conscious) 
of the technology and its properties and meanings; we (Mindfully) see such 
technologies as distinct and can theorise upon such properties (through a reflective-
conscious awareness). When able to theorise upon technologies properties and 
meanings novel and multiple uses become apparent, that is to say the technologies 
multiple affordances become available.  
Of importance here is the understanding that an interruption to ‘normal’ 
(Mindless) functioning, promotes a reflective (Mindful) engagement; bringing the 
technology forth from a phenomenological invisibility (Mindless) to the centre of 
(Mindful) reflective conscious awareness. Thus, of particular interest to the 
understanding of Mindfulness and Mindlessness during interaction is the notion of 
interruption to “normal” functioning, and the ways in which technologies reveal 
themselves through such events. This positioning is highlighted in the study design 
of the following Section 2, where a purposeful interruption to an on-going activity is 
introduced through the event of a randomised “pop-up” (following a prolonged 
engagement). Similarly in Section 3 the notion of ‘breakdown’ is drawn upon in 
positioning alternate framings and alterations to ‘normal’ interactions through 
design as prompting novel engagements and opportunities for reflective (and 
Mindful) experiences.  
As previously highlighted it is important to maintain clarity when discussing 
specific elements of Mindfulness and Mindlessness (here in relation to technologies), 
thus in contribution to the understanding of Mindfulness and Mindlessness during 
interaction, the distinctions of Tool and Equipment were provided to clarify how an 
agent perceives the capacities (meanings and potential uses – i.e. affordances) of a 
technology. Building upon the definitions of tool and equipment (Chapter 1.9), and 
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in further part contribution to the understanding and clarification of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness; four definitions of technologies in use are provided – namely 
Abstract-tool, Fluidic-tool, Equipmental-fixedness, and, Equipmental-transparency 
(Chapter 1.10). While the use of tool and equipment refers to the subjective 
availability of a technologies affordances, the extending definitions build upon these 
to include the broader experiential state of the agent operating the technology. 
Such categorisations provide clarification when describing and understanding 
interactions with technologies within the context of Mindfulness and Mindlessness 
during interaction, a utility lacking in previous definitions of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness. 
 
Understanding Mindfulness and Mindlessness  
While the previously described contributions attend to Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness in philosophical understandings, centred around experiential qualities 
of consciousness; these are further supported through findings in the field of 
cognitive science. As described through neurophenomenology, richer 
understandings of such complex phenomena can be gained through a comparison 
of both findings in cognitive science and philosophical and phenomenological 
understandings; or more simply as described by Varela (p344, 1996) if “Φ [an 
observable phenomena] looks like Ψ [a reported phenomena] ⇒ Φ explains Ψ”. In 
the following Section 2, neurophenomenology provides the basis of methodology in 
development of physiological measurements of Mindful and Mindless states during 
interaction.  
This division (and specific inclusion) of consciousness and cognition in the 
provided definitions and their grounding serves as the distinction between Mindful 
and Mindless actions and provides (a partial) biological and evolutionary basis for 
such qualities, an understanding lacking in previous definitions of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness. Such understanding (and incorporation to the definitions of 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness) additionally facilitates the application of objective 
methods of analysis from cognitive science in measuring such states.  
While the above holds position for understanding Mindfulness and Mindlessness 
in a broader sense of human (or indeed any conscious agent) processes, here the 
specific interest is how these states inform and alter actions with technologies, 
namely through their influence upon how technologies affordances are revealed and 
utilised. As noted by Shanahan (2010) affordance is “cognition”, a position echoing 
that of Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s (1991) notions of Enaction, whereby we 
assume action from the perception of specific action possibilities (here described as 
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equipment – Chapter 1.9.2). Shanahan (2010) further proposes the use of a 
combinatorial structuring of objects in our environment (applied as tools Chapter 
1.9.1) that draws upon a higher level of cognition including a sense of ‘self’; here 
assumed to be a Mindful act of conscious-cognition according to that described by 
Århem and Liljenström (1997).  
Such positions strengthen the argument for Tools and Equipment as differing 
states of action within an environment; Tools revealing a combinatorial structures 
and planning (conscious-cognition) and so Mindful; and Equipment drawing upon 
rapid cognition and the previously known (i.e. memory) and Mindless. Consequently 
their utility in the pragmatic definitions provided offers support to the philosophical 
perspectives, though draws upon learnings from well-established domains (i.e. 
cognitive- and neuro-science) which may be validated through methods of those 
domains, such as observable physiological changes and characteristics. 
In the same vein, global workspace theory of Baars (1993, 1996, 1997) is drawn 
upon to provide a broader integration of consciousness and cognition akin to that of 
Århem and Liljenström (1997) and Anderson (1992). It is proposed that a specific 
information processing architecture exists in all agents with cognitive and conscious 
capacities. This is comprised of multiple sets of parallel specialist processes (which 
are sub-/non-conscious optimised cognitive processes) working and competing 
together to enter a state of control over the global workspace, which is a conscious 
(potentially Mindful) event. This global workspace then broadcasts (Shanahan, 2010) 
back outward through the network (directing toward action) as conscious intent 
guiding actions (as opposed to solely reactionary). Indeed the segregated and 
specialist human brain processes conform to such physiological architecture as 
noted by Shanahan (2010). 
Such positions strengthen the biological underpinning of how Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness might be measured through physiological observation, and 
consequently further justify the application of methods of analysis derived from 
cognitive and neurosciences (as performed in Section 2). This attribute of their 
inclusion and utility is lacking in previous definitions of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness and here offers potential for the objective measurement of these 
states. Equally significant here, cognitive science perspectives, such as the positions 
of Baars (1993, 1996, 1997), Århem and Liljenström (1997) and Anderson (1992) (and 
others), draw a balance between Mindfulness and Mindlessness in terms of their 
positive and negative functional attributes. This balance is often overlooked or 
skewed heavily toward Mindfulness as optimal in all circumstance in previous 
perspectives; yet through the supporting literature (of Section 1) it is evident that 
Mindlessness offers an equally significant and beneficial role, should the situation be 
appropriate. 
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It was highlighted use of consciousness (and unconsciousness) in cognitive 
science is easily replaced by Mindfulness (and Mindlessness) respectively. Mindful 
perception enables access to widespread cognitive sources of information and (and 
to the ‘‘observing self’’ – reflective consciousness. However, and significant to the 
following Section 2, when in states of automaticity, Mindlessness, the ability to self-
report on sub-/non-conscious events becomes diminished as noted by Shanahan 
“Some are accurate, but some are just guesses, and some are plain wrong” (p71, 
2010).  
 
From the above contributions of Section 1 support is given to the overarching 
contribution of the first section of this thesis - the defining of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness within human-computer interaction:  
Mindfulness, is defined as a state of broad reflective-conscious awareness 
upon the present context and content of information and stimulus. 
Information and technologies are explored and combined through 
concerted deliberation in novel categorisations of distinctions and action 
potentials as an abstract-tool.  
During interaction mindfulness is slow yet analytical whilst being receptive 
to change, whereby constituting elements are consciously present through 
use and application of a fluidic-tool. 
Mindlessness is defined as an intuitive understanding that exists in non-
conscious processes, with failure to account for contextual dependencies 
through premature cognitive commitments; where information and 
technologies hold a functional fixedness viewed as absolute through 
equipmental-fixedness. 
During interaction, mindlessness is without conscious deliberation through 
sub-conscious automaticity, developed from a cognitive fixation upon 
previous well-learned solutions. Such actions are performed before, faster 
than or without concerted conscious awareness in phenomenological 
invisibility; resulting in the inability to develop novel solutions and the 
application of technology through equipmental-transparency. 
Both of these states are defined as the opposing ends of a spectrum of which 
activities may move from one to another end and between. While these definitions 
are presented here as grounded within the previously described findings (of Section 
1) they are expected to develop with future research and further inquiry to the field, 
and through the advancement of knowledge in the contributing disciplines.  
As previously stated the definition’s hold a number of criteria for which they can 
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be evaluated. The definitions produced in this first section of this thesis sought to 
reduce the ambiguity of previous definitions of Mindfulness and Mindlessness. This 
was achieved through grounding from supporting and well-established fields. 
Similarly, a number of lexicon are provided (e.g. for differentiating conscious and 
cognitive states; Abstract-tool, Fluidic-tool, Equipmental-fixedness, and, 
Equipmental-transparency) to better describe Mindful and Mindless interactions and 
engagements with technologies. Finally, ambiguity of the phenomena is reduced 
through ensuring the definitions hold interaction as a central tenet in their formation. 
Consequently, the definitions are equally centred toward describing specific 
instances and qualities of interactions. Through the incorporation of supporting 
knowledges from well-established fields further understanding of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness is also provided as those fields advance their understandings. Primarily 
the division of cognition and consciousness, within an approach akin to a 
neurophenomenological methodology, allows for understandings gained through 
philosophical learnings support where cognitive science currently lacks. Through this 
methods for analysis of these qualities from their respective fields can be applied (as 
demonstrated in the following section) and enhanced as knowledge in these areas 
increases.  
Consequently, the definitions provided in this section of the thesis not only meet 
the previously described criteria needed in offering a greater suitability in describing 
Mindful and Mindless interactions; but additionally (as described above and 
demonstrated in the following) provide utility in methods of analysis and 
understanding previously missing.  
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SECTION TWO 
Study To Explore The Physiological Correlates Of Mindfulness And Mindlessness 
During Interaction 
“[…] the most complicated achievements of thought are possible without 
the assistance of consciousness”  
(Freud, 1900, p. 593)  
In this section an exploratory study is reported. The goal of this study is to guide 
future work upon methods in analysis of Mindful and Mindless interactions. As this is 
an exploratory study its aim is not to produce a final method of analysis but to 
highlight potentially useful methods that can be refined through future work. 
Consequently, an additional goal of this study is to “rule out” methods that are 
unsuitable or fail to yield indicators of the phenomena in question. That is to say, 
reject those used in related fields or in the analysis of Mindfulness and Mindlessness 
in different contexts that fail to indicate specific moments of Mindful or Mindless 
interaction. Accordingly, this exploratory study should be considered as laying the 
groundwork for future work in this emerging area. Here it is considered that a useful 
method of analysis will hold the capabilities of being easily integrated into 
interactive technologies (and their evaluation) and accessible by common 
place/commercial technologies (i.e. non-specialised medical equipment such as 
fMRI technologies). Most significantly a useful method would provide indicators of 
specific moments of Mindful and/or Mindless interactions, and would work toward 
the future aim of an unobtrusive and objective method/system for the analysis of 
Mindful and Mindless interactions with technologies. The development of such a 
tool will allow for better understanding design implications (and more specifically 
points of interaction) that invoke Mindfulness and Mindlessness and the effect these 
hold upon the user of technologies.  
The success of this exploratory study is evaluated not upon the production of a 
finalised method of analysis but on: the ruling out of existing methods unsuitable in 
the analysis of Mindful and Mindless interactions, highlighting of useful methods of 
analysis that might be further refined, capability of being easily integrated into 
interactive technologies (and their evaluation) and accessible by common 
place/commercial technologies, ability to provide indicators of specific moments of 
Mindful and/or Mindless interactions, contribution toward the development of an 
unobtrusive and objective method for the analysis of Mindful and Mindless 
interactions with technologies. 
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2.0: Introduction to Measuring Mindful and Mindless 
Interactions  
 “The most profound technologies are those that disappear […] Such a 
disappearance is a fundamental consequence not of technology but of 
human psychology. ”  
(Weiser, 1991, p94) 
Notions of interactions with computing technologies “disappearing” into 
phenomenological invisibility, as presented in Weiser’s (1991) pivotal vision; and 
reliance upon familiar design to improve ‘usability’ (Poole et al., 2008) and 
‘intuitiveness’ (Naumann et al., 2007) is now practiced through much of HCI design. 
That is to say, there is an emphasis toward designing technologies as ‘equipment’ 
(Chapter 1.9.2). While such design choices (e.g. implementing familiar design 
elements) hold benefit in terms of speed of learning and performing interactions, 
and low cognitive loading; they additionally reduce the capacity of an agent to 
contextualise interactions to the present, apply new meanings, and develop novel 
solutions and approaches (as will be discussed in greater length in Section 3).  
As such, it is particularly important draw better balance to the consideration, 
understanding, and subsequently the design; of how technologies work: 
• ‘For’ us, sub-consciously, ‘invisibly’ and autonomously  
and  
• ‘With’ us, exposing and encouraging opportunities for novel solutions and 
interactions through reflective-/conscious engagements as (Mindful) ‘tools’ 
(Chapter 1.9.1).  
The following section details an exploratory study that investigates potential for 
the objective measurement of Mindful and Mindless states during interactions with 
digital technologies that might be applied in future evaluation of human-computer 
interactions. As will be described further in the following (see: Limitations and 
Support Chapter 2.0.2) the objective measurement of such phenomena: 
• Might help reveal and distinguish one physiological process form another 
and broaden our understanding of the phenomena in question;  
• Facilitate triangulation of sources of information to provide more accurate 
evaluation of how and when such states arise;  
And furthermore;  
• Would provide a grounding from which evaluation of subjective experiences 
(of interactions with technology) can occur that overcomes the limitations of 
first-person reporting on experiential/subjective events that transpire 
outside of conscious and reflective-conscious experiences.  
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The aims of this study firstly, seek to understand if Mindful and Mindless states 
can be measured through current “public domain” technologies; and if so, what are 
the appropriate modalities with which to measure these states. Furthermore, this 
study seeks to provide further insight and support toward the theoretical 
foundations and definitions of such phenomena as outlined in previous Section 1. 
Finally, it is hoped this study will inform future development in the objective 
evaluation of Mindful and Mindless states during interactions with technology.  
Consequently, the broader goal of this study is to pave way toward providing 
tools with which designers of digital technologies can better understand and 
evaluate how their design choices might alter the Mindful and Mindless experiences 
of users, the value and cost of such choices and alterations, and, when and where 
best to invoke Mindful and Mindless interactions. 
 
While it might be assumed that directly questioning participants on their 
experience while evaluating interactions with technology might prove most 
beneficial in terms of speed and accuracy, there is an inherent difficulty with such 
method (as will be described in Limitations and Support Chapter 2.0.2). Specifically, 
questioning users of technologies their degree of immersion or awareness of 
surroundings (i.e. if they are Mindless or Mindful during an interaction) will invoke a 
reflection upon their state of awareness and draw attention toward and awareness 
upon the experience in question (altering any sub-/non-conscious process to 
conscious and reflective conscious experience). Thus, such line of questioning will be 
biased by the very act of probing on such state – i.e. asking if someone is not aware 
of his or her actions during an interaction breaks the interaction/immersion itself and 
draws attention toward it and so any answer given can be assumed to be false 
reporting of an assumed previous state. And so, it is imperative that measurements 
of Mindfulness, and more significantly Mindlessness, are supported through discreet 
and subtle modalities. Consequently, this furthers the need for objective 
(technologically supported) means of measuring such states. 
Here the reporting of an exploratory study provides guidance to the 
development of future methods in the understanding and classifications of Mindful 
and Mindless interactions.  
 
2.0.1: Applying A Neurophenomenological Methodology 
As previously described in section 1.11.1, Varela (1996) proposed that we might 
better support philosophical perspectives upon the phenomena of experience 
through understandings gained through differing disciplines such as through 
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advancements in cognitive science and physiological measures. As Lutz (p134, 2002) 
describes: “The neurophenomenological program encourages researchers to pay 
attention not only to neuronal or physiological data but also to the data produced 
by accounts of subjective experience”; as a “methodological answer” (p134, Lutz, 
2002) to the on-going debate of how the brain (and body) works not only in terms of 
functional attributes (objective - third person) but in relationship toward subjective 
experiences. This neurophenomenology uses phenomenological information (first-
person reporting of the subjective experience) to help reveal and understand the 
relationship toward, and complexity of, physiological changes. In this study 
physiological measures are gained through eye-gaze and pupillometry, and Q/EEG 
(Qualitative/Electroencephalogram – a measurement of brain activity). In doing so, 
such methods offer promising tools for addressing the challenges of understanding 
conscious experience (Fazelpour and Thompson, 2015). This merging of objective 
measures and self-reporting has been previously applied in similar ways in related 
fields e.g. the work of Kahneman (2011) and the subsequent work on cognitive bias. 
However, it should be noted System 1 and System 2 “thinking” (Kahneman, 2011) 
while similar to Mindlessness and Mindfulness (respectively) differ in that they are 
inherent behaviours (as opposed to Mindlessness as learned through routinisation). 
As Lutz notes (p143, 2002) a neurophenomenological methodology holds 
advantage of allowing a more complete understanding of the abstract and 
theoretical framework typically inherent within studies of phenomenology through 
applying a pragmatic approach. This pragmatic approach is “explicitly anchored in 
lived experience and open to scientific inquiry” (p143, 2002). Where one might 
study “experience” (first-person subjective) though questioning people on various 
general events, neurophenomenological method requires a specific and rigorous 
technique that may be reproduced. In this study this is achieved through the 
application of several “conditions” through which an experience is invoked. This was 
followed by questionnaire, and responsive open-ended interview that queried 
several specific topics to better understand and probe specific experiential qualities 
held by the participants during interaction. Similarly (as previously described) this is 
supported through objective physiological measures of brain and eye activity 
(captured during the activity of enquiry); through reproducible conditions. It is 
important to note in a neurphenomenological approach: 
 “The key point is that both forms of evidence are granted an equal 
importance and therefore need the same attention”  
(p145, Lutz , 2002).  
That is to say, both first-person account of experience and physiological data 
hold equal importance and value.  
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Given the complex nature of studying phenomena of experience such as 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness, as will be described in the following Limitations and 
Support (Chapter 2.0.2), a neurophenomenological methodology is most valuable; 
as advocated by Fazelpour and Thompson: 
 “[…] neurophenomenology can be employed to produce more fine-
grained first-person reports of the variability of moment-to-moment 
experience (such as fluctuations of attention, metacognition, emotion, 
bodily sensation, and memory) in a given individual from trial to trial in an 
experiment, and such reports can be used to reduce the noise of the neural 
signals, thereby providing a tighter coupling between the variability of the 
network dynamics and that of experience.”  
(p225, Fazelpour and Thompson, 2015) 
 
As noted by Varela and Shear (p6, 1999) such methods require two central 
elements. Firstly a clear and consistent procedure for accessing the phenomenal 
domain, and secondly, a clear means for an expression and validation within a 
community who have familiarity with such procedures (i.e. study and findings 
reporting through commonly practiced methods).  
Respectively, this following section reports an exploratory study to detect 
(empirically) Mindful and Mindless states during interaction with digital technologies. 
This firstly seeks to outline a procedure used and secondly provide empirical 
measures for the expression and validation of Mindful and Mindless states 
supported through first-person reporting. In doing so this section seeks to move 
toward addressing the previously described requirements in the study of 
Mindfulness as suggested by Brown and Cordon (p59, 2009):  
• A phenomenon may only be studied if it can be properly defined and 
measured;  
• The investigation of Mindfulness facilitates understanding in the role of this 
quality in subjective experience and behaviour through methods derived 
from basic science;  
• The effects of Mindfulness can only be measured through clear definitions;  
and finally,  
• The study of Mindfulness can help inform understanding of consciousness 
and its fundamental role in human functioning and its processes can be 
refined to enhance such functioning.  
As section one provided definitions of Mindfulness and Mindlessness, this study 
builds upon these findings and draws upon the methods of inquiry used in the 
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validation of the main concepts previously discussed (in section one) with aim to 
provide empirical measurement. This holds several tenets guiding the methods 
used: 
• First (and most significantly), those with capacity for introspection (specifically 
reflective-consciousness) and experience of consciousness are equipped with 
capability to report on such phenomenal state (or realisation of a previous 
lack of such state).  
• While reporting on phenomenal states holds a degree of fallibility (as will be 
described in the following Limitations and Support Chapter 2.0.2), with 
rigorous investigation and cross-question of statements this fallibility can be 
reduced.  
• Cognitive and conscious states that occur within a bodied being are both 
affected by and effect said body (e.g. sensory experience as an affect toward, 
reactions as effect upon).  
• Through measurement of the external influence upon such body 
(environmental affect), its correlation with introspective report, and its 
correlation with a physiological change the effect upon the body, an 
empirical understanding of the phenomena can be made.  
• And finally, through a corpus of such empirical understandings a means of 
expression, measurement, and validation of these phenomenal states can be 
made. 
In providing the definition and tools for measurement of Mindful and Mindless 
states during interaction, methods for the study and understanding of such 
phenomena in human-computer interaction are developed. With further exploration 
and development upon the definitions and methods of study (as a field of enquiry), 
an informed understanding of Mindfulness and Mindlessness and their fundamental 
role during human-computer interaction can be refined to better facilitate and 
enhance such interaction experiences with technologies.  
 
2.0.2: Limitations and Support 
Prior to the application of a neurophenomenological methodology it is important 
to recognize the limitations and support for, and challenges in, use of such method.  
Understanding mechanisms of (and so the mapping between) experience and 
brain activity remains an “outstanding challenge” (Fazelpour and Thompson, 2015). 
This is due in part to the connectivity between functional neuronal networks and 
larger brain structures being of a complex “many-to-many” nature (Pessoa, 2014), as 
opposed to dedicated (singular) processing structures. For example, while the visual 
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cortex is understood to be vital for processing of visual information its function in 
‘seeing’ is not of a solitary or independent nature. In actuality many substructures of 
the brain become active in unison during visual processing. The challenge of 
understanding brain activity is further increased when seeking to understand the role 
of consciousness within such processes (Cosmelli, Lachaux and Thompson, 2007) 
e.g. to produce the experience of ‘seeing’. This is, in part, due to the complexity of 
our experience including sight, sound, smell etc. coupled with our attentive state 
toward relevance and motivators (e.g. emotions, goals and actions) all forming and 
shaping our conscious experience, ‘presented’ not as singular units of experience 
but in a unified whole (Fazelpour and Thompson, 2015); thus necessitating the 
‘many-to-many’ perspective in understanding such physiological affect. To 
experience is coupled with many accompanying facets such as memories, goals, 
contemplation etc.; as noted by Fazelpour and Thompson, (p224, 2015)  “[…] we 
should not expect there to be the kind of one–one mapping between brain regions 
and mental functions predicted by the view of the brain as a stimulus-driven 
device”. In understanding brain functions we are required instead to remember that 
while context and task dependent regions may be active in one process they may 
also serve functionality in others; e.g. the visual cortex is additionally active in 
imagination, spatial awareness, and even in blind humans during auditory tasks 
(Kujala et al., 1995). This should not be understood as contradicting the previously 
described (chapter 1.11.3) understandings of Århem and Liljenström (1997), but as 
cognition and conscious-cognition consisting of a broadcasting of differing 
information (e.g. from the nervous system or internally driven) across the brain and 
toward multiple ‘centres’ of processing. As highlighted by Århem and Liljenström 
(1997), Anderson (1983, 1992 and 1996), and Baars (1993, 1996, 1997); it is this 
broadcasting of multiple centres of processing that becomes refined over time to 
remove centres unnecessary for completion of the task or response to the stimulus 
i.e. the event moving toward a purely cognitive, automatic, and thus Mindless task. 
Therefore we might understand a conscious event as having many multiple regions 
of activation (e.g. 15 centres of high processing) though over time as such event 
becomes increasingly cognitive this may reduce toward fewer centres of specialized 
processing (e.g. 5). 
While such complexity initially appears prohibitive to understanding specific 
conscious experiences in relation to physiology, triangulation of sources of 
information might help reveal and distinguish one physiological process form 
another. This is the standpoint from which neurophenomenology presents the 
argument that while such phenomena, outlined by Chalmers’ ‘hard problems’ (1995) 
are illusive; determining their ‘physiology’ maybe facilitated through a balanced and 
disciplined account of both the ‘internal’ (experiential) and ‘external’ (physiological) 
elements of an experience and so move "[…] one step closer to bridging the 
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biological mind - experiential mind gap."(p343, Varela, 1996). This 
neurophenomenological approach holds first-person reports, gained through 
methods provoking implicit experiences, as both bounding an experience to an 
event while simultaneously revealing (and bounding) its evidence within a 
physiological process; which might be further refined over multiple observations. 
These first-person accounts and reporting are upon the ‘felt’ and subjective 
experience of an agent with capabilities of introspection. This is often understood as 
‘looking into our inner world’ comprised of thoughts, feelings, and ultimately our 
sense of ‘self’. Commonly these subjective qualities are hidden as there is no explicit 
communication ‘outward’ to others. However, through linguistic description, 
physiological expressions of emotion, or expression through other medium (e.g. as 
with many works of art), we are offered a degree of communication. While these 
communications may be of a ‘truer’ nature (of sharing subjective experience) in 
comparison to purely physiological measurements; they remain subjective and so 
are constrained by limitations in the mode of communication. For example, the 
communication of what red ‘feels like’ might be ineffable to those not having 
experienced the colour red itself (an argument heavily debated through Jackson’s 
(1982) thought experiment of Mary). Likewise, to subjectively describe a non-
conscious event might also be ineffable; though it is suggested that subjects might 
more accurately report on moments of automatic inattentiveness (moments of 
Mindlessness) upon realization of such events i.e. present awareness as comparator 
to a previous lack of awareness, as discussed by Van Dam et al. (2010), Baer (2011), 
and Grossman (2011).  
In the context of Mindfulness and Mindlessness, such limitations of first-person 
reporting must be taken into consideration when developing a study design and 
analysis of results. Specifically, in asking someone if they are immersed or have 
awareness of their surroundings (i.e. if they are Mindful or Mindless during an 
interaction); the very act of asking one to reflect on such state of awareness draws 
attention toward and awareness upon the phenomena. Thus, while such first-hand 
accounts hold value, such direct line of investigation would not prove fruitful when 
seeking to measure Mindless states (i.e. asking a participant to report if they have 
lost awareness toward a task would encourage them continually maintain awareness 
toward the task waiting for a lack of such experience). While first-person post-event 
reporting is useful in overcoming challenges of bounding experiential states to 
objective measurements, such feedback is likewise delicate; specifically, persons 
reporting upon interactions might wrongly report a level of attention and awareness 
they held during a specific interaction (only revealed upon in-depth and cross 
questioning). And finally, there is further care needed in post-event reporting upon 
interactions, as such action leaves the timeframe of when a participant is Mindful or 
Mindless unbound to specific events or elements of interaction. This is not to say 
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that such first-person accounts should be disregarded however, as previously 
described such insights provide a bounding of subjective experience to empirical 
measurement, though acknowledgement of such limitations is required alongside 
thorough enquiry into the nature of the experience being reported. To help 
overcome the limitations in first person reporting, third-person accounts provide 
objective descriptions of first-person experiences. This is often understood to be of 
scientific method whereby a corpus of first-person accounts informs objective 
descriptions and regulated knowledge (Varela and Shear, 1999). As noted by Varela 
and Shear (1999) such corpus ultimately remains part subjective, dependent on 
individual’s observation and experience, and part objective defended and controlled 
through empirical understandings. Thus, objective detailed descriptions of the 
phenomena of inquiry here (Mindfulness and Mindlessness) necessitate both 
qualitative first-person accounts and objective third-person understandings, 
supported through a neurophenomenological methodology.  
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2.1: Study Design 
The underlying hypothesis in study design was that a repetitive task could (or 
would) become automatic and as such Mindless, unless or until a ‘breakdown’ occurs 
forcing a Mindful engagement. That is to say, initially tasks require concerted effort 
and necessitate a Mindful approach and interaction as previously described by 
Langer (p20, 1989); though with enough repetition of a task the "... learned tasks 
drop out of mind", as "...the individual parts of the task move out of our 
consciousness. Eventually, we come to assume that we can [original in italics] do the 
task although we no longer know how [original in italics] we do it." (p20, Langer, 
1989). Similarly, and as previously described, Anderson (1992) proposes several 
qualities of automaticity development during a task:  
• The acquisition of skilled performance speeds up with a reduction in error 
rate with practice.  
• As a skill becomes more practiced, there is less interference with concurrent 
tasks; and furthermore it is less interfered with by a concurrent task.  
• “It is easier for a task to become "automatic" if there is a consistent stimulus-
to-response mapping. In the context of this statement, the term automatic 
connotes fast processes, little interference by concurrent processes, and little 
effect of number of alternatives.” (p167) 
Concurrently, Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman note the effect of ‘breakdown’ 
upon a task as "...a disruption in the normal functioning of things forcing the 
individual to adopt a more reflective or deliberative stance toward ongoing activity." 
(p26, 1998). A position supported by Langer further describes that: "If something or 
someone makes us question our competence on a task that we know moderately 
well but is not overlearned in this way, we can search our minds for the steps of the 
task and find them" (p20, Langer, 1989).  
 
2.1.1: Procedure 
The study design was developed with aim to understand if Mindful and Mindless 
states can be measured through current “public domain” technologies, using a 
number of theoretical positioning’s informed by the previous findings (Section 1) as 
points of contrast and comparison, and analysis. This study comprised of seven 
conditions that vary in their degree of difficulty and ‘steps’ in completion (described 
in detail in Comparative Conditions Chapter 2.3.0 (outline Chapter 2.2.1). Each 
condition was presented in the same modality; a 23” 1080p resolution colour screen 
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displaying the condition’s test (Tobii TX3007), with four answers presented in fixed 
locations along the bottom of the screen. Four 100mm white physical buttons (with 
high speed switches) in fixed positions of an equal distance apart on which answers 
were to be given were placed in front of the screen (see figure 2.1 below). Each test 
had a single correct answer. Participants were allowed prior to the test to adjust the 
buttons positions to a place where they were both comfortable and able to press all 
buttons freely. The screen was then adjusted to a position that was again 
comfortable for the participant and at a distance that allowed eye-tracking detection 
(i.e. approximately 65cm and at a horizontal level not exceeding 30º angle) (see 
figure 2.1 below). Participants were informed of the condition they were about to 
undertake and that they should answer as quickly and as correctly as possible prior 
to each condition. It was ensured that each participant understood what the 
condition tests would require to provide a correct answer. Each participant was 
informed that their data would be fully anonymised and that they were free to 
withdraw from the study at any time without reason (and could request their data be 
destroyed within the 30 days following their participation), and this study was in no 
way a medical exam (or replacement to), and signed consent of participation (see 
appendix 2.1) prior to undertaking the study. Prior to agreement of participation, 
participants were informed of the ways in which the technologies for capturing 
physiological data worked and their capabilities, and provided opportunity to have 
any questions answered they might have about the study and technologies, e.g. if 
the EEG device could tell they were thinking of personal information.   
 
Figure 2.1; Participant during study (*facial features hidden for anonymity). 
Each of the seven conditions had a custom written software controlled using 
Cycling ’74 – MaxMSP; a visual programming language for developing multimedia 
interactive software. This custom software additionally controlled randomization of 
                                               
7	http://www.tobiipro.com/product-listing/tobii-pro-tx300/	
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testing (i.e. stimulus shown), recorded input of participant responses from the four 
input buttons, events log (e.g. between stimulus presentation and response), 
recording of test shown, and provided correct or wrong audio response. Each 
condition had a total of 200 tests with a 500ms blank screen between an answer 
being provided and display of the following test. Audio feedback was provided 
through the computer operating the custom study software and was ensured to be 
audible to the participant. The audio feedback was demonstrated to participants 
prior to presentation of the first condition tests and was used to represent correct 
and wrong answers through generic ‘ding’ and ‘beep’ (i.e. non-linguistic) sounds of 
the same length; this was consistent across all conditions and participants, and was 
the only metric of performance given to participants during each condition. 
Conditions varied in presentation order cross-participant informed by a Latin Square 
configuration to account for accumulative effects (i.e. length of study) across 
conditions (see following Condition Presentation Ordering - Table A2.2 in Appendix 
2.2). In total there was 11 participants8. The remainder population comprised of 2 
female, 9 male; 3 left-handed (8 right-handed); and an average age of 34 years. All 
participants were proficient in English language (i.e. English first language or use in 
higher degree level). 
                                               
8	In	total	12	participants	were	recruited,	one	participant	(P2)	was	removed	mid	study	due	to	health	and	so	their	data	is	not	included	in	the	final	analysis.	
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2.2: Study And Condition Design Grounding 
2.2.1: Comparative Conditions Of Study Outline 
While the seven conditions for comparison used in the study are explained in 
greater length in Comparative Conditions (Chapter 2.3); an outline is provided here 
for context of the following statements informing study and condition design and 
how they relate to / inform the choice of these conditions. 
Outline of Condition 1: 
Condition 1 of the study can be considered the simplest of the seven conditions. 
This condition presented participants with one of four stimulus – a (Green) X, O, 
(Red) X, O; randomly presented. As shown in figure 2.3, 4 potential answers were 
displayed onscreen in fixed positions (in order: X, X O, O). Participants were 
instructed to provide the correct answer to the corresponding stimulus. 
Outline of Condition’s 2 and 3: 
The basis of conditions 2 and 3 are developed from the well-established Stroop 
testing (Stroop, 1935) that has been noted to provide testing of the effects of 
Automaticity (Saling and Phillips, 2007). The two condition’s test’s presented 
participants with the (literal) word of a colour (e.g. Blue) presented in either an 
incongruent colour (e.g. Blue), or congruent colour (e.g. Blue). Each test stimulus for 
this condition was randomly selected from a pool of 16 – 4 words (Red, Blue, Yellow, 
Green); each in 4 differing colour’s (Red, Blue, Yellow, Green). During these 
conditions participants were instructed to provide either the word (Condition: Stroop 
Word - e.g. Blue would answer “Blue”) or the colour (Condition: Stroop Colour e.g. 
Blue would answer “Red”). As shown in figure 2.4, 4 potential answers were 
displayed onscreen in fixed positions (in order: Red, Green, Blue, Yellow9).  
Outline of Condition’s 4 and 5: 
The conditions 4 and 5 again follow the underpinning concept of the Stroop test 
(Stroop, 1935); however this is provided with the removal of the linguistic portion of 
the test (Wühr, 2007; Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974). While the Stroop test provides 
stimulus based on words and colours, conditions 4 and 5 rely upon symbolic 
direction (i.e. an arrow pointing in a direction) and spatial orientation (i.e. the arrows 
                                               
9	Red,	Green,	Blue,	Yellow	–	font	in	corresponding	colour	
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position is relative to a centric indicated position), as shown in figure 2.5. The arrows 
point in four directions (Left, Right, Up and Down) and are displayed around a centre 
marker (a red square) that indicates their position (Left, Right, Above, Below; the 
centric point). Each test stimulus for this condition was randomly selected from a 
pool of the potential 16 – 4 directions (Left, Right, Up and Down); each in 4 differing 
positions relative to a centric red square (Left, Right, Above, Below). During these 
conditions participants were instructed to provide either the position of the arrow 
relative to the centric point (Condition: Stroop Arrow Position) or the direction the 
arrow is pointing (Condition: Stroop Arrow Direction). Potential answers were 
displayed onscreen in fixed positions displaying arrows pointing Left, Right, Up, and 
Down. 
Outline of Condition 6: 
Condition 6 draws upon a “familiar” informational display (Blackler, Popovic, and 
Mahar, 2010; Raskin, 1994), i.e. an “analogue” clock face with standard numeral 
designation of hour positions (with the 12th hour on top) (see figure 2.8). Each test in 
this condition would randomly generate a time: an hour and minute (in five minute 
increments), displayed on the clock face with only one of the possible answers 
matching the time in a twelve hour numeric format (e.g. 10:45). Participants were 
presented with four options of answer along the bottom of the display that 
corresponded to the physical input buttons. As the condition had a pool of 144 
differing times (12 hours with 12x5 minute increments), the four potential answers 
displayed along the bottom of the screen would randomize (the correct answer 
being one of those); consequently the answer display positions were not permanent. 
This condition is referred to as Fixed Clock Face. 
Outline of Condition 7: 
Condition 7 was the most complex of all conditions and specifically sought to 
hinder potentials for automaticity learning (Mindless interaction). In a similar design 
to condition 6, condition 7 displayed an “analogue” clock face; however, 
designation of hour positions was randomly rotated per test i.e. the 12th hour (and 
following hours in normal ordering) would rotate their position on the clock face 
(though the digits themselves remained upright) (see figure 2.9). As with condition 6 
each test in this condition would randomly generate a time: an hour and minute (in 
five minute increments), displayed on the clock face with only one of the possible 
answers matching the time in a twelve hour numeric format (e.g. 10:45). Participants 
were presented with four options of answer along the bottom of the display that 
corresponded to the physical input buttons. As the condition had a pool of 1728 
differing times (12 variants of 12 hours with 12x5 minute increments), the four 
potential answers displayed along the bottom of the screen would randomize (the 
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correct answer being one of those). As with condition 6 the answer display positions 
were not permanent. This condition is referred to as Rotating Clock Face. 
Outline of Pop-Ups: 
Five Pop-Ups, displaying the text “Retry?” (see figure 2.2), were additionally 
introduced for each of the conditions (randomized between tests 180 – 200). These 
were specifically intended to introduce a disruption to the ongoing condition and 
were unrelated to preceding answer correctness. Participants were informed prior to 
each condition that a pop-up may occur and this would allow them to change their 
answer if they wished to one they felt was correct (though the stimulus and potential 
answers were hidden) or they would be required to re-enter the answer they felt was 
correct. 
 

























1 200 5 500ms 4 Yes 4 
2 and 3 200 5 500ms 4 Yes 16 
4 and 5 200 5 500ms 4 Yes 16 
6 200 5 500ms 4 No 144 
7 200 5 500ms 4 No 1728 
Table 2.1: Comparison of Condition design. 
 
2.2.2: Statements informing Study and Condition Design  
The study and conditions design was informed by a number of findings as 
described in Section 1. These positioning statements (drawn from the key texts and 
positions in agreement) informed the inclusion of elements and positions form which 
analysis of data should occur. 
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With enough repetition a task will become automatic (sub-conscious).               
(Langer, 1989) 
Each condition of the study would require a sufficient number of tests to allow a 
high degree of familiarity and opportunity for the task to become automatic. 
Following a pilot study it was determined that 200 tests was sufficient to allow many 
of the conditions to be performed automatically.  
 
A novel task will require concerted effort (conscious cognition), and so require 
more time (or incur more errors) than when the task is automatic.                                  
(Århem and Liljenström, 1997; Anderson, 1992). 
As noted by Baars (1993, 1996, 1997), global workspace theory proposes 
information processing architectures (within the brain) comprised of multiple sets of 
parallel specialist processes within a global workspace. The specialist processes 
(which are sub-/non- conscious) work together and compete to enter 
dominance/control of the global workspace (as a conscious event); which is then 
broadcast back outward through the network (directing toward a dominating action 
and/or goal) (Shanahan, 2010). Should an event or task be novel it will not have a 
‘specialist process’ that may be called upon to complete the event or task sub-
consciously and in entirety. Consequently novel tasks draw upon multiple (sub-
conscious) resources to complete as the task itself directs the workspace as a 
conscious/reflective-conscious event; all of which requires an additional time 
resource. Århem and Liljenström (1997) state purely cognitive processes, e.g. sub-
conscious and automatic tasks, are performed (or initiated) faster than conscious 
awareness or interruption. This is due to strengthened neuronal connections 
facilitating a faster (and perhaps dedicated) network of response to stimulus (e.g. 
repeated events result in faster recall), and a reduction of the resources needed – i.e. 
sub-conscious specialist processes not requiring control of the global workspace 
(and so multiple specialist processes) for execution. Such position supports the 
hypothesis that conscious and reflective-conscious tasks require additional effort, 
resources, and subsequently time to complete in comparison to those performed 
sub-consciously.  
Consistent stimulus-to-response mapping will better facilitate automatic 
responses.  
(Anderson, 1992)  
The seven conditions can be understood to hold varying degrees of consistency 
of stimulus to response requirement.  
Firstly, condition 1 (Green X O - Red X O) contained a pool of four stimulus and 
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four potential answers (consistently displayed on screen in fixed positions). This 
provided a very limited number of potential stimulus to response. 
Secondly, conditions 2 through 5 (variations of Stroop test) contained a pool of 
sixteen stimulus and four consistently displayed potential answers (i.e. response 
positions fixed in same location). This decreased the directness of the stimulus to 
response as each condition held 4 variations of stimulus that would require a specific 
response (e.g. the word blue would appear in four stimulus though each would 
require answering with the correct response ‘blue’).  
Thirdly, each of the conditions 2 through 5 additionally contained a counter part 
(Stroop Word Text V’s Colour, Stroop Arrow Position V’s Direction) that would require 
a differing response to that previously learned e.g. the word blue would appear in 
four stimulus though now only one (coloured in blue) would require answering with 
the correct response ‘blue’ and three additional text (coloured in blue) would also 
require the response blue.  
The fourth variation can be found in the Fixed Clock condition (6). While the clock 
face itself drew upon a familiar stimulus (i.e. an analogue clock face) the response 
mapping varied as the answer, even should the stimulus be the same, would likely 
differ in the four potential response positions (i.e. answers would be inconsistently 
displayed on screen). Similarly with 144 potential stimulus an intentional inhibition to 
develop a ‘mapping’ of stimulus to response was created (and can be understood as 
in opposition to the simpler condition 1 - Green X O - Red X O).  
The final variation in conditions is facilitated through condition 7, the rotating 
clock face. This condition (as with 6 – Fixed Clock) held inconsistently displayed 
answers on screen. However, in the further attempt to prevent automatic responses 
the clock face in itself would additionally randomize its position, generating a 
potential 1728 potential stimulus. Thus, the stimulus could be understood to require 
a remapping of the stimulus upon each presented test.  
Thus it was expected that the conditions would increase in their difficulty to 
become automatic ranging from condition 1 (easily facilitating Mindlessness) to 
condition 7 (preventing automaticity). 
In addition to the above, consistency in stimulus-to-response was encouraged in 
the testing presentation, each being separated with a 500 millisecond blank 
following answer; to prevent influence upon automatic response. That is to say, 
should the presentation of stimulus be a randomized event (varying in time between 
answer to next test presentation) then it is understandable that this could prevent or 
hinder responses being automatic. 
Likewise, each response was consistently indicated as correct or incorrect with 
prediction that the majority of answers would be correct. Thus, when an incorrect 
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answer was provided following a series of correct answers a breaking of the familiar 
stimulus-to-response (i.e. answer – correct answer sound) would occur. It was 
predicted that this would cause a brief period of reflection or contemplation upon 
why an answer was incorrect alongside a re-evaluation of the mental schema being 
applied (potentially drawing into question if the schema needs adapting). Similarly, 
randomized pop-ups were introduced as a means of breaking the ‘answer – correct 
answer sound’ stimulus-to-response.  
 
A task with fewer ‘individual parts’ or steps of processing (i.e. a simpler task with 
lower cognitive and conscious requirement) will better facilitate a transition toward 
automaticity.                                                                                                                        
(Langer, 1989; Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998)  
As previously described (Section 1.6) Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman (p30, 
1998) note that initially each step in a process of action is initially performed as a 
conscious action. Through routine these steps become conglomerated into singular 
chunks of action that require little to no planning or decision making (i.e. automatic). 
This process of combining steps or ‘chunks’ of action continues until, ultimately, the 
action becomes an embedded automatic operation within larger actions and goals, 
which in turn become automatic operations. Similarly, as noted by Langer tasks that 
may have previously required concerted conscious awareness become sub-
conscious as the individual parts of the task move from our consciousness (p20, 
Langer, 1989); until the agent performing the part of an action is no longer thinking 
of ‘how’ that action is performed and instead ‘knows’. As Shanahan (p42, 2010) 
describes, cognition (from the Latin ‘cognosecre’) is to "know" rather than cogitare, 
to think; cognition being a sub-/non-conscious act of knowledge processing and 
application opposed to a reflective-/consciousness 'thinking'. 
From this understanding of smaller units of an action combining and becoming 
sub-conscious operations it is hypothesized that a simpler task with fewer elements 
of action/processing will more easily become automatic. Thus, condition 1 Green X 
O - Red X O with the fewest elements would be more quickly transformed into a 
sub-conscious (and Mindless) action as opposed to the far more complex condition 
(7) of a rotating clock face with a much higher number of steps within the stimulus-
to-response action.  
 
Disruption to an automatic task will force the individual to adopt a more reflective 
or deliberative (i.e. Mindful) stance toward the task.                                                       
 (Langer, 1989; Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998) 
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Automatic tasks will be less interfering with concurrent automatic tasks.                                                                                 
(Anderson, 1992) 
As noted by Anderson (p167, 1992) automatic task are less interfered with and 
interfere less with concurrent tasks. From this position it stands to reason that to 
understand if an agent is sufficiently proficient in performing an automatic process 
one could observe how the process is performed alongside a concurrent task. This is 
exemplified by Langer’s (p20, 1989) observation of a person who is able to knit while 
simultaneously watching T.V.; performing two concurrent tasks without apparent 
interference to either. While this is not to say that both actions will merge as a new 
singular automatic act (as a merged / new mental schema), they do not hold conflict 
or force adaption (to the schema’s); and more significantly do not require reflection 
upon the actions. Should interruption occur the task’s would be drawn to the fore of 
consciousness and the actions revealed; as previously described by Koschmann, 
Kuutti, and Hickman (1998), facilitating review and contemplation upon the ‘steps’ of 
the actions (p20, Langer, 1989) to resolve the breakdown. Actions providing less 
interruption to existing performed schema’s are more easily enacted automatically; 
and so “rules” of the schema might be broadened to encompass the additional 
automatic action without interruption to either. For example, in the context of the 
study described it might be assumed that the answering of test may become 
automatic and a response to a pop-up may also become automatic. While a novel 
pop-up event interrupts the on-going automatic answering of test (forcing 
contemplation upon their relationship), when both tasks are sufficiently automatic 
they may be performed alongside each other without interference to one another. 
As such neither are treated as events prompting breakdown, though trigger their 
own schema to fit around the existing enacted schema, while both simultaneously 
occurring.  
Similarly, to observe the characteristics described above it is expected that over 
the course of study participants will get a number of answers wrong. When such an 
event occurs it is assumed that it will cause a sufficient breakdown of the task and 
force a reflective state and questioning upon the validity of the mental schema 
being applied (i.e. the alert to a wrong answer will disrupt an automatic/ sub-
conscious action and provoke a conscious interaction). Over time, as the wrong alert 
becomes incorporated into the mental schema of the condition, it is expected that 
the effects of this breakdown will decrease until there is little to no effect upon the 
task. Likewise, it is expected that the introduction of pop-ups will invoke a 
breakdown as a direct interruption toward the task. Following a sufficient number of 
exposures to pop-ups the interrupting breakdown effect will also lessen. While it is 
understandable that incorrect answer alerts and pop-ups will be handled by the 
participant in similar ways (i.e. being forced into a reflective state); it is also 
important to note the subtle difference between the two forms of breakdown. 
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Wrong answers are an element of an on-going task and so would require 
modification of the mental schema for the automatic action to remain valid. 
Conversely, pop-ups are concurrent to the on-going task and so would require the 
creation of a new mental schema to accommodate.  
 
2.2.3: Points Of Unobtrusive Analysis 
The previous positions (repeated below) provide several marker points from 
which to measure Mindfulness and Mindlessness.  
• With enough repetition a task will become automatic (sub-conscious) 
• Consistent stimulus-to-response mapping will better facilitate automatic 
responses. 
• A task with fewer ‘individual parts’ or steps of processing (i.e. a simpler task 
with lower cognitive and conscious requirement) will better facilitate a 
transition toward automaticity. 
• Disruption to an automatic task will force the individual to adopt a more 
reflective or deliberative (i.e. Mindful) stance toward the task. 
• Automatic tasks will be less interfering with concurrent automatic tasks. 
These events can be inferred from the interaction data and so viewable within the 
empirical data unobtrusively i.e. the broader ongoing condition is not interrupted to 
generate the data. This allows for an empirical data collection of Mindful and 
Mindless events without influencing such states through an explicit enquiry of the 
participant (causing introspection).  
It is expected that a comparison of the conditions start and end’s will provide an 
indication of automaticity occurring. Initial tests will be novel and so will not be 
automatic where as a strong familiarity will exist by the end of the condition (should 
the condition allow). That is to say, one point of analysis is comparing early tests with 
later tests in each condition for each participant. Time required to answer early tests 
in comparison to the later tests will provide indication as to weather the task has 
become learned and may provide insight to automatic enacting.  
Consistent stimulus to response additionally provides points for comparison. Pop-
ups break an expected stimulus i.e. the participant is not presented with a familiar 
blank but with a new stimulus that does not fit the previous experience of the 
condition. Likewise wrong answers provide a point for analysis, should the 
participant be achieving a number of correct answers, as this will break the 
expectation of correct answer alert. Thus pop-ups and wrong answers can be used 
comparatively against the more commonly occurring stimulus (i.e. test being shown 
and correct alerts). Conditions also increase in their inhibiting automaticity, ranging 
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from Green X O, Red X O (easily facilitating Mindlessness) to the Rotating Clock 
Face (preventing automaticity), as the variation of the stimulus and potential answers 
(i.e. with the two clock conditions) increases. This variation in conditions will also 
provide facility for comparison that moves beyond cumulative effects (e.g. being 
exposed over time of study or accumulative effects of condition).  
As with increasing the degree of variation of stimulus, increasing the number of 
steps involved in a condition (i.e. its complexity and difficulty) will also provide 
opportunity for comparison between conditions. Thus it is expected that an easier 
condition will better facilitate Mindlessness in comparison to more challenging and 
complex conditions.  
Disruption to the on-going task will also provide points for analysis. As previously 
described this will occur at two points; where a ‘wrong’ answer alert occurs, and, 
where pop-up events occur. These two events hold comparison to ‘correct’ answer 
alerts and regular test display correspondingly. However, it is also expected that as 
these events become more familiar (and so automatic) they in themselves can be 
used as a comparator. That is to say, the first ‘wrong’ alerts and pop-ups will likely be 
experienced as more Mindful than when such events have been experienced several 
times.  
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2.3.0: Comparative Conditions 
The comparative conditions described below are suitable for application in a 
neurophenomenological methodology as they provide a range of comparative 
activities that facilitate or inhibit the phenomena in question. Furthermore, such 
conditions provide a high degree of control in comparison to more familiar 
interactions with digital interfaces (such as webpage navigation) as the interaction is 
reduced in the number of potential options and information displayed or directions 
that may further interaction.  Some of the conditions are well established (though 
applied in differing context) though all are easily reproducible. The order of 
presentation to participants can be found in Appendix  2.2 - Condition Presentation 
Ordering. 
2.3.1: Pop-Up (total of 5 per condition): 
Though not a condition in the same sense as the more substantial 7 conditions; 
the Pop-Up events introduced in the study are comparable in that they facilitate an 
on-going concurrent task during each (and all) condition. The introduction of Pop-
Up’s is intended to invoke a breakdown of the on-going condition and force a 
reflective positioning toward the activity taking place.  
Participants were informed prior to commencement of each condition that a 
‘pop-up’ might appear (stating “Retry?”, see figure 2.2) at a randomized time during 
the test. They were informed that this ‘pop-up’ would be in relation to the 
immediately preceding test and appeared immediately following answer of the test 
that it was in relation to. When such pop-up occurred they would be given chance to 
change their previous answer (if they felt it was incorrect) or they would be required 
to re-enter their answer (if they felt it was originally correct). No audio response was 
give for the preceding test, however, feedback was provided on the pop-up answer. 
Pop-up randomization occurred following test 180 for each condition with a total of 
5 pop-ups per-condition and increasing likelihood of occurrence from tests 180 and 
200 (ensuring all 5 pop-ups would occur before the end of the condition tests).  
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Figure 2.2; Pop-up presented to participants during each condition. 
 
2.3.2: Condition 1 (Green X O - Red X O): 
The first condition (see figure 2.3) was designed to be a simple symbol match. 
The symbols presented consisted of a Green circle, a Green ‘X’, a Red circle, and a 
Red ‘X’. The presentation of the tests was randomized with a 500ms blank between 
providing an answer and the next test appearing. It was aimed that such symbol 
matching would require a very low (relatively speaking) cognitive loading and so is 
considered the simplest of conditions. It was also assumed that this test would best 
facilitate automatic responses. Participants were instructed to press the button 
corresponding to the test e.g. below would require the button second from right to 
be pressed. 
 
Figure 2.3; Figure showing a typical test presentation for the Green X O, 
Red X O condition. The correct answer for this test being a Green circle 
 
2.3.3: Condition 2 and 3 (Stroop (Word) and Reversed Stroop (Colour)): 
Conditions 2 and 3 were based on adaptation of Stroop testing (Stroop, 1935). 
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The Stroop effect is a psychological test on interference upon reaction time of a 
task. It has been noted that the Stroop test is the testing of automatic phenomenon 
(Saling and Phillips, 2007). A Stroop test presents participants with the word of a 
colour (e.g. Blue) that may be in an incongruent colour (e.g. Blue), or a congruent 
colour (e.g. Blue). A participant of the Stroop test is required to provide the colour 
of the word and not the word itself e.g. Blue would require the correct answer “red”. 
The Stroop effect demonstrates that congruent stimulus is answered faster than 
incongruent stimulus i.e. interference of task increases reaction time. Thus the 
Stroop test reveals and invokes an interference example in which the participant is 
required to perform one task (e.g. provide the colour of a word) yet performs 
another (provides the word itself). In doing so the Stroop test reveals automatic 
phenomenon (the reading of a word) against the instructed and controlled process 
(providing the colour of the word). Stroop’s test is subsequently often used in the 
investigation of mechanisms in cognitive control and selective attention as 
participants have to selectively attend to one particular stimulus element (e.g. the 
word colour) and reject another stimulus information (e.g. the word itself). As noted 
by Saling and Phillips, (2007) the context and instruction with which the Stroop test 
is provided greatly modifies the ‘automaticity’ of the process (i.e. controlled or 
uncontrolled reactions) and automatic processes are learned; i.e. participants learn 
the how to perform Stroop tests and mitigate effects of incongruent stimulus. 
Similarly, in Section 1 it was highlighted that automatic processes are a product of 
repeated stimulus – reaction / goal – action learning. Thus it is understandable that 
prolonged testing of the Stroop test, though initially may reveal automatic 
tendencies, will invoke a learning that will overcome task interference i.e. both 
congruent and incongruent testing will reveal automatic tendencies. Such position is 
also supported through Anderson (1992) who states that automatic skills hold less 
interference with concurrent tasks and less interfered with by a concurrent task; thus 
if e.g. automaticity is developed in the skill of naming the colour of a word rather 
than the word itself then this will be less effected by the match/mismatch of the 
Stroop test stimulus.  
Given the length of time in existence and notoriety of the Stroop test, much work 
has been done upon the exploration of physiological measurement (of particular 
interest here in relation to EEG recordings) during such test across a wide range of 
conditions. Such examples include Schack et al. (1999) who revealed a higher 
degree of coherence across the frontal lobe of the brain (in the frequency bandwidth 
of 13-20Hz) during incongruent stimulus in comparison to congruent stimulus in a 
study of ten participants; suggesting a greater and unified workload in the frontal 
lobe during the processing of mismatch stimulus. Similarly West and Bell (1997) 
found a greater magnitude of activity (in the lateral frontal and parietal regions of 
the brain) in the processing of mismatched Stroop test in older (healthy) adults in 
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comparison to younger (healthy) adults – yet found similar workload during 
congruent stimulus, supporting the hypothesis that the anterior attention system is 
more effected by increasing age than the posterior attention system. 
Given the previously described position that the Stroop test may become a 
learned automatic response (both congruent and incongruent stimulus) and 
overcome with contextual manipulation such as setting a task to ignore additional 
stimulus (Saling and Phillips, 2007), and the wealth of existent research on the test 
and its physiological correlations the Stroop test is here used as a conditional 
stimulus for learning as opposed to testing congruent/incongruent effects.  
The Stroop test informed two conditions - one where participants were instructed 
to provide the colour of the word (e.g. Blue would require an answer of Red); and a 
second reverse Stroop where participants were instructed to provide the word itself 
and not the colour it is presented in (e.g. Blue would require an answer of Blue). To 
ensure consistency across conditions there was four potential answers (one correct 
per test) displayed in a fixed location across the bottom of the display that 
corresponded to the physical buttons for answer input. Sixteen stimuli were 
randomized in presentation across 200 tests per condition. It should be noted that 
all participants reported the ability to recognize and distinguish the colours 
presented prior to testing. Example of a typical test for Condition 2 and 3 can be 
found in figure 2.4 below.  
 
Figure 2.4; Showing a typical test for the Stroop Colour (Blue) and Word 
(Yellow) conditions. 
 
2.3.4: Condition 4 and 5 (Stroop Arrow (Direction) and Reversed Stroop 
Arrow (Position)): 
The fourth and fifth condition presented is an adaptation of the Stroop test that 
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removes the linguistic portion. These conditions are an adaptation of two variants of 
the Stoop test, the Spatial Orientation Stroop test (Wühr, 2007), and the Eriksen 
Flanker Task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974). To overcome the linguistic portion of the 
traditional Stroop test, these conditions draw upon a spatial reasoning using arrow 
direction and their relationship to a central point. The arrows point in four directions 
(Left, Right, Up and Down) and are displayed around a centre marker (a red square) 
that indicates their position. A congruent stimulus here would be e.g. an Up arrow 
displayed above the centre point, where as an incongruent stimulus might display 
e.g. a Right pointing arrow positioned to the left of the centre marker. As with the 
previously described conditions four answer options were provided in a fixed 
location (i.e. did not alter cross testing/condition) along the bottom of the screen in 
relation to the physical input buttons. The two conditions consisted of variants of 
this test; one condition would require participants provide the arrows direction (e.g. 
below (figure 2.5) would be an answer of Left); and another ‘reverse’ equivalent 
where participants would provide the arrows position (e.g. below (figure 2.5)) would 
be an answer of Up). As such, these two conditions are comparable to the 
adaptation of the traditional Stroop test (described above), both in the number of 
potential stimuli and answer, and the interference upon task; yet differ in the 
mechanisms used to complete i.e., non-linguistic, non-colour dependent, symbolic 
matching, spatial reasoning.  
 
Figure 2.5: Showing a typical test for the Stroop Arrow position (Up) and 
direction (Left) conditions. 
 
2.3.5: Condition 6 & 7 (Fixed Clock Face and Rotating Clock Face): 
As previously described (Chapter 1.12.2) interfaces are often described with 
terms such as intuitive. The use of the term intuitive in this context, describes a 
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specific form of “familiar” (Blackler, Popovic, and Mahar, 2010; Raskin, 1994), in that 
a person “knows” how to interact (toward a specific goal) without conscious effort. 
This is achieved through drawing upon previously gained knowledge and 
experience (enacted as “implicit memory” (Blackler, Popovic, and Mahar, 2010)). This 
sub-conscious processing of information as an “intuitive interaction” (Blackler, 
Popovic, and Mahar, 2010) and can be understood as “knowing without reasoning 
or conscious processes” (p379, Sinclair, 2010). One such example of this might be 
found when viewing an (or digital reproduction of) analogue clock (Figure 2.6 
below). As noted by Norman (p249, 2013), through a standardization of the design 
of a clock we can confidently read a vast array of such clocks. This standardization 
states that the (normal) clock face will display the time for twelve hours of a day 
(twenty four when doubled) – represented by a shorter ‘hour hand’, the same clock 
face (often) will display a sixty minute / hour representation where one full rotation 
equals an hour and each of the 12 segments from the previous hour will equal five 
minutes – represented by a longer ‘minute hand’, and some may have a second 
hand following the same format as the ‘minute hand’ though for seconds (e.g. 
Figure 2.6 ‘left’ below). So effective and familiar is this standardization that many 
clocks may use Roman numerals to depict the hours and still many people can read 
the time as being e.g. twenty-three minutes past one (e.g. Figure 2.6 ‘middle’ 
above), though they are unfamiliar to reading numerals in such form. However, we 
can understand the clock-face as an intuitive interface as even when the numbers 
are removed, as with many clocks and watches (e.g. Figure 2.6 ‘right’ above), we can 
still make an approximation of the time; we draw upon our implicit memory of clock 
faces and know how to achieve the goal of telling the time without considerable 
conscious effort through drawing upon previously gained knowledge and 
experience; i.e. we know that 12 hour is at the top and six at the bottom.  
 
Figure 2.6: clock, left - numeric, middle - Roman numeral, right – blank face. 
This is not strictly an ‘intuitive’ interaction as we might consider the term in 
commonplace usage, i.e. we are not born with clock reading abilities as we are with 
holding our breath when being submerged under water. However, the familiarity to 
the clock face allows us to ‘intuitively’ know it, with minor amendments to the rules 
of how clocks behave removes such intuitiveness (for those used to the current 
standardization) as noted by Norman in his demonstration of “The Nonstandard 
Clock” (Figure 2.7 below): 
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Fiure 2.7. Norman’s Nonstandard Clock, (p249, Norman, 2013) 
“What time is it? This clock is just as logical as the standard one, except the 
hands move in the opposite direction and “12” is not in its usual place. Same logic, 
though. So why is it so difficult to read? What time is being displayed?” (p249, 
Norman, 2013) 
It is this widespread familiarity with analogue clock face’s that informed the final 
two conditions of the study. Condition six presented participants with an analogue 
clock face in a standardized format (i.e. with the twelfth hour at the top). Participants 
were presented with four options for answer along the bottom of the display that 
corresponded to the physical input buttons. Each test in this condition would 
randomly generate a time to be displayed on the clock face with only one of the 
matching the time in a twelve hour numeric format displaying an hour and minute (in 
five minute increments). For example, in figure 2.8 (following) the correct answer 
would be the furthest right – 3:55. As the number of potential stimulus was 
randomly drawn from a pool of 144 for each of the 200 tests the answers along 
bottom would also vary in their display (i.e. each test would produce four new 
potential answers). It was felt that this would add an additional processing ‘step’ in 
the test and reduce the capacity for the process of solving the test becoming 
automatic. The final condition was identical to condition six with one additional 
factor to decrease to the potential for the task to become automatic. 
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Figure 2.8; Showing a typical test for the Fixed Clock condition. 
Inspired by Norman’s Nonstandard Clock (Norman, 2013), the final condition 
removed the intuitiveness of how one might traditionally read a clock face. For this 
condition upon each test the clock would rotate to a randomized orientation e.g. as 
with figure 2.9 the orientation for this test placed two at the normal position for 
twelve. Aside from this difference the clock would read normally (i.e. not as with 
Norman’s Nonstandard clock which moved counter-clockwise), e.g. the correct 
answer for the test figure 2.9 would be 9:10 (where as a standard orientation would 
read 7:00). It was hypothesized that this condition would hold the least capacity for 
the test becoming automatic (of all the condition in the study) as the variation of the 
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2.4: Data Collation 
As previously described the study described here adopts a 
neurophenomenological methodology (Varela, 1996; Lutz, 2002; Fazelpour and 
Thompson, 2015) in seeking to better understand and measure Mindful and 
Mindlessness states during interaction. Here the neuro-phenomenological 
methodology employed uses phenomenological information (first-person reporting 
upon subjective experience – as subjective ‘A posteriori’ data) to support and 
understand the relationship and measurement of empirical physiological information 
(as objective ‘A priori’ data).   
 
2.4.1: Subjective data 
Questionnaire 
Following each condition participants were asked to complete a brief 
questionnaire (informed by the preliminary findings of section 1) based on the 
condition they had just completed. Answers were given through a five-point Likert-
type scale (from “Agree completely” to “Disagree completely”), and had option to 
provide comment following each statement (participants were informed this was 
entirely optional and not constrained to a particular form of comment). Participants 
were informed that they may skip a statement or discuss it following completion of 
the questionnaire. The statements provided were: 
• I was intentionally aware of my thoughts and feelings 
• My mind wandered off and I was easily distracted 
• I knew the correct answer and made my choice quickly without needing to 
think too much 
• I paid attention to the environment around me 
• I was completely absorbed in the display/audio; so that all my attention was 
focused upon it 
• I found myself watching/listening to the display/audio but thinking of 
something else at the same time 
* Space to leave broader additional comments 
See Appendix 2.3 
Open-ended Interview 
To gain a broader understanding of the participants subjective experience during 
each condition a brief open-ended interview was conducted following completion of 
the questionnaire (described above). This was intended to be a responsive probe to 
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participant answers and thoughts, and explore themes as they arise and provide 
deeper enquiry into topics of discussion that were unpredictable prior to study. 
There were however several prompting questions to initiate conversation with focus 
upon the participants attention and awareness, perception of time, thoughts and 
feelings, reaction to pop-ups, perception of challenge (ease of completion of test), 
mind wandering, and any strategies they employed or developed through the 
condition. As this line of enquiry varied between participants (being responsive to 
their answers and points raised) the specific prompts and questions also varied yet 
followed the previously outlined themes. 
 
2.4.2: Objective data 
Interaction metrics 
As the interaction of the broader study occurs with digital technologies, objective 
data can be easily gathered that relates specifically to metrics of the interaction 
occurring. Such metrics include; time between a condition stimulus being shown and 
answer, correct v’s wrong answers, when a pop-up stimulus is shown (and time to 
answer) and if the answer provided changed.  
Video Analysis 
Participants consented to video recording of the study. While video analysis 
facilitates analysis following a condition i.e. of the open-ended interview, it 
additionally allows for analysis of the participant during interaction. In this study 
video analysis of the participant during interaction provided a metric of hesitation. A 
hesitation here is understood as an act of altering an action prior to a final choice in 
action. Here a hesitation was regarded as a self-induced (i.e. by the participant) 
interruption to prevent an action (i.e. provide answer to stimulus) or change an 
answer. While such events cannot be linked to specific time points (such as with the 
digitally produced or recorded events) they offer additional insight to the subjective 
aspects of the interaction and provide stimulus test numbers where an event of 
reflection might have occurred.  
EEG (Electroencephalography – Brain Activity) 
While (as previously stated) this thesis does not claim consciousness to be a 
product of brain activity; there is strong evidence and accounts of correlation 
between conscious and/or sub-conscious events and brain activity (e.g Baars, 1993, 
1996, 1997, 2003; Chalmers, 1995; Varela, 1996; Århem and Liljenström, 1997; 
Saling and Phillips, 2007; Cosmelli, Lachaux and Thompson, 2007; Shanahan, 2010; 
Fazelpour and Thompson, 2015). Electroencephalography (EEG) is a process of 
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recording brain activity as a “non-invasive” measurement in that it does not break 
the skin of the subject and does not enter the body in anyway.  
To understand how EEG works and what it is measuring it is important to 
understand some fundamental aspects of the brains physiology; this can be found in 
appendix 2.4 Brain Activity, EEG and QEEG.  
The EEG data was captured using an Emotiv EPOC EEG neuroheadset 10. The 
EEG headset provides 14 channels (electrodes) with a sampling rate of 128Hz per 
channel; and so a range of 1-64Hz measurement following FFT. As noted by 
Debener et al. (2012) the Emotiv EPOC provides an affordable and accessible EEG 
hardware device, though it should be noted that the standard saline pads (for 
conductivity of electrical current from the scalp to the electrodes) reduces signal 
quality, and the placement of electrodes is approximate (i.e. does not adjust to 
compensate for head shape and size). As with Debener et al. (2012) these limitations 
were overcome through the use of a third-party stretchable EEG cap (Mitsar medical 
MCSCap 11 ) that when placed over a participant head provides correct 10/20 
placements of electrodes. To allow for mating the EPOC to the MCSCap sintered 
Ag\AgCl electrodes were connected to the EPOC electrode fittings using silver 
solder (for reduced signal noise). EEG signals were validated through comparison of 
the adapted headcap and original saline electrodes, assessing signal amplitude, 
noise, and original software signal analysis. Through the use of this cap custom 
electrode positioning was allowed that moved beyond the EPOC standard position, 
in addition to a reduced sensitivity to artifacts in the EEG signal from body 
movements. The final 1212 electrode positions can be found in figure 2.10. 
 EEG raw data recording was performed using the Emotiv Test Bench software 
(v1.5.1.2). Communication between the custom software (controlling stimulus, input, 
and interaction metrics) and Emotiv Test Bench was facilitated using Eterlogic 
VSPE13, a virtual serial port emulator. Events (such as start of study, end of study, 
stimulus shown) were sent form the custom software through the serial port emulator 
and to the Test Bench software so that markers could be used in data analysis off-
line (i.e. after the study).  
                                               
10	https://www.emotiv.com/product/emotiv-epoc-14-channel-mobile-eeg/	11	http://www.mitsar-medical.com/eeg-accessories/	12	While	the	MCSCap	provided	correct	placement	of	electrodes,	due	to	differing	head	shapes	and	participants	hair,	several	of	the	participants	had	intermittent	‘noisy’	EEG	signals	from	the	placement	of	electrodes	at	positions	O1	and	O2.	For	reasons	of	cross	condition	comparability	and	to	prevent	erroneous	data	effecting	evaluation,	these	electrode	recordings	were	removed	from	the	data	following	recording	and	prior	to	final	data	processing.	13	http://www.eterlogic.com/Products.VSPE.html	
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Figure 2.10: EEG electrode positioning used in analysis: Fp1&2; F3,z,4; C3,z,4; 
P3,z,4; Oz. Reference electrodes (CMS and DRL) were connected to the left 
and right ears respectively via sintered Ag\AgCl electrodes in a spring clamp. 
Ten20 conductive paste was used for skin-electrode conductivity.  
 
EEG data, following each condition testing, was saved and exported in .EDF 
format14; a common exchange file format for multi-channel biometric recordings. 
Due to the nature of EEG and the sensitivity of the electrodes, it is common that 
artifacts from body movement, eye-blinks, speech etc. produce spikes in the 
recording. To improve signal quality the EDF recordings were imported to EEGLab15 
extension of MATLAB (Version R2013b), and ‘cleaned’ using the clean_rawdata16 
toolbox plugin. This plugin utilized Artifact Subspace Reconstruction to reconstruct 
missing data using a spatial mixing matrix (with assumed volume conduction). To 
facilitate this, prior to each condition participants were asked to remain still for two 
minutes to provide a baseline of clean data from which calibration would occur; an 
example of this processes effect can be seen in figure 2.11. While performing 
artifact rejection two electrodes (O1 and O2) showed intermittent excessive artifacts 
(i.e. signal amplitudes excessive of brain activity from muscle and head movement) 
during several recordings of conditions and so were removed for all participants and 
all conditions (with a new artifact rejection being performed on the raw/ original 
data excluding O1 and O2 electrodes). The positions O1 and O2 are typically 
                                               
14	http://www.edfplus.info	15	https://sccn.ucsd.edu/eeglab/	16	http://sccn.ucsd.edu/eeglab/plugins/ASR.pdf	
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utilised in the understanding of visual association processing of the secondary visual 
cortex. The data from those electrodes are excluded from dataset processing and 
analysis to prevent erroneous data effecting evaluation and allow cross 
condition/participant comparability.  Following artifact rejection the raw EEG files 
were exported and analysed using MNE package for Python (v2.7) (Gramfort et. al., 
2013; Gramfort et. al., 2014). Specific methods of analysis are discussed in greater 
length in the results chapter. 
  
Figure 2.11: Artifact Rejection can be seen in red (large spikes in the raw 
EEG signal), these deviate from normal (blue) EEG signal. Corrected signal 
(used for analysis) can be seen in blue (i.e. an EEG signal with large 
contaminate artifacts caused by bodily movements removed). 
 
Eye Tracking and Pupil Dilation metrics: 
To compliment the EEG data, eye tracking and pupil metrics were additionally 
captured. As noted by Liversedge and Findlay (2000), saccadic eye movements (how 
the eye move between fixation on different objects) can provide indication toward 
cognitive processes; likewise, Kahneman (1973) found strong correlation between 
pupil size and cognitive loading. Eye-gaze and pupilometry were captured using a 
Tobii TX300 system capturing both eye gaze position and pupil dilation (at 300Hz 
sampling frequency of both eyes). Eye data was recorded using the Tobii Studio 
Professional v3.2 software17, which exported eye-tracking data into a CSV format for 
analysis in Python (v2.7). Participants performed a 9-point calibration of the eye-
tracker prior to each condition. Data was exported using the recommended settings 
of the Tobii Studio Pro software, specifically applying the Tobii Fixation filter and 
saccade analysis (Olsson, 2007; Komogortsev et al. 2010). Specific methods of 
analysis are discussed in greater length in the following chapters.  
                                               
17	http://www.tobiipro.com/product-listing/tobii-pro-tx300/	
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2.5: Results and Analysis – Interaction Metrics and 
Questionnaire 
2.5.1: Interaction Metrics – Time to Answer 
Basic metrics of interaction were captured during each condition. Figure 2.12 
shows the average (across participants) answer time per test per condition for the 
initial 25 test in each condition (Figure 2.13 – showing the same data minus the two 
Clock Face conditions). While there were 200 tests per condition, evidence of 
learning can be seen within the first 25 responses. It can be seen across the data 
collected for each of the conditions that the speed in which the ability to perform 
the task plateaued for many of the conditions following an initial learning period 
(e.g. the first 10 test stimulus). However, this true to a lesser extent of the Clock 
Fixed condition and even lesser to the Clock Rotate (showing erratic timings across 
the whole condition). This is unsurprising as it was hypothesized that these two 
conditions would limit the degree to which automaticity can occur. This observation 
follows the position upon Automaticity and Intuition (Section 1.12.2) being most 
apparent in the speed at which meaning or significance occurs (being sub-/ non-
conscious) as opposed to slower more analytical (predominantly conscious and 
reflective-conscious) processes (Baars, 1993; Blackler, Popovic, and Mahar, 2010). 
That is to say, the conditions that were predicted to facilitate automaticity 
(Mindlessness) allowed for a ‘learning’ period where the action became sub-
conscious / non-reflective where there was an increase in speed of completion. 
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Figure 2.12; average (across participants) answer time per test per condition 
for the initial 25 tests in each condition 
 
Figure 2.13; average (across participants) answer time per test per condition 
for the initial 25 tests in each condition excluding the two Clock based 
conditions 
The utility of “time to answer” as a method for the analysis of Mindful or Mindless 
interactions is small when viewed in this broader understanding; however, as will be 
shown in the following chapters when looking into specific events (such as pop-ups 
or following wrong answers) “time to answer” can provide unobtrusive insight to 
potentially Mindful moments. 
2.5.2: Interaction Metrics – Time to Answer (Pop-Up 
Stimulus) 
This learning period of how to answer to a stimulus was most evident when 
viewing the ‘Pop-Up’ answer time (Figure 2.14 below). While there is some non-
conforming data points in Set 1, 4, and 5 first Pop-Up’s; this shows a gradual 
quickening across each of the repeated exposures.  
Pop-Up set18 1’s first Pop-Up was dramatically larger than the additional sets as 
one participant (Participant 1) did not know how to respond. While they had been 
                                               
18	Pop	up	Set’s	refer	to	the	order	in	which	Pop-ups	were	presented	e.g.	Set	1	(1	set	of	5	Pop-Ups)	being	for	the	first	condition,	Set	2	(1	set	of	5	Pop-Ups)	being	for	the	second	condition.	
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informed of the Pop-Ups and how to respond (and acknowledged this) during the 
first condition they had forgotten. However, other participants, remembering how to 
resolve/respond to Pop-Ups, still took longest to answer the initial Pop-Up for the 
first set in comparison to the later Pop-Ups sets. During first Pop-Up in the 4th set of 
Pop-Ups participant 10 reported confusion over the event of the Pop-Up and why it 
occurred: “I think I made a mistake and it asked me for a different one, I’m not sure 
if that happened… of if its just… I couldn’t tell you…” (Participant 10, interview 4). 
Consequently participant 10 took considerably longer to respond to the Pop-Up. 
Similarly participant 9 used the first Pop-Up in the 5th set of Pop-Ups to try and 
remember if they should change their answer, to “think” if they were correct initially 
and realized that they were. 
 
Figure 2.14: Pop up Set’s refer to the order in which Pop-ups were 
presented e.g. Set_1 (1 set of 5 Pop-Ups) being for the first condition. Due 
to the differing order of conditions these are presented in the order in 
which Pop-Ups occurred (e.g. condition A, condition B etc.), rather than in 
relation to a condition type (e.g. Linguistic Stroop, Symbolic Stroop etc.).  
As can be seen the “time to answer” of pop-ups reveals a trend of reducing. This 
might be integrated into common place systems (e.g. that contain system alerts) to 
evaluate if the user of the system has automatically responded or has become 
habitualised to the message form. Consequently this method of analysis holds 
usefulness in providing points of comparison to physiological data and potentially 
might be integrated into systems as a sole factor in understanding Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness during interaction with technologies.   
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2.5.3: Interaction Metrics – Time to Answer (Wrong 
Answers and Hesitations) 
While the previous Chapter’s (2.5.1 and 2.5.2) has looked at the time to provide 
answer to a stimulus for a condition (or ‘Pop-Up’), it is also important to look at the 
impact of hesitations and wrong answers (or rather the subsequent wrong alert) on 
following test stimulus. Table 2.2 below provides an overview of the number of 










Green X O - Red X O 4.8 28.0 
Linguistic Stroop 1 4.4 38.7 
Linguistic Stroop 2 9.4 39.5 
Symbolic Stroop 1 9.5 31.6 
Symbolic Stroop 2 11.8 35.1 
Clock Face Fixed 13.8 31.6 
Clock Face Rotate 23.9 37.1 
Table 2.2; overview of the number of wrong answers and hesitations as an 
average per-participant per-condition. 
As can be seen in figure 2.15 (below) both hesitation and wrong answers had 
effect on the time to answer following tests. Figure 2.15 (below) shows the averages 
for all wrong answers and hesitations across all participants and conditions. It should 
be noted that the ‘Wrong’ answer times are substantially higher than ‘Hesitation’ 
due to a higher number of wrong answers occurring in the conditions that took 
longer in general to answer in comparison to the conditions with faster and easier 
solutions (as can be seen in table 2.2 above). Where the hesitations occurred in a 
more generalizable number across conditions (thus lowering the average times).   
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As can be seen in figure 2.15 below, ‘Wrong’ answers highly influenced the 
answer time to the following stimulus (i.e. ‘+1’,’+2’). This can be seen as an 
increasing following the ‘0’ test (the test that was answered incorrectly). As 
previously described this increase in answering time may be caused by a reflective 
process interrupting the sub-conscious process of performing the condition; the 
wrong alert sound interrupting the on-going process and invoking a breakdown. 
However, ‘Hesitations’ additionally effected the following answering time. While the 
test incurring the hesitation (understandably) took longer, the proceeding tests 
(‘+1’,’+2’) additionally required more time in comparison to the preceding tests.  
 
 
Figure 2.15: Effect of Wrong answers and Hesitations on proceeding tests 
answer times.  
Wrong answer or hesitation toward stimulus occurs at 0. Increase in 
response time in following two stimulus can be seen following (+1, and +2) 
in comparison to preceding stimulus responses (-1, and -2). 
 
The effect of ‘Wrong’ and ‘Hesitations’ on the proceeding answer times suggests 
a degree of reflectivity or preventative / slowing effect upon the less interrupted and 
‘normal’ completion of condition tests. This also warrants their use as points of 
enquiry and analysis and suggests a utility for future methods.  
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2.5.4: Questionnaire Data 
As previously described following each condition participants were asked to 
complete a brief questionnaire (See appendix 2.3 for Questionnaire, See appendix 
2.5 for questionnaire results). Answers were given through a six-point Likert-type 
scale (from “Agree completely” to “Disagree completely”), and had option to 
provide comment following each statement. Scoring ranged from 1 =Agree 
Completely, to 6 = Disagree Completely. 
Questions: 
A. I was intentionally aware of my thoughts and feelings. Lower scores indicate 
Mindfulness 
B. My mind wondered off and I was easily distracted. Higher scores indicate 
Mindfulness  
C. I knew the correct answer and made my choice quickly without needing to 
think too much. Higher scores indicate Mindfulness  
D. I paid attention to the environment around me. Lower scores indicate 
Mindfulness 
E. I was completely absorbed in the display/audio; so that all my attention was 
focused on it. Higher scores indicate Mindfulness 
F. I found myself watching/listening to the display/audio but thinking of 
something else at the same time. Higher scores indicate Mindfulness 
 
Comparison of Conditions 
 
Figure 2.16; Comparison of responses to quantitative questionnaire 
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When comparing the averages (across participants) of the questionnaire results 
(figure 2.16 above) the most obvious disparity was found in question C: ‘I knew the 
correct answer and made my choice quickly without needing to think too much’. 
This question provided an understanding of the perceived difficulty (how much the 
participant needed to ‘think’ of the answer). Not only does this, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, show the Clock Face conditions being perceived as (by far) the most 
difficult; but also reveals the Stroop conditions (both linguistic and symbolic based) 
as holding a greater difficulty when ‘reversed’ in comparison to the previously 
learned answer requirements i.e. when the answer required is opposite to the 
previously learned Stroop condition.  
Conversely question F: ‘I found myself watching/listening to the display/audio but 
thinking of something else at the same time’; showed a diversity across conditions. 
However, this appears to place the simplest task (Green X O - Red X O) alongside 
the more difficult Clock Face conditions. This may be explainable through theory of 
Flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1992). Csikszentmihalyi (1992) found while observing artists 
during creation of their works they would devote an intense amount of dedication 
and immersion to the task, ignoring food, sleep and other distractions; receiving an 
intrinsic pleasure “reward” from the act of making as opposed to the final outcome 
(to which they had comparatively little interest). Csikszentmihalyi (1992) proposes 
that this experience, Flow, exists in any tasks that require some form of engagement 
where there is a balance between possessing the skills needed to achieve a task and 
the demands of that task (Figure 2.17). Should a challenge outweigh an individuals 
skillset (i.e. be too difficult) they will experience anxiety; should a task hold little 
challenge in comparison to the skillset of the individual (i.e. too easy), they will 
experience boredom.  
 
Figure 2.17: Adaptation of an image taken from Flow: Optimal Experience 
(p74, Csikszentmihalyi, 1992) 
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Kane et al (2007) note those experiencing boredom often report the related 
condition of ‘mind-wandering’, i.e. thinking of unrelated events/thoughts during a 
specific event/activity. As suggested by Csikszentmihalyi (1992) low challenge tasks 
require little impetus of flow states. While this explains a lack of focused 
engagement upon the easier task (Green X O - Red X O); inducing boredom and so 
facilitating mind wandering, it suggests that the same ‘boredom induced mind 
wandering’ state would not be achievable in the more difficult Clock Face 
conditions. In contradiction to Csikszentmihalyi (1992) understanding of how 
boredom might arise Acee et al (2010) report on experiences of boredom in under- 
and over- challenging situations in academic environments, and frame boredom as a 
multidimensional and situation-dependent construct. Through this it is suggested 
that while the Clock Face conditions were intended to prevent Mindless 
engagements, they may also facilitate such experiences (Mindlessness) when the 
challenge is perceived as too great and induces states of boredom. 
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2.6: Methods, Results and Analysis - Physiological 
Measurement   
One of the primary aims of this presented study is to pave development of subtle 
systems for the analysis of Mindful and Mindless states during interactions with 
technologies. In doing so such systems seek to discriminate Mindful and Mindless 
from ongoing physiological processes, e.g. motor control, to allow for the evaluation 
of when the users of interactive systems experience these states and how they may 
be best augmented or employed. 
As previously described (Chapter 1.11), the brain is assumed to be an essential 
requirement in (human) cognition and consciousness (Anderson 1983, 1992, 1996; 
Århem and Liljenström, 1997; Ashby, Turner, and Horvitz, 2010; Baars, 1993, 2003; 
Liljenström, 1994; Shanahan, 2010). It has been very long understood and 
established that measuring brain activity (e.g. the frequency and amplitude of 
brainwave data captured via EEG) can reveal aspects of a persons subjective 
experience. Such findings and understandings suggest EEG providing a suitable 
modality for the measurement of Mindfulness and Mindlessness. 
In compliment of the EEG data capture eye tracking and pupillometry were 
additionally drawn upon as a data source to better understand how subtle 
measurements of a person’s Mindful or Mindless state during interaction might 
occur. This is performed through three modalities; saccadic eye movements (how 
the eye move between fixation on different objects), eye fixations (the eye holding 
gaze upon a specific location), and pupil dilation (variations in pupil size). 
Methods of analysis are described prior to analysis findings, which are reported 
alongside qualitative interview data to facilitate comparison (Chapter 2.8). 
 
2.6.1: Previous Measurements Of Mindful States 
As found by Banquet (1973) subjects invoking states of meditation exhibited a 
prominent 40Hz or gamma frequency band. Further to this differing meditative 
states have been observed to invoke activation in differing areas of the brain as Lou 
et al. (1999) found. Meditative states characterized by detached attention (loss of 
conscious control or direction of experience) but focusing on different contents-
elicited / content-specific activation (i.e. focus toward experience itself as opposed 
to guiding/directing said experience) were revealed in e.g. higher parietal and 
superior frontal activation for bodily sensations; and higher occipital and parietal 
activation during attention toward visual imagery (Lou et al., 1999). However Langer 
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(1989) found that those practicing transcendental meditation report restful yet alert 
consciousness and exhibit highly correlated alpha coherence across the frontal 
regions. However, with the practice of mediation and Mindfulness holding a focus 
upon attention to experiential stimulus Lehmann et al. (2001) may offer further 
insights. Lehmann et al. (2001) found gamma frequency range to be present (and 
may indicate) a focus upon sensory experience. The distinguishing conscious 
experience is often by a recognized importance of the 40Hz range present both in 
animals (Gray et. al. 1989) and humans (Singer et al. 1997) when problem solving. 
Baars et al. (2003) also claim the fronto-parietal cortex to play a role in the abstract 
aspects of experience such as social, emotional and self-evaluation, and suggest the 
higher “executive” part of the cortex as looking at and interacting backwards (to 
where the brain processes sensory information). The claim of Baars et al. (2003) is 
substantiated by their findings that fronto-parieral metabolism was increased in 
subjects when experiencing inward reflective moments opposed to outward 
directed cognitive tasks. In addition to these findings Philippi et al. (2012), Moran et 
al. (2011) and Mitchell et al. (2005) have found many links to the medial pre-frontal 
cortex (mPFC) showing strong association with self-referential thoughts and 
behaviour. However, the medial prefrontal cortex is located between the two 
hemispheres (right and left) extending from the forehead rearwards, and as such 
proves difficult to read using EEG within a localized area (and so prevents real-time 
portable equipment for use in a range of studies).  
The measurement of emotional valence, the intrinsic attraction or averseness 
towards an event or object, has also gained interest in EEG analysis. While this is 
often referred to as a positive/negative experience (as an emotional state) (Bos, 
2006) some have argued that the previous measurements may be better understood 
in terms of motivational direction (Harmon-Jones, 2003); that, is an approach or 
withdrawal of attention to stimulus. Consequently, given Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness’ connections with attentive processes it was assumed emotional 
valence as motivational direction might be used to measure such states. 
Motivational direction shows itself in EEG studies by an imbalance in the frontal 
regions of the brain; it is commonly assumed the left hemisphere frontal lobe with 
raised activity compared to the right is associated with positive/approach 
behaviours, whereas raised activity in the right frontal hemisphere is associated with 
negative/withdrawal behaviours. Choppin (2000) however argues that a high level of 
frontal lobe coherence in alpha frequencies alongside right parietal lobe displaying 
higher amplitude beta frequency indicates a positive emotional response (and vice-
versa). As claimed by Bos (2006) the position that returns the most correct and 
stable results when measuring valence is the F4-F3 (Frontal lobe) comparison 
(additionally supported by Niemic, 2002). In a similar vein to emotional valence is 
the measurement of arousal. Arousal can be broadly described as interest or 
  165 
excitement and manifests as a higher beta amplitude and coherence across the 
parietal lobe (Fp1-Fp2) (with the addition of lower alpha activity) (Choppin, 2000). 
However, Bos (2006) reports of a 97.4% accuracy upon measuring beta amplitude 
from the F3-F4, and Fpz positions. In addition Lehmann et al. (2001) suggest that 
rhythmic synchronization of gamma activity may represent a focused arousal during 
tasks and may act as a link between areas in a given network. Alertness and 
relaxation can be determined by the ratio between beta and alpha frequencies; beta 
wave dominance indicates alertness and alpha wave dominance is present during 
relaxation. Given the nature of Mindfulness being an attentive awareness, such 
perspectives of general alertness in comparison to relaxation were also given value 
in evaluation.   
 
While performing EEG data analysis a focus toward specific frequency bands and 
lobes (specifically frontal) as ‘markers’ for Mindful and Mindless states, as outlined by 
the previously cited authors (where possible), showed little discernable states or 
correlation to the interaction data. This is exemplified by Figure 2.18 (below) 
whereby the participant reported that this condition got easier, and so Frontal 
amplitude (as per Bos (2006)) would be expected to reduce (though participant 
reported an event near the middle of the condition where they stopped to think). 
Figure 2.19, similarly shows inconsistencies as events such as wrong answers and 
initial hesitations (following a period of no hesitation or wrong answers) provoke an 
expected increase in Frontal Beta activity (as per Bos (2006)). However, unexpectedly 
the very first pop-up event in the first condition (a startling event requiring attention) 
held little or no influence in comparison. 
Such dissimilarities in findings may be due to a differing context of study (e.g. 
Mindful Meditation V’s Mindful interactions) and states invoked (e.g. bodily 
awareness V’s contextual). Notably the ambiguity of what ‘states’ were being 
measured, exemplified by the many perspectives of specific frequency range and 
areas of interest, in highly comparative mental states additionally highlights the 
need for more precise definitions between Mindful, Mindless, attention and 
awareness; an aim of the first section of this thesis. Frontal lobe activity however was 
used in comparison to Parietal lobe activity analysis of Flow, engagement, overload 
and boredom states, specifically at 10/20 position’s of Fz and in a frequency range of 
Theta in comparison to Alpha power at position P4; as described by Ewing, 
Fairclough and Gilleade (2016) (See: Chapter 2.7.1). 
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Figure 2.18: Frontal Beta amplitude (Black) rises across condition though 
based upon participant feedback this would be expected to fall. 
 
 
Figure 2.19: Frontal Beta activity (Black) is rapidly increased following 
events demanding attentional resources as expected (Wrong answer alerts 
(Red vertical), initial hesitations (Green vertical) following periods lacking 
wrong answers or hesitations), yet pop-up events (Blue vertical) (reported as 
surprising/unexpected) hold little comparative influence (though does 
increase over a longer period). 
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2.6.2: Event Related Potentials – Measurement of brain 
activity in relation to specific events 
Perhaps of a longer and more established lineage than the previously described 
states of enquiry is the measure of alertness and awareness via EEG e.g. Loomis, 
Harvey, and, Hobart, (1937), and Davis et al. (1938) – measuring changes in brain 
activity during wakeful, drowsiness, and sleep cycles. Jung et al. (1997) propose 
measuring the EEG spectrum (i.e. QEEG- differing frequencies (cycles) of neuronal 
firing alongside their amplitude) for real-time information upon workers using 
autonomous systems (e.g. air traffic controllers) in assessing their attention via real-
time analysis in changes to EEG power spectrum. Their focus was toward the 
analysis of error rates during prolonged activities derived from responding to an 
auditory stimulus. In their study Jung et al. (1997) held focus toward two electrode 
positions (Central and Posterior midline (Cz and Pz)). While (as with many EEG study) 
the results varied across participants (e.g. differences in amplitude and specific 
frequencies of activity) they recognized a consistent findings within participants. 
Jung et al. (1997) argue that while many understandings have held particular focus 
toward specific pre-selected frequencies of EEG power (as previously described); 
their analysis revealed a more favorable measurement through understanding the 
full EEG spectrum i.e. power across all frequencies (a position supported by Makeig 
and Inlow (1993)). Additionally, Jung et al. (1997) findings suggest that 
understanding responses in brain activity as a whole may provide more reliable 
measurements when understanding evoked responses; that is to say, view the 
multiple brain areas response to events as opposed to limited areas of observation.  
What is apparent from all of these studies (described above and previously 
(chapter 1.11)), beyond the potential of EEG in the analysis of subjective 
experiences, is a marked increase in brain activity during moments of what may be 
considered Mindfulness in comparison to moments that may indicate Mindlessness. 
However, the specific regions of this increased activity are evidently up for debate as 
differing studies place emphasis on differing areas. What is understandable is the 
substantial role the pre-/frontal regions of the brain hold in directing or alerting 
toward conscious experiences and events; and a relational broader activity across 
the brain. As noted by Baars: 
 “Conscious perceptual input to [or from] frontal regions might lead to 
executive interpretation and control, which enables working memory, 
voluntary action, voluntary selective attention, and accurate report. 
[…] 
Thus conscious access to self-systems of the prefrontal cortex might enable 
the other functions”  
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(p51, Baars, 2003) 
Baars here is specifically describing a global workspace theory (1993, 1996, 1997, 
2003) (as previously discussed: chapter 1.12.5); a brain architecture of specific 
information processing comprised of multiple sets of parallel specialist (sub-/non- 
conscious) processes within a global workspace; which work together and compete 
to enter dominance/control of the global workspace (as a conscious event). This 
workspace is then broadcast (Shanahan, 2010) back outward through the network 
(across the brain) as an orienting of action, attention and awareness toward a 
specific task. In this way, we may also understand and observe a broader (correlated) 
brain activity as the recognition and activation of such a global workspace. 
In addition to observing areas of activation and the frequency of activity (as a 
brainwave oscillation), is the measurement of peaks in brain activity following an 
event of significance i.e. an externally driven stimulus that provokes an noticeable 
brain response. These are known as Event Related (brain) Potentials (or ERP’s) 
(Donchin and Coles, 1988); the most common of which is classified as a ‘P300’ 
(sometimes referred to as P3) that can be recognized by a positive (P) spike in brain 
activity approximately 300 milliseconds following a stimulus. As Donchin and Coles 
(1988) note; though the specific intracranial sources of the ERP’s are unknown, and 
the ensembles of neurons that produce these sources may not be responsible for 
the broader activity in which the ERP relates; the measurement of ERP’s has 
produced a variety of insights. This is exemplified in P300 amplitude as a marker of 
cognitive processes such as attention and working memory (Donchin, Kramer, and 
Wickens, 1986), and of its dysfunction (such as delays in P300) in neurologic and 
mental disorders that might indicate broader psychological factors such as psychosis 
and dementia (Linden, 2005). The P300 is often measured with regards to amplitude 
comparable to ongoing measures, and its amplitude (though measureable in 
expected events) is greatly magnified during unexpected events (Donchin and 
Coles, 1988). In Donchin and Coles work (p355, 1988), they propose that we view 
the P300 as a form of “context updating”, “[…] a manifestation of activity occurring 
whenever one's model of the environment must be revised”. Similarly, Gray et al’s 
(2004) findings reveal that larger amplitude P300 ERP’s (most notably in the 10/20 
positions Cz,3,4 and Pz,3,4 though additionally in Fz,3,4) provide an index of self-
relevant stimulus (e.g. ones own name) in comparison to irrelevant stimulus (e.g. 
random words).  
The most relevant position (of the previously discussed) to this study is the Jung 
et al. (1997) and the position of Baars’ global workspace theory, which suggest that 
rather than observing specific lobes and frequencies (of brain activity gathered 
through QEEG) a broader understanding of the brain activity as a whole would 
provide more useful indication of Mindful awareness during a task; though the 
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interplay of activity between lobes should also be of interest. Likewise, Donchin and 
Coles work (1988) additionally highlights that observation of the P300 would serve 
as indication of a potentially Mindful act whereby a revised mental schema of an 
action is forced into effect and revealed following a causal stimulus. This suggests a 
valuable source of analysis in understanding specific events during the conditions 
that may be fixed to a specific time point, namely condition test shows, right and 
wrong alerts, and, pop-up event shows.   
Findings of cross channel average power of brain activity and event related 
potentials responding to specific events (differing conditions being shown, correct 
and wrong alerts, and pop-ups) are described in detail in the following.  
 
2.6.3: Findings of Cross Channel Average Power of 
Brain Activity and Event Related Potentials 
The following chapter provides the results of the average power (measured in µV 
- microvolt) across the 12 electrodes used in the study for the differing conditions 
and points of analysis (as an average across participants also). As indicated in the 
works highlighted in chapter 2.6.2 an increase in EEG amplitude often indicates an 
increase in cognitive loading and effort or experience of significant events. Thus it is 
expected that events that provoke a higher cognitive demand (or hold higher 
significance as an event of recognition) will yield higher amplitude of activity (i.e. 
higher µV). Consequently events with a higher µV might be those draw upon a larger 
network of brain activity that invoke or indicate a conscious response (as suggested 
by Århem and Liljenström (1997), Anderson (1983, 1992, 1996) and Baars (1993, 
1996, 1997)).  Each condition/event is offset to an average of 0 µV (average of the 
first 500ms pre-event). Each graphs shows a total of 1.5 seconds – 0.5 seconds pre-
event and 1 seconds post. This time period is chosen as EEG averages are required 
to be performed within a fixed timeframe relative to an event (though each test 
varied in length) and to allow for comparison across conditions and events. 
Displayed is the average for each test shown (per condition) as an average across all 
participants (0.0 on the x-axis is the point at which the condition test was shown). 
 Condition 1 - Green X O – Red X O Event Related Potential (On Test Show) 
The following (Fig. 2.20) shows the ERP for the Green X O – Red X O condition. 
This highlights the P300 amplitude as expected with recognition of a stimulus (as 
previously described).  
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Figure 2.20: ‘Green X O – Red X O’ cross participant average Event Related 
Potential. 0 on the x-axis is the point at which the test stimulus was initially 
shown.  
Condition 2 and 3 - Stroop (Word) and Reversed Stroop (Colour) Event Related 
Potential (On Test Show) 
As the two linguistic Stroop conditions were conducted in a mixed order across 
participants these are presented in the ‘First’ Stoop presented (STR_1; Figure 2.21) 
and ‘Second’ Stroop presented (STR_2, Figure 2.22). 
 
Figure 2.21: ‘Linguistic Stroop (First)’ cross participant average Event 
Related Potential. 0 on the x-axis is the point at which the test stimulus was 
initially shown.  
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Figure 2.22: ‘Linguistic Stroop (Second)’ cross participant average Event 
Related Potential. 0 on the x-axis is the point at which the test stimulus was 
initially shown.  
Condition 4 and 5 - Stroop Arrow (Direction) and Reversed Stroop Arrow 
(Position) Event Related Potential (On Test Show) 
As with the linguistic based Stroop, the two symbolic based Stroop conditions 
were conducted in a mixed order across participants these are presented in the 
‘First’ Stoop presented (ARR_1; Figure 2.23) and ‘Second’ Stroop presented (ARR_2, 
Figure 2.24). 
 
Figure 2.23: ‘Spatial Stroop (First)’ cross participant average Event Related 
Potential. 0 on the x-axis is the point at which the test stimulus was initially 
shown.  
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Figure 2.24: ‘Spatial Stroop (Second)’ cross participant average Event 
Related Potential. 0 on the x-axis is the point at which the test stimulus was 
initially shown.  
Condition 6 & 7 - Fixed Clock Face and Rotating Clock Face Event Related 
Potential (On Test Show) 
As the Clock Face conditions are largely different (in comparison to the Stroop 
conditions and their reversal) these are analysed as separate conditions regardless of 
the order in which they were presented to participants.  
 
Figure 2.25: ‘Fixed Clock Face’ condition cross participant average Event 
Related Potential. 0 on the x-axis is the point at which the test stimulus was 
initially shown.  
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Figure 2.26: ‘Rotating Clock Face’ cross participant average condition Event 
Related Potential. 0 on the x-axis is the point at which the test stimulus was 
initially shown.  
 
Condition Show Event Related Potential Analysis 
It can be seen each of the conditions varied in their effect upon a P300 ERP. This 
is observable in the comparison of ‘Green X O – Red X O’, with an averaged 
amplitude of 2µV, the initial Linguistic and Spatial Stroop conditions being of a 
slightly higher average activation (approximately 2.5µV) in comparison to the 
reversed conditions (approximately 2µV), and both Clock Face conditions being 
considerably higher in average amplitude of approximately 4µV. From this it is 
observable that the ‘easier’ tasks (i.e. cognitively less demanding) produced a lower 
widespread activation in comparison to the more demanding Clock Face conditions, 
producing both higher amplitude and a more gradual return to 0/ negative µV. 
 
2.6.4: Pop-Up and Wrong Answer Alert Event Related 
Potential (On Pop-Up Show / Wrong Answer Alert 
Sounding) 
While understanding how participants processed the tests shown, it is also of use 
to observe events that were unexpected and less periodic. It should be noted that 
the (visually) more irregular ERP for each of the following data, in comparison to the 
smoother ERPs found in the previously described ‘test shows’, is a result of a lower 
number of stimulus (e.g. 5 per Pop-Up ‘set’ per participant – total 55 ERP’s per Pop-
Up set) in comparison to 2200 test shows per condition (across participants). This 
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lower number of stimulus recordings holds effect of distorting the averaged ERP 
through differing latencies of P300. 
 
As the Pop-Up stimulus was intended to observe the development of automatic 
behaviors (as it was assumed that responses to the Pop-ups would become 
automatic) these are averaged into sets of pop-ups (i.e. 5 Pop-Ups per condition 
(set), for 7 conditions). The first set of Pop-Ups encountered is represented by the 
dark blue line, and the last set is represented by the brightest red line (sets between 
are varied in colour from blue to red as a gradient between) (0.0 on the x-axis is the 
point at which the Pop-Up was shown).  The influence on participants from the Pop-
Ups can be seen in figure 2.27. 
  
Figure 2.27: ‘Pop-Up’ Event Related Potential sets. 0 on the x-axis is the 
point at which the Pop-Up stimulus was shown.  
As can be seen in figure 2.27 (and will be explained further in Chapter 2.8 – 
Participant Qualitative Interview) the initial Pop-Ups (the first set in dark Blue) 
invoked a much higher amplitude ERP and in comparison to the final (seventh - 
Red). This suggests that initially the Pop-Ups invoked a greater response (cognitive 
demand) that over time with familiarity was reduced, a position that is supported in 
the time required to respond to the Pop-Up (as described in Chapter 2.5.2 
Interaction Metrics – Time to Answer (Pop-Up Stimulus).  
It was also of interest to understand how wrong answer notifications and correct 
answer notifications were experienced over repeated exposures. These are 
averaged into groups of 10% (i.e. 10% is an average of the first 10% of notifications 
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across participants, 100% is an average of the last 10% of notifications). It is also 
important to recognize that participants differed in the number of correct : wrong 
answers across tests and so would not have an equal number of responses in this 
form of measurement. This would cause discrepancy in the data if calculating the 
averages as participants would naturally vary in their physiology in how the brain 
responds to stimulus. That is to say, responses to stimulus in EEG amplitude are 
participant relative. Consequently if, e.g. Participant ’A’ had a far higher number of 
‘Wrong’ notification stimulus and far higher amplitude than other participants that 
data would skew higher when it was solely their data. To counteract such effect the 
total number of stimulus measured for the ‘Wrong’ and ‘Correct’ notifications was 
limited per participant to the minimum number stimulus held by a (singular) 
participant in the group i.e. if P1 had the least total of  ‘Wrong’ stimulus across all 
seven conditions (e.g. x) then both Wrong and Correct stimulus would be limited to 
x for all participants. The first 10% of stimulus (audio notifications) encountered are 
represented by the dark blue line, and the last set (90% onward) is represented by 
the brightest red line (stimulus groupings between are varied in colour from blue to 
red as a gradient). 
 
Figure 2.28: ‘Correct Answer Alert’ Event Related Potential sets. 0 on the x-
axis is the point at which the Audio stimulus was sounded.  
As can be seen in figure 2.28 (above) the Correct Answer Alerts, while still 
invoking an ERP held a reasonably consistent response throughout the entire data 
sets. This highlights little initial response and little change with familiarity.  
Differing from the Correct Answer Alerts, the Wrong Answer Alerts (figure 2.29) 
varied across exposures. Initially there was a large ERP invoked from the auditory 
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stimulus, however, with repeated exposures there was a reducing in the stimulus 
invoked ERP. This suggests that while initially there was a large cognitive demand 
and response to the alerts, with familiarity these became less influential upon the 
participants actions and experience.  
 
 Figure 2.29: 
‘Wrong Answer Alert’ Event Related Potential sets. 0 on the x-axis is the 
point at which the Audio stimulus was sounded.  
 
2.6.5: Event Related Potential As Measurement in Mindful 
and Mindless States 
It was found through analysis of event related potentials that the amplitude of 
P300 revealed not only differences in cognitive demands but additionally how these 
were altered over time with familiarity to the stimulus. The greater amplitude of 
P300 appeared in the Clock Face conditions upon their showing, and was 
additionally present during the initial Pop-Ups and Wrong alerts stimulus. However, 
as was shown, with repeated exposure the evoked reaction to the Pop-Ups and 
Wrong alerts stimulus (intended to raise attention and awareness) was reduced.  
These findings indicate that to measure Mindful and Mindless reactions to 
specific stimulus one should consider P300 ERPs (and their alteration in amplitude) 
as indicators to the level of information processing held by an individual. The core of 
this proposition follows that of Donchin, Kramer, and Wickens, (1986), (Donchin and 
Coles, 1988), Jung et al. (1997), and Gray et al (2004); in highlighting P300 
amplitude as providing an indication of mental loading and attentional resources. 
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Furthermore the proposition here holds that the measurement of ERP evoked by 
specific stimulus can additionally indicate events that invoke a shift in the 
functioning of the individual; realized as a revision of context in response to ones 
functioning in an environment or activity. Here this framed as a Mindful act whereby 
a revised mental schema of an action (or environment) is forced into effect and 
revealed following a specific causal stimulus as stated by Baars’ global workspace 
theory (1993, 1996, 1997, 2003); invoking conscious and reflective-conscious access 
to previously sub-conscious processes as important events are ‘broadcast’ through 
the brain (Shanahan, 2010).  
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2.7: Mental State Changes Across Prolonged 
Periods Of Time  
While it is useful to understand responses to specific events (through observable 
ERPs), it was also hoped to gain an understanding of the participants mental states 
as a progression over time in response engaging in the task (as opposed to reaction 
to a specific event). This was primarily approached through two methods. Firstly, 
mental states were evaluated as classified by Ewing, Fairclough and Gilleade (2016); 
consisting of analysis of Flow, Engagement, Boredom, and, Overload. Secondly 
analysis of the correlation between neural dynamical complexity and the level of 
consciousness (Mindful/Mindless balance) was performed, following Schartner et 
al.’s (2015) method for evaluating consciousness variation during induced 
anesthesia, and findings of Mölle et al (1996) evaluation of dynamic and convergent 
thinking.  
 
2.7.1: Flow, Boredom, Engagement, Overload 
The understanding of Flow states (Csikszentmihalyi, 1992) through EEG during 
interactions has previously been explored in a number of ways such as; in 
combination with galvanic skin response - measuring arousal (Kramer, 2016), in 
combination with pupillometry - understanding peoples immersion and pleasure 
with online social media (Mauri et al, 2011), and understanding video game player 
experience (Nacke, Stellmach, and Lindley, 2011). The work of Ewing, Fairclough 
and Gilleade (2016) explores not only the measurement of states of Flow, but 
additionally its position relatively in a broader range of mental states during 
interaction (engagement, overload, and boredom). Their work explores the use of 
EEG in the real time monitoring of these mental states during an interaction with an 
adaptive computer game i.e. an interaction that changes its difficulty depending on 
the broader spectrum of mental states (measured through EEG) of a user of 
technology.  The basis of their position is to provide a framework for analysis of an 
adaptation of the Motivational Intensity Model (MIM) (Wright, 2008); figure 2.30. 
Their predictive model understands motivation and engagement with a task as 
reciprocal toward its difficulty. Ewing, Fairclough and Gilleade’s (2016) core premise 
(as equally Csikszentmihalyi’s (1992)), is that through a balance of effort and difficulty 
a range of differing mental states are activated (specifically of interest here is the 
immersive qualities that may be offered through such balance). During an 
interaction, if effort (analogous to skill level) and demand (analogous to challenge 
level) requirements are low a state of boredom is experienced, as both increase a 
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state of engagement is invoked, this continues to ‘Zone’ (understood as a state of 
Flow). However, should demand become too great over the perceived effort (a skills 
deficit) a state of ‘overload’ exists, resulting in detachment from the task as can be 
seen in figure 2.30. This position supports the previously described findings of Acee 
et al (2010) who suggest that disinterest from interactions and task-oriented 
experiences of boredom may arise in both under- and over- challenging situations.  
 
figure 2.30; (p2, Ewing, Fairclough and Gilleade, 2016): Adaptation of 
Wright (2008) MIM model of user engagement. 
 
Ewing, Fairclough and Gilleade (2016) draw upon two classifiers in their 
measurement of the four states previously described. Firstly they draw upon 
frequency bandwidths, Alpha (7.5 – 13Hz) and Theta (4-7Hz) as measures of cortical 
activation mental effort, as measures of power in these frequency domains indicate 
manipulations in cognitive demand and motivational incentives. Secondly, from their 
findings it was shown that Frontal central (Fz) and Parietal (P4) regions were most 
sensitive to demands during an interaction in addition to being sites responding to 
incentives/rewards during interactions. In particular was Frontal Theta amplitude in 
relation to sustained attention and cognitive demands, yet also note that previously 
unreported was reduced Frontal Theta amplitude observed during periods of 
cognitive overloading (p7, Ewing, Fairclough and Gilleade, 2016). From this they 
propose the first classifier as Fz Theta amplitude. The second classifier was drawn 
from observations of changes in P4 Alpha (specifically upper 10-13Hz) wave 
amplitude that showed increases relative to interaction demands. From these two 
positions and bandwidths the four mental state classifiers of ‘zone’ (Flow), 
engagements, boredom, and overload can be calculated (Ewing, Fairclough and 
Gilleade, 2016). The way in which these classifiers indicate the specified states is 
highlighted in figure 2.31. The classifiers proposed by Ewing, Fairclough and 
Gilleade, (2016) are additionally supported by the work of Gevins et al (1997) who 
describe a frontal midline theta increase in magnitude with increased memory load; 
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and parietal-central, alpha signal decrease with increased working memory load, 
during verbal/spatial match/mismatch study.  
 
 
Figure 2.31; Two-dimensional 
representation of user state and their 
relation to Theta amplitude at Fz and 
upper Alpha amplitude at P4  (p8, 





Using the MNE Python package (Gramfort et. al., 2013; Gramfort et. al., 2014) 
raw data across the entire condition was processed. This firstly involved performing 
an FFT (Fast Fourier Transform) upon the data to obtain time/frequency amplitudes 
(though the mne.time_frequency. single_trial_power module that utilizes 
scipy.fftpack.fft19). Frequency information was windowed between the frequencies of 
interest per channel as previously described by Ewing, Fairclough and Gilleade 
(2016). Due to differences in participant physiology and frequency amplitude, 
relative power variables were transformed by log[χ ÷ (1 ‒ χ)] to normalize the 
distribution of the data as per Gasser, Bacher, Mocks (1982), Knott et al (2001), 
Marosi et al (2001), and Yuvaraj et al (2014); which provided comparative amplitudes 
of frequencies. The mean of each channels frequency band were calculated and 
then subtracted from the corresponding data with values above the mean 
considered ‘high’ (time position represented by +1 in an array) and values below 
mean as ‘low’ (time position represented by 0. in an array). This was then used to 
calculate mental states as per Figure 2.31: Ewing, Fairclough and Gilleade (2016); 
e.g. P4 with a value of 1 and Fz with a value of 1 would indicate a state of 
engagement. Data was then averaged through a moving window of 2 seconds to 
provide clearer indication of sustained states.  
The results of this analysis are discussed in Chapter 2.8.3.  
                                               
19https://docs.scipy.org/doc/scipy/reference/generated/scipy.fftpack.html		
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2.7.2: Dynamic Complexity And Degrees Of Conscious 
Awareness  
In addition to measuring changes in mental states, analysis of the correlation 
between neural dynamical complexity and the level of consciousness 
(Mindful/Mindless balance) was also performed. This was following Schartner et al.’s 
(2015) method for evaluating differing states of consciousness during induced 
anaesthesia. Schartner et al (p1, 2015) highlight the growing body of literature that 
suggests neural theories of consciousness indicate a correlation between specific 
types of consciousness (e.g. sleep in comparison to waking alertness) and neural 
dynamical complexity. Dynamical complexity is understood as subsets of a system 
(the subsets of brain activity) being dynamically distinct (differentiation) yet 
additionally supporting integration across the whole system. And so, various 
conscious experiences are composed of a differentiation of subsets of brain activity 
though experienced through a coherent integrated whole, measureable as a degree 
of ‘system wide’ coherency. To measure complexity Schartner et al (2015) propose 
the computation of Lempel-Ziv complexity (Lempel and Ziv, 1976) upon EEG data, 
that provides an understanding of differentiation as diversity in EEG activity across 
both space and time, however they note (p2, 2015) that on spontaneous data (as 
with this study) such measurement reflects only differentiation and not the degree of 
integration. Lempel-Ziv complexity is used within a range of applications beyond 
analysis of biometric signal, such as compression algorithms, and can be most 
simplistically understood as an algorithm for counting the number of distinct (and 
recurring) patterns within a series of data; the higher the degree of repetition of 
patterns the lower the complexity of the data.  
Following Schartner et al (2015) 20 the EEG data was transformed to a binary 
sequence with rows corresponding to channels of EEG data in observation, and 
columns of time points of the data in observation. The Lempel and Ziv compression 
algorithm (Lempel and Ziv, 1976; Schartner et al, 2015) obtains a dictionary of words 
from this data period, the words being recurring binary sequences as exemplified in 
figure 2.32, and then calculated across the matrix of data for their recurrence. 
Resulting from this, a high degree of randomness in EEG data would produce a 
higher number of ‘words’ in the dictionary set (a completely random dataset 
requiring more words to describe it than its length). Thus the Lempel Ziv 
compression calculation is proportional to the level of complexity within a data 
                                               
20	Code	obtainable	from:	https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0133532.s002	
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matrix, returning a score between 0 (entirely repetitive), to 1 (highly complex).  
 
figure 2.32; Example of Lempel Ziv compression.  
 
While Schartner et al (2015) use Lempel Ziv Complexity to differentiate between 
participants waking, mild, and heavy sedation others have proposed the 
measurement of complexity in different context. Klonowski, Olejarczyk, and Stepien 
(2002) propose the use of EEG complexity as a diagnostic tool for the assessment of 
patients in medical settings due to its robustness in measurement and the speed 
and simplicity of data outcome (i.e. one series) in comparison to raw EEG (multiple 
channels of subtle changes). While noting the difficulty in producing concrete 
meaning in such measures of EEG, Bhattacharya (2000) highlights the degree of 
complexity in EEG data can provide understandings of independent, parallel and 
functional processes of brain activity produced from differing states, actions and 
experiences; suggesting complexity measures might provide clues to parallel sub-
conscious processes as described by Baars’ (1993, 2003) and Shanahan (2010). More 
relatedly to the aims of this thesis is the work of Mölle et al (1996), who propose the 
measurement of EEG complexity in the understanding of processes during creative 
thinking. Mölle et al (1996) provide the distinction of divergent thinking as the 
general process underlying creative production, and convergent thinking as that 
which one experiences during analytical thought. They note how EEG activity 
complexity was higher across the central and posterior cortex during divergent 
thinking exercises, in comparison to periods of relaxation; and while complexity in 
the frontal cortex was comparable during divergent thinking and mental relaxation it 
was reduced during convergent thinking. Their results indicate that the processes 
underlying the novel ideation are observable in a strong increase in the EEG's 
complexity. However, the framing of divergent and convergent thinking posed by 
Mölle et al (1996) does not directly map to Mindful and Mindless framings. While 
novel ideation is a core outcome of a Mindful perspective or approach, it is 
additionally of an analytical framing. A Mindful thought process requires divergent 
thinking to see new perspectives and solutions, but additionally is not a blind 
creative process. Consequently Mindful thought processes additionally require an 
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analytical approach in determining context and evaluation of available information. 
This is not to say that the findings of Mölle et al (1996) are not of use however, most 
prominent difference between divergent and convergent thinking in comparison 
relaxation was found to be in the parietal regions; providing a site of enquiry during 
complexity analysis (i.e. exposing both modalities of thinking as observable changes 
during interaction). 
To understand changes in EEG complexity the measures were performed on 1 
second (128 samples) of data per complexity data point. This provides an 
understanding of changes in complexity as the interaction with conditions occurs 
over time. To observe EEG complexity two methods in analysis were used. This was 
conducted following Schartner et al (2015) across three measurements, using the 
entire range of viable EEG channels across the: raw EEG data, frequency amplitude, 
and EEG phase coherency (see appendix 2.4); and a second following findings of 
Mölle et al (1996) observing Alpha wave (7.5 – 13Hz) complexity in the parietal 
region (across 10:20 positions P3,4, and z as ‘Rear Complexity’) and Theta wave (3.5 
– 7Hz) complexity in the frontal region (across 10:20 positions F3,4, and z as ‘Frontal 
Complexity’). The results of this analysis are discussed in Chapter 2.8.3. 
 
2.7.3: Pupil and Eye Gaze 
It has long been understood that there is a relationship between the eyes and 
mental states as a bidirectional relationship (Goldwater, 1972). Hess and Polt (1960) 
noted how the pupil diameter variations accompanied seeing emotionally toned or 
interesting stimulus such as sexual attraction and fear (increasing with arousal and 
decreasing with negative emotions). Kahneman and Beatty (1966) noted that the 
relationship between pupil diameter mental states moves beyond solely emotion 
and attraction and is additionally altered through demand upon working memory 
and cognitive loading (increasing proportionately with demands) (Kahneman, 1973). 
Similarly, and more recently, Pomplun and Sunkara (2003) note the use of pupil 
dilation in rapid and reliable indication of individuals cognitive workload during 
human computer interaction. Consequently the variation of the pupil size during and 
across conditions can provide indication to the cognitive loading and learning 
aspects of a participant. Since each condition remains at a relative difficulty, aspects 
of learning and reduction in cognitive loading (i.e the task becoming Mindless) 
present themselves in a reduction of pupil diameter, conversely, events that require 
additional effort, cognitive loading and awareness will report as increases.  
In addition to pupil dilation is the observation of fixations and saccades. Fixations 
are classified as moments when the eye holds focus toward a specific area. Saccades 
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are (broadly) classified as the movement between fixation points. Saccades direct 
the eyes toward areas of importance and considered most informative, where 
fixation occurs. Thus the observing of saccade and fixation events provides 
understanding of a persons attention toward a scene of vision. As noted by Rayner 
(1977), it is not only that these events occur or the order in which they occur that is 
of sole significance, but the duration they hold that might reveal affect of cognitive 
processes. Such position is observable in recent work understanding mind-
wandering or Mindless reading (Reichle, Reineberg and Schooler, 2010; Uzzaman 
and Joordens, 2011; Schad, Nuthmann, and Engbert, 2012). These are typically 
defined as states whereby a person is reading a piece of text yet has little retention 
of information or the goal to which the activity is held; when attention is directed 
away from the external environment and cognitive processing is “decoupled from 
perceptual information”(Schad, Nuthmann, and Engbert, 2012). During this period 
individuals fail to notice the goal they originally held has been replaced by another 
activity or concern (Uzzaman and Joordens, 2011) and that “none of what they have 
been “reading” has been processed in a meaningful manner” (Reichle, Reineberg 
and Schooler, 2010). From each of these studies it was found that during mind-
wandering events the duration of fixations increased. Similarly the study of eye 
movements has held recognition of its importance in understanding attentive and 
awareness processes (Hoffman and Subramaniam, 1995) and reflecting a number of 
psychological processes (Liversedge and Findley, 2000); with some claiming the 
study of eye movement offers a measure of mental activity independent of 
participant report (Bridgeman, 1992). Kumari et al (2017) held lens toward the 
understanding of smooth pursuit eye movements, where the eye follows a particular 
‘object’ in a field of view; and anti-saccade movements, where a person intentionally 
prevents the eye from instinctual following toward an object. However, Kumari et al 
(2017) additionally sought to understand the effect of Mindfulness upon these eye-
movements. Kumari et al (2017) assessed Mindfulness through analysis of 
Mindfulness trait through the previously described Five Facet Mindfulness 
Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006; chapter 1.2.0); and through Mindfulness developed 
through training (meditation practice for a minimum of two years v’s non-meditators) 
as ‘cultivated Mindfulness’ (Ivanovski and Malhi, 2007). While it was found that those 
who practiced meditation (cultivated Mindfulness) had superior smooth pursuit eye 
movement and anti-saccade control; there was little consistency in correlation in 
reporting of high trait Mindfulness (assessed through Five Facet Mindfulness 
Questionnaire) (p71, Kumari et al, 2017). 
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Fixation and saccade classifications were performed automatically through the 
Tobii Studio Professional v3.2 software21 during eye data capture, (classifications 
derived from Olsson, 2007; Komogortsev et al. 2010) and formatted for analysis in 
Python (v2.7). Due to the nature of eye events being significant in periods of length, 
the durations of saccades and fixations were calculated as (multiple) individual 
events per test in each condition presented to participants. These were then 
calculated as a mean per test (i.e. mean number of samples of all fixations/saccades 
lengths per test). Test length was calculated in seconds and the mean 
fixation/saccade per second (as opposed to test) calculated. Due to fixations being 
(naturally) a magnitude longer than saccades these are divided by 10 to provide 
comparability to mean saccade length per second. Pupil dilation is reported with the 
subtraction of the total (per condition) mean.  
The results of this analysis are discussed in Chapter 2.8.3.  
 
                                               
21	http://www.tobiipro.com/product-listing/tobii-pro-tx300/	
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2.8: Participant Qualitative Interview and 
Physiological Measurement Results and Analysis 
As noted by Braun and Clarke (2006) “Thematic analysis is a method for 
identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data.”. Theoretical 
thematic analysis was conducted upon participant interviews following Braun and 
Clarke (2006) at the sentence to paragraph level for semantic and latent meaning 
i.e. a top-down approach driven by the concepts informing the definitions of Section 
1. This was drawn upon to provide further insight toward points of analysis and 
common themes, and so it was chosen to focus toward data that was of this 
particular analytic interest, specifically to descriptions related to the previously 
defined phenomena of question and to the interactions themselves. Consequently, 
data unrelated to the interaction tasks and phenomena of Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness (and their related understandings) were discarded; such as 
conversation between trials (e.g. asking if they require a refreshment or personal 
break, general conversation e.g. how their day had been) and informing the 
participant of the process (e.g. informing when calibration data would be 
performed). Given that participants might discuss aspects of analytic interest outside 
of interview (e.g. following calibration of equipment), whole study conversation was 
analysed. Analysis centred upon increasing/reducing cognitive loading and 
interaction strategies adopted, attention and awareness, thinking and knowing, 
experience of passage of time, moments of reflection, moments of automaticity, 
significant interaction events i.e. wrong answers, pop-ups, participant identified 
events. As recognised by Braun and Clarke (2006), for some excerpts of data many 
codes might exist. Some of the themes identified ([bold and underlined]) were latent 
in description e.g. P3, Int. 2, “I saw blue [word] a couple of times [in different 
colours] [attention and awareness], but then the next word is red, but I naturally hit 
blue [moment of automaticity], when that happened I would notice... [moment of 
reflection, attention and awareness]”; P4, Int. 2 “when I didn't think about it… when 
I didn't try to think what I was doing, then I could do it. [thinking and knowing, 
interaction strategies adopted]”. Others described events in more explicit ways e.g. 
P5, Int. 7 “That was harder when I zoned out. [moment of automaticity]”; P6 Int. 3 
“[…] you’re not thinking of all the bits you’re doing you’re just kind of doing it 
[thinking and knowing, moment of automaticity]”, P3, Int. 2 “… I can feel my 
attention going away [attention and awareness]”.  
Graphs of participants physiological metrics for conditions present the following 
information: 
A. Engagement and Boredom (see chapter 2.7.1) 
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B. Flow and Overload (see chapter 2.7.1) 
C. Rear Complexity: Alpha wave (7.5 – 13Hz) complexity of the parietal region 
(10:20 positions P3, 4, and z); and Frontal Complexity: Theta wave (3.5 – 7Hz) 
complexity across 10:20 positions F3, 4, and z. (see chapter 2.7.2) 
D. Frequency amplitude complexity, and EEG phase coherency (See chapter 
2.7.2) complexity (across all channels) over a 3 second period.  
E. Raw EEG complexity mean variation (across 3 second period), and, raw EEG 
complexity mean standard deviation (across 3 second period). This 
measurement was produced following initial observations that complexity 
varied greatly in response to wrong answer alerts, hesitations, and pop-ups. 
F. Mean Pupil Dilation (across 3 seconds), Mean Eye Saccades duration per 
second (across 5 seconds), Mean Eye Fixation duration per second (across 5 
seconds) (divided by 10 to accommodate comparability to saccades), and 
Mean Eye Saccades duration per second minus mean Eye Fixation duration 
per second. This data is collated as a per-test measurement as opposed to 
continuous data (See chapter 2.7.3). 
Each of the graphs additionally indicates tests where hesitations occurred (green 
vertical), wrong answer alerts (red vertical) and Pop-Ups (blue vertical). 
 
2.8.1:  Participant strategies to augment cognitive load to 
improve performance  
Reducing Cognitive Load 
During interview it became clear that some participants held strategies for 
improving performance. This was often in relation to reducing the cognitive loading 
of the condition to improve speed.  For example, Participant 1 (Interview 2 - Spatial 
Stroop 1) reported they found it easier to rely upon peripheral vision as opposed to 
directly focusing on the information displayed: 
“If I looked at it I tend to follow the arrows, so if it pointed right even 
though it was up I’d press the right button, but if I looked off to one corner 
of the screen my peripheral vision knew where it was without paying 
attention to the arrows”  
(Participant 1, Interview 2 - Spatial Stroop 1) 
Whereas previous framings of Mindlessness (e.g. Bodner and Langer, 2001) have 
suggested that such states occur with a trait of ignoring or obliviousness to 
additional, often contextual, information; here Participant 1 sought this capacity. 
While traditional concepts of Mindfulness and Mindlessness would hold this as a 
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negative attribute it provided functionality whereby information would not cause 
additional questioning over meaning. Participant 3 also applied similar practice; 
during their first Linguistic Stroop condition Participant 3 was required to provide 
the colour of the word and not the word itself and so intentionally ignored the shape 
and size of the words to hold focus to the colour of the word alongside imagining 
coloured lines emanating from the words position to the position of the answers. 
During their Linguistic Stroop condition requiring the colour Participant 1 again 
chose to look off screen and rely upon their peripheral vision. 
However, there was not only an intentional blocking of additional and 
unnecessary information but also of subjective evaluation and, as participants often 
described it, “thinking” upon the task at hand. Participant 4 noted during their 
second condition (Rotating Clock Face) that they were often confused over their 
actions and if it was correct or not (even though there are audible alerts informing 
so): 
 “[…] I think a lot of the time I wasn't really sure if I was doing it right, and 
when I did think I was doing it right, that's when I got it wrong. Every time. I 
was like “oh yeah I know this one” [makes button press gesture]; and 
wrong, wrong, wrong.  
But, when I didn't think about it… when I didn't try to think what I was 
doing, then I could do it.” 
(Participant 4, Interview 2 - Rotating Clock Face) 
 
Several participants reported that the act of ‘thinking’ of what it was they were 
doing often provided more of a hindrance and such second questioning would lead 
to mistakes and wrong answers. Consequently many reported the desire to achieve 
automaticity, recognizing its value and capacity, such as Participant 6 (Interview 3 - 
Linguistic Stroop 1): 
“I think that's what I was going for, I was trying to get to a place where I 
was, ok this sounds bad… you know when you kind of driving and you’re 
not thinking of all the bits you’re doing you’re just kind of doing it… I guess 
that's the aim, you’re trying to get to a point where your hands, where you 
see the thing and do the thing.” 
(Participant 6, Interview 3 - Linguistic Stroop 1) 
Participant 7 (Interview 1, Linguistic Stroop 1) reported how they had achieved 
this state, notable as no longer requiring looking at the physical interface or 
potential answer positions and just knowing ‘where to go’. They described how their 
“hands knew where the buttons where I didn't have to check” coupled with a 
pleasurable feeling that allowed them to “forget everything”. Such descriptions are 
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akin to that of Flow states (Csikszentmihalyi, 1992), often described as an optimal 
experience that incorporates the merging of action and awareness and pleasure.  
The most commonly the reported strategy to reduce cognitive loading was 
employed during the two Clock Face conditions whereby participants would often 
resort to observing a sole ‘hand’ of the clock (e.g. the hour hand) and then choosing 
an answer based on the nearest time displayed in potential answers.  
 
Increasing Cognitive Load 
In contradiction to reducing cognitive load and information, a number of 
participants reported strategies to increase cognitive loading during some of the 
conditions to prevent wrong answers, predominantly during the two variations of 
Stroop conditions. This included mentally repeating aloud the words or colours of 
the words during the Linguistic Stroop, and mentally announcing the position or 
direction during the Spatial Stroop. One bilingual participant (Participant 3) reported 
how they had relied upon translating the information on screen into their native 
language to add a cognitive step and differentiate possible answers. Others 
remarked how they had kept a rhythm and focused toward maintaining this to keep 
them alert, such as Participant 8 tapping rhythm on the table supporting the 
interface to cover the ‘off beat’ between pressing the answer. 
 
2.8.2: Recognition Of Mindlessness And Automatic 
Processes 
For many participants there was a recognition or understanding as to the 
experience of Mindful and Mindless states, though described through different 
terms. While these were clearly described indirectly, when directly questioned in 
regard to these states the ‘orientation’ of these was often confused and far narrower 
than originally indicated. That is to say, while participants could report of 
phenomenological states akin to Mindfulness and Mindlessness when directly 
questioned they would over assume e.g. their state of awareness. Often when 
asking participants upon their attention or degree of held awareness they would 
respond they were fully attentive and aware, yet with further probing into aspects, 
such as if this was toward the broader environment, would often reveal that it was 
directly toward the interaction at hand with little or no external awareness (i.e. 
immersion toward the condition). Similarly, participants who’s initial responses 
suggested they held a high degree of awareness would additionally report that they 
had little or lost sense of the passage of time when questioned further. However, 
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participants could often provide indication as to where points of conscious 
awareness were experienced in contrast to sub-conscious operating; often at 
specific points such as wrong answer alerts or Pop-Ups or when they had 
experienced repetition of answers/stimulus and this changed (though all stimuli was 
randomly generated). 
Participant 3 (Interview 2, Linguistic Stroop 2) clearly described their inability to 
prevent an automatic action. As described by Anderson (1992, Chapter 1.12.3) 
automatic actions become difficult to prevent or stop. While this is often described 
through long standing habitual behaviours, Participant 3’s account additionally 
highlights short-term persistent automatic actions: 
Interviewer: Can you describe your attention? 
Participant 3: Mostly at the screen,  
Interviewer: And did your mind wonder? 
Participant 3: Yes, same words showed up multiple times in a row I just 
started to… I don't know, I can feel my attention going away. When the 
same word repeated 3 times… 
Interviewer: And what happened then, were you still… 
Participant 3: I stopped processing, and when there was a new word, I 
thought what do I do now?, do I match the colour or the word then that was 
when I made a mistake also. 
Interviewer: So, you were answering them in a row correctly?  
Participant 3: Yes 
Interviewer: And you knew you had to answer with the word? 
Participant 3: Yeah 
Interviewer: And the colours were changing? 
Participant 3: Uh-huh. 
Interviewer: But then the word changed, which you were already answering 
correctly... 
Participant 3: I saw blue [word] a couple of times [in different colours], but 
then the next word is red, but I naturally hit blue, when that happened I 
would notice but its too late by then.  
(Participant 3, Interview 2, Linguistic Stroop 2) 
While Participant 3’s account provides a clear enactment of automaticity (and 
Mindlessness) their recollection of events additionally provides insight to how this is 
experienced. They were consciously aware of the interaction and its requirements, 
and so the interaction was not of Mindless totality, yet they were unable to prevent 
their actions and only aware as it occurred. The change and interruption caused 
them to question their actions and how to proceed, though they had successfully 
been performing the interaction. Participant 9 described similar experience as an 
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inability to see the images in the same way, and when they had drifted into this state 
as it not being a hallucination but as a ‘dream effect’ (Interview 1 – Green X O, Red 
X O). They further described their immersion as similar to riding a bike whereby you 
don't pay attention in terms of ‘how’ (to ride a bike) until an event occurs and you 
‘suddenly wake up’, that “then you loose focus, and its not there, and you realize, 
but all these happen in a second” (Participant 9, Interview 1 – Green X O, Red X O). 
While it is often described that Mindless actions are performed over broader actions 
and prolonged engagements, Participant 9 and Participant 3’s (above) accounts 
suggest that Mindlessness additionally occurs in brevity of singular actions that are 
recognizable as moments of disruption to ongoing activities. 
Others described a broader spectrum of experience than a clearly defined 
moment of Mindlessness. Participant 5 (Interview 7 – Linguistic Stroop 2) provided a 
description of a spectrum of conscious experience they held during one condition. 
They described being in a conscious awareness state following wrong answers, an 
automatic mode of answering (sub-conscious being ‘in the zone’); in addition to a 
further (less functional) ‘zoned out’ state: 
Participant 5: That was harder when I zoned out. I was getting more correct 
when I was doing it more automatically. 
Interviewer: When were you aware you were doing this automatically?  
Participant 5: When I made an error, there was a couple of times I made an 
error and realized what I was doing.  
I was just in the zone, I wasn't conscious of doing it… I was just… I guess I 
was kind of just in that space of doing something…  
Interviewer: And when in that space if I asked you for the answer, would you 
be able to tell me?  
Participant 5: No, I don't think so, I was just in the, probably the most 
automatic then; and I really struggled to get myself back.  
So when I made an error, it was like breaking [hand gestures chop], but I 
was still going. 
(Participant 5, Interview 7 – Linguistic Stroop 2) 
While it is difficult to clearly delineate the experienced states from their 
description it could be assumed that for Participant 5, acting ‘automatically’ is 
experienced as a conscious control of automatic actions (i.e. a sub-conscious action 
by intent, a degree of conscious awareness), whereas ‘zoned out’ might refer to the 
non-conscious control over the enactment of these actions (non-conscious).  
While it was assumed during study design that wrong answers would provoke a 
more Mindful stance toward the interaction, i.e. breaking of automatic actions, many 
participants described wrong answers and mistakes (hesitations) as leading from 
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Mindful like thoughtful interactions. Participant 4 (Interview 1, Fixed Clock Face) 
described this with certainty that they could maintain a “rhythm” and the interaction 
would be successful, however, when they lost this “rhythm” and “thought about it” 
they failed. 
 
2.8.3: Notable Conditions 
Several of the conditions contained notable events that served as unintended 
points of enquiry and exemplar cases of critique. This included participants 
confusion when encountering Pop-Ups, dramatic changes in physiological data in 
response to wrong answers, participants reporting being more considerate of 
answers at known time points (i.e. encountering Pop-Up), and interruption to 
condition study from an external source. Notable conditions were selected through 
observation during the condition (i.e. interruptions, participant requesting 
instructions on how to proceed) and through response during qualitative interview.  
Participant 1, 1st Condition (Green X O - Red X O): 
When questioned if there were any moments in which they felt they had ‘zoned 
out’ participant 1 responded that they had experienced this “from the beginning” 
(Participant 1, interview 1). They reported that they were not aware of any thoughts 
or feelings other than to when the condition would end, and their experience or 
awareness of time was irrelevant, the audio being the only indicator of time passing. 
They additionally reported their awareness of wrong answer alerts slowing them 
down, and that “[…] it was easier to slow down and get them right than to try and 
do it more quickly” (Participant 1, interview 1). Participant 1’s first condition 
presented an opportunity to understand Mindfulness and Mindlessness during 
interactions in an unexpected way. While the undertaking the condition the initial 
Pop-Up caused confusion over how to proceed. While they had confirmed they 
understood the instructions of how to respond to the Pop-Up prior to commencing 
the condition they required assistance when the event occurred (verbally asking how 
to proceed after several seconds):  
Interviewer: “So what happened when you saw the pop-up?” 
P1: “I looked for an option, but there wasn't an option” 
Interviewer: “When the pop-up of “re-try” appears you enter what the 
answer to the previous test was or what you think is the correct answer” 
P1: “but I’m not remembering them” 
Interviewer: “So you didn't remember the answers or the positions?” 
P1: “I’m just reacting, I’m not recording them, so when it comes to the retry 
screen it was just a random… I just hit something” 
  193 
(Participant 1, interview 1) 
The reaction to the initial Pop-Up can be seen in figure 2.33 (at approximately 
205 seconds) (following page). In graph C of figure 2.33 it can be seen that the point 
at which the Pop-Up occurs there is a large decrease in frontal complexity in 
comparison to rear complexity. In graph D of figure 2.33 it can be observed that the 
phase coherency complexity has little response yet the Frequency Amplitude 
complexity is reduced. Following the Pop-Up presentation (at the point of Pop-Up 
answer at approximately 230 seconds), graph E of figure 2.33 shows a large variation 
in the mean standard deviation (across 3 seconds) of raw EEG complexity at the 
point where the answer was provided. In graph F of figure 2.33 it can be observed 
that following the initial Pop-Up there is an increase in mean pupil dilation, and 
following an initial fall (to the point where the answer was provided) an increase in 
the Mean Eye Saccades duration per second minus mean Eye Fixation duration per 
second. 
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Figure 2.33; Physiological measurements: Participant 1, Condition 1 (Green 
X O - Red X O) 
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Figure 2.34: Raw EEG complexity (top) and Eye Data (bottom): Participant 
1, Condition 1 (Green X O - Red X O). Hesitations (green vertical), Wrong 
answer alerts (red vertical), Pop-Ups (blue vertical). 
 
From the pupil and gaze measurements it can be seen that participant 1’s first 
condition initially required a high cognitive loading (relative to the entire condition) 
seen as large pupil dilation at the beginning of the condition (Figure 2.34, above). 
However, this quickly reduced (from 0-50 seconds) and plateaued until the end of 
the condition where the onset of Pop-Ups increased pupil dilation (understood as 
relational to cognitive loading, mental effort, and mental arousal). Similarly mean 
Eye Saccades duration per second minus mean Eye Fixation duration per second 
also followed this trend yet were more responsive to wrong answers (e.g. wrong 
answers at approximately 25 seconds, 100 seconds, 150 seconds, Figure 2.34, 
above). This suggests that following the wrong answer alerts and Pop-Up’s there was 
an increase in the cognitive loading that is observable in these metrics. It is 
important to note that the tests themselves in this condition (as with the others) do 
not change in objective difficulty and so indicates that there was a learning process 
that required less mental effort yet subjectively increased with interruption that 
required a degree of conscious thought (e.g. correcting or reflecting upon actions 
and responses). 
While the participant reported that they were ‘zoned out’ throughout the 
condition they additionally reported awareness that wrong answer alerts and 
mistakes (as hesitations) slowed them down, suggesting that the condition was not a 
period of Mindlessness totality but induced a Mindful (or closer to Mindful) 
experiences of contemplation of events and actions that interrupted the ongoing 
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condition. As can be seen in (Figure 2.34, above) many increases in raw EEG 
standard deviation complexity occur around such events, some prior to the events 
and some in response. Yet this is not without exception, the largest increase in EEG 
complexity occurs at 50 seconds into the condition, though there is no wrong 
answer alert or hesitation to prompt such a response. At the same timeframe there is 
also an increase in the mean saccades per second (Figure 2.34, Pupillometrics). The 
increase of saccades in comparison to fixations was observed in the study data 
following wrong answer alerts and suggest an active search of the ‘environment’ or 
area of interaction. Thus such observation may indicate a subjectively motivated (as 
opposed to reactionary) reflective-/conscious awareness. 
During interview upon this condition participant 1 was questioned on their 
experience of the passage of time to which they answered: 
 “it wasn't relevant, I could hear the pings so I knew I was going faster, but 
there was a point about mid way through that I was making lots of mistakes 
so I slowed down” [their answer times varied little]  
“it was easier to slow down and get them right than to try and do it more 
quickly.” 
(Participant 1, interview 1) 
This may relate to the period at 100 seconds where the participant answered 
incorrectly twice in a row, followed by several hesitations. It can be seen in Figure 
2.34 (Pupillometrics) that prior to these wrong answers there is a decrease in both 
mean pupil dilation and saccades per second in comparison to fixations per second, 
both of which increase following the wrong answer.  
 
Participant 4, 1st Condition (Fixed Clock Face): 
Participant 4’s first condition was the Fixed Clock Face. While this condition was 
not unusual in terms of external events or participant interview the physiological 
data captured during this condition provided a strong indication of areas 
investigation. During interview Participant 4 was questioned on how they felt the 
condition went. Participant 4 expressed their confusion and frustration during the 
condition regarding incorrect answers: “Some of them I got wrong, I was sure I got 
them right. I found it confusing.” (participant 4, interview 1). They expressed that 
they were aware that these errors slowed their completion of tests and that they 
were aware of the frustrations that arose following these mistakes. They additionally 
remarked in interview that when they thought about the process of how to answer 
the tests they would loose their rhythm and make errors. Similarly they expressed 
how the Pop-Ups were “quite a surprise” (participant 4, interview 1) that woke them 
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up. As can be seen in Figure 2.35 pupillometrics (below), highlighted by blue ovals, 
these wrong answers though not holding impact toward the raw EEG complexity 
variation / deviation, dramatically increased the mean pupil dilation and mean Eye 
Saccades duration per second minus mean Eye Fixation duration per second. 
 
Figure 2.35: Raw EEG complexity (top) and Eye Data (bottom): Participant 
4, Condition 1 (Fixed Clock Face). Hesitations (green vertical), Wrong 
answer alerts (red vertical), Pop-Ups (blue vertical). Blue ovals indicating 
wrong answer and Pop-Up effect upon mean Pupil Dilation and mean Eye 
Saccades duration per second minus mean Eye Fixation duration per 
second. 
Participant 9, 5th Condition (2nd Spatial Stroop Condition): 
As previously described (Chapter 2.5.2) participant 9 chose to intentionally take time 
to “think” upon their answer during the first Pop-Up stimulus, though it remained 
the same. Upon viewing the physiological metrics (see figure 2.37 on following 
page) for this time point it can be seen that there is a large reduction in the raw EEG 
complexity mean standard deviation (figure 2.37 graph E). This, however, is 
following a hesitation (that immediately preceded the Pop-Up), which in turn was 
following a period where there were no wrong answer alerts or hesitations. As such 
the participant may have been more Mindful toward the interaction due to the 
preceding hesitation and the Pop-Up invoked intentional “thinking” upon the 
answer resulting from a primed state. This potentially maintained a higher degree of 
complexity, thus reducing the complexity variation related to the Pop-Up. It can be 
observed in figure 2.36 (Below) that the raw EEG complexity is often, for this 
participant in this condition, erratic with a high degree of deviation prior to (and 
  198 
during periods of) hesitations or following wrong answer alerts. However, as can be 
see in figure 2.38 there are many instances where these fluctuations in the standard 
deviation of raw EEG complexity and changes in saccade-fixation per second 
correspond to events such as hesitations and wrong answer alerts (indicated by blue 
circles/ovals, in figure 2.38). Similarly there are many instances where raw EEG 
complexity changes alongside changes in saccade-fixation per second trends 
(indicated by red arrows, in figure 2.38). 
 
 
Figure 2.36: Raw EEG complexity (top) and Eye Data (bottom): Participant 
9, Condition 5 (2nd Spatial Stroop). Hesitations (green vertical), Wrong 
answer alerts (red vertical), Pop-Ups (blue vertical). 
 
Participant 10, 7th Condition (2nd Spatial Stroop): 
Participant 10’s final condition, similarly to participant 1, also presented an 
opportunity to understand Mindfulness and Mindlessness during interactions in an 
unanticipated way. This condition was interrupted midway due to an external party 
entering the room the study was held to converse with both myself (conducting the 
study) and the participant. When questioned on how this affected them the 
participant responded that they were “fresher” when they returned to the condition 
and that it gave them a welcomed rest. The decision was made to not repeat the 
condition, as this would influence any developed automaticity of the condition; and 
to keep the data for this period as it provides a point of analysis in comparison to 
the broader condition. The period of interruption is observable in figure 2.39 
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(following page) as a period between approximately 190 seconds to 330 seconds 
(notable as a continuous line in figure 2.39 graph F). The effect of the interruption on 
the participant was most noticeable at approximately 200 seconds into the condition 
where the participant was engaged in a conversation (correlating to the increase in 
variation and standard deviation). This is also reflected in a following period of 
sustained engagement (figure 2.39 graph A), and a drop in both frontal and parietal 
(rear) complexity followed by an increased parietal complexity in comparison to 
frontal complexity (figure 2.39 graph C). Similar metrics are observable when the 
condition testing resumed (indicated by a wrong answer), however, mean pupil 
dilation increases (figure 2.39 graph F) suggesting an increase in cognitive loading 
following condition resume. This may be accountable as the participants report on 
being ‘fresher’ upon the condition resume.  
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Figure 2.37: Physiological measurements: Participant 9, Condition 5 (2nd 
Spatial Stroop) 
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Figure 2.38; Raw EEG complexity (top) and Eye Data (bottom): Participant 
9, Condition 5 (2nd Spatial Stroop). Hesitations (green vertical), Wrong 
answer alerts (red vertical), Pop-Ups (blue vertical). Fluctuations in the 
standard deviation of raw EEG complexity and changes in saccade-fixation 
per second corresponding to events such as hesitations and wrong answer 
alerts indicated by blue ovals. Fluctuations in the standard deviation of raw 
EEG complexity corresponding to changes in saccade-fixation per second 
indicated by red arrows. 
It can be seen in Figure 2.40 (complexity) there is a large increase in raw EEG 
complexity variation / standard deviation at 200 seconds as previously described 
(highlighted by blue oval) followed by a second when the condition resumed. While 
the largest increase occurs at 200 seconds it should be noted that is nearly double 
the largest increase in raw EEG complexity variation / standard deviation of the 
comparable condition (i.e. the 1st spatial Stroop condition) (Figure 2.41). This 
dramatic change in variation suggests a relationship to the degree of interruption 
toward ongoing tasks. That is, wrong alerts and pop-ups are accommodated as part 
of the condition whereas in Participant 10, Condition 7 (2nd Spatial Stroop) the 
interruption of an external event caused a prevention of the task, yet also required a 
much more subjectively involving interaction (answering and responding in 
conversation). Similarly in Figure 2.41 it can be observed that the two largest ‘spikes’ 
in raw EEG complexity deviation are followed by large increases in mean pupil 
dilation (indicated by red arrows). This might be the change in complexity denoting 
a drawing forward of sub-conscious and Mindless cognitive processes toward 
conscious Mindful engagements. 
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Figure 2.39: Physiological measurements: Participant 10, Condition 7 (2nd 
Spatial Stroop) 
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Figure 2.40; Raw EEG complexity (top) and Eye Data (bottom): Participant 
10, Condition 7 (2nd Spatial Stroop). Hesitations (green vertical), Wrong 
answer alerts (red vertical), Pop-Ups (blue vertical). Fluctuations in the 
standard deviation of raw EEG complexity and changes in saccade-fixation 
per second corresponding to condition interruption indicated by blue ovals. 
 
 
Figure 2.41: Raw EEG complexity (top) and Eye Data (bottom): Participant 
10, Condition 5 (1st Spatial Stroop). Hesitations (green vertical), Wrong 
answer alerts (red vertical), Pop-Ups (blue vertical). 
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2.9.0 Section 2 Discussion and Conclusion  
As previously described (Chapter 2.0.2- Limitations and Support) there are many 
complexities in understanding physiological metrics in relation toward felt 
experiences and actions. While there remain a number of uncertainties in that there 
are no definitive physiological indicators of Mindful or Mindless states the findings of 
the study revealed a number of insights to guide future work.  
As will be discussed in the following (Chapter 2.9.1) there was a validation of the 
guiding statements derived from the findings of Section 1. Equally noteworthy was 
the support in the distinctions of conscious and cognitive states. Participants when in 
states that might be considered automatic (and Mindless) reported contradictory 
statements and a lack of knowledge of their actions. This however was often not 
described as a negative quality as they often held confidence that their actions were 
correct. Equally important is the finding that participants seek such states (often 
described as being in the ‘zone’) yet for some they recognised the danger of a 
further state of uncontrolled automaticity (a non-conscious state). Such findings 
highlight the need for a greater consideration in how and when Mindful and 
Mindless interactions might be sought. The simpler conditions facilitated Mindless 
interactions easily however, some participants took steps to increase their cognitive 
loading (perhaps to maintain the correct balance of Mindlessness); similarly ‘short 
cuts’ were adopted in the more difficult clock face conditions increasing their ease. 
Likewise the ‘Pop-Up’ breakdown that was introduced was quickly adopted into a 
Mindless response with the middle ‘analysis’ step removed and replaced with an 
action akin to ‘re-press the previous button’. Here ‘re-press the previous button’ 
should not be confused with previous answer as the answer in itself was quickly 
forgotten and unavailable for recall upon ‘Pop-Up’. The analytical steps in ‘Pop-Ups’ 
was also removed i.e. [if Pop-Up, review previous answer choice, then choose 
correct answer, then press/repress answer button] removed the analytical elements 
to streamline the process to become [if Pop-Up, repress  button]. Such trade-off’s in 
meaning and information for speed (i.e. employing a Mindless equipmental use) 
consequently loose the analytical and experiential steps and as such the potential 
for exploring novel affordances (as a Mindful tool).  
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2.9.1: Validation Of Guiding Statements 
There were a number of guiding statements that informed the study design as 
previously described (Chapter 2.2.2 – Statements Informing Study Design): 
 
With enough repetition a task will become automatic (sub-conscious). 
It was observed that in many of the conditions participants reported experiences 
relatable to Mindlessness and automatic behaviours. As described in Chapter 2.8.1 
and 2.8.2 participants explained these states in differing terms with confusion over 
their allocation of awareness and attention, often claiming to have maintained a high 
degree of awareness yet upon further enquiry this was revealed to be a high degree 
of immersion. Often participants would describe conditions performed in 
automaticity as additionally performed with little awareness of the passage of time, 
suggesting the entrance of Flow states (Csikszentmihalyi, 1992). Consequently, it can 
be held that with repetition of tests, these conditions hold capacity to become 
Mindless interactions (in varying degrees). While participants responses indicated an 
entrance to Flow this was less evident in EEG analysis and so it is suggested that 
Flow estimation is conducted through qualitative methods rather than objective 
quantitative methods (such as EEG). 
A novel task will require concerted effort (conscious cognition), and so require 
more time (or incur more errors) than when the task is automatic.                                  
Points of errors remained erratic throughout the condition across all conditions; 
i.e. there was not an observable reduction in wrong answers as specific conditions 
progressed. However, as highlighted in table 2.2 (chapter 2.5.3) with increasing the 
difficulty in condition and with requiring a reversal of test answer (e.g. providing the 
direction of an arrow in comparison to previously providing its spatial position), the 
average number of wrong answers did increase. The number of hesitations, 
however, did not follow such trend though did increase in comparable conditions 
(e.g. Linguistic Stroop 1 in comparison to Linguistic Stroop 2). It is observable that 
the conditions did accommodate a reduction in answer times from initial test 
(though to a far lesser degree for the Clock Face conditions) to a plateau. This varied 
across participants and conditions, the more difficult conditions typically taking 
longer for answer time to plateau (if at all). Many participants, during the two Clock 
Face conditions, chose to reject much of the information and focus toward a single 
hand and guess the closest time (e.g. choosing to read the hour hand and choose a 
time that appeared to be closest). This may have accounted for a plateau in answer 
times as it was often reported that this was not a strategy employed from the onset 
of the condition. Similarly observation of mean pupil dilation (a physiological metric 
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in cognitive loading and arousal as described in chapter 2.7.3), while taking longer 
to plateau than answer times, also indicated a reduction in mental effort. However, 
mean pupil dilation additionally increased with response to initial wrong answers 
and Pop-Ups.  Coinciding with testing times Pop-Ups additionally highlighted a 
decrease in response times with successive exposures.  
Consistent stimulus-to-response mapping will better facilitate automatic 
responses.  
A task with fewer ‘individual parts’ or steps of processing will better facilitate a 
transition toward automaticity.  
During interview many participants reported a loss of the sensation of time across 
all conditions. This was particularly evident in the simpler of conditions where 
participants not only reported experiences that can be interpreted as Mindlessness 
and automatic (loss of the sensation of time, being on ‘auto-pilot’, merging of action 
and awareness, lack of conscious recollection of events and information) but 
additionally expressed effort and desire to achieve these states. However, for the 
more complex Clock Face conditions (aimed to impede automaticity) it was 
expressed that this was harder to achieve and was framed as a state of boredom 
due to its difficulty. As described in chapter 2.5.4, such states of boredom might 
induce experiences of mind wandering (and consequently Mindlessness), yet might 
not be experienced in similar ways to, as some participants professed, a more 
functional automaticity. Thus automaticity reported as ‘being in the zone’ and as 
effortless interactions may correspond to the statements above (Anderson, 1992; 
Langer, 1989; Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998); yet Mindlessness (from 
boredom) may also be facilitated in interactions that do not hold consistent stimulus-
to-response and have a perceived difficulty and higher cognitive and conscious 
requirement.  
Disruption to an automatic task will force the individual to adopt a more reflective 
or deliberative (i.e. Mindful) stance toward the task.                                                        
Automatic tasks will be less interfering with concurrent automatic tasks.                                                                                  
It was predicted that wrong answer alerts would invoke a disruption to the 
condition task and result in a reflective stance. As can be seen in figure 2.15 
(Chapter 2.5.3) wrong answers increased the following answer time. Similarly, though 
not predicted, it can be seen that participant hesitations additionally increased the 
following test answers time in comparison to the preceding tests (the test with 
hesitation remaining the longest). This highlights the disruption to the on-going task 
caused by hesitations and wrong answer alerts, and may indicate additional 
cognitive resources in resolving previous / preventing further errors. 
It was intended that Pop-Ups would create an interruption to the on-going 
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condition task. This was observable in the answering times and was reported in 
participant interview. However, the effects were short lived as participants became 
accustomed to them. 
 
2.9.2: Participant Questionnaire 
The participant questionnaire (chapter 2.5.4) while useful in providing prompts for 
the qualitative questionnaire offered little variation over the conditions. While it 
provided opportunity for participants to expand upon answers few chose to do so. It 
did however provide participants opportunity to reflect upon the questions (where 
comments were made) and provided the qualitative interview with points of 
discussion and expansion. As can be seen in the final results of the participant 
questionnaires (Appendix 2.5 (Questionnaire Appendix 2.3), Figure 2.16 
(Comparison of conditions) Chapter 2.5.4); there was little variation in responses 
across the conditions. It was revealed however, during further questioning in 
interview, that many participants held over estimations to the quality of their 
experience when initially questioned at a ‘surface’ level. This was illustrated e.g. 
when asking “can you describe your awareness?” with response of being fully aware, 
yet on further inquiry was revealed to be ‘in the zone’, or directed fully toward the 
task.  
Future work might look refine and better tailor such survey toward specific 
conditions and explore where and how participants understood their attention and 
awareness and perceptions of passage of time. However, this would need to be 
supported through further qualitative interview and ensure that participant 
responses are of how they experienced and not how they assumed to have 
experienced. 
Consequently, this form of analysis does not hold the utility expected and future 
researchers should be aware of its limitations.  
 
2.9.3: Participant Interview 
For many participants the experience of Mindlessness was prized during the 
interactions with these conditions. Many expressed desire toward ‘being in the zone’ 
in recognition of its speed, ease, and functionality. These sates were often described 
in similar ways to states of Flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1992), yet (as described) such 
Flow states were not apparent in EEG data. For some, however, there was the 
opposite, enforcing additional cognitive tasks to prevent the automatic actions from 
making wrongful assumptions and answers. In this study the reasoning for wanting 
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automaticity and being ‘in the zone’ were clearly in relationship to task simplicity and 
desire for fast completion. Though these were relatively simple tasks (aimed to 
facilitate automaticity), future work might widen and vary the degrees of creativity 
and reflection required. In doing so such work might gain broader understanding of 
how, when and why people apply strategies to accommodate Mindlessness in more 
general interactions and the effect of doing so.  
Unexpected was the variation in description of Mindful and Mindless events and 
experiences reported by participants. While many initially reported a high degree of 
awareness it was only upon further questioning, and enquiry upon such awareness, 
that participants expanded upon their actual experience, often describing states of 
Flow or immersion. This was often assumed as being highly aware and attentive 
though critically was toward a single point (the interaction) lacking in awareness of 
events outside to this including the passage of time. In describing the drifts in 
degrees of attention Participant 3 (interview 2) described how “I can feel my 
attention going away”. This statement is particularly interesting as it highlights a 
degree of awareness associated with shifts in attention and a lack of control that 
occur over substantial time frames. Conversely Participant 9 described their 
knowledge in the loss of awareness as occurring in much shorter periods; “then you 
loose focus, and its not there, and you realize, but all these happen in a second” 
(Interview 1). Future work might build upon these insights to understand their 
differences and how such awareness might be utilized to prevent moments of 
automaticity in future systems. Similarly participants also reported differing degrees 
of Mindlessness. This revealed four distinct states during interactions, a Mindful 
reflective state caused by errors and realization as meta-awareness/metacognition, 
one of awareness and consideration to the interaction, a controlled effortless 
interaction as automaticity understood to be a functional ‘in the zone’, and a less 
functional automaticity where interaction still occurs yet is uncontrolled and 
experienced as ‘zoned out’ and Mindless.   
Consequently, participant interviews proved to be a vital part of a broader 
method in the analysis of Mindful and Mindless interactions, though future research 
should hold that such reporting occurs following specific events, holds inherent 
limitations (as described in Chapter 2.0.2) and so should be used to understand 
broader aspects of interaction as opposed to specific occurrences.  
 
2.9.4: Physiological Measurement – EEG, Gaze and 
Pupilometry  
While it was hoped that existing EEG measures of Mindful states would provide 
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correlation and insight to the study data this was not found. This highlights the 
differences in the qualities of Mindfulness as it is perceived and described. 
Consequently this further highlights the need (and aims of this thesis) to explicitly 
describe and define what form of Mindfulness (and Mindlessness) is being drawn 
upon in study, analysis, and conclusions to prevent confusion and wrongful 
evaluation of states which are phenomenologically distinct.  
Similarly, mental state classifications of Flow, Boredom, Engagement, and 
Overload (as described in chapter 2.7.1) held little response and correlation to 
interaction events (such as wrong answer alerts and Pop-Ups). This may be due to 
the time period and activity in which this was calculated. As was seen in Participant 
10 Condition 7, engagement was sustained for a longer period that coincided with 
direct engagement with another person outside of the condition.  
Future work would benefit from drawing upon a broader range of conditions for 
comparison, such as relaxation, immersion, cognitively challenging interactions etc.; 
from which a ‘baseline’ (per participant) might be drawn upon for comparison in 
further interactions of enquiry.  
 
While there were some uncertainties in EEG analysis, as described above, there 
was additionally findings which highlight avenues of future work; particularly in P300 
Event Related Potentials and EEG Dynamic Complexity and its variation. As 
highlighted in Chapter 2.6.3 P300 activations were found in response to all 
condition events that could be located accurately in time position (test show, wrong 
answers, Pop-Ups). The average amplitude of P300 ERP was observed to be nearly 
double for the two Clock Face conditions (approximately 4 µV) in comparison to the 
other conditions (approximately 2 – 2.5 µV). This highlights the additional cognitive 
resources required during the Clock Face conditions. Likewise it was observed that 
the Stroop based conditions (Linguistic and Spatial) lowered in P300 amplitude 
when the condition reversed (e.g. from indicating the word V’s indicating the colour 
of font). This suggests that the following reversed condition required less cognitive 
resources. It is assumed that the reverse condition will initially require more cognitive 
effort (to overcome acquired automaticity) and this was reported by a few 
participants during interview. As previously described (Chapter 1.12.1) schema 
theory proposes that schemas can be applied to fit a required action or event as an 
automatic action (the application of previously knowledge) (Fischer, Itoh, and 
Inagaki, 2009). However, when no schema is triggered an effortful analysis of 
information of the environment/interaction is required mechanism until new ad hoc 
schemas are constructed. However, as noted by Chalmers (2003), Piaget (1962) 
states that schemas need not always be produced as new; schemas allow for the 
assimilation of new information into an existing schema. This faster and less effortful 
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process justifies the reduction in cognitive load (and P300 ERP) in the reverse (in 
comparison to the initial comparable) Stoop conditions, as elements of interaction 
are retained yet the rule (e.g. provide an arrows direction) is adapted to support the 
new requirements (e.g. provide an arrows position). 
Observations of P300 ERP were most apparent in the correct, wrong, and Pop-Up 
events (Chapter 2.6.4). It was observed that the correct alerts held little variation in 
amplitude over time (from the first 10% of correct alerts to the last 10% of correct 
alerts). Contrary to this wrong answer alerts showed a more broader change, the 
ERP moving firstly closer to the event (i.e. reducing in time) and then reducing in 
amplitude (from approximately 4 µV to approximately 2 µV). Likewise Pop-Up ERP’s 
can also be observed to firstly closer to the event (i.e. reduce in time to peak) and 
then reducing in amplitude (from approximately 4 µV in the first conditions Pop-Up 
set to approximately 2 µV in the last conditions Pop-Up set). It should be noted 
however that there are substantially fewer observations of Pop-Ups to wrong and 
correct answer alerts. While all events still retained an ERP the change in amplitude 
follows participants responses that Pop-Ups became less surprising, and supports 
that wrong answers while initially causing interruption to the ongoing task became 
less meaningful as participants grew familiar (i.e. Mindless) to their occurrence. This 
provides indication that observation of ERP amplitude and peak amplitude time 
point within a time frame of 200 to 500 milliseconds following specific events can 
provide indication to event significance in a Mindful or Mindless context.  
Raw EEG complexity mean variation and standard deviation (across 3 second 
period) additionally provides basis for further investigation in future work. While 
previously it was found that EEG complexity (over prolonged periods of time) would 
increase with more complex conscious states and reduce in less conscious states 
(e.g. anaesthesia (Schartner et. al., 2015)); it was observed that both increases and 
decreases of raw EEG complexity correlated with differing events. These alterations 
(and variation) in the complexity of brain activity suggest disruption to on-going 
mental processes. That is to say that simply being of high complexity does not 
conclusively indicate high mental activity. Low complexity may be representative of 
differing areas of the brain working synchronously yet in high frequency (e.g. a 
complex task performed globally); with high channel complexity but low 
comparative channel complexity. Yet this may equally be representative of 
independent brain regions working in low frequency (e.g. multiple simple tasks 
performed independently) low channel complexity and high comparative channel 
complexity. Thus the fluctuations toward lower raw EEG complexity might reveal 
actions whereby the brain engages in activating multiple regions (and processes) in 
harmony (as a global workspace proposed by Baars (1993, 1996, 1997)). 
Consequently the observation raw EEG complexity may be of the movement from 
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sub-conscious activities to conscious events and so it is not the degree of 
complexity that is here understood to hold significance but the comparative 
variation in complexity. 
While there were many instances where raw EEG complexity mean variation was 
seen to dramatically increase without apparent (comparative) cause there were many 
instances where increases followed specific events. The degree of these variations 
was also seen to be considerably higher in many instances, such as Participant 10’s 
final condition where an interruption occurred and they were forced to engage in 
conversation (Chapter 2.8.3). It is possible that the un-associated changes in 
variation of raw EEG complexity mean variation could be the result of momentary 
loss and regain of conscious awareness over the interaction. As described by many 
in interview there was often moments of ‘being in the zone’ and then ‘loosing it’ that 
might not necessarily be from e.g. wrong answer, with some reporting such 
occurrences as preceding mistakes and wrong answers. Similarly, as described by 
Participant 9, these changes from (possibly) conscious to sub-/non-conscious 
experiences could occur in very short timeframes. Thus future work should utilize the 
measurement of variation in raw EEG complexity as a potential indicator to Mindful 
and Mindless events and changes.  
In addition to EEG measurement providing avenues for future work data from 
gaze and pupilometry data also provided points that might be considered changes 
in and states of Mindfulness and Mindlessness. As previously described (Chapter 
2.3.7) the relationship between the eyes and mental states has previously been 
stated as a bidirectional relationship (Goldwater, 1972). As with Kahneman and 
Beatty (1966), Kahneman (1973) and, Pomplun and Sunkara (2003); changes (i.e. 
increases) in pupil dilation were observed at events such as Pop-Ups, in addition to 
preceding and following wrong answer alerts and hesitations. As increases of pupil 
diameter have been previously associated with cognitive loading, these events 
reflect such changes and may provide indication to Mindful and Mindless 
interactions. As the conditions test themselves are randomized and of equal 
difficulty the reduction in diameter of pupil suggests a learning that requires fewer 
cognitive demands, i.e. the task becoming automatic. As many participants 
exhibited an increase in pupil dilation following events such as wrong answers, 
hesitations and Pop-Ups, and the difficulty of the condition did not alter; it suggest 
that the increase of cognitive demands is of a conscious demand, breaking the 
previous automatic action. This may be the alteration or questioning of mental 
schemas as a reflective conscious event drawing the interaction to the forefront of 
the global workspace and allowing the interaction to be experienced Mindfully.  
In addition to pupil dilation, saccades and fixations additionally responded to 
errors and events during the conditions. The role of saccades and fixations has 
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previously been linked to mind-wandering and automatic actions (Reichle, 
Reineberg and Schooler, 2010; Uzzaman and Joordens, 2011; Schad, Nuthmann, 
and Engbert, 2012); with the eyes movements recognized as meaningful in 
understanding a number of psychological processes (Liversedge and Findley, 2000) 
including attentive and awareness processes (Hoffman and Subramaniam, 1995), 
and its role in Mindfulness (Kumari et al, 2017). In this study it was found that Mean 
Eye Saccades duration per second  minus mean Eye Fixation duration per second 
(divided by 10 to accommodate comparability to saccades) was altered by events 
such as hesitations, Pop-Ups, and wrong answers. The changes were occurred both 
preceding and following such events, following participants reporting during 
interview that their sudden awareness would cause a wrong answer, and highlighting 
the bidirectional relationship between what we see and our experience as noted by 
Goldwater (1972). This was not always true however and so future work might 
explore the relationship of pupil dilation and saccade/fixations duration per second 
in assessing Mindful and Mindless states in broader contexts and scenarios of 
interaction. 
2.9.5: Limitations In Physiological Measurements 
While the value of physiological measurements in understanding our being and 
behaviours is without question there are inherent difficulties that range beyond 
sensitivities of the equipment and concern experiential states (as previously 
described in Chapter 2.0.2). It cannot be expected that participants in study will 
hold mental states on demand, nor can it be expected that such states can be 
controlled. As noted by Anderson, Devulapalli and Stolz (p172, 1995) “the 
concentration of a person can vary while the person is supposedly performing a 
simple mental task”. Consequently the classification accuracy of decoding mental 
states from physiological measures varies greatly, with even the best classifications 
of motor activities (e.g. imagined movement of left arm V’s right) EEG activity 
occurring in differing hemispheres holding an accuracy of 70% (Anderson, 
Devulapalli and Stolz, 1995). Often such classification models are developed in 
carefully controlled and highly simplified situations and observing very short time 
frames (often under a second following stimulus), in comparison to what might be 
expected in practical applications (Haynes, 2011).  
Such restriction of conditions would here be inappropriate given the context of 
Mindful and Mindless occurring over both short and long timeframes. As highlighted 
by Haynes (p524, 2011), the determining factor in whether conscious and 
unconscious “cognitive” states can be decoded is how distinct one state is from 
another. While it can be seen in the data (appendix 2.6) the physiological 
measurements are not consistently responsive to events, future work might hold 
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focus to further understanding the role of these and refining such measurements. 
This might involve responsive measurements that probe participants immediately 
following such occurrences; e.g. should there be a large increase in raw EEG 
complexity variation the condition be halted and participant questioned. This would 
require extensively informing the participant of differences in attention and 
awareness to overcome initial presumptions found during this study (e.g. 
participants reporting high degrees of immersion (Mindless) as high levels of 
attention and awareness (Mindful)). Similarly future work might seek to establish 
differences though a broader range of conditions e.g. watching uninvolving media 
v’s complex solution finding, such as those requiring a approach viewing objects as 
Tool’s (Chapter 1.9.1) to overcome functional fixedness (Chapter 1.7.1); to 
extrapolate differences in mental states.  
 
2.9.6: Future Work 
As outlined above this exploratory study has provided a number of insights that 
can guide future work in the development in methods to detect Mindful and 
Mindless states.  
The quantitative participant questionnaire proved ineffective in drawing clear 
distinctions between Mindful and Mindless states.  
In contrast the qualitative interviews proved successful in gaining a broader 
understanding of participants experiences in relation to the conditions. This 
neurophenomenological methodology proved vital in understanding participant 
experiences that would not be possible without such line of inquiry. However, care 
must be taken to ensure that participants have the capacities to describe 
phenomenal states accurately, such as the distinction between immersion and 
awareness. 
Successes were found in physiological metrics in four areas. Firstly ERP showed 
changes in time of peak amplitude and changes in degree of amplitude. While these 
occur within small timeframes (typically less than 500ms) such measurement might 
allow for the understanding of Mindful and Mindless responses to interaction events 
(i.e. from interface to user) such as security warning Pop-Ups or system notifications. 
Likewise variation in raw EEG complexity also indicated physiological changes in 
response to events and alongside gaze and pupil dilation changes. Further work is 
required to explore the variation in raw EEG complexity as a potential indicator to 
Mindful and Mindless events and changes. However, such work would benefit from a 
broader range of conditions for and incorporate participant feedback during the 
condition. Mean eye saccades duration per second minus mean eye fixation 
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duration per second and mean pupil dilation also signposted response to events 
that invoked an interruption to the on-going activity. Future work might focus upon 
these physiological measurements and seek to apply them in ‘real time’, allowing 
participants to provide immediate responses to the phenomenal state. This would 
allow for better classification and understanding of these different mechanisms role 
in Mindful and Mindless states.  
 
2.9.7: Evaluating The Success Of The Exploratory Study 
At the start of this section it was highlighted that the aims were to lay groundwork 
for future work on methods of analysis for Mindful and Mindless interactions and not 
to produce a final method of analysis but to highlight potentially useful methods 
(that might be refined through future study). This has been described in the previous 
chapter (2.9.6) and so the study highlights success in this aim. Equally important is 
the “ruling out” of methods that are unsuitable (from those used in related fields 
and/or in the analysis of Mindfulness and Mindlessness in different contexts). This is 
reported in the chapter 2.6.1 where little correlation was found between EEG 
analysis (using existing methods) and participant feedback and interaction metrics. 
Lacking in utility was analysis of Flow, Boredom, Engagement, Overload; future work 
might explore changes in these states however it is suggested here that a far greater 
degree of refinement would be required.  
It was described that a useful method of analysis will hold the capabilities of 
being easily integrated into interactive technologies (and their evaluation) and 
accessible by common place/commercial technologies (i.e. non-specialised medical 
equipment such as fMRI technologies). This has been demonstrated throughout the 
study.  
It was highlighted that a useful method would provide indicators of specific 
moments of Mindful and/or Mindless interactions; and would work toward the future 
development of an unobtrusive and objective method/system for the analysis of 
Mindful and Mindless interactions with technologies. This was achieved and 
highlighted through chapter 2.9.6 on future work.  
While a definitive method for the analysis of Mindfulness and Mindlessness 
during interaction with technology is not provided fertile groundwork for future 
methods to reach this aim are; explicitly, future work should hold lens toward a 
neurophenomenological methodology to draw upon qualitatively rich interview 
alongside EEG (specifically in terms of ERP and variation in raw EEG complexity) and 
mean eye saccades duration per second minus mean eye fixation duration per 
second, and mean pupil dilation. 
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3.0: Human-Computer Interaction Design, 
Mindfulness And Mindlessness 
“[…] novices learn skills first by acquiring a set of decontextualized rules. 
The novices' mode of understanding is "theoretical." As they become more 
experienced, they become more attuned to situational specifics and their 
reasoning becomes more holistic. Previously solved problems are retained 
as resources for future problem solving. Eventually, a level of expertise is 
achieved in which problems are approached "intuitively" instead of 
"analytically." Expert problem solving, therefore, involves a more "primary" 
mode of understanding. However, when the expert encounters a novel 
problem, one for which a previously solved case is not available (or not 
recognizable), the expert may be required to adopt an "interpretive" 
approach to solving the problem, appealing to previously learned rules and 
reasoning from basic principles.”  
(p39, Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998) 
 
As learned in the first section (Section 1) novices learn skills and this knowledge 
may become stored within a mental schema, a blueprint of action or knowledge 
learned, as a state of rules e.g. [if  then do ¤ and then ¢]. While during rule 
formation this action set may have been conscious they increasingly become 
enacted (and potentially adapted) sub-consciously with repeated exposures. This 
holds benefits of speed and freeing of (conscious) cognitive resources toward other 
objects of attentive awareness. This can be seen in the Mindless expert who 
performs multiple tasks with speed and without effortful attention. In this state a 
natural and primacy of understanding exists (often described as “intuitive”); the 
agent and equipment perform as one where the technology exists as an extension 
of the self. This process (when operational) becomes increasingly automatic over 
repeated exposure; as noted by Langer (1989) the steps involved become sub-
conscious and inaccessible (without difficulty) to contemplation [ = ¢]. 
Furthermore, it is also recognized that these actions may be invoked through events 
that suggest or appear to (yet do not) match the mapping existent mental schema, 
[w = ¢]. To be noted  and w though similar are not the same; though they 
appear to be similar enough that previous understandings may be wrongfully 
applied. A potentially crucial step [e.g. ¤] is also removed from the process. Such 
steps may be contextual (and analytical) and required when the familiar context 
stimulus is not there, though now lost from conscious availability as the task 
becomes intuitive, automatic and Mindless (Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998). 
  217 
This forces the (now) expert to adopt “…previously learned rules and reasoning from 
basic principles” (p39, Koschmann, Kuutti, and Hickman, 1998); ones that may not 
be appropriate/correct toward this novel problem (Schramm and Hu, 2014). The task 
(technology) has become functionally fixed as intermediary steps (and potential 
novel solutions) exist in a ‘phenomenological invisibility’.  
As will be highlighted in the following, interactive systems invoke this state of 
‘phenomenological invisibility’ through: 
• Easing cognitive loading by transferring familiarly through metaphor  
• Invoking routine behaviours and fixed meaning  
• Homogenization and repetition of interface and information provision  
• Forcing users to adopt defensive behaviours from information intense 
environments and through surface level information consumption 
And 
• Immersion 
This section addresses this dominance of ‘phenomenological invisibility’ within 
Human-Computer Interaction. This is here specifically understood as interactions 
without conscious consideration or reflection upon “how” they are performed i.e. as 
non-/sub-conscious interactions. This is achieved through critique upon the 
promotion of the invisible computer as optimal design in all circumstance; building 
upon existing notions that designers should attend to both the functional and non-
functional properties of interactive systems to improve the experience and abilities 
of the user.  
Primarily this section illustrates alternate framing and understanding of interaction 
design in terms of the previously defined Mindfulness and Mindlessness; and 
provides example of why such states may occur and how they may be countered 
through design.  This is achieved through highlighting the interrelated nature of 
cognitive load, metaphor, intuition, efficiency and functionality, repetition and 
routine, and information provision, as motivating Mindless states through differing 
influence; and provide example of how these may be countered to foster Mindful 
interactions.  
Through this understanding of such experiences with technologies (e.g. when a 
user is unaware of the presence of a technology or interface as distinct from 
themselves), it is highlighted both positive and negative qualities held by users of 
technologies when in these differing states. In doing so it is aimed to demonstrate 
how positioning interactions with technologies through such lens (of Mindful and 
Mindlessness) may draw better balance the understanding (and subsequently the 
design) of how technologies work for us, ‘invisibly’ and autonomously; and with us, 
exposing and encouraging opportunities for novel solutions and interactions.   
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3.1.0 How Things Become Mindless - The Vision Of 
Invisible Interactions And The Counter 
“The most profound technologies are those that disappear […] Such a 
disappearance is a fundamental consequence not of technology but of 
human psychology.”  
(p94, Weiser, 1991) 
 
Designing for ‘Knowing’ and ‘Thinking’ 
Weiser’s seminal article “The computer for the 21st century” (Weiser, 1991) 
presented a vision of the next generation of computing technologies disappearing 
into the “periphery” of our awareness (Weiser and Brown, 1997), and embedding 
themselves into “…everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it” (p94, 
Weiser, 1991). This disappearance, Weiser claims, is to free us “…to focus beyond 
them on new goals” (Weiser, 1991, p94). The disappearance occurs not as a visual 
property of the object but in a phenomenological awareness of the technology. That 
is to say a well-designed technology is considered to employ invisibility of and in 
operation (Weiser, 1994), it “does not intrude on your consciousness; you focus on 
the task, not the tool” (Weiser, 1994, p7) (see Chapter 1.9.1 on tool and Chapter 
1.9.2 on equipment). As noted by Weiser (above) this is not a unique property of 
digital technologies but is a functional aspect of human existence as previously 
described in Chapters 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8. 
This view of invisible computing was extended by Tolmie et.al. (2002) who 
proposed that computing technologies should become "Unremarkable". 
Unremarkable computing relates to technologies that become ‘phenomenologically 
invisible’ through integration into routine, providing a level of automation that the 
user assumes occurred through their actions; fundamentally the “…ubiquitous 
computer leaves you feeling as though you did it yourself ” (p404, Tolmie et.al., 
2002). Such positions strongly advocate the designing of technologies to be 
phenomenologically invisible, not just in design theory but in applied design 
practice (i.e. designing toward equipment –Chapter 1.9.2). As previously described 
(chapter’s 1.6 to 1.12) such invisibility is incurred both in our approach to the 
technology and through our understanding as technologies become routinized in 
our activities. Resultantly such invisible and unremarkable technologies leave the 
user ‘knowing’ the interaction without need to ‘think’ how such interaction occurred.  
Whilst the complete vision of ubiquitous computing may not be fully realised, 
many its concepts have been adopted throughout computing research and practice 
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(Abowd, 2012). The former dominance of the stationary desktop personal computer 
is no longer as clear as the number of smartphones and tablets in use now rivals. 
While these devices offer a broader range of input the majority of communication to 
the user occurs in the same modality, via a two dimensional Graphical User Interface 
(GUI) (Abowd, 2012), moving the desktop design traditions (developed for the 
workplace) into our hands and environments. These are, however, pervasive in our 
daily routines and social interactions; the effects of which warrants investigation into 
the influences that exist beyond the immediacy of the technologies design and 
intended use (Nathan et. al., 2006) to facilitate reconsideration to the broader 
impact of such design practices.  
As noted, at present many of the ideas of ubiquitous computing are now 
implemented in most of computing research and practice (Abowd, 2012). 
Algorithms are being developed to replace the “mundane” actions of the user 
through automation (Rogers, 2006) by interpretation of routine and preference. Yet 
how designers should decide if, when and why such automation should occur 
receives far smaller attention; the ideals of designing computing for using without 
thinking still needing to be “counter-balanced” (Rogers, 2006).  
Rogers (2006) proposes “a new agenda for UbiComp”, one in which computing 
technology should be designed to “…extend and engage people in their activities 
and pursuits.” (p411, Rogers, 2006); arguing that rather than reducing the 
requirements of the user to “think” ubiquitous computing should consider further 
driving the abilities of human intellect and extend “…their ability to learn, make 
decisions, reason, create, solve complex problems and generate innovative ideas” 
(p411, Rogers, 2006). Such position echo’s distinctions drawn by Shanahan (p42, 
2010) who frames cognition as to "know" (reliant upon previous schemas); as 
opposed to “cogitare, to think” an active process such as a formation of new 
knowledge and mental schemas.  
Likewise Wright, Wallace and McCarthy (2008) propose that though functional 
attributes of interactive systems are of high value, an understanding of the 
emotional and experiential values that people construct through interactions with 
technology should also be supported and designed for. Wright, Wallace and 
McCarthy’s (2008) position highlights how HCI research is limited in its focus on 
making interactions between people and technology functionally efficient rather 
than attending to the subtle and on-going changes in emotions and experiences 
people might feel.  
Such visions that highlight the need to reconsider the design and usage of 
computing technology are fundamental and syncretic to the aims of this thesis. 
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3.1.1 Designing for Transparency  (Knowing) or Reflectivity 
(Thinking) 
Much of HCI design may be considered as situated within cognitive models of 
understanding human-machine interactions (Bolter and Gromala, 2006); that is, the 
user in action independent of experience. To further this, the archetypal 
measurements of “User Experience” hold 3 qualities of focus in the evaluation and 
improvement of HCI systems: 
1. Effectiveness (Can it perform the required task) 
2. Efficiency (Steps/time/skills required) 
3. Satisfaction (Fittingness of technology to achieve desired goals) 
Whilst these qualities allow for a quantification of the performance of an 
interactive system they fail to consider the experience of the user.  
Subsequently, attempts to analyse and further develop interactive systems based 
upon this paradigm retain a focus upon usability (effectiveness, efficiency, and user 
satisfaction) and performance of the system (speed) rather than the subjective 
experience (how the experience “felt”) of the user (Dillon, 2002); a method of 
measurement that reinforces the “transparency” model of human computer 
interaction (as critiqued by Bolter and Gromala, 2006; and the work of Wright and 
McCarthy, 2010; Wright, Wallace and McCarthy 2008). 
To further highlight the need of human computer interactions to support 
Mindfulness (and how those needs might currently be neglected); it is proposed that 
current design qualities, specifically the use of “metaphor” in suggesting particular 
affordance, are applied in such a way that they further encourage/facilitate 
Mindlessness and Automaticity.  
This position is supported by Blackwell (2006), who suggests that even though 
metaphor is widely used in user interface design many have recognised the 
potential harmful effects of such design strategies (when applied as universal 
principles of design). Blackwell highlights several authors (including design 
guidelines from the dominant software development companies such as Apple and 
Microsoft) (p492, Blackwell, 2006) who reinforce the use of metaphor as a device to 
allow users to rapidly recognise “digital objects” (interactive elements of a user 
interface as a graphical representation of a function e.g. a “trash can” for discarding 
no longer required files). By use of these design principles designers are able to 
relate functions of the digital objects to “real-world” abilities of the physical 
counterpart the metaphor is developed from; and allow users to quickly familiarise 
with function. Furthermore, through the sharing of these design elements across 
applications users may apply knowledge across differing applications (through the 
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commonality of design elements).  
However, as noted by Blackwell (2006), through “enhancing” these digital objects 
by increasing the “realness” or “richness” of the pictorial representation beyond 
more abstract representations the ability of the user to recognise function did not 
increase. This suggests that the communication of affordance offered by the digital 
object and metaphor is not of perceptual affordance but of a conceptual affordance, 
the mapping of an existent mental schema (Chapter 1.12.1) of function (of a physical 
object) to the digital counterpart. Thus, such relationship between the digital object 
and its physical counter part suggest to the user that they both share the 
“affordances” (Chapter 1.8) of one another and the same mental schema.  
As noted by Fischer, Itoh, and Inagak: 
“Schema theory postulates that perception, interpretation, specification and 
execution can be shortcut when prior schemas are triggered. Action is 
direct, automatic - we might here say intuitive - if each stage benefits from 
prior schemas. Conversely, when no schema is triggered, the user has to 
analyze the interface content. This effortful mechanism is necessary until 
new ad hoc schemas are constructed. It is consequently important that the 
“system image” or the interface that fails to trigger prior schemas, at least 
supports the construction or induction of new ones” 
 (p36, Fischer, Itoh, and Inagaki, 2009) 
Consequently, this mental schema does not need questioning on the difference 
between the digital and the physical since it is automatic; and so stand to reason 
that the previous rule set of the “applicable” mental schema is transferable and valid 
[if  then do ¤ and then ¢]. As previously described this may include a removal of 
contextual and analytical steps, which may prove problematic as they wont hold 
same properties (being differing digital and physical objects. Subsequently the 
digital object performs as a ‘tool’ (Chapter 1.9.1) of the physical, limiting the 
availability of affordances that might be offered or extended (in relation to the 
physical counterpart). 
 
While the dominance of designing for the invisible computer is clear there have 
been previous works that seek to reframe and address this balance. Bolter and 
Gromala (2006) provide the explanation of interface design as falling into two 
principles; those that utilise “Transparency” (akin to ‘equipment’ Chapter 1.9.2) and 
those that utilise “Reflectivity” ” (akin to ‘tool’ Chapter 1.9.1). Bolter and Gromala 
(2006) claim that designers of interactive systems attempt to create a “transparent” 
window that presents information of the workspace to the user without (or with 
minimal) interference and distortion. Interactive systems designed upon this 
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paradigm are therefore considered flawed if the technology draws attention to itself 
or enters the users conscious consideration. Contradictory to this are designs that 
“reflect” the interactor, such as an aesthetical representation as seen in the majority 
of interactive digital art. This mirroring promotes the user to reflect on the 
interaction process and their relationship with the interface. Additionally through the 
use of aesthetically focused interaction states of play occur with user who 
experiments with the interface to explore new creative possibilities. This idea of 
bringing the interface and interaction to the centre of the dialogue between the user 
and the technology runs in opposition to how many ubiquitous computing 
technologies are designed as embedded and autonomous in the environment, 
invisible in their processes. Although Bolter and Gromala (2006) argue for mirroring 
of the users interaction they further support the notion that there should be a 
degree of exchange between transparency and reflectivity, which the interactive 
system should reflect the users action and presence yet should also provide a 
transparent window to information.   
Consequently, it can be understood that systems developed upon a 
“transparency” model are reliant upon/encouraging Mindless (sub-/non-conscious 
and cognitive) actions. As such there is a removal of the contextual awareness (i.e. 
The Mindful awareness) of the information presented and may not facilitate the 
broader (and richer) abilities that are associated with reflective-/conscious actions. 
This may result in or encourage a premature cognitive commitment or “blindness” 
to the semantic variation (As described in chapters 1.7 and 1.12).  
 
3.1.2 Enhancing Reflection Through Augmenting 
Cognitive Load 
As will be highlighted through this section there are various modalities for 
designing Mindful interactions; specifically drawing upon differing forms of reflection 
through a number of modalities and design values. 
While the previous (3.1.0) has discussed a design trope of reducing cognitive 
loading, Mindfulness (high in cognitive loading in comparison to Mindless 
interactions) may be encouraged through provoking and utilizing cognitive load. 
Niedderer (2014) proposes such position through example of “Come a little bit 
closer” (by Nina Farkache of Droog Design22 (p. 57, Ramakers, 2002); Figure 3.1). 
                                               
22http://www.droog.com/project/come-little-bit-closer-bench-nina-farkache	
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Figure 3.1; “Come a little bit closer bench”23 by Nina Farkache of Droog 
Design 
 ‘Come a little bit closer’ is, defined by Niedderer a ‘performative object’ 
(Niedderer, 2007), a bench that has altered its performance as a bench. This is 
achieved through the placement of marbles under seating ‘shells’ that allow them to 
‘float’ i.e. move freely across the width of the bench frame. As these seating shells 
are free moving the design allows for users to move the seating position to and from 
others sharing the bench; as Niedderer (2014) claims suggesting movement of not 
only a physical presence but closer and further on (conceptual) social levels.  As 
noted by Niedderer (p347, 2014): “[…] the design questions people’s behavior in 
public places— which is to avoid strangers and to sit down at opposite ends of a 
public bench—by offering alternative actions”. In its alteration ‘Come a little bit 
closer’ forces a questioning upon the premature cognitive commitment held of a 
bench in a public place (Niedderer, 2014); drawing attention to the additional 
affordance and questioning what a bench is ‘commonly like’ through adding 
additional choices – to slide closer or further, perhaps to engage in ‘play’.  
As Niedderer explains (p352, 2014); “The aspect of choice is important because 
choice makes us Mindful”, and that with more choices being expected to increase 
reflection and so more Mindful through: 
• Encouraging a greater sensitivity to the environment 
• Encouraging openness to new information 
• Creation of new categories for structuring our perception 
                                               
23	Image	retrieved	16/09/2017	-	http://www.designlaunches.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/come_closer_bench.jpg	
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And 
• Enhancing awareness toward multiple perspectives of problem solving 
(As stated by p3, Langer and Moldoveanu, 2000) 
Niedderer goes on to state: 
“This suggests that Mindful design needs to offer the user choices. Adding 
more choices can be expected to increase reflection and thus 
Mindfulness,[…] “ 
(p352, 2014) 
This, however, is at odds with the statement of Anderson (1992) who described 
automatic (Mindless) processes as ‘less slowed down by the number of alternatives’ 
(chapter 1.12.3). This suggests that the augmented bench (or other augmented 
object) is not perceived through the same understanding as other commonplace 
comparable (automatically / Mindlessly experienced) bench/objects; e.g. regular 
benches – perceived as ‘equipments’ (chapter 1.9.2) with sole, immediate, and 
apparent affordance of ‘bench for sitting’.  
Possibly such augmented objects are instead so ill-fitting to pre-existing mental 
schemas that they require a ‘tool’ (chapter 1.9.1) approach to apply previous (or 
combinations of) mental schema. And so then (when experienced as tool) reveal the 
additional choices afforded beyond the most immediate and apparent of ‘bench for 
sitting’. Through this perspective it is not the choices offered by the augmentation of 
the bench but the augmentation itself that prompts Mindfulness, the choices offered 
(revealed through a tool – multiple affordances) being a result of a Mindful 
approach. As previously described, Niedderer explains (p352, 2014); “The aspect of 
choice is important because choice makes us Mindful”. However, considering 
Anderson’s (1992) understanding, this statement might better be explained as “the 
aspect of Mindfulness is important because Mindfulness reveals choice”.  
An analogy of this could be, for example: in my favorite coffee shop I order a flat-
white each visit; they have multiple choices available but these are ‘invisible’ to my 
habit (automatic process) – I am Mindless to them. If however, I move beyond my 
habit (e.g. a new barista does not know how to make a flat-white – causing a 
augmentation of the process (a breakdown)), I become Mindful of the differing kinds 
of coffee – though the number of choices are the same as before (minus the flat-
white) these are now phenomenologically present. Thus the augmentation (not the 
choices): 
• Require multiple perspectives of problem solving to fit pre-existing 
knowledge 
• Require creation of new categories for structuring our perception (i.e. 
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novel mental schemas) 
• Require openness to new information to develop new schemas 
And 
• Require a greater sensitivity to the environment to contextualize schemas 
And as a result of this process the availability of choices we understand as 
afforded by the augmentation. Though such differences may seem perhaps ‘chicken-
and-egg’; here discrepancy is important in justifying the provocation of Mindful 
experiences over simply offering additional choices (that may be Mindlessly 
invisible).  
 What is clear from the “Come a little bit closer” bench (Ramakers, 2002) is that 
there is an additional level of reflection required in understanding and approaching 
the bench. While (as previously described (3.0 and 3.1)) designers typically seek to 
provide a transparent window to information, and remove the ‘middle steps’ e.g. [if 
 then do ¤ and then ¢] to ease cognitive loading; here there is an intentional 
increase upon cognitive loading to cause reflection. With such design there is 
intentional breaking (through augmentation) of the intuitive and automatic 
approaches we hold to commonplace technologies, and in doing so a refusal to 
easily fit to existing mental schemas: 
“Conversely, when no schema is triggered, the user has to analyze the 
interface content. This effortful mechanism is necessary until new ad hoc 
schemas are constructed. It is consequently important that the “system 
image” or the interface that fails to trigger prior schemas, at least supports 
the construction or induction of new ones” 
 (p36, Fischer, Itoh, and Inagaki, 2009) 
Thus such design attributes can be seen to augment not solely the object (as it 
still remains a bench and holds affordance of sitting), but rather they are an 
alteration toward the efficiency of cognitive loading, forcing effortful interactions, 
interpretation, and reflection. In doing so performance as a metric of cognitive load 
(ease of use and intuitiveness) is reduced, however, performance as tool is increased 
(revealing novel affordances in the objects ‘tool’ state). 
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3.2. Intuition and Metaphor as design attributes of 
Mindless interaction 
As previously described, designers seek to reduce concerted conscious 
awareness of an interfaces presence and functionality (i.e. ‘thinking’ about the 
interface) through being Intuitive (Naumann et. al., 2007). The ability to allow users 
to draw on previous knowledge to interact with new interfaces has prescribed the 
‘intuitiveness’ of a software or interface as a desirable trait (Löffler et. al. 2013; 
Raskin, 1994), used as a measure in the analysis of “usability” (Naumann et. al., 
2007; O’Brien, Rodgers & Frisk, 2008; Poole et. al., 2008; Raskin, 1994) and, as a 
device for marketing (O’Brien, Rodgers & Frisk, 2008; Raskin, 1994). Thus, 
improvements of interactive technologies seek to enhance the intuitiveness (and so 
the phenomenological invisibility) of interfaces and interactions. As previously 
described (Chapter 1.12.2) such intuitiveness is not ‘intuitive’ in the truest sense of 
the word, but developed from existing mental schemas as an act of automaticity in 
‘knowing’ an interface or ‘rule’ of interaction.  
Though intuition may appear as a positive attribute it presents problems when it 
is misused. Users may learn incorrect methods of interaction through their reliance 
upon and application of previous knowledge, and may fail to utilise many system 
features (O’Brien, Rodgers & Frisk, 2008). There is a lack of guidance for designers 
to correctly implement intuitiveness (Löffler et al, 2013), and if there is a novel 
experience to which there is no relational prior experience, the seemingly intuitive 
(to the designer) requires exposing (see Raskin, 1994 for example). Additional 
failures resulting from misguided intuition are exposed when viewing intuition 
developed from metaphors. As intuition is largely developed from pre-existing 
knowledge; designers of interactive systems often exploit this through the use of 
interface metaphors (Blackwell, 2006) (as previously described). This is evident when 
viewing the commonplace “desktop” model, applying metaphors gained from office 
workspaces (Bewly et. al., 1983). Metaphors have played a dominant role in HCI 
interface design since the earliest GUI’s (Graphic User Interface) with software 
development companies suggesting that metaphors based upon “real-world” 
objects allow users to draw upon existing knowledge and quickly familiarise 
themselves with the functions of the interface (Blackwell, 2006).  
 
Norman (p50, 2013) suggests that this mode of design may be understood as 
part of the three levels of information/interaction (and cognitive) processing -
Visceral, Behavioural and Reflective.  
Visceral processing involves an initial non-conscious assessment (e.g. a positive or 
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negative valence) of the information provided from an object; it is rapid and entirely 
automatic (in that it is beyond conscious control) and being reflexive occurs without 
any context, as an affective property. Visceral is the most immediate of all the 
sensing and directs decision to what is good/bad, safe/dangerous etc. The visceral 
level of understanding informs the next level of information processing; behavioural.  
Behavioural processing exists as learned (well practiced) skills and occurs largely 
as sub-conscious actions. Whilst a user may interact with a system and have an 
awareness of their actions (to an extent) the actions are carried out too quickly for 
conscious control (p51,Norman, 2013), the behavioural response is one that’s is 
learned (through repetition) and repeated, that may be understood as an 
“experiential cognition” (Niedderer, 2007).  
Reflective processing is least immediate level, in which conscious consideration 
and reflection on past experiences is drawn upon the object. Reflective processing 
can enhance or inhibit behavioral processing, but has no influence upon the 
automatic visceral reaction. Through reflective processing we are able to integrate 
previous experience with technologies into broader life experiences and associate 
meaning and value with the artifacts themselves. 
A metaphor, when used in a GUI, is specifically chosen to convey a particular 
(single or set) of ‘affordances’ and suggest how that object may be used (Norman, 
2013) (see chapter 1.8) and its significance. A designer utilising a metaphor will draw 
upon a user’s expectations of the affordances of a non-digital object or quality to 
give clues to the digital counterpart’s ability through invoking differing stages of 
processing as described above. For example, this may be the colour scheme or 
aesthetic elements to help direct visceral processing (e.g. warning signs in yellow 
and black diagonal stripes); invoking behavioural processing through highlighting 
affordances of a metaphor (e.g. a broken padlock suggesting caution to safety and 
security) and familiar traits to help direct the user in a suggested or desirable action 
(e.g. fig 3.2 below).  
 
Figure 3.2; Broken padlock symbol suggestive of broken 
or flawed security. Colour use additionally familiar to 
that of typical warning or alert signs 
 
Whilst interface metaphor is useful to provide users instantaneous knowledge of 
the functional potentials of a system it has been met with some resistance (Blackwell, 
2006). The usage of metaphors, while beneficial for basic understanding, may 
influence the user’s perceptions of the system’s functionality negatively (Blair-Early 
and Zender, 2008) as they attribute abilities in a fixed “premature cognitive 
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commitment” (Chanowitz and Langer, 1981). A premature cognitive commitment 
occurs from an initial exposure of information whereby the information is accepted 
uncritically. As previously described, Langer (1992) proposes that this state occurs 
when information (or objects) is perceived in such a way it appears as an absolute 
and requires little or no reason to critically examine further. When this assumption is 
made the person viewing the information fails to see “contextual dependencies” 
(Langer, 1992) that may alter the meaning of the information and “fixes” the 
meaning of what was originally assumed. This removes the ability to perceive the 
“semantic variability” and makes future reconsideration of their understanding 
unlikely (Chanowitz and Langer, 1981; Langer, 1989). While previous examples held 
focus toward non-digital objects in problem solving (chapter 1.7: Two-rings problem 
(McCaffrey, 2012) and Dunker's "Box" problem (Dunker, 1945; Anderson, 1992)); 
example of this in HCI may be a save icon/action whereby a novice user commits to 
the assumption this will safely store a file. Through repetitive use the save function 
replaces the original file (deleting it). Therefore the save function actually has the 
dual action of both saving and deleting, however due to the premature cognitive 
commitment, save fails to include “removal of previous version” in its perceived 
meaning, this is problematic as the original file (or previous versions), if looked for, 
has been replaced. The metaphor here is a representation of a number of functions 
yet understood as an absolute singular function – in its automatic use as an 
‘equipment’ (Chapter 1.9.2) the analytical and contextual steps are lost in the more 
direct mental schema. These problems are further understood through framing 
within “functional fixedness” (Chapter 1.7.1; Adamson, 1952). More specifically, this 
may be seen as a user failing to find or account for the full functionality of a system 
through assumption derived from overt and common use metaphor to infer a 
specific function (without providing more broader contextualization of said function).   
To summarize, designs that employ metaphor invoke a visceral reaction (of 
familiarity) and prompt a learned behavioural response (through association of 
affordances) that can be seen as being performed ‘intuitively’ (chapter 1.12.2), all 
mostly occurring as non-/sub-conscious process (i.e. prior to a reflective processing) 
with aim to direct the user in a suggested or desirable action (as described by 
Norman, 2013).  
Yet perhaps more rarely, and advocated in this thesis, there are times when a 
designer might wish to invoke the reflective processing (Norman, 2013), allowing the 
user to contextualize the meaning and use of a technology in a broader, specific, or 
personal context than that of previously learned routines.  
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3.2.1 Enhancing Reflection Through Augmenting Utility 
The design methods described above draw upon intuitiveness (and metaphor) as 
a utility and exploit this feature as a Mindless attribute of a system. Here utility is 
understood to be a function, a use toward a particular benefit – here specifically a 
conveyance of meaning and information. Though this is clearly a required attribute 
of any interface here it is suggested that this might be augmented to provide 
benefits (in the right circumstance). Designs to support Mindfulness might seek to 
open up utility through embracing interpretative qualities; encouraging reflection 
upon the wider affordance space and meanings offered through the interaction; and 
consequently the development of appropriate schemas of meaning contextualized 
to the present interaction.   
Mind Pool24 (Long and Vines, 2013), is a Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) artwork 
that provides real-time feedback to participants of brainwave activity. The work 
highlights how the use of multiple modalities of ambiguous feedback (Gaver, Beaver, 
and Benford, 2003) engaged users in reflective ways that is unsupported by 
quantitative information feedback. The aim of the system was to present EEG 
information ambiguously so as to encourage and support sustained interactions and 
Mindful-reflection by participants through relating the ambiguous feedback with 
their brain activity. Brain activity is sonically represented and physically represented 
via a magnetically reactive liquid (ferro-fluid) sitting in a pool in front of the 
participant (See Fig AA). Feedback is produced from 12 dominant brainwave 
frequencies of a participant wearing a BCI device and represented through 
ambiguous forms allowing participant’s to associate information provided with their 
own experiential state.  
Mind Pool utilizes EEG (Electroencephalography) as a source of control by 
revealing 12 dominant brainwave frequencies that alter parameters of information 
feedback. This frequency information is gathered from QEEG (appendix 2.4), 
whereby readings were taken between 1 and 48Hz and then further divided into six 
bandwidths of 8Hz (i.e. 0-8Hz, 8-16Hz and so on). The frequency with the highest 
amplitude within a bandwidth was used as the dominant frequency providing six 
dominant frequencies per hemisphere. It is these dominant frequencies that alter the 
                                               
24	Mind	Pool	Publication:		Kiel	Long	and	John	Vines,	2013,	Mind	Pool:	Encouraging	Self-Reflection	Through	Ambiguous	Bio-Feedback,	ACM	CHI	doi:10.1145/2468356.2479588			*Previous	iterations	of	Mind	Pool	were	developed	as	part	of	a	Master	of	the	Arts	Degree	completed	at	University	of	Wales,	Newport	(2010).	The	system	was	subsequently	redesigned	with	deployments	in	various	art	and	conference	exhibitions	following	this	period.	
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parameters of the installation (such as pitch and timing of audio triggered, and 
control of physical feedback system). The final iteration of Mind Pool consisted of a 
large flat surface with a ‘pool’ of ferro-fluid at its center. 12 electromagnets below 
the pool produce ripples through alternating on/off cycles at a rate determined by 
the dominating frequency for that bandwidth. The electromagnets are arranged in a 
circle with lowest bandwidth closest to user and higher bandwidth furthest, and are 
split left and right according to the hemispheres (Figure 3.3). Audio is triggered in 
correlation to ripples produced and alters pitch according to dominant brainwave 
frequency. Participants sat at the installation (Figure 3.4) although were free to move 
around the environment.  
  
Figure 3.3; Mind Pool installation feedback system layout. 
 
  
Figure 3.4; Participant using Mind Pool 
The governing motivations behind the design of Mind Pool was the information 
provided to participants had to balance opportunities to interpret its meaning (i.e., 
its relationship to brain activity) with motivating sustained interaction. During 
development testing a number of feedback mechanisms were tested such as a 
‘physical’ visual feedback system (a series of moving actuators) and graphical 
displays (graphs of the full spectrum of brain activity) alongside the audio feedback. 
There were stark contrasts in the ways in which testing participants reacted to these 
two forms of representation. When observing the graphical display, which was very 
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information rich, testing participants would initially be highly engaged. Very quickly 
however testing participants would come to passively observe the information and 
there was very little impetus to explore how the information related to actual brain 
activity. Contrasting with this, the combination of ‘physical’ visual representation and 
sonic feedback led to less immediate engagement but supported exploratory 
interactions over more sustained periods of time. Equal frequency division was 
applied to avoid users of the installation applying any existing knowledge of 
brainwave pattern categorization and their associations (e.g. “Alpha (8-13Hz) is 
relaxation”), promoting self-derived correlations of mental states and experiences 
with feedback. This was particularly important as during the initial development 
testing many participants with some knowledge of EEG and brain activity would 
assume the interface feedback (i.e. when numeric/graphical) was dictating their 
states causing conflict between their experiential state and that ‘told’ to them from 
previous knowledge and information rich displays. Following these explorations the 
‘Pool’ (previously described) and audio were designed to provide ambiguous (Gaver, 
Beaver, and Benford, 2003) level of feedback for participants. This allowed 
participants to observe activity for individual brain hemispheres and bandwidths; 
and, by viewing the center of the pool the waves of each bandwidth aggregated to 
produce a pattern of activity across the entire brain. It is important to note here that 
while the information feedback was ambiguous, it still remained ‘true’ and was an 
accurate reproduction of the data. However, the ambiguity of the feedback did not 
hold suggestion toward how to ‘read’ the system and encouraged reflection upon 
the subjective state and how this was correlated through the system changes.  
The metaphors used in Mind Pool (Long and Vines, 2013) were intended to be 
interpretive and so would hold meaning subjectively. This required users of the 
system to find their own meaning in the data, relating alterations in the feedback 
with their own subjective experience. This was starkly different from the information 
rich feedback previously explored where values and bar charts, though familiar and 
easily read, suggested rises and falls as holding positive and negative meanings. 
Such use of metaphor and their interpretation affecting emotional reactions and 
perception has been widely discussed such as the work of Lakoff and Johnson 
(2008). Thus, it was clear that the form in which feedback is presented had 
noteworthy impact upon the quality of engagement with the interface. While one of 
the key aims of the work was to provide an ambiguous (Gaver, Beaver, and Benford, 
2003) interface where participants could explore relationships between brain activity 
and feedback it is still important for participants to be able to ‘see themselves’ in the 
interface in order to provoke reflectivity (Bolter and Gromala 2006).  
While more commonplace design tropes draw upon familiar objects as directions 
toward use and specific meaning (through metaphor), the utilization of ambiguity in 
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Mind Pool (Long and Vines, 2013) opened a space for users to interpret meaning of 
interface elements – the utility of the feedback. This was realized as the users own 
understandings, through a required contextualization that relates the present 
interaction to system feedback (as opposed to previous and/or ill-fitting schemas). In 
doing so such systems encourage a moving beyond Visceral and Behavioural 
(Norman, 2013) equipment (Chapter 1.9.2) understandings and promote a Reflective 
(Norman, 2013) engagement (inclusive of the visceral and behavioural 
understanding) with technologies as tools (Chapter 1.9.1) that may be considered as 
Mindful. Such experiences facilitate novel behavioural responses (as opposed to 
learned) that open users toward novel solutions and identifying personally 
meaningful interactions.  
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3.3: Mindlessness From Repetition - Disappearing 
Through Design - Disappearing Through Repetition 
and  Homogenisation  
Whilst intuition (previously described) draws upon previous experiences and 
knowledge to understand new experiences (and metaphors), phenomenological 
invisibility additionally occurs through well-learned actions (described in chapter 
1.12). As previously described, Hollis-Walker and Colosimo (2011) frame 
Mindlessness as an “unknowing of underlying processes in our subjective and 
objective worlds […] where a person goes into automatic pilot-mode during a 
complex, well-learned activity”. Likewise, Langer (1992) proposes “that 
Mindlessness may result from a single exposure to information.”; suggesting that 
Mindlessness states occur when information (e.g. technologies and interfaces) are 
presented and perceived in such a way they require little or no reason to critically 
examine further. In this state the person viewing the information fails to see 
“contextual dependencies” that may alter the meaning (and context) of the 
information; and assume the same meaning of a previously learned interaction 
through enacting a “premature cognitive commitment” (Chanowitz and Langer, 
1981); as though performing a well-learned script.  
Langer’s (1992) position states that Mindfulness and Mindlessness are central to 
cognitive functioning; here this is understood in relations to working memory, and 
more specifically the limitation on the available amount of workable 
information/memory that humans can engage with during tasks. In learning, 
automaticity (through mental schemas) takes sequential steps required to perform 
an action and groups them as a singular whole. For example, to log into a computer 
the steps might involve: opening a laptop, waiting for the login screen to appear, 
entering a user name, entering a password, pressing the return key; however in the 
perceived conscious action the process is simply grouped within the mental schema 
of “log in” (perhaps the log in screen acting as a prompt to enter the automatic 
following steps). This is exemplified in Langer’s (1989) statement that such steps, 
with repetition, eventually drop out of mind (conscious awareness); that anyone 
familiar to this "…knows how learned tasks drop out of mind." (p20); how the "…the 
individual parts of the task move out of our consciousness. Eventually, we come to 
assume that we can [original in italics] do the task although we no longer know how 
[original in italics] we do it." (p20, Langer, 1989). This is typically experienced when 
being required to enter a user name and password on a different device, the well 
learned (and automatic) routine is enacted before and without interruption 
(realization often occurring when the password or user is denied). Similarly (and in 
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personal experience of switching between Apple OS X and Microsoft Windows) such 
difficulties occur when using differing operating systems; the match of how one 
functions in comparison to another, the aesthetics (typically a windowed display), 
suggest that the previous mental schemas will transfer (and they often do with minor 
amendments) – yet when reaching to “close” a window on the interface one will find 
that they are clicking on the wrong side of the windows frame (no affordances of the 
interface suggest the ‘wrong’ corner as holding any functions i.e. there are no 
‘buttons’ placed there).  
While this phenomena of ‘disappearing’/‘invisible’ technologies occurs naturally 
from repeated exposures (Weiser, 1991) it has also been noted (Bolter and Gromala, 
2006) that designers of more commonplace interactive systems (e.g. personal 
computers, smartphones) seek to utilize this phenomenological state under the 
guise of simplifying the experience of the user. This helps in allowing the user to 
transfer and apply previous learning’s without need to re-learn all of the previously 
learned actions.  
Such interfaces may be considered as seeking to provide a “transparent” (Bolter 
and Gromala, 2006) window that presents the information for the workspace to the 
user without (or with minimal) interference and distortion; the designer seeks to 
make the interface “disappear” and become a window to information. In doing so, 
the designer aims to reduce the cognitive load as the user will no longer hold 
consideration upon the accustomed interface tropes but see beyond to focus upon 
the goal of the interaction (as previously described by Weiser, (p94, 1991)). 
Interactive systems designed upon this paradigm could therefore be considered 
flawed if the interface draws attention to itself through the users conscious 
consideration. Consequently, such interfaces, derived from previously learned 
experiences, also limit opportunities for novel interactions and explorations as they 
encourage a reiteration of previous actions used to achieve goals.  
 “With enough practice we can make many apparently difficult things 
disappear- my fingers know editing commands that my conscious mind has 
long forgotten. Good tools enhance invisibility.” (p7, Weiser, 1994) 
The effects (and exploitation) of automaticity can be seen in ‘phishing’ attempts 
where websites appeal to users visceral reactions and lack off reflective conscious 
awareness by displaying graphic elements, such as padlocks to invoke a sense of 
security and trust, and mimic official websites to extract personal data (passwords, 
financial information etc.) through users automatic (non-/sub-conscious) and 
behavioural actions (Dhamija, Tygar and Hearst, 2006).  
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3.3.1 Enhancing Reflection Through Augmenting Usability 
While use of repetition in interaction design is beneficial as it quickens the 
learning process, it may also be altered to provoke Mindful states. Here this is 
exemplified through the augmentation of usability – specifically alterations to the 
familiar use of objects while maintaining core functionality. 
The work of Niedderer (2007), focused within the field of design, explores 
“Mindful interaction” through the use of objects within social context. Although 
these objects are not digitally interactive they serve well as an example of how 
interactions can be designed for inducing Mindfulness.  
Niedderer’s “performative objects” consisted of “Social Cups” (figure 3.5 below) 
“…designed to actively explore the social interaction within which they are used, 
and to make the user aware of this interaction and reflect on it.” (Niedderer, 2007, 
p3). These cups follow the design of a champagne flute glass however where usually 
a stem and base would normally be present (to allow the glass to stand freely) this is 
lacking in the Social Cups. This design requires at least 3 cups to group together 
(and be connected via suction pads attached to the cups) to allow the cups to stand 
freely without being held. These design choices were specifically implemented with 
aim that “[…] people are encouraged to explore their interactions when using the 
cups” (p3, Niedderer, 2007). 
 
Figure 3.5; Niedderer’s “Performative object” of “Social Cups” (p3, 
Niedderer, 2007) 
Such ‘Performative Objects’ (Niedderer, 2007) are intently designed for Mindful 
engagements, as Niedderer states: 
“The concept of Mindfulness refers here to the attentiveness of the user 
towards the social consequences of actions performed with the object. […] 
we can design artifacts that communicate and cause Mindfulness of others 
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in the context of social interaction by means of a modification of function 
[…]”  
(p4, Niedderer, 2007). 
 By altering the usability the user of the object is forced to reflect on their 
engagement with the object, its meaning and how it is used within the context of 
the environment (by enforcing a social interaction). This can be seen as breaking the 
repetition of what a cup/glass is and how it is used, and forces the user of the cup to 
reflect upon the semantic variability; the cup is no longer solely a vessel for 
containing liquid but includes the dependency of social interaction (more explicitly a 
negotiation) to function as a cup would normally fully function. The ‘cup’ no longer 
functions as a cup equipment (Chapter 1.9.2), but calls itself into question as a ‘tool’ 
object (Chapter 1.9.1), maintaining the perhaps more explicitly recognized 
affordances of a cup (storing liquid for consumption), but with socio and functional 
affordances brought to the fore also.  
Niedderer’s cups (2007) highlight designing for usability in terms beyond 
traditional concepts of performance (as described by Dillon (2002)) through 
considering the broader experiential aspects and contexts of the user. Thus 
alterations in usability (here removing the phenomenologically invisible aspects of 
usability), even if considered damaging in more traditional metrics, may facilitate 
and provoke Mindful engagements, contextual awareness, and performance in 
understandings of peoples lived values and experience. In their design these ‘cups’ 
break traditional concepts and familiarity of what a cup is and how it may be used 
(its usability) while maintaining enough familiarity to be recognizable and usable as 
such (a cup).  
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3.4: Invisible And Everyware: Mindlessness As A 
Defensive Response To Information Intense 
Environments 
As Weiser (1994) claims “good design”, is considered to employ invisibility of 
and in operation. Likewise, this position is encouraged by (Tolmie et al., 2002) who 
propose that ubiquitous computing technologies become “Unremarkable” and  
“phenomenologically invisible” through integration into routine, providing a level of 
automation that the user assumes occurred through their own actions. In the view of 
Weiser (1994) and Tolmie et al. (2002) the “…ubiquitous computer leaves you 
feeling as though you did it yourself.” (p404, Tolmie et.al., 2002) and seeks to 
“…embed computation within life not just in cups.” (p404, Tolmie et.al al., 2002). 
This is highlighted through Greenfield’s definition of ubiquitous computing as being 
“Everyware”, a technology that is: 
 “Ever more pervasive, ever harder to perceive, […] will appear in many 
different contexts and take a wide variety of forms, but will affect almost 
every one of us, whether we’re aware of it or not.”  
(Greenfield, 2006, p8).  
These movements in the application of technologies (as “post-desktop”) 
redefines the notion of ubiquitous as “being” in every location but towards 
becoming a part of everything, enveloping our interactions with commonplace (and 
potentially all) objects; a concept more commonly known as “the internet of things” 
(Atzori et al. 2010). Although the term internet of things may be defined in differing 
ways (Atzori et al. 2010), it may be classified as “a world-wide network of 
interconnected objects uniquely addressable, based on standard communication 
protocols (NSFO, 2008). That is to say, the internet of things is a broad range of 
objects with embedded technology that facilitates the (often) bidirectional 
communication of information across the internet. This allows for a world where your 
fridge could know when your milk is low and order you more, your shoes might tell 
your doctor how far you have walked, or your newspaper automatically updates with 
latest news based on its urgency/importance and proximity; all of which would occur 
through unremarkable computing and as invisible.  
Though such technologies hold utility and convenience there is risk that the 
degree of automation left unchecked might facilitate a level of Mindlessness and 
inability to understand and contextualise the interaction, particularly when 
breakdown occurs. For example, if there is a failure to deliver more milk one might 
not know an alternative source, misreporting shoe sensors might suggest poor level 
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of activity and wrongful diagnosis, hacking a digital newspaper might misinform of 
events and sway political opinion. While such overt (Mindless) trust in technologies 
commanding actions over reflective (Mindful) questioning may appear counter to 
common sense and plausible actions there have been many accounts of such 
experiences. Carr (p45, 2015) notes (among other examples) how such complacent 
trust in technologies resulted in the death of 228 crew and passengers aboard Air 
France flight AF447, Rio de Janeiro to Paris June 1st, 2009. The official cause of the 
crash is reported as a high altitude stall; however, a faulty airspeed reading caused 
by ice on airspeed sensors first caused the interference of the autopilot to correct; 
following this a disengaging of the autopilot and pilot error (multiple and drastic 
over corrections following incorrect display commands) caused the crash. Resulting 
from alerts and warnings (form the initial faulty readings) the co-pilot forced the 
plane into a steep accent, drastically reducing the speed. This attempted climb, 
dictated by the aircrafts information display, persisted until the crash; the readings 
provided to them being a mixture of inaccurate and missing information resulting in 
confusion on how to react. It has been claimed that this poor information feedback 
provided by the aircraft encouraged the pilots to “slavishly” follow incorrect 
commands (to pull up) rather than questioning validity or following suggested 
procedures ignoring unreliable speed indications (Dubois, 2012). The accident 
report (BEA Report, 2012) on the incident stated: 
“In the first minute after the autopilot disconnection, the failure of the 
attempt to understand the situation and the disruption of crew cooperation 
had a multiplying effect, inducing total loss of cognitive control of the 
situation.  
[…] 
the crew never understood they were in a stall situation and therefore never 
undertook any recovery manoeuvres.” 
” (p3, BEA Report, 2012).  
With digital technology becoming increasingly pervasive accounts of the negative 
impacts are increasingly reported on. Experiences of “Technological Addictions” 
(Griffiths, 1996) are commonplace, existing since the beginnings of the internet 
becoming publicly available (but with reports of similar experiences dating back to 
the advent of mass produced books) as reported by Shenk (1997). Shenk, within the 
first decade following the launch of the worldwide-web (i.e. internet becoming 
publicly available), had comprised a book detailing various accounts of persons 
experiencing an uncontrollable desire for,  (and subsequently the inability to 
manage) the increasing amounts of information that could be provided through this 
new medium (the internet). The resultant from persons acting in the way Shenk 
reported is commonly referred to as “Information Overload”. Information overload 
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is defined by Eppler and Mengis (2004) as a situation whereby too much information 
is presented or available to a person resulting in the person being unable to 
recognize, understand or handle the amount of information; the person becomes 
highly selective of information (ignoring large amounts of additional information), 
holds difficulty in identifying relationships within the information and broader 
perspective and requires more time to make an accurate decision (Eppler and 
Mengis, 2004). Thus, when information available exceeds our capacities to process it 
we ignore large amounts of the information and hold focus to a selective amount 
while failing to recognize the broader context, details, and relationships within the 
information – i.e. we approach the data from a Mindless perspective.  
Shenk (1997) quotes Dr. Theodore Gross (p36, Shenk, 1997) on these new 
technologies and information overload as correlating to persons developing a form 
of Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD); whereby usually ADD is (assumed to be) 
genetically inherited, this “”condition” develops as a […] culturally induced 
attention deficit disorder” (Shenk, 1997, p36). In combination with this condition, 
now widely recognized yet defined in many ways, it is often described that these 
dense bursts of information overload and interaction with technology are sought 
after (by the user or consumer of information) similar to states of drug addiction; for 
example “Information anxiety”, a state of anxiety/stress induced from a lack of 
information accessibility (Wurman et al, 2001); and,  “Infobesity” (Bawden and 
Robinson, 2009) a situation of “personal information overload” that is similar to 
“feasting on fast food”. A natural response occurs to these states of information 
overload defined by Hallowell (2005) as acquiring an “Attention Deficit Trait” (ADT); 
 “ADT isn’t an illness or character defect. It’s our brains’ natural response to 
exploding demands on our time and attention. As data increasingly floods 
our brains, we lose our ability to solve problems and handle the unknown. 
Creativity shrivels; mistakes multiply. Some sufferers eventually melt down.”   
(p55, Hallowell, 2005) 
These qualities of unremarkable and invisible computing, technological addiction 
and attention deficit trait may be understood as invoking states of, or, the 
body/mind exhibiting Mindlessness:  
“… Mindlessness, which we denote as the relative absence of Mindfulness, 
can be defensively motivated, as when an individual refuses to 
acknowledge or attend to a thought, emotion, motive, or object of 
perception. These forms of consciousness thus serve as concrete 
counterpoints to Mindful presence and the attention to current experience 
within and without oneself that such presence entails.”  
(p823, Brown and Ryan, 2003) 
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Evidence of the type of behaviour, as a defensively induced/responsive state, can 
be seen through the example of “Display Blindness” (Müller et al, 2009; Huang et 
al., 2008). Display blindness is an action that individuals exhibit when confronted 
with seemingly unimportant/unnecessary or non-personally relevant information 
displays in information intensive environments. When in environments that provide 
stimulus that is too excessive for an inhabitant, the inhabitant becomes unable to 
“recognize, understand or handle” the information, and, as a result “He/she 
becomes highly selective and ignores large amounts of information,” (p2, Müller et 
al, 2009). As such, multiple exposures of this kind encourage a habitual (automatic / 
Mindless) behaviour where by the commonplace modalities of “irrelevant” 
information (e.g. public displays as discussed by Müller et al, (2009); or Burke et al. 
(2005) “banner blindness” from internet banners/popups) are unconsciously 
ignored. That is to say, the user/inhabitant sub-consciously (automatically – 
Mindlessly without reflection) chooses what information to regard as important and 
what information to disregard based upon previous experiences of similar exposure. 
Consequently this choice is made regardless of the content of the information 
presented in the current exposure (i.e. it is decontextualized). The user acts upon a 
premature cognitive commitment and fails to recognise the semantic variability e.g. 
of an operating system/browser ‘pop-up’ security warning as opposed to an 
advertisement.  
This position of information overload and “homogenisation” being inter-related is 
recognize by Bawden and Robinson (2009): 
“This diversity of provision, however, is typically delivered through a limited 
number of interfaces: most usually a web browser, whether on a computer 
screen, a mobile device, an e-book reader or some other device. The result 
is a ‘homogenisation’ of the information, with the look and feel of different 
resources of the print age – a text book, a newspaper, a hand-written diary 
entry, a photo-copy of a journal article, a printout of a data file, etc. – being 
largely lost. It is this ‘homogenised diversity’ of information communication 
which lies at the root of the problems discussed here, as much as the 
expanded volumes of information which are available.” 
 (Bawden & Robinson, 2009, p181) 
 
3.4.1 Enhancing Reflection Through Augmenting Efficacy  
Currently within HCI research there is growing support in movements that aim to 
encourage users of technologies to reconsider/reflect and readdress how they 
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engage with technology that is often demanding, “invisible” and time centric.  
The “Slow Technology” movement (Hallnäs and Redström, 2001) “…is about 
exposing technology in a way that encourages people to reflect and think about it.” 
(p169, Hallnäs and Redström, 2001) and arose in response to computers that are 
increasingly integrated into commonplace experiences (such as ubiquitous 
computing technologies). The movement promotes a reconsideration in the design 
values of information technology that were previously designed to make people 
more efficient in a specific task; yet, now have greater demands that encompass a 
broad spectrum of activities (such as assistive, social and entertainment) and are 
“…more or less continuously present as part of a designed environment” (p162, 
Hallnäs and Redström, 2001). Thus, the goals of slow technology may be seen to 
counteract states that may be explained through Anderson’s (1992) “Acquired 
Automaticity” and provide “reflection and moments of mental rest rather than 
efficiency in performance” (p161, Hallnäs and Redström, 2001); a position highly 
sympathetic to the action of Mindfulness. 
In a similar vein to the slow technology movement is growing interest within the 
HCI research community that considers the felt experience of the user as central 
motivations of action and design. Such concepts support the position that 
interactive experiences focusing on functionality (understood in quantifiable metrics 
of evaluation) only activate limited capacities of the experience of the user. Exemplar 
position supporting such views can be found in experience-centered design (Wright, 
Wallace and McCarthy, 2008; Wright and McCarthy, 2010; Hassenzahl 2011); that 
proposes while functional attributes of interactive systems are of great importance, 
these should be supported through an understanding of the emotional values that 
people construct through interactions with other people and technology. Wright, 
Wallace and McCarthy; (2008) propose three central tenants of experience–centered 
design: 
•  User as an individual with emotions, thoughts etc. is the focus for 
design.  
•  Design process is seen as continually evaluating the experience of 
the user.  
•  Design process is a dialogical ontology in which self, others, and 
technology are constructed as multiple centers of value.  
 
McCarthy and Wright’s argument highlights how HCI research is limited in its 
focus on making interactions between people and technology experientially efficient 
rather than attending to the subtle and ongoing changes in emotions and 
experience people might feel.  
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Grosse-Hering et al. (p3431, 2013) directly relate Slow Technology to 
Mindfulness, noting how “Slow Design principles can be used to create more 
‘Mindful’ interactions that stimulate positive user involvement”. They go on to state 
that such slow design does not specifically mean slowing interactions (with regards 
to time taken) but opening up interactions to promote ‘slowness’ on aspects of 
interaction that may be more meaningful for users. While it is recognized that such 
principles of design are yet to be realized in the broader arena of mass-produced 
objects (Grosse-Hering et al., 2013); there are a number of bespoke explorations of 
these ideals. In particular notoriety to the Slow technology movement is the 
catalogue of work by William Odom such as: 
 
‘Photo Box’ (Odom et al. 2014) 
Photo Box is a ‘domestic technology’ device that prints 4 or 5 randomly selected 
images from the ‘users’ online photographic archive at random time points through 
a month. The aims of the technology was to support experiences of anticipation and 
re-visitation of the past events and moments of importance (given the significance to 
take a picture and store it online). In use the technology initially caused frustration 
yet during the course of the deployment (14 months) the photos produced 
facilitated reflections on previous life events and renewed interest in personal online 
image repositories, and was accepted as a ‘domestic technology’ and produce a 
broader reflection on technologies in the home. In its slow (and random) release the 
technology facilitates anticipation and reflection upon what will be produced; and 
consequently from what – facilitating a Mindful reflection upon the amount and 
kinds of ‘things’ we store digitally, sometimes without intent to view again.  
Olly (Odom25, On-going) 
The on-going work Olly is a slow technology in the form of a tangible music 
player linked with the users music streaming service. Several times per week the Olly 
will allow the user to play songs from the their past. When a song is ready to play 
the Olly rotates a circular wooden disc, with the speed determined by the period of 
time from when the song was selected (i.e. the further in the past the slower the 
speed of rotation). The disc turns for 20 rotations at which point the song is 
‘abandoned’. To play a song users must tangibly rotate the wooden disc, speeding 
up the rotation. 
                                               
25http://willodom.com/portfolio/portfolio/olly-design-field-study/	-	retrieved	25/05/17		
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Through this interaction it can be imagined that users are presented chance 
opportunities to engage with the technology and reveal opportunistic reminiscence 
of their past. 
 
Slow Game (Odom26, On-going) 
Slow game is a project drawn upon the practice of playing Chess across distances 
remotely, communicating moves through postal correspondence. Slow game 
maintains this ‘slowness’ through a tangible digital artefact based on the ‘classic’ 
video (and mobile) game ‘Snake’, that allows for a single move a day. With such a 
low resolution of interaction it is hope the project will challenge understandings and 
experiences of memory, observation and patience.  
 
Fenestra (Uriu and Odom, 2016) 
Fenestra consists of a digital photo-frame mirror and candle, when active the 
technology displays images of departed loved ones. When lighting the candle the 
Fenestra is activated, linked to the changes in the flame of the candle altering how 
images are displayed and cycled through, though it is only by gazing directly into 
the mirror the images are revealed to the user.  
Through these interactions are facilitated rituals of memorialization that might 
alter how we engage with digital media and memories of those who have past.  
 
While these works vary in their forms and interactions they hold a unique set of 
properties that embody the philosophy of ‘slow technology’. These are realized 
through invoking moments that encourage anticipation, chance, patience, and 
ritualization; and challenge the immediacy facilitated by more commonplace 
interactions with digital technologies. Thus the changes to the performance of the 
technologies that challenge commonplace values (speed and efficiency) open 
opportunities for reflection on the content of the media and interaction. 
Furthermore such technologies break the homogenization of the ways in which we 
consume and engage with digital media and facilitate rituals around objects.  
                                               
26http://willodom.com/portfolio/portfolio/slow-game/	-	retrieved	25/05/17	
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3.5: Framing Mindfulness Within Existing Human-
Computer Interaction And Design – Designing 
Beyond Functionality And Immersion 
It is evident that the definitions of Mindfulness include a central commonality, i.e. 
a particular form of awareness. This awareness however is not to be confused as 
solely attention (or as a singular properties) as noted by Westen (1996) who suggests 
that sensory experience can be in “awareness” (present in consciousness and 
experienced) without being the focus of “attention”; attention being a directed 
conscious awareness towards a limited range of experience. A position further 
explained through awareness as “…monitoring the inner and outer environment…” 
and attention as “a process of focusing conscious awareness, providing heightened 
sensitivity to a limited range of experience”, yet it is noted that these processes are 
intertwined where attention draws out elements of interest from awareness (p822, 
Brown and Ryan, 2003).  
While it may initially seem that with attention being focused awareness it is 
therefore more Mindful, it may be also be enacted Mindlessly. Such Mindless yet 
focused states can be likened to high levels of immersion that, while holding the 
focused attention of the immersed, remove the broader awareness required for a 
situated contextualization. This is exemplified through the concept of “Flow” 
(Csíkszentmihályi, 1990). It has been has argued at length that certain activities allow 
people to enter a state of flow where there is a balance between effort and ease in a 
particular task, a concept that suggests an “optimal experience” when this occurs. 
The concept of Flow has been applied to many differing fields and practices 
including human-computer interaction. This theory has, in its components of flow, six 
factors that may be considered as Mindfulness and Mindlessness. During the 
experience of flow a person will experience: 
• Intense and focused concentration on the present moment (considered 
Mindful) 
• Merging of action and awareness (considered Mindless) 
• A loss of reflective self-conscious (considered Mindless) 
• A sense of control/action over a task or activity (considered Mindful) 
• A loss/alteration in the subjective experience of time (e.g. 1 “real” hour may 
“feel” as 5 minutes) (considered Mindless) 
• Autotelic/intrinsic reward from the task/activity (neither Mindful or Mindless) 
A Flow state holds several characteristics, notably here the focus of attention 
becomes limited to specific task whereby external stimulus (to the task) are ignored. 
This is additionally accompanied by a loss of reflective self-conscious and a 
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distortion in the subjective experience of time, highlighting the de-contextualization 
of the task and the restricted range in awareness. Additionally highlighted by 
Csíkszentmihályi (1990), as one of the most distinctive features of Flow, is the 
merging of action and awareness. When a person’s attention is completely absorbed 
within a task (when in a state of Flow) the “activity becomes spontaneous, almost 
automatic; they stop being aware of themselves as separate from the actions they 
are performing.” (p53, Csíkszentmihályi, 1990), therefore it is understood here as the 
interaction being phenomenologically invisible (i.e. Mindless).  
Norman also discusses a similar quality as “experiential cognition”, a sub-
conscious “expertise” (p23, Norman, 1993). However Norman states that when (and 
if) decision-making is required a “Reflective” cognition or processing is required that 
although slower, allows following “chains of reasoning” forward and/or backward 
(when decisions prove unsuccessful), by inferring upon temporarily stored 
knowledge. This reflective cognition is the Reflective level of processing that is 
beyond the visceral and behavioural levels of processing (previously discussed) and 
is, as Norman states, the “home of conscious cognition” (p53, Norman, 2013). The 
reflective level is where conscious decision making occurs, whilst it is slow in 
comparison to sub-conscious and non-conscious actions, it is the highly analytical 
process. Whilst Norman (2013) suggests that all three processing levels (visceral, 
behavioral and reflective) are required for Flow (the reflective processing level is the 
analysis of “results” in comparison to “expectations”) I infer this (in the context of 
Flow) as being a low-level analytical reflection and still captivated in the singular task 
(as opposed to a broader level of reflection facilitated by truly Mindful states). Dane 
(2011) supports this position through differentiating Flow and Mindfulness in terms 
of the breadth of attention, Flow being narrow and Mindfulness being relatively 
wide. When in a Mindful state individuals are “attuned” to a large number of 
internal and external phenomena, a state where individuals can consciously attend 
to increased number of stimulus within the environment (Dane, 2011). As Langer and 
Moldoveanu (2000) describe, it is the process of drawing novel distinctions situated 
in the present rather than reliance upon previously drawn distinctions and 
categories. This leads towards a greater sensitivity to one’s environment, openness 
to new information, the creation of new categories for structuring perception, and, 
an enhanced awareness of multiple perspectives in problem solving (Langer and 
Moldoveanu, 2000). 
 
  246 
3.5.1 Enhancing Reflection Through Augmenting 
Immersion  
While many designers often seek to facilitate experiences of ‘Flow’ 
(Csíkszentmihályi, 1990) - given its reward and engaging properties in addition to 
‘good design practice’ guides that promote practices that reduce “friction” of 
interactive systems27; there are those who argue for designing in opportunities to 
counter these moments through ‘Design Frictions’ (Cox et al., 2016). Design frictions 
can be understood (here) as purposeful interruptions to an interaction through a 
slowing or breaking of the process. This differs from slow technology (previously 
described) by being an element of interactions (typically a purposeful difficulty 
introduced) as opposed to a purposeful technology; however, design frictions carry 
much of the same principles. Cox et al. (2016) state that design frictions can disrupt 
“Mindless” and automatic interactions and promote moments of reflection and 
“Mindful” interactions. They (Cox et al., 2016) propose the introduction of 
“Microboundaries”, small moments of friction or obstacles that encourage a change 
in cognitive strategy through an interruption and prevent users from “rushing from 
one context to the next” and slow us down before acting. Through this, they 
suggest that these moments might provide brief opportunities for moments of 
reflection. 
Thus Microboundaries and design frictions can be understood as devices toward 
the interruption of immersive engagements (such as those that facilitate experiences 
of Flow) and breaking of chains in interactions. In doing so mincroboundaries and 
design frictions can be understood as Mindful design qualities.  
                                               
27	https://thenextweb.com/dd/2015/03/08/how-to-reduce-friction-with-good-design/#.tnw_5nregzdy	-	retrieved	26-05-2017	
  247 
3.6.0 Section 3 Discussion and Conclusion 
As previously described, designers of commonplace interactive systems typically 
seek to employ “transparency” (Bolter and Gromala, 2006), a ‘phenomenologically 
invisible’ interface to information. In contradiction to this are designs that “reflect” 
(Bolter and Gromala, 2006) or mirror the user (such as an aesthetic representation as 
seen in the majority of interactive digital art). This quality can be seen as bringing 
the interface and interaction to the center of the dialogue between the user and 
aims of the interaction; and so encouraging reflection upon the relationship of self 
with the interface and technology, framed here as a Mindful interaction. Whilst these 
design qualities (reflection and transparency) may appear at conflict within 
interaction design requirements; as highlighted, the significance of the “non-
functional” (Poole et al., 2008) attributes of technologies is increasingly apparent in 
recognition that computational technologies are no longer solely in the workplace; 
and as such design practices developed for the workplace may risk quality of life 
when applied outside of those spaces (Sengers et al, 2005). A position supporting 
the argument that interactive experiences focusing on functionality (performance, 
utility, and usability) (Poole et al., 2008) only activate limited capacities of the 
experience of the user (framed here as Mindless).  
In this section (3) it is proposed that while the designing of Mindless 
engagements of systems holds benefit there are additional opportunities to design 
for moments of reflection and Mindfulness. Therefor a number of design qualities 
present in Mindless and Mindful engagements with technologies can be put 
forward. 
 
3.6.1 Designing For Mindlessness  
Mindlessness is defined as an intuitive understanding that exists in non-conscious 
processes, with failure to account for contextual dependencies through premature 
cognitive commitments; where information and technologies hold a functional 
fixedness viewed as absolute through equipmental-fixedness. 
During interaction, Mindlessness is without conscious deliberation through sub-
conscious automaticity, developed from a cognitive fixation upon previous well-
learned solutions. Such actions are performed before, faster than or without 
concerted conscious awareness in phenomenological invisibility; resulting in the 
inability to develop novel solutions and the application of technology through 
equipmental-transparency. 
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Commonalities of Systems Supporting Mindless Interactions and 
Equipment: 
The implementation of what are here considered ‘Mindless’ equipment of 
interaction are often employed as measures to reduce cognitive loading and ease of 
use. While the term Mindless is often a negative connotation, here (in this thesis) it is 
understood to be of a neither inherently positive or negative nature. Mindlessness is 
clearly a valuable quality in our daily lives and interactions facilitating speed and 
intuition of how we interact and navigate a multitude of complex systems. Mindless 
equipment’s allow for users to quickly achieve known goals and interactions, missing 
out process steps between intent and completion (as they require little or no 
consideration toward the ‘how’ to achieve this).  Mindless equipment allow for 
‘expert-like’ operation where users experience low cognitive loading and so can 
multitask if required, as highlighted by Langer (1989). Such equipment perform 
complex actions but allow the user to feel though they did it themselves (Tolmie et 
al.; 2002) through e.g. automation. Equipment of interaction typically prize; 
effectiveness in performing a specific task, efficiency through a low number of steps, 
time and skill required to perform an action, and, speed; all with aims to improve 
user satisfaction. Consequently, such equipment encourage flow like experiences, 
allowing for immersion and prolonged interactions and in doing so allow for a 
‘shutting out’ of events outside of the interaction. Additionally Mindless equipment 
might be seen to encourage repetition and routine of actions and in their 
communication of elements of action and features (Rogers, 2006), drawing upon 
familiar symbols, layout, and steps of process (Blackwell, 2006). Through these 
processes Mindless interactive systems can be understood to provide efficient 
transparent windows to information (Bolter and Gromala, 2004). 
A resulting trade-off of these systems of efficiency is a difficulty to inhibit actions 
once initiated and a dependency upon the information provided (i.e. failure to 
question if the information is accurate or optimal). Similarly, difficulties in recalling or 
altering (or preventing) the “middle steps” of a process are also a result of drawing 
upon automatic processes. Mindless systems might also invoke wrong mental 
schemas if they are too similar to existing schemas. Consequently contextualization 
of the interaction is lost as processes are executed as though performing a well-
learned script; whereby equipment’s are functionally fixed in their capabilities and so 
lack novel problem solving or exploration of novel features. In their use of 
algorithms and automation (such as recommender systems and performing 
background processes), Mindless interactions additionally result in an unknowing of 
the underlying architecture of our interactions with technologies; and so mystify how 
these might be changed or replaced if required. Ultimately, through repetition and 
decontextualization of the aspects of interaction, and disregarding new information 
  249 
from the interaction, the potential for novel and creative solutions is contracted.  
Designing Mindless Interactions: 
To design for Mindlessness equipment’s should facilitate technologies to hide the 
“middle steps” through increasing automation, and reducing the “friction” between 
steps involved. Technologies should remain ‘unremarkable’, predicable and 
‘invisible’, and commonplace, as not to draw attention to the interface. Equipment 
should facilitate intuition though use of common metaphors (homogenization). 
These metaphors should be unambiguous and singular in their meaning and 
function. Interactions should not facilitate or require contextual dependencies. In 
doing so the equipment interface should draw upon ‘known’ knowledge (as 
opposed to requiring ‘thinking’ (contemplation) and interpretation). This should be 
achieved through drawing upon and invoking visceral and behavioural knowledge 
processing and routine. Likewise, equipment should direct use and present 
information in a way that subtly directs action toward desired goal. Mindless 
interactive systems should also limit the affordances offered and encourage 
selectivity of information (i.e. a low number of choices and information sources). 
 
3.6.2 Designing For Mindfulness  
Mindfulness, is defined as a state of broad reflective-conscious awareness upon 
the present context and content of information and stimulus. Information and 
technologies are explored and combined through concerted deliberation in novel 
categorisations of distinctions and action potentials as an abstract-tool. During 
interaction Mindfulness is slow yet analytical whilst being receptive to change, 
whereby constituting elements are consciously present through use and application 
of a fluidic-tool. 
Commonalities of Systems Supporting Mindful Interactions and Tools: 
While, understandably, in this thesis there is support for designing Mindful tools 
this is not to be held as true in all circumstance. Mindful tools are slow in their nature 
and as such should not be enforced or encouraged when technologies are time 
sensitive or hold little need for critical and creative engagements e.g. emergency 
shutdown systems. The core commonality of tools that support Mindful interactions 
is a focus toward facilitating prolonged or moments of reflection. That is to say, 
Mindful tools encourage ‘thinking’ (i.e. increase cognitive load) over reliance upon 
previously gained knowledge; they require and encourage the user to learn, make 
decisions, reason, and create to solve complex problems, generate innovative ideas, 
and provide moments for contemplation upon information exchanges. Mindful 
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technologies are often unfamiliar and bespoke, and are outside of ‘work’ 
environments and so hold different values; specifically holding user experience at 
the centre of design choices above more traditional concepts of performance and 
functionality. With this Mindfulness supporting technologies encourage openness to 
multiple perspectives and new information (i.e. the viewing of information as novel) 
and discourage ignoring or selective attention to specific elements. In doing so 
Mindful tools encourage contextualization to the present. Mindful tools also reject 
homogenization of information and interaction methods and so encourage creativity 
in their approach, understanding and outcomes. Mindful technologies additionally 
incorporate the philosophy and ideas of Slow Technology, with effortful, fractioned, 
and slow interactions providing opportunities of reflection over efficiency; alongside 
inhibiting states of Flow that might be initially frustrating (Odom et al. 2014) as they 
interrupt the commonplace ‘on-demand’ interactions with technologies. 
Mindful tools, however, are not suitable to interactions that require low cognitive 
load or those that are time sensitive. They are additionally problematic in their 
interpretation given they encourage reflection and realization of multiple 
affordances, and so may facilitate multiple (valid) perspectives, meaning, and 
usages. Similarly, given their (often) novelty, Mindful interfaces may take 
considerably longer for users to understand and learn in comparison to those 
designed around familiar design tropes. 
Designing Mindful Interactions: 
As previously described, designing for Mindful tools requires valuing a different 
set of ideals over more traditional performance metrics as suggested by Dillon 
(2002). They should hold contextualization to the present and in doing so recognize 
or adapt to on-going and subtle changes in a users experience and needs. This 
requires a moving beyond repetition of previous ‘known’ design tropes (that carry 
with them their own inherent meaning), or altering the interaction so that it 
incorporates a new meaning derived from the production of new schemas. It should 
be noted that such design implementation will additionally increase cognitive 
loading through the requirement of ‘thinking’ (and so time to perform an action or 
task), though this in turn can open the technology toward a ‘tool’ like state. In this 
tool state, there is openness toward multiple affordances and values, realized as 
novel choices, interpretations, and information (contextualized to the present 
interaction and goals); revealing novel answers or multiple perspectives to problem 
solving. Thus Mindful tools should additionally be designed to accommodate 
multiple affordances and encourage change through reflective processing, limiting 
visceral and behavioural learned responses. 
Where there is need to balance functionality (in traditional performance metrics) 
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with Mindful and reflective moments breakdowns such as design frictions and 
microboundaries can be incorporated. However, it is encouraged to make these 
‘remarkable’ and unique perhaps highlighting moments of background automation, 
and explicitly contextualizing ‘pop-up’ and banners to prevent habitual ‘blindness’ 
as described by Burke et al. (2005), Huang et al., (2008). However, commonly 
Mindful tools might be considered entirely new modalities of interaction, holding 
common features and functionality, but presented in radically different and 
augmented forms that force the development of new mental schemas. To 
encourage this, Mindful tools should be designed in ways that highlight their novelty 
and difference as bespoke performative tools. These might seek to encourage ritual 
and provoke ceremony over accessibility to encourage significance and meaning of 
interaction. Similarly, designs might encourage interactions take place over 
protracted periods of time and require periods of memory, observation and 
patience. In the sacrifice of functionality there is opportunity to enhance utility 
through the application of ambiguity, allowing multiple modes of interpretation and 
meaning. Similarly, through augmenting interactions through designing for 
anticipation and the unplanned opportunities for chance interactions that require 
engagement, on-chance as opposed to on-demand are facilitated that break 
routines and provide opportunities to see oneself within new connections. Thus 
Mindful tools should additionally invite and provoke openness to change and ‘un-
control’.
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SECTION FOUR  
 
Overview Of Thesis Findings And Contributions 
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4.0: Conclusion 
For a large part this thesis has predominantly sought to address the concerns raised 
in the position of Brown and Cordon (p59, 2009) regarding Mindfulness (and 
Mindlessness) to prevent similar failings as those found in clinical applications of 
Mindfulness (as described in chapters 1.1 to 1.3). As stated they, Brown and Cordon 
(2009), highlight “a phenomenon can be studied only if it can be properly defined 
and measured”. This was addressed through the broader research question of how 
Mindfulness and Mindlessness might be understood, measured and invoked in 
relation to Human-Computer Interactions.  
Understanding Mindfulness and Mindlessness 
Firstly it is important to understand that applying previous definitions and 
framings of Mindfulness toward human-computer interactions is problematic in that 
there is often confusion in describing exactly what form or ‘parts’ of Mindfulness are 
being discussed. For many previous framings the concept of Mindfulness carries 
with it a spiritual and/or emotional aspect that is part of a persons broader 
disposition. Consequently such positions hold values that might be considered 
inappropriate in their application or use in evaluation (particularly when applied 
directly from Mindfulness based cognitive therapy). As such positions additionally 
often portray Mindfulness as a personality disposition, due to their intended 
application, they fail to account for transient periods and experiences of Mindfulness 
and Mindlessness. However, as described by participants reporting on their 
experiences (Chapter 2.8) moments of automaticity (Mindlessly performing a task 
while holding little subjectively experienced ‘consciousness’) and moments of 
Mindfulness like qualities (such as meta awareness – evaluating ones mental state) 
were often fast in their transitions.  
• Mindful and Mindless states are not trait like but state like moving and 
changing rapidly in response to demands of actions, environmental 
stimulus, and subjective direction.  
The defining of Mindfulness and Mindlessness has been approached from a 
pragmatic stance that sought to position the understandings through a number of 
associated fields and paradigms. The aims of this were threefold, firstly to provide a 
unified interaction oriented understanding (avoiding the pitfalls described above), to 
allow for the future alteration and refinement of the concepts, and finally to allow for 
the further enquiry into the phenomena through research methods developed and 
transferable from well-established related domains.  
Broadly this understanding holds two central perspectives guided by a 
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neurophenomenological approach; one philosophically informed concerning 
subjective experience (conscious experience) and a second informed through 
cognitive science concerning biological and cognitive findings. Consequently 
Mindfulness is understood to be of a conscious state while Mindlessness is 
understood to function as a cognitive property.  
• Mindfulness and Mindlessness are understood (and defined) to be 
conscious and cognitive processes (respectively).  
Philosophical understandings highlighted familiar technologies incorporated into 
our actions and behaviours as moving toward a phenomenological invisibility, 
experienced as an extension of the self without contemplation upon 
(additional/alternate) meaning or use. As such states exist outside of conscious 
experience and driven by previous use they are here considered as a cognitive 
process and consequently as Mindless. Contrary to this are technologies that 
prevent ‘normal’ functioning, drawn into the forefront of consciousness through 
contemplation on meaning and use. In such a state novel applications (and 
affordances) are revealed. As such states involve a reflective-conscious process in 
exploring the affordances offered they are here considered Mindful.  
• Mindful technologies are present at the forefront of conscious 
experience, available to be theorized upon, and so reveal the multiple 
(and potential) affordances offered. 
• Mindless technologies draw upon previous and familiar actions and 
mask novel affordances from conscious consideration. 
• Interruption to the normal functioning of a technology can call it into 
question and facilitate Mindful contemplation.  
• Affordances are not a fixed property of a technology and agent but 
fluid and reciprocal to an agents Mindful or Mindless approach.  
It was highlighted that actions with enough repetition become streamlined, 
where once separate steps amalgamate into a singular mental schema. The 
discounted steps however might involve analytical or contextually differing 
processes required or meaningful to novel contextual encounters of the familiar 
technology.  Such schemas are subsequently (sub-/non-consciously) enacted when 
encountering the stimulus that relates to them (perception directed action). While 
the above concerns technologies that have a repetitive or habitual use it was also 
highlighted that when encountering events or technologies that are familiar to 
previous encounters (i.e. not the same be understood to be the same) the 
corresponding mental schema may be enacted without modification. This allows for 
rapid understanding and engagements with environments or technologies without 
requiring extensive contemplation upon how. 
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• Mindless engagements occur with repetitive use of technologies. 
• Mindless engagements with technologies remove intermediary steps 
that might provide contextual information or required analytical steps.  
• Familiar technologies invoke Mindless intuitive engagements if similar 
mental schemas exist. These might however be inappropriate for the 
context in which they are enacted. 
In a similar light, it was additionally highlighted that due to streamlining of mental 
schemas Mindless states were cognitively light and facilitate rapid responses. This 
was observable through the study data presented in Section 2, where wrong 
answers provoked reflection upon the following test which was subsequently longer 
to answer, the accommodation of Pop-Up responses becoming faster with 
subsequent repetition, etc.. Likewise participants during this study reported an 
effortless ease and speed when operating in states of Mindlessness – where they 
‘knew’ what to do. Contrary to this were moments where participants described 
needing to take time and ‘think’.  
• Mindless engagements are cognitively light and fast in action. 
• Mindless engagements are difficult to prevent once initiated and will 
be enacted till completion or interruption. 
• Mindful engagements are effortful and slow. 
• Mindful engagements facilitate drawing forth sub-conscious processes 
into the front of conscious and reflective-conscious experience. 
In addition to the above understandings this thesis contributes: 
 A lexicon for describing conscious states in the context of Mindful and Mindless 





Definitions of technologies affordance availability in the context of Mindful and 
Mindless approaches (Chapter 1.9) 
• Tool  
• Equipment 
Definitions of technologies affordance availability inclusive of the broader 
experiential state of the agent operating the technology in the context of Mindful 
and Mindless approaches (Chapter 1.10) 
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• Abstract-tool 
• Fluidic-tool 
• Equipmental-fixedness  
• Equipmental- transparency  
 
And most significantly the overarching defining of Mindfulness and Mindlessness 
during interactions with technologies (Chapter 1.3) 
 
Measuring Mindfulness and Mindlessness 
As previously highlighted a phenomenon can be studied only if it can be properly 
defined and measured. Through the previously described contributions a definition 
of Mindfulness and Mindlessness was developed (Section 1). Building upon this 
Section 2 aimed to provide an initial framework with which to measure such states. 
This was inherently exploratory as an initial body of work to pave way for future 
investigations (highlighted in Chapter 2.9.6) in hopes it might build upon and further 
refine such measurements. While there remain challenges in such refinement in that 
there are no “definitive” physiological indicators of Mindful or Mindless states this is 
not unexpected in the application and understanding of physiological 
measurements (as highlighted in Chapter 2.0.2). This is not to say that this 
contribution is without value, it was evident that through the application of a 
neurophenomenological methodology insights were gained that might otherwise be 
overlooked. 
• Accounting for an agent’s subjective experience alongside 
physiological responses (through a neurophenomenological 
methodology) is vital in the understanding, measurement, and 
justification of Mindful and Mindless states. 
Persons interacting with technology were able to report, through careful 
questioning, on their conscious (Mindful) experience and moments where there was 
sub-conscious processes (Mindlessness) through their lack of awareness. 
Furthermore many understood and valued Mindless processing for its cognitive ease 
and speed, often viewing interruptions to simple tasks (such as ‘Pop-Ups’) as 
distracting and negative, an interruption to being ‘in the zone’. While such optimal 
Mindless operations (for simple repetitive tasks) were often desired, some 
recognized the danger of a further state of uncontrolled automaticity (possibly a 
non-conscious state of action) introducing additional cognitive steps and processes 
to prevent such states.  
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• With moving beyond surface level responses upon attention and 
awareness people are able to respond upon a spectrum of varying 
levels and qualities of consciousness, awareness, and attention. 
• Mindless states in simple repetitive actions can be desired and 
functional. Interruptions (breakdowns to normal functioning) of 
Mindless states (when in optimal conditions) are negative in felt 
experience. 
• Balance between Mindfulness and Mindlessness is not only related to 
which of the states is invoked but the degree to which each is allowed 
to extend. 
However, once Mindless states were achieved there were several properties that 
highlight potential negatives of Mindlessness; lack of sense of time, lack of recall in 
processes (unknowing of actions taken), lack of knowledge to external events 
(outside of immediate interaction). Participants assumed they were holding 
awareness though were immersed in the interaction (as Mindless activity). This was 
highlighted with ‘Pop-Ups’ which initially prompted reflection toward the previous 
answer though quickly became ‘re-press the previous button’, however with ‘Pop-
Ups’ becoming enacted as Mindlessly the previous answer was sub-conscious and 
consequently unavailable for recall. The analytical steps in ‘Pop-Ups’ was removed 
i.e. if Pop-Up, review previous answer choice, choose correct answer, and then 
press/repress answer button became Pop-Up ‘ repress ‘ button.  
• Mindless activities lack: contextual awareness, information external to 
immediate interaction, sense of passage of time, conscious awareness, 
recall of interactive information (choices made, information presented 
etc.). 
• Immersion may be considered Mindlessness interaction. 
• Simple action/response prompts (e.g. Pop-Ups) that previously forced 
reflection/conscious awareness quickly became Mindless. 
• Mindless responses removed contextualizing information. 
In addition to the above findings and those reported in Chapter 2.9 four 
measures are also provided in contribution to the development of systems to 
measure physiological indications of Mindful and Mindless states: 
• Through EEG recordings P300 ERP amplitude as a cross channel 
average was seen to be correlational to invoked Mindful (and 
noteworthy) events (Chapter 2.6.2 – 2.6.5 and Chapter 2.9.4). This 
supports that conscious and Mindful actions draw upon (and orientate) 
larger cognitive resources of the brain (as described in Chapter 1.11 
and Chapter 1.12) than sub-/non-conscious actions.  
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• Raw EEG dynamic complexity mean variation and standard deviation 
(across 3 second period) was seen to follow invoked Mindful (and 
meaningful) events (Chapter 2.7.2, 2.8.3, and Chapter 2.9.4). This 
supports that conscious and Mindful actions disrupt / alter previous 
brain activity (of Mindless actions) and might reveal a reorienting of a 
global unified activity or drawing upon / activation of multiple regions 
of cognition (as described in Chapter 1.11 and Chapter 1.12). 
Consequently it is not the degree of complexity that is understood to 
hold significance but the comparative variation in complexity. 
• Increases of pupil diameter are associated with cognitive loading 
(Chapter 2.7.3) and such changes may provide indication to Mindful 
and Mindless interactions and events (when viewed comparatively 
across ongoing activities). This measure highlights Mindful activities as 
more cognitively demanding (as described in Chapter 2.8.3 and 
Chapter 2.9.4). 
• Eye movements are recognized as substantial in understanding a 
number of psychological processes including attentive and awareness 
processes and here as Mindful and Mindless state changes. It was 
found that Mean Eye Saccades duration per second - mean Eye 
Fixation duration per second (divided by 10 to accommodate 
comparability to saccades) increased with events that could be 
considered to invoke Mindful states of interaction. This highlights 
Mindful states as actively seeking multiple sources of information from 
the environment (here the interface of interaction). 
 
Invoking and Designing Mindfulness and Mindlessness 
While the above has demonstrated the thesis contributions in defining and 
measuring Mindfulness and Mindlessness Section 3 aimed to provide better 
understanding of how and where such states are understood and designed for in the 
wider field HCI design. Here findings are summarised with design considerations 
applicable to the designing of technologies to encourage Mindful and Mindless 
interactions.  
Primarily Mindful interactions can be understood to encourage and hold 
reflectivity (of the user and interaction context), novel and exploratory thinking, and 
experientially focused interactions as a central tenet (Chapter 3.1.1). Mindless 
interactions can be understood to prize efficiency, effectiveness, and windows to 
information as core attributes; encouraging ‘calm’ and ‘unremarkable’ interactions 
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that exist in the periphery of the users awareness and ‘thinking for us’ (Chapter 
3.1.0). 
• Mindful technologies should be designed to think with us and 
encourage us to think (Consciously – Chapter 1.11.2). They should 
account for slow interactions. 
• Mindless technologies should be designed to think for us and allow us 
to know (Cognitively – Chapter 1.11.2). They should encourage fast 
interactions. 
As highlighted, users of technologies learn skills and this knowledge becomes 
stored within a mental schema, a blueprint of action or knowledge learned as a set 
of rules. While during rule formation an action set may have been conscious it will 
increasingly become enacted (and potentially adapted) sub-consciously with 
repeated reenactments. Such application of mental schemas allows for rapid use of 
technologies and additionally facilitates ‘intuition’ the application of previous 
knowledge to similar situations (Chapter 1.12.2). The application of intuition 
facilitates rapid learning, however, care must be taken to ensure that contextual and 
analytical steps, if offered or required, are highlighted as novel from previous 
schemas. Similarly it was highlighted presentation of familiar technologies can limit 
their novel use (Chapter 1.7) and are less receptive to novel or alternate options 
(Chapter 1.12.3). 
• Mindful designs should highlight differences, options and novelty, 
expanding cognitive loading and questioning upon the technology 
(Chapter 3.1.2); invoking a tool state of technology. In doing so, 
Mindful technologies reveal affordances in their questioning. 
• Mindful technologies should be designed to encourage the user to 
‘see’ themselves and the relationship they hold within a technology.  
• Mindful designs should seek to limit automation or highlight its 
presence and function (Chapter 3.1.0). 
• Mindless designs should draw upon previous schemas where possible 
through familiar design and interaction elements. They should seek to 
encourage transparent windows to information without question upon 
the interface elements (Chapter 3.1.1). 
• Mindless interactions are less altered by options and difficult to inhibit 
once initiated. Such interactions exist as nested behaviors (Chapter 
1.12.4) and run to completion if left uninterrupted. Consequently 
Mindless designs should not stray from mental schemas or offer 
options without imposing a ‘breakdown’ of familiar functioning. It 
should be noted breakdowns in themselves become resolved 
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Mindlessly if left unchanged (e.g. the responding toward ‘Pop-Ups’ 
(described in Section 2) becoming habitualised and automatic). 
Similarly, Mindless interactions should be designed to minimize 
interruptions to normal functioning’s. 
 
As highlighted in Chapter 3.1.2 Mindful interactions can be facilitated by 
increasing and augmenting cognitive loading; through breaking existing mental 
schema and forcing the user to ‘think’. Similar practice was reported by some 
participants during the study reported in Chapter 2.8.1 in finding the right balance 
or preventing Mindless interactions. 
• Mindful designs augment and increase cognitive loading through the 
prevention of enacting mental schemas  
It was described in Chapter 3.2.1 that Mindless systems invoke intuitive 
interactions and guide the users understanding through the use of metaphor, 
invoking visceral and behavioural modes of interaction. The use of metaphor allows 
users to quickly apply the understandings of alternate mental schemas to the 
present interaction, through may not actually hold the original technologies 
functionalities. It is therefore critical that designers acknowledge that the use of 
metaphor should hold true to the object/technology they draw upon. This might be 
through explicitly stating or notifying where, when and how differences arise.  
• Mindless designs should draw upon metaphor to invoke visceral and 
behavioral actions and understandings. However, these must hold true 
to the metaphor, else risk misunderstandings and interpretations. The 
use of metaphor will draw upon previous understandings and so 
current context may be lost. 
In Chapter 3.2.1 it was highlighted that the augmentation of utility (through 
ambiguity) encouraged users of a technology to reflect on its meanings. While the 
example provided drew upon metaphor it was intentionally abstract, forcing 
interpretation. Ambiguity does not equate to fuzzy or inconsistent information, but 
rather an availability of interpretation. In the application of ambiguity an 
interpretation of the interaction is encouraged and so the invoking of a tool state 
and multiple affordances revealed. 
• Mindful designs augment utility by interpretation through the use of 
ambiguity 
As described above and more extensively in Chapter 3.3 the homogenisation of 
technology encourages a Mindless approach. Similar technologies invoke similar 
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behaviours and actions, for good or ill (such as information displays holding 
common design elements for ease of reading, and phishing websites replicating 
login pages to invoke previous actions).  
• Mindless designs follow homogenization of information, interface, and 
interaction. 
While homogenisation affords rapid and familiar usability this can be augmented 
as highlighted in Chapter 3.3.1. Through the alteration of commonplace usability, 
such as removal of elements that support normal functioning, reflection occurs that 
can call for a re-contextualisation of the technology. Such technologies operate in 
the same ‘fundamental’ ways though their broader usability is novel.  
• Mindful designs can promote novelty and contemplation over 
familiarity and usability 
As highlighted in Chapter 3.4, there is an increasing pervasiveness of technology 
as automated ‘everyware’. While such technologies lessen work and mundane tasks 
they additionally pose risk of increasing an unknowning of how, where, and when 
technologies perform processes for us. Such unknowning however poses potential 
risk in its failings as persons are unable to reconsider what and how the technology 
performed. Similarly dependence on automated systems that think for us creates 
difficulties should they fail to account for a contextual dependency or fail in 
reportability. 
• Automated systems encourage Mindless interactions. Measures 
should be included to facilitate reflection (user thinking) upon failure 
and contemplation upon potential erroneous information.  
As previously described, homogenisation facilitates a Mindless approach to 
technologies, this is additionally problematic in information intense environments. 
When encountering environments that hold vast amounts of information a 
defensively motivated Mindlessness state may be produced to allow the inhabitant 
to better consume information in manageable amounts (reduction of critical 
information consumption toward a Mindless accepting, surface level understanding, 
or, selectively ignoring large amounts of information). During such states the 
experiencer (inhabitant) of the environment views information sources as 
homogenised and as previous encounters. Such states are problematic during 
human-computer interactions as information events such as ‘Pop-Ups’ are quickly 
viewed as similar to previous exposures (i.e. regardless of information or criticality). 
This was observed during the study reported in Section 2, where ‘Pop-Up’ warnings 
quickly became viewed as irrelevant and no-longer read or observed as a prompt to 
action.  
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• Information intensive environments encourage defensively motivated 
Mindless interactions where large amounts of information are 
discarded to enable consumption. Familiar events are viewed 
uncritically regardless of meaning as information becomes 
homogenized. 
In countering homogenisation and information intensity is Slow Technology 
(Chapter 3.4.1), a movement to encourage interactions with technologies that 
support rest and reflection over more commonplace values in efficacy. Slow 
Technologies share the ideals of experience centred design through consideration of 
users felt experience (as a central tenet), the self, others, and technology, are held as 
equally valuable and intrinsic to the design process. Slow Technologies encourage 
‘slow’ interactions that are less ‘on demand’ than commonplace engagements (e.g. 
the twitter app continually updating with newest information) and move toward an 
unfolding over protracted periods of time and chance interactions. Similarly Slow 
Technologies encourage ritualization of interactions, drawing upon multiple 
stipulations to formulate a unique experience and remove homogenized interactions 
and information exchange; as highlighted by Fenestra (Uriu and Odom, 2016).  
• Mindful designs are slow and unfolding, they encourage reflection 
and rest over speed and efficiency.  
• Mindful interactions are designed to encourage and facilitate 
experience centric interactions. 
It was additionally highlighted that immersive states of Flow are considered 
Mindless interactions (Chapter 3.5.1). While a common misconception that flow 
states are Mindful states (given the attentive process of immersion) or optimal, here 
the counter is proposed. As reported by participants during study (Section 2), there 
was a loss of the passage of time, a lack of awareness of external (to interaction) 
events, and a merging of action and (sub-conscious) awareness. Participants often 
reported these sates as ‘being in the zone’, in this thesis understood to be an 
optimal Mindless functioning. It was described that interactions can incorporate 
design frictions and microboundaries to slow otherwise rapid Mindless interactions. 
While such interventions can be viewed as strategies toward the interruption of 
immersive engagements (such as Flow) and breaking of chains in interactions here 
they might facilitate the balance of Mindlessness (and Mindfulness) that participants 
sought to achieve during the study (Chapter 2.8.1). As such, such design 
considerations might better facilitate the desired degree of Mindlessness; 
maintaining a Mindless functionality without a Mindless totality. The modalities of 
measurements presented in Section 2 might be incorporated into systems and 
automatically introduce design frictions to prevent undesirable degrees of 
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Mindlessness. 
• Mindless technologies should consider the degree to which 
Mindlessness is desired and facilitate optimal levels through the 
inclusion of adaptive design frictions and microboundaries.  
• While understanding the balance of Mindful and Mindless systems of 
interactions is important, the degree of these states must also be 
considered and designed for 
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Final Reflection 
While this work is positioned within HCI design research it should also be 
recognised that the understandings hold value in a number of fields and so future 
work should seek to incorporate these as a multi-disciplinary effort to strengthen the 
understandings. Where typically areas such as neuroscience attempt to understand 
singular functions of an organisms ‘parts’ and processes, here a view was held not to 
understand Mindfulness or Mindlessness as singular specific biological functions (in 
isolation) but as intrinsically interrelated acts of an agent, a spectrum of subjectivity 
and being. The neurophenomenological approach of marrying the two differing 
practices of ‘science’ and ‘philosophy’, an act some might view in same light as 
mixing ice-cream and sand, provides fertile ground by justifying and confirming 
philosophical understandings while simultaneously providing a ‘knowledge crutch’ 
while empirical methods are developed. The work presented in this thesis is by no 
means a closed book; and it is hoped that it will serve as an early chapter for future 
work. In summation the overarching question of this thesis, “How might Mindfulness 
and Mindlessness might be understood, measured and invoked in relation to 
Human-Computer Interactions?”; has been addressed as an initial basis from which 
further work can build upon. Section one has addressed how Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness can be understood and provides operational definitions and lexicon 
for understanding the facets of Mindfulness and Mindlessness as they relate to 
human-computer interaction. Section two has addressed how Mindfulness and 
Mindlessness can be measured and provided fertile ground from which to build and 
incorporate systems for the automatic detection of such phenomena during 
interaction with technologies. Section three has provided insight to how Mindfulness 
and Mindlessness can be invoked, with example from which to further 
understanding of how one might design interactions with digital technologies to 
provoke these qualities. However, much work is still needed in refining and maturing 
these understandings as a distinct sub-field within human-computer interaction 
research. This is to be expected given the position of the work as an initial 
grounding for such research to build upon. Specifically future work should focus 
effort to the measurement of these phenomena under a number of settings and 
scenarios. The suggested next steps for future work would be to incorporate the 
physiological measures into a real time system, perhaps alerting users as they drift 
between Mindful and Mindless states or prompting for reporting of validity of 
measures. Such findings and refinement of such system would then allow for the 
evaluation of systems Mindful and Mindless invoking qualities. In doing so future 
interactive systems can be developed that fully apply and adapt to Mindful and 
Mindless states to enhance our interactions with technology. More significantly such 
work would greatly improve our understanding of who, what, and where we are.  
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5.0: Appendix  
Appendix 1.1: Mindful Attention And Awareness Scale 
Questionnaire 
The MAAS study was developed with specific focus to examine empirical links 
between Mindfulness and well-being and focuses upon the presence or absence of 
attention to awareness of present moment (as opposed to more traditional concepts 
from Buddhist practice that emphasise behaviours such as empathy, gratitude and 
acceptance to emotional/psychological valence). 
Brown and Ryan (2003) state that allowing automatic / habitual thought processes 
can be non-beneficial and facilitate unwanted responses; and that persons having a 
greater awareness of their actions, environment etc. (i.e. “Mindful”) are better able 
to control these actions with benefits to their cognitive and emotional well-being. 
While finding grounding in more Western (and scientific) conceptualisations of 
Mindfulness, Brown and Ryan note: “The present definition emphasizes an open, 
undivided observation of what is occurring both internally and externally rather than 
a particular cognitive approach to external stimuli.” (p823, Brown and Ryan, 2003). 
The agree / disagree items presented in the Mindful attention and awareness scale 
questionnaire can be found below: 
• I could be experiencing some emotion and not be conscious of it until 
some time later.  
• I break or spill things because of carelessness, not paying attention, or 
thinking of something else.  
• I find it difficult to stay focused on what's happening in the present.  
• I tend to walk quickly to get where I'm going without paying attention 
to what I experience along the way.  
• I tend not to notice feelings of physical tension or discomfort until 
they really grab my attention.  
• I forget a person's name almost as soon as I've been told it for the 
first time.  
• It seems I am "running on automatic," without much awareness of 
what I'm doing.  
• I rush through activities without being really attentive to them.  
• I get so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I lose touch with 
what I'm doing right now to get there.  
• I do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of what I'm 
doing. 
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• I find myself listening to someone with one ear, doing something else 
at the same time.  
• I drive places on "automatic pilot" and then wonder why I went there.  
• I find myself preoccupied with the future or the past.  
• I find myself doing things without paying attention. 
• I snack without being aware that I'm eating. 
(Brown and Ryan, 2003) 
 
Appendix 1.2: Toronto Mindfulness Scale Questionnaire 
Mindfulness is framed by Lau et al. in the Toronto Mindfulness scale as: 
“(a) the intentional self-regulation of attention to facilitate greater 
awareness of bodily sensations, thoughts, and emotions;  
and  
(b) a specific quality of attention characterized by endeavoring to connect 
with each object in one’s awareness (e.g., each bodily sensation, thought, or 
emotion) with curiosity, acceptance, and openness to experience. Such a 
state involves an active process of relating openly with one’s current 
experience by allowing current thoughts, feelings, and sensations”  
(p1447, Lau et al., 2006) 
The Toronto Mindfulness Scale test states that the interest of the questionnaire is 
directed towards what the participant “just experienced” (contextualised to the 
present) and is divided into two categories; “curiosity” (questions 3, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13), 
and “decentring” (questions 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11). The questions presented during the 
test are:  
• I experienced myself as separate from my changing thoughts and 
feelings.  
• I was more concerned with being open to my experiences than 
controlling or changing them.  
• I was curious about what I might learn about myself by taking notice 
of how I react to certain thoughts, feelings or sensations.  
• I experienced my thoughts more as events in my mind than as a 
necessarily accurate reflection of the way things ‘really’ are.  
• I was curious to see what my mind was up to from moment to 
moment.  
• I was curious about each of the thoughts and feelings that I was 
having.  
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• I was receptive to observing unpleasant thoughts and feelings without 
interfering with them.  
• I was more invested in just watching my experiences as they arose, 
than in figuring out what they could mean.  
• I approached each experience by trying to accept it, no matter 
whether it was pleasant or unpleasant.  
• I remained curious about the nature of each experience as it arose.  
• I was aware of my thoughts and feelings without over-identifying with 
them.  
• I was curious about my reactions to things.  
• I was curious about what I might learn about myself by just taking 
notice of what my attention gets drawn to.  
(Lau et al., 2006)  
 
Appendix 1.3: State Mindfulness Scale Questionnaire 
Tanay and Bernstein frame Mindfulness through an integration of both Buddhist 
philosophy and contemporary psychological definitions of Mindfulness. In 
recognition of the limited number of measurements of Mindfulness as a temporary 
state Tanay and Bernstein (2013) seek to apply such measures towards specific task 
and context dependent understandings. This is achieved through understanding 
Mindfulness on the first level as “focused on the nature of events or aspects of one’s 
experience in the present moment of which one is mindful” (p1287); and a second 
level focusing upon Mindfulness “… as a meta-cognitive state (i.e., “how” a person 
attends)” consisting of five qualities; awareness, perceptual sensitivity to stimuli, 
deliberate attention to the present moment, intimacy or closeness to one’s 
subjective experience, and curiosity (p1287). Points of measurement in the State 
Mindfulness Scale (including omissions that “lacked evidence of univocality or 
theoretically interpretable multivocality” (p1289, Tanay and Bernstein, 2013)) can be 
found below: 
• I was aware of different emotions that arose in me.  
• I tried to pay attention to pleasant and unpleasant sensations.  
•  I found some of my experiences interesting. 
• I noticed many small details of my experience.  
• I felt aware of what was happening inside of me.  
•  Omission: “I noticed various sounds [e.g., sounds in the room, 
sound of my own breathing]” 
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• I noticed pleasant and unpleasant emotions.  
• I actively explored my experience in the moment. 
• I clearly physically felt what was going on in my body.  
• I changed my body posture and paid attention to the physical process 
of moving.  
•  Omission: “I noticed a thought that came into my mind and 
then that it passed” 
• I felt that I was experiencing the present moment fully.  
• I noticed pleasant and unpleasant thoughts.  
• I noticed emotions come and go.  
• I noticed various sensations caused by my surroundings (e.g., heat, 
coolness, the wind on my face). 
• I noticed physical sensations come and go.  
• I had moments when I felt alert and aware.  
• I felt closely connected to the present moment.  
• I noticed thoughts come and go.  
• I felt in contact with my body. 
• I was aware of what was going on in my mind.  
• It was interesting to see the patterns of my thinking.  
• I noticed some pleasant and unpleasant physical sensations. 
(Tanay and Bernstein, 2013) 
 
Appendix 1.4: Langer Mindfulness/Mindlessness scale 
Bodner and Langer (2001) construct validation of the Mindfulness/Mindlessness 
Scale though several theoretically associated constructs.  
Openness to experience: a part of the “Big Five” personality dimensions 
(Digman,1990), is cited as a correlation toward Mindfulness. Those who exhibit a 
willingness to be open to experience are more likely to novelly engage with the 
surrounding environment. It is further hypothesised that: “individuals with high levels 
of openness to experience have a greater degree of tolerance for the unfamiliar; in 
fact, such individuals seek out and explore the unfamiliar” (p2, Bodner and Langer, 
2001). That is, a Mindful individual will be open to and seek unfamiliar and novel 
experiences.  
Capacity to entertain multiple perspectives: is highlighted as a concurrent 
construct; that is, the capacity to view/understand the “world” form 
another’s/multiple perspectives corresponds to Bodner and Langers understanding 
of Mindfulness: 
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“Mindfulness too involves an awareness that any event or fact can be 
understood from multiple perspectives. In fact, one might anticipate that 
the propensity to be mindful and a capacity to entertain multiple 
perspectives to correlate strongly as entertaining multiple perspectives is a 
key component of mindfulness (Langer, 1997)”  
(p2, Bodner and Langer, 2001) 
Need for cognition: (Cohen, Stotland and Wolfe, 1955), the degree to which an 
individual enjoys and engages in thinking (Bodner and Langer, 2001), is suggested 
as a component of Mindfulness. Cohen, Stotland and Wolfe (1955) define the need 
for cognition as:  
“… a need to structure relevant situations in meaningful, integrated ways. It 
is a need to understand and make reasonable the experiential world. 
"Meaningfulness" and "integration" are individually defined in that they 
vary with the person's past experience and capacity for such integration. 
For any given individual different situations will be differentially important 
for the arousal and satisfaction of the need. In addition, any given situation 
will have differential importance for the arousal and satisfaction of the 
cognition need.”  
(p291, Cohen, Stotland and Wolfe, 1955) 
That is to say, individuals who possess a high need for cognition will actively seek 
to apply cognitive processing in order to fully understand the underlying structure of 
a situation or experience (i.e. Mindfully seek further information and understanding); 
in opposition to this would be individual with a low need for cognition who may 
choose to accept (uncritically) experiences or information without further inquiry.  
Need for simple structure and need for cognitive closure: as Bodner and Langer 
(2001) additionally state: 
 “In a complex environment, individuals use a variety of cognitive tools to 
minimize the competition for precious cognitive resources. One such tool is 
a reliance on cognitive structures (e.g., prototypes, schemas, scripts) to 
organize experience.”  
(p3, Bodner and Langer, 2001) 
Quoting Neuberg and Newsom (p.114, 1993) 28 , Bodner and Langer (2001) 
                                               
28	“people meaningfully differ in the extent to which they are dispositionally motivated to 
cognitively structure their worlds in simple, unambiguous ways”	
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highlight that a Mindful state requires “complex and dynamic” cognitive structures 
that are receptive to change through multiple interpretations of a given situation, 
thus retain and facilitate ambiguity. Likewise, Bodner and Langer (p3, 2001) state 
that individuals who seek to achieve cognitive closure display decisiveness and 
close-mindedness and are motivated to quickly attend and resolve uncertainties and 
desire predictability, order and structure over the discomfort caused by ambiguity; 
whereas contrary to this “mindfulness is antithetical to the need for structure and the 
need for closure”.  
Thinking styles and general cognitive ability are additionally factored into the 
construct validation of Mindfulness/Mindless Scale. Bodner and Langer (2001) state 
that a Mindful person should exhibit a “legislative-liberal” thinking style: 
“When mindful, individuals are aware of the existence and limitations of 
currently used rules and procedures. They are also aware that other rules 
and procedures are possible and can generate these new rules and 
procedures. Though mindful individuals can implement their plans 
consistent with existing rules and procedures, this takes place after the 
mindful consideration and construction of alternative procedures.” 
(p3, Bodner and Langer, 2001) 
The “general cognitive ability” or intelligence is framed as “a constellation of 
thinking abilities designed to cope with environmental complexity” (p3, Bodner and 
Langer, 2001). Such abilities include memory, reasoning and recognition; the 
combination these “lower-level cognitive and perceptual systems” (p3, Bodner and 
Langer, 2001) with intelligence being the higher level abstraction of such abilities. 
Bodner and Langer (2001) suggest that such “cognitive systems” are additionally 
important in facilitating Mindfulness, e.g. The ability to generate and maintain 
multiple interpretations of a situation requires the “existence of a fluent associative 
memory system” (p3, Bodner and Langer, 2001). Such perspectives are discussed at 
greater length in chapter 1.12. The Mindfulness/Mindlessness scale questioning is 
presented with the factoring as defined by Haigh et al. (2010) (test order number 
prior to statement): 
Mindfulness/Mindlessness Scale (MMS) 
Factor 1 (Mindfulness): 
14 : I try to think of new ways of doing things. 
18 : I find it easy to create new and effective ideas. 
3   : I am always open to new ways of doing things. 
13 : I am very curious. 
10 : I am very creative. 
20 : I like to figure out how things work. 
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17 : I like to be challenged intellectually. 
1   : I like to investigate things. 
4   : I “get involved” in almost everything I do. 
12 : I attend to the “big picture.” 
16 : I have an open mind about everything, even things that challenge my 
core beliefs  
Factor 2 (Mindlessness): 
15 : I am rarely aware of changes. 
19 : I am rarely alert to new developments.  
8   : I seldom notice what other people are up to.  
9   : I avoid thought provoking conversations.   
21 : I am not an original thinker.  
Items that do not load on either factor: 
2   : I generate few novel ideas. 
5   : I do not actively seek to learn new things. 
6   : I make many novel contributions. 
7   : I stay with the old tried and true ways of doing things.  
11 : I can behave in many different ways for a given situation.  
(Haigh et al., 2010) 
 
Appendix 1.5 Codification Of Mindfulness And 
Mindlessness From Pre-Existing Definitions And Framings 
The construct of Mindfulness in the previously discussed framings that may be 
applied within the intended scope of the research and applicable to human-
computer interaction was coded as: 1 = Directed / controlled attention and / or 
awareness; 2 = Presence of “mind” (i.e. Conscious awareness of experience); 3 = 
Habit / repetition / automatic behaviour; 4 = Contextualisation to present moment; 
5 = Openness to novelty; and, 6 = Cognitive state. 
Eastern/Buddhist construct: A presence of mind [2]; Reflection upon moment-to-
moment experience [2, 4]; Consciousness orientated toward present reality [2, 4]; 
Directed attention [1]; Open and self-guided awareness [1, 5]. 
Clinical application and measurement as trait like (Eastern): Observation of 
sensory experience [2]; Controlled attention and awareness [1, 6]; Attentive to 
present experience [2, 4]; Directed focus [1]. 
Clinical application and measurement as state like (Eastern) (* Indicates 
Mindlessness): Focused awareness toward inner and outer environment (as 
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attention) [1]; Attentive to present reality [2, 3, 4]; * Carelessness / distraction [1]; 
Goal oriented [3, 4]; * Failure to retain recent information [4]; * Automatic behaviour 
and processing of information [1, 2, 3, 4]; Bodily awareness [2]; Awareness of 
thoughts [1]; Openness to experience [2, 5]; Reflection upon experience [1, 2, 4]. 
Western understanding and measurement as state-like (* Indicates Mindlessness): 
Mental behaviour [6]; State-like experience (variable) [4, 6]; Meta-cognitive / self-
reflective state [6]; Concerted/ deliberate awareness to present [1, 2, 4]; Self-
regulated attention toward immediate experience [1, 2, 4]; Interest in experience [5]; 
Context dependant [3, 4]; Object/task oriented [3, 4]; Relational to present stimulus 
[2, 4]; Attention to bodily experience [2]; Awareness of surrounding [1, 2, 4]; 
Attention to detail [1]; Alertness [6]; * Automaticity [1, 3, 4, 5]; * Rigid understanding 
[4, 5]; Active discovery of novel distinctions [1, 4, 5]; Awareness to alternate 
meanings [1, 4, 5]; * Repetitive behaviour [3, 4, 5]; * Behaviours without conscious 
control/awareness [1, 2, 3, 4]; Tolerance of unfamiliar [5]; Arousal and satisfaction of 
cognition [5, 6]; Complex/dynamic cognitive structures (mental models) [6]; 
Generating new rules and procedures [3, 4, 5]; Higher functioning memory, 
reasoning and recognition [1, 3, 6]; Novelty in action [3, 5]; Novelty in thought [3, 5, 
6]; Creative/ease of ideation [5]; Open to new modes of action [5]; Investigatory [5]; 
Aware of bigger picture (contextualization of understanding) [1, 4, 5]; * Lack of 
change awareness [1, 2, 3, 4]; * Lack of awareness of surroundings [1, 2, 4]. 
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Appendix 2.1: Participant Information Sheet and 









Thank you for participating in the study “Influence of feedback modalities upon 
Mindfulness”; which is part of an ongoing PhD research project in Lancaster 
University.  
This study is concerned with how differing designs/forms of feedback modalities 
with digital technology: - 
• Support mindfulness during interaction 
• Allow a deeper understanding of information/feedback 
• Encourage longer duration interactions 








Study Influence of feedback modalities upon Mindfulness 
Key terms: Mindfulness: Mindfulness in this study is described as a 
state of awareness where one is actively conscious of (paying 
attention to) thoughts, feelings, bodily sensations and the 
surrounding environment. This is the opposite of 
Mindlessness where one is “on auto-pilot” or “zoning out”, 
for example when travelling a familiar route and arriving at 
the destination with no recollection/awareness of the journey. 
The testing will use EEG as an input. 
EEG: EEG measures fluctuations in electronic charge 
produced by normal brain functioning by the placement of 
electrodes across the scalp (these do not pierce the skin and 
do not cause pain/discomfort). EEG cannot detect individual 
thoughts or any personal information. 
What will happen 
and when 
Participants will be expected to attend a 2 hour session 
(approximate)  
The session will consist of 7 differing forms of interaction 
followed by a short questionnaire/survey.  
At the end of the final session an informal Q&A will be held 
(optional).   
Privacy and 
confidentiality  
All your information will be treated with confidentiality. At 
any point in the research you have the right to withdraw from 
the study; this will not affect your relationship with any of the 
organisations/persons connected to the study. Should you 
withdraw within 2 weeks following the study your data will be 




If you partake in the study the principal investigator will 
create a transcript of your interview and testing, collect 
questionnaire feedback, capture video recording of testing, 
measure and record EEG data and eye-tracking data. Data 
may be recorded on a password-protected and encrypted 
mobile device. For subsequent analysis, data will be stored 
on an encrypted password-protected PC and will be 
accessible only to the principal investigator and his 
supervisors. You have the right to request any data from your 
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participation in the study at any time. Data will be stored in 
ways to make sure your identity can’t be inferred. Data 
(and/or a summary of data) will be stored up to and including 
December 2015 unless otherwise requested.  
Use of your data The principal investigator may use your 
survey/questionnaire/feedback, data collected from eye-
tracking and EEG, and/or data collected from video analysis 
in academic publishing (e.g. PhD thesis) and reports (e.g. 
journal articles, presentations) that concern this study. Any 
such public document/presentation will never state/show 
your identity, but use pseudonyms instead. From 
testing/questionnaires, quotes will only be snippets of the 
entirety. Any audio recordings/video recordings of testing will 
be deleted once the study is complete. All other data will be 
preserved for long-term access and will be anonymised for 
this purpose. 
Project funding The principal investigator is funded via the Digital 
Economy Program of the EPSRC (Engineering and physical 
sciences research council of the UK). 
Contact details Principal investigator: Kiel Long, PhD Candidate, HighWire 
Centre for Doctoral Training, Lancaster University. e-mail: : 
kslong@highwire-dtc.co.uk 
// 07530 003185 
If you wish to contact an independent person for concerns 
or complaints please contact: 
Dr Paul Coulton 
e-mail: p.coulton@lancaster.ac.uk 
The LICA Building, Lancaster University, Bailrigg, 
Lancaster, LA1 4YW 
Or alternatively  
Dr Jason Alexander; 
e-mail: j.alexander@lancaster.ac.uk  
Office C18, InfoLab21, Lancaster 
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CONSENT FORM:  
Influence of feedback modalities upon Mindfulness  
Name of Researcher: Kiel Long, HighWire DTC, Lancaster University  
Participant Identification Number:  
Please initial box 
3. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the 
above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
4. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time, without giving any reason.  
5. I understand that any information collected from/given by me may be used 
in future reports, articles or presentations by the research team.  
6. I understand that my name will not appear in any reports, articles or 
presentations.  
7. I agree to take part in the above study. 
      
________________________ _______________ __________ 
 Name of Participant          Signature        Date 
 
________________________ _______________ __________ 
 Name of Researcher          Signature        Date 
When completed, please return to the researcher conducting the study. One 
copy will be given to the participant and the original to be kept in the file of the 
research team at Lancaster University. 
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Appendix 2.2: Condition Presentation Ordering 
The following table A2.2 provides the condition presentation per participant (A 
through G). Comparative conditions were intentionally clustered with aims to 
provoke automatic responses in the following test (e.g. Condition 2 Stroop 
influencing condition 3 Stroop), and subsequent effort to inhibit the recently 
acquired automaticity. GXRX denotes Condition 1; STR denotes an adapted Stroop 
word test (Condition 2 and 3) (WRD – participants providing the written word, COL - 
participants providing the colour of text); ARR denotes an adapted Stroop Arrow 
test (Condition 4 and 5) (POS – participants providing the position of arrow, DIR - 
participants providing the direction of arrow); CLK denotes a clock face based 
condition test (Condition 6 and 7) (FIX – Condition of a fixed clock face, ROT - 
Condition of a rotating clock face). 
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Participant No. Condition A Condition B Condition C Condition D 
1 GXRX ARR.DIR ARR.POS CLK.FIX 
3 STR.COL STR.WRD CLK.FIX CLK.ROT 
4 CLK.FIX CLK.ROT GXRX STR.COL 
5 GXRX ARR.POS ARR.DIR CLK.ROT 
6 ARR.POS ARR.DIR STR.WRD STR.COL 
7 STR.WRD STR.COL CLK.ROT CLK.FIX 
8 CLK.ROT CLK.FIX GXRX STR.WRD 
9 GXRX ARR.DIR CLK.ROT STR.COL 
10 STR.WRD CLK.FIX STR.COL CLK.ROT 
11 STR.COL STR.WRD CLK.FIX CLK.ROT 
12 ARR.DIR ARR.POS STR.COL STR.WRD 
Participant No. Condition E Condition F Condition G 
 1 CLK.ROT STR.COL STR.WRD 
 3 ARR.DIR ARR.POS GXRX 
 4 STR.WRD ARR.DIR ARR.POS 
 5 CLK.FIX STR.WRD STR.COL 
 6 GXRX CLK.ROT CLK.FIX 
 7 ARR.POS ARR.DIR GXRX 
 8 STR.COL ARR.POS ARR.DIR 
 9 ARR.POS CLK.FIX STR.WRD 
 10 ARR.POS GXRX ARR.DIR 
 11 ARR.DIR ARR.POS GXRX 
 12 GXRX CLK.FIX CLK.ROT 
 Table A2.2: Condition presentation ordering  
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Appendix 2.3: Participant Questionnaire  
1. I was intentionally aware of my thoughts and feelings.  
Agree completely       Disagree completely 
          
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
2. My mind wondered off and I was easily distracted.  
Agree completely       Disagree completely 
          
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
3. I knew the correct answer and made my choice quickly without needing to 
think too much.  
Agree completely       Disagree completely 
          
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
4. I paid attention to the environment around me.  
Agree completely       Disagree completely 
          
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
5. I was completely absorbed in the display/audio; so that all my attention was 
focused on it. 
Agree completely       Disagree completely 
          
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
6.  I found myself watching/listening to the display/audio but thinking of 
something else at the same time. 
Agree completely       Disagree completely 
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Appendix 2.4: Brain Activity, EEG and QEEG  
The structure of the human brain is formed by an estimated 100 billion neurons 
‘connected’ together via synapses (of which it is estimated of 100 quadrillion) to 
form clusters of densely connected areas known as lobes that specialize in differing 
functions e.g. the occipital lobe at the rear of the human brain is considered to be 
vital in visual processing. To form these clusters the neurons are connected in a 
complex mesh that extends to interconnect the differing lobes and form a network 
across (and of) the brain allowing differing specialized lobes/areas communication. 
Neurons can vary in length from less than a millimetre to over a meter (such as the 
motor neurons required to activate leg and foot muscles). Communication between 
neurons is produced by the passing of electrical charge across the body (along the 
axon to the axon terminals) (see figure A.2.1) to ‘connected’ neurons via synapse 
(though considered as connected, synapse do not always physically connect but 
exchange electrical and chemical stimulus). To receive stimulus a neuron will receive 
a charge (from another connected neuron) via its dendrites.  
 
Figure A.2.1: diagram of a typical neuron29. 
 
It should be noted that neural pathways and synapses are able to change from 
                                               
29https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a9/Complete_neuron_cell_diagram_en.svg/1280px-Complete_neuron_cell_diagram_en.svg.png	
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events such as brain injury, environment, changes in behavior, and (of importance to 
the research), from neural processes such as repeated or lack of firing. This process 
is known as “neuroplasticity” and is a “rewiring” of the brain in response to learning, 
memory, and to make processes more efficient (as described in Chapters 1.11 and 
1.12.; Baars, 1993 and 1997; Århem and Liljenström, 1997). Neurons can allow and 
propagate information across connected neurons as ‘excitatory’, and may also 
prevent or slow communication as ‘inhibitory’ depending on stimulus received. 
To prevent a chaotic pattern of communication the neurons of the brain (or 
clusters of neurons) “fire” (neurons discharge electric in communication) in rhythmic 
cycles of varying speeds (measured in Hertz- Hz, as cycles per second). It is 
important to note that EEG cannot detect singular neurons activity however, when 
firing in larger groups an electromagnetic field produced is large enough that it may 
be detected by the placement of electrodes on the scalp. Through measuring the 
amplitude (measured in micro-Volts, µV) of the electrical signal measured, EEG is 
able to give an indication to the amount of ‘information processing’ occurring in 
areas of the brain (e.g. a high amplitude indicating a large group of neurons 
discharging in synchronicity). An example of brainwave patterns and their associated 
mental states can be seen in figure A.2.2  
 
Figure A.2.2, EEG wave patterns in differing states30 
                                               
30	Electroencephalogram.	(n.d.)	Miller-Keane	Encyclopedia	and	Dictionary	of	Medicine,	Nursing,	
and	Allied	Health,	Seventh	Edition.	(2003).	Retrieved	May	17	2017	from	http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/electroencephalogram	
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It should be noted however that EEG does not have an advanced level of 
locational accuracy as the electrodes are placed away from the brain and the 
electromagnetic waves are partially deflected by the skull; however, reliable results 
are still obtained through the use of multiple electrodes (to compare signals) and 
through the mapping of the head known as the 10/20 system (see figure A.2.3) to 
measure and determine areas of interest. EEG does however provide near 
instantaneous readings over time (unlike more detailed recording procedures such 
as fMRI – functional magnetic resonance imaging) and so is a powerful tool in the 
analysis of brain activity when performing tasks – or as here, during specific 
interactions. 
  
Figure A.2.331, 10/20 mapping across the human skull. Letters denote lobes 
Fp F, T, C, P and O relating to frontal polar, frontal, temporal, central 
(though not a lobe C denotes the central position), parietal, and occipital 
lobes, respectively. Even numbers indicate the right hemisphere and odd 
the left, while z indicates the central (zero) midline.  
Quantitative EEG (QEEG) is the transform of “raw” EEG data (as in figure A.2.2) 
into a numerical representation through a Fast Furrier Transform (FFT) to extract the 
frequency and amplitude of neuronal group firing, and allow for easier classification 
and observation of EEG recordings. QEEG measures the frequency (Hz) of 
oscillations (as many frequencies occur simultaneously) to give an indication of the 
speed of information processing e.g. a high brainwave frequency (e.g. >30Hz) 
                                               
31	Adaptation	of:	Klem,	G.	H.,	Lüders,	H.	O.,	Jasper,	H.	H.,	&	Elger,	C.	(1999).	The	ten-twenty	electrode	system	of	the	International	Federation.	Guidelines	of	the	International	Federation	of	
Clinical	Physiology,	52(3),	3-6.	
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indicates fast information processing (e.g. alertness) and lower frequency (e.g. 10Hz) 
indicates a lower workload (e.g. relaxation). Fig. d below provides a pictorial 
representation of this.  
 
 
(figure A.2.432, FFT example. A raw EEG signal is exemplified as in the red 
box, by performing an FFT the frequency bandwidths (ranges in Hz’s) of the 
recording are extracted and can then be represented as in the blue box 
(showing the frequency and its amplitude). This process aids in the 
classification and analysis of brain activity. 
In addition to understandings gained through brainwave frequency analysis, 
QEEG allows for understandings of phase coherence between EEG frequency 
waveforms.  
 
Figure A.2.5: Example of waveforms and phase 
 
A waveform consists of both positive and negative amplitude that occur as an 
oscillation (a single positive (peaks) and negative (troughs) movement of the wave) 
                                               
32	https://groups.csail.mit.edu/netmit/sFFT/algorithm.html	
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(see: figure A.2.5); with the number of oscillations equal to the frequency of the 
wave (e.g. one oscillation per second equalling 1Hz). This is exemplified in figure 
A.2.5, where wave a (black) shows a 1Hz waveform, and c (green) shows a 2Hz 
waveform. Fourier transform is used to calculate frequency information as an angle, 
the waves position in oscillation relative to 0 degrees. Phase coherence is a 
measurement between two oscillations at specific time points as an understanding 
of the difference between them e.g. in figure A.2.5 wave b has zero coherence to 
wave a though both waves present the same amplitude and frequency. That is to 
say, while wave a and wave b in figure A.2.5 hold identical properties outside of 
consideration of their phase (i.e. high correlation), they are opposites in their phase 
(zero coherency). The understanding of phase is particularly import when 
understanding two waveforms as their phase influences their amplitude (increasing 
or reducing); as exemplified in the blue waveform in figure A.2.5 showing the 
interaction between wave a (1Hz) and wave b (2Hz). It has previously been identified 
that EEG phase coherency provides broader understandings of the functional 
connectivity of areas in the brain and indication to cognitive processes and 
hindrance (Marosi et al, 1997; Martin-Loeches et al, 2001; Kislova and Rusalova, 
2009); and that alterations in phase (high and low phase coherency shifts) provide 
insight to the dynamic properties of brain functions (Thatcher, 2012). As previously 
described, within the brain neurons propagate information to connected neurons as 
‘excitatory’, and may also prevent or slow communication as ‘inhibitory’. The 
measurement of phase coherency reveals the synchronized neural oscillations, 
whereby areas of the brain with a high coherency are understood to be facilitating 
information flow (Fries, 2005) and facilitate multiple brain regions to interact in 
events such as sensory awareness (Engel and Singer, 2001), yet can be inhibitory 
(low phase coherence) and prevent activation and communication. Similarly, changes 
to EEG phase coherency have additionally been linked responses to error 
(Cavanagh, Cohen, and Allen, 2009), suggesting a re-ordering of brain processes to 
work in synchrony for re-evaluation of acts and behaviours. 
Thus, through QEEG we are provided three metrics to understand brain activity. 
Firstly, we can understand brain regions activity in relation to their amplitude, 
revealing the degree of activity. Secondly, we can understand brain activity in terms 
of its frequency of activity, providing insight to information processing. Thirdly, we 
can understand brain activity in associative terms (between two or more sites) 
through understanding their phase coherency, revealing communication and 
cooperation between differing areas.  
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Appendix 2.5: Quantitative Questionnaire Data 
As previously described following each condition participants were asked to 
complete a brief questionnaire (See Chapter 2.5.4). Answers were given through a 
six point Likert-type scale (from “Agree completely” to “Disagree completely”), and 
had option to provide comment following each statement. Scoring ranged from 1 
=Agree Completely, to 6 = Disagree Completely. 
Questions: 
G. I was intentionally aware of my thoughts and feelings. Lower scores indicate 
Mindfulness 
H. My mind wondered off and I was easily distracted. Higher scores indicate 
Mindfulness  
I. I knew the correct answer and made my choice quickly without needing to 
think too much. Higher scores indicate Mindfulness  
J. I paid attention to the environment around me. Lower scores indicate 
Mindfulness 
K. I was completely absorbed in the display/audio; so that all my attention was 
focused on it. Higher scores indicate Mindfulness 
L. I found myself watching/listening to the display/audio but thinking of 
something else at the same time. Higher scores indicate Mindfulness 
Condition 1 (Green X O - Red X O) 
 
Figure A.2.6: GXRX quanatative questionaire feedback results 
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Condition 2 and 3 (Stroop (Word) and Reversed Stroop (Colour)) 
As the two linguistic Stroop tests were conducted in a mixed order across 
participants these are presented in the ‘First’ Stoop presented and ‘Second’ Stroop 
presented.  
 
Figure A.2.7: Linguistic Stroop 1 quanatative questionaire feedback results 
 
Figure A.2.8: Linguistic Stroop 2 quanatative questionaire feedback results 
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Condition 4 and 5 (Stroop Arrow (Direction) and Reversed Stroop Arrow 
(Position)) 
As with the linguistic based Stroop, the two symbolic based Stroop tests were 
conducted in a mixed order across participants these are presented in the ‘First’ 
Stoop presented and ‘Second’ Stroop presented. 
 
 
Figure A.2.9: Spatial Stroop 1 quanatative questionaire feedback results 
 
Figure A.2.10: Spatial Stroop 2 quanatative questionaire feedback results 
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Condition 6 & 7 (Fixed Clock Face and Rotating Clock Face): 
 
Figure A.2.11: Clock Face Fixed quanatative questionaire feedback results 
 
Figure A.2.12: Clock Face Rotate quanatative questionaire feedback results 
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